Armas vs. Calisterio

A marriage contracted under the Civil Code by a spouse whose prior spouse had been absent for more than seven consecutive years without news of being alive is valid until declared null and void by a competent court, even without a prior judicial declaration of presumptive death; the burden of proving its invalidity rests on the party challenging the second marriage.

Teodorico Calisterio died intestate on 24 April 1992, leaving an estate valued at approximately P604,750.00. He was survived by his wife, Marietta. Marietta had previously been married to James William Bounds in 1946; Bounds disappeared without a trace on 11 February 1947. In 1958, without having obtained a judicial declaration of presumptive death of Bounds, Marietta married Teodorico. After Teodorico’s death, his sister Antonia Armas petitioned for administration of his estate and sought to be declared sole heir, asserting that the marriage between Teodorico and Marietta was bigamous and void. Marietta opposed, claiming that the prolonged absence of Bounds dissolved the first marriage and that she was the legitimate surviving spouse. The controversy turned on the validity of the second marriage under the law in force at its celebration.

• The Prior Marriage: Marietta Calisterio married James William Bounds on 13 January 1946 in Caloocan City. Bounds disappeared without a trace on 11 February 1947, and his whereabouts remained unknown for over eleven years before Marietta contracted a second marriage.

• The Second Marriage: On 8 May 1958, Marietta married Teodorico Calisterio. She did not first obtain a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James Bounds.

• Death of Teodorico: Teodorico died intestate on 24 April 1992, leaving several parcels of land with an estimated value of P604,750.00. He was survived by Marietta and his sister, Antonia Armas.

• Petition for Intestate Administration: On 9 October 1992, Antonia filed a petition with the RTC of Quezon City, alleging that the marriage between Teodorico and Marietta was bigamous and thus void. She prayed to be declared sole heir and for the appointment of her son, Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., as administrator without bond.

• Opposition: Marietta opposed the petition, asserting that her first marriage had been dissolved by James Bounds’ prolonged absence and that she was the surviving spouse entitled to priority in the administration and inheritance of Teodorico’s estate.

• Trial Court Ruling: The RTC ruled in favor of Antonia, declaring her the sole heir on the ground that Marietta’s failure to secure a decree of presumptive death rendered the marriage bigamous.

• Appellate Court Ruling: The Court of Appeals reversed. It held that under Article 83 of the Civil Code, the marriage was valid until declared null and void, no judicial declaration of presumptive death having been required. It classified the house and lot at No. 32 Batangas Street, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, as conjugal property, awarded one-half of Teodorico’s net estate to Marietta as compulsory heir, and the other half to Antonia and her children.

• Invalidity of the Marriage: Petitioner argued that the marriage between Marietta and Teodorico was bigamous and void ab initio because Marietta lacked a judicial declaration of presumptive death of her first husband before contracting the subsequent marriage, a requirement she contended should apply either directly or retroactively under the Family Code.

• Successional Rights: Petitioner maintained that, as the sole surviving sibling, she was the exclusive heir of her brother Teodorico, and that Marietta, being a party to a void marriage, possessed no successional rights to the estate.

• Validity of the Second Marriage under the Civil Code: Respondent countered that the marriage was celebrated in 1958, during the effectivity of the Civil Code, and that Article 83 thereof governed. She argued that because her first husband had been absent for more than seven consecutive years without news of his being alive, the subsequent marriage was valid until declared null and void by a competent court; no prior judicial declaration of presumptive death was required.

• Vested Rights and Retroactivity: Respondent contended that the trial court erred in applying the Family Code, as its retroactive effect under Article 256 cannot impair vested rights acquired under the Civil Code. The marriage’s validity, having been established under the old law, could not be nullified by the later statutory requirement of a summary proceeding for presumptive death.

• Status as Surviving Spouse: Respondent asserted that she was the legal surviving spouse of Teodorico, entitled to priority as administratrix, to her share of the conjugal partnership property, and to her legitime under intestate succession.

• Validity of the Second Marriage: Whether the marriage between Teodorico Calisterio and Marietta Calisterio, contracted in 1958 without a prior judicial declaration of presumptive death of her first husband who had been absent for more than seven years, is valid under the applicable law.

• Successional Rights: Whether the Court of Appeals correctly determined the successional rights of the parties, particularly in granting a share of the decedent’s net estate to the children of petitioner Antonia Armas alongside her.

• Validity of the Second Marriage: The second marriage was upheld as valid. The marriage was solemnized on 8 May 1958, when the Civil Code was the governing law; the Family Code, effective from 3 August 1988, could not retroactively impair vested rights. Under Article 83 of the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is void ab initio unless the first marriage was annulled or dissolved, or the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee was generally considered dead and believed to be so. In these exceptional cases, the marriage is deemed valid “until declared null and void by a competent court.” A judicial declaration of absence is not necessary as long as the prescribed period of absence is met. The burden of proof rests on the party assailing the second marriage. Here, it was undisputed that James Bounds had been absent for over eleven years before Marietta contracted the second marriage, and no evidence of bad faith on her part was adduced. Accordingly, Marietta was properly recognized as the surviving spouse.

• Successional Rights: The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta pertained to them in common and, upon dissolution of the marriage, was to be divided equally: one half to the surviving spouse and the other half to the estate of the decedent. From the decedent’s net estate, the surviving spouse concurring with legitimate brothers and sisters (or nephews and nieces by right of representation) is entitled to one half, while the siblings take the remaining half. Nephews and nieces, however, can only succeed by right of representation when their parent (a sibling of the decedent) predeceased or is incapacitated to succeed; they cannot inherit in their own right alongside a living sibling who asserts her own hereditary share. The Court of Appeals therefore erred in awarding a portion of the other half to Antonia’s children; that one-half share of the net estate pertains exclusively to Antonia Armas, the decedent’s sister.

• Validity of a Subsequent Marriage under Article 83 of the Civil Code — A marriage contracted during the subsistence of a prior marriage is void ab initio unless the first marriage was annulled or dissolved, or the prior spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years without news of being alive (or was generally considered dead and believed to be so, or presumed dead under Articles 390 and 391). In these exceptional cases, the subsequent marriage is valid until declared null and void by a competent court. No prior judicial declaration of presumptive death is necessary; the prescribed period of absence suffices. The burden of proving invalidity lies on the party challenging the second marriage. The spouse present must have acted in good faith — bad faith imports a dishonest purpose, moral obliquity, or conscious wrongdoing. (Applied to sustain the 1958 marriage.)

• Retroactivity of the Family Code and Vested Rights — The Family Code has retroactive effect only insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights under the Civil Code or other laws. A marriage validly contracted under the Civil Code’s exceptions cannot be invalidated by the subsequent requirement under the Family Code for a judicial declaration of presumptive death and a well-founded belief of death. (Used to reject the application of Articles 40 and 41 of the Family Code.)

• Intestate Succession of a Surviving Spouse Concurring with Siblings — Upon the death of a spouse, the conjugal property is divided into two equal parts: one half to the surviving spouse, the other half to the decedent’s estate. The surviving spouse is entitled to one half of the net estate, with the other half going to the legitimate brothers and sisters (or their children by right of representation). Nephews and nieces inherit only by representation when their parent (a sibling of the decedent) predeceased or is incapacitated; they cannot succeed in their own right together with a living sibling who claims a direct share. (Applied to correct the CA’s award, excluding Antonia’s children from sharing in the other half while she was alive.)

• “Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved. Paragraph (2) of the law gives exceptions from the above rule. For the subsequent marriage referred to in the three exceptional cases therein provided, to be held valid, the spouse present (not the absentee spouse) so contracting the later marriage must have done so in good faith.”

• “A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid ‘until declared null and void by a competent court.’ It follows that the burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the party assailing the second marriage.”

• “In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death …; (b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee ….”

• Jones vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179 — Followed as authority for the rule that a judicial declaration of the absentee’s absence is not required under Article 83 of the Civil Code as long as the period of absence is met.

• Lapuz Sy vs. Eufemio, 43 SCRA 177 — Cited for the proposition that the good faith or bad faith of the other party to the subsequent marriage is not material; what matters is the good faith of the spouse present who contracts the later marriage.

• Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 557 — Relied on for the definition of bad faith as importing a dishonest purpose, moral obliquity, and conscious wrongdoing.

• Article 83, New Civil Code — Applied as the governing provision for the 1958 marriage; the marriage fell within the exceptional case where the first spouse had been absent for more than seven consecutive years without news, rendering the subsequent marriage valid until declared null and void without need of a prior judicial declaration of presumptive death.

• Article 256, Family Code — Cited to limit retroactive application of the Family Code; its requirement of a judicial declaration of presumptive death could not impair the vested right to the validity of a marriage already perfected under the Civil Code.

• Article 41, Family Code — Distinguished as imposing a new condition (judicial declaration of presumptive death and well-founded belief) not found in Article 83 of the Civil Code, and thus inapplicable to the marriage contracted in 1958.

• Article 40, Family Code — Mentioned in relation to the requirement of judicial intervention for remarriage after a void marriage under the Family Code, reinforcing the distinction from the old law.

• Articles 390 and 391, Civil Code — Referenced as bases for the presumption of death within the exceptions of Article 83; their mention highlights the alternative grounds for treating a spouse as presumptively dead.

• Intestate succession provisions of the Civil Code (applied but not cited by number) — Governed the distribution of the net estate: the surviving spouse receives one-half, and the siblings receive the other half; nephews and nieces may inherit only by right of representation if their parent predeceased or is incapacitated.

Melo, Panganiban, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concurred.