Ark Travel Express, Inc. vs. The Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 150

A trial court confronted with a motion to withdraw an Information grounded on a resolution of the Secretary of the Department of Justice finding lack of probable cause must make an independent assessment of the merits of the motion and embody that assessment in its order; it may not deny the motion by mere reliance on the DOJ's ruling or on the Crespo doctrine alone. Where the falsity of the testimony charged as false testimony in a civil case is determinative of the accused's guilt, the pending civil case presents a prejudicial question under Section 7, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the criminal proceedings must be suspended.

Ark Travel Express, Inc. was the plaintiff in a civil action for collection of sum of money, torts and damages against New Filipino Maritime Agencies, Inc. and Angelina T. Rivera, while Violeta Baguio and Lorelei Ira were witnesses presented by the defendant corporation, Baguio being its cashier. The dispute implicated Article 182 of the Revised Penal Code, which punishes the giving of false testimony upon a material fact in a civil case, and the authority of the Department of Justice to review the resolutions of the City Prosecutor on the existence of probable cause.

Ark Travel Express, Inc. filed a complaint for collection of sum of money, torts and damages against New Filipino Maritime Agencies, Inc. (NFMA) and Angelina T. Rivera before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 137, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-1542. In that civil case, Violeta Baguio and Lorelei Ira were presented by NFMA as its witnesses; Baguio held the position of cashier. They executed their respective sworn statements and testified before the trial court that NFMA had no outstanding obligation to Ark Travel because the claims had been paid in full.

On February 19, 1996, during the trial of the civil case, the two witnesses gave the testimony that later became the subject of the criminal charge. Ark Travel then filed with the City Prosecutor of Makati a criminal complaint for False Testimony in a Civil Case under Article 182 of the Revised Penal Code against Baguio and Ira. In a resolution dated November 20, 1996, the City Prosecutor found probable cause and filed the corresponding Informations against each of them before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 200894 and 200895. The Informations alleged that on or about February 19, 1996, in Makati, the accused willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously gave false testimony upon a material fact in Civil Case No. 95-1542, where one of the principal issues was whether payment of Ark Travel's claim had been made by NFMA, and that while testifying for NFMA the accused stated that the claims of Ark Travel supported by statements of accounts were baseless and/or had been paid, which they knew to be false by reason of their position as cashier.

Private respondents filed a petition for review of the City Prosecutor's resolution with the Department of Justice. In a resolution dated March 9, 1998, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito P. Zuño reversed the City Prosecutor's resolution, and the prosecution office of Makati thereafter filed with the MTC a Motion to Withdraw Information. On May 15, 1998, Ark Travel filed an "Urgent Petition for Automatic Review" with the DOJ. In a letter dated May 27, 1998, Secretary Silvestre H. Bello III resolved to treat the urgent petition as a motion for reconsideration, reversed the March 9, 1998 resolution, and directed the City Prosecutor to proceed with the prosecution of the two criminal cases. For this reason, the MTC issued an Order dated June 10, 1998 denying the Motion to Withdraw Information and setting the cases for arraignment on July 30, 1998.

Private respondents then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the May 27, 1998 resolution of Secretary Bello III, alleging that the March 9, 1998 resolution finding no probable cause had become final and executory because the Urgent Petition for Automatic Review was filed beyond the 10-day reglementary period, and that the May 27, 1998 resolution did not reverse the finding that they did not act with malice or criminal intent. DOJ Undersecretary Jesus A. Zozobrado, Jr., signing "For the Secretary", granted the motion in a resolution dated June 26, 1998, reconsidered and set aside the May 27, 1998 resolution, reinstated the March 9, 1998 resolution, and directed the withdrawal of the Informations. Consequently, private respondents filed with the MTC a Motion for Reconsideration of its June 10, 1998 Order. The MTC denied the motion in an Order dated July 21, 1998, ruling that under the Crespo doctrine the disposition of a case after an Information is filed rests in the sound discretion of the court, and that the allegations of the Information sufficiently made out the offense charged.

Private respondents questioned the MTC Orders dated June 10, 1998 and July 21, 1998 via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the respondent RTC of Makati. The RTC issued the assailed Order dated October 2, 1998, granting the petition and setting aside the questioned orders, holding that the MTC should have made its own study and evaluation of the motion rather than relying on the awaited action of the Secretary, and that the MTC may have acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion based solely on its bare reliance on the Crespo doctrine. The RTC accordingly considered the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 200894 and 200895 as withdrawn. The RTC denied Ark Travel's motion for reconsideration in its Order dated November 23, 1998. The RTC found that the MTC had not conducted any independent evaluation before issuing its two questioned orders.

• Crespo Doctrine and Discretion of the Court: Ark Travel argued that the ruling of the RTC contravened the doctrine laid down in Crespo vs. Mogul, which enunciated that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case — such as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused — rests in the sound discretion of the court.
• Non-Enjoinment of Criminal Prosecutions: Ark Travel insisted that criminal prosecutions cannot be enjoined.
• Propriety of Certiorari: Ark Travel argued that the petition for certiorari, and not appeal, is the proper remedy because what is being questioned is not the correctness of the subject Orders but the jurisdiction of the RTC in considering the criminal cases as withdrawn when said cases are not pending with it but with the MTC.
• Inadequacy of Appeal: Ark Travel maintained that appeal is not a speedy and/or adequate remedy.
• Hierarchy of Courts: Ark Travel argued that the petition does not violate the principle of hierarchy of courts because it presents a question of law.

• Wrong Remedy: Private respondents countered that appeal, and not certiorari under Rule 65, is the appropriate remedy.
• Late Filing: Private respondents argued that even if the petition is treated as an appeal, its filing way beyond the 15-day reglementary period renders it outrightly dismissable; and that, assuming certiorari is the correct remedy, the petition should still be denied for having been filed beyond the 60-day reglementary period provided by Rule 65.
• Finality of the RTC Orders: Private respondents argued that the RTC's Orders have become final and executory and consequently may no longer be disturbed.
• Hierarchy of Courts: Private respondents argued that the filing of the petition with the Supreme Court is grossly violative of the principle of hierarchy of courts.
• Validity of the DOJ Ruling: Private respondents argued that there is no ground to reverse the RTC's Orders because the petition does not rebut the validity of the ruling of the DOJ that there is no probable cause to charge them with the crime of false testimony.

• Propriety of Certiorari as Remedy: Whether certiorari under Rule 65, rather than appeal, is the proper remedy to assail the RTC's orders.
• Timeliness of the Petition: Whether the petition was filed within the reglementary period.
• Hierarchy of Courts: Whether direct resort to the Supreme Court violates the principle of hierarchy of courts.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion by the MTC: Whether the MTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the Motion to Withdraw Informations without making an independent assessment of probable cause.
• Jurisdiction of the RTC: Whether the RTC acted in excess of or beyond its jurisdiction in considering the criminal cases as withdrawn.
• Prejudicial Question: Whether the pendency of the civil case constitutes a prejudicial question requiring suspension of the criminal proceedings.

• Propriety of Certiorari as Remedy: Yes. The issue concerns the jurisdiction of the RTC in ordering the dismissal of cases pending before the MTC, and all three recognized exceptions to the interlocutory-order rule are present.
• Timeliness of the Petition: Yes. Under Section 4, Rule 65 as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-03, the 60-day period is counted from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration, and procedural laws are retroactive.
• Hierarchy of Courts: No violation. The Court has full discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition filed directly with it for compelling reasons or when warranted by the nature of the issues raised.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion by the MTC: Yes. The MTC denied the Motion to Withdraw Informations without making an independent assessment of probable cause, relying solely on the DOJ ruling and the Crespo doctrine.
• Jurisdiction of the RTC: Yes. The RTC exceeded its jurisdiction in considering the criminal cases as withdrawn, since they were pending before the MTC, and it failed to make the very assessment it required of the MTC.
• Prejudicial Question: Yes. The falsity of the testimony is determinative of guilt, so the pending civil case constitutes a prejudicial question warranting suspension of the criminal proceedings.

• Propriety of Certiorari as Remedy: The general rule is that the denial of a motion to withdraw an Information, like a motion to dismiss a complaint, is an interlocutory order and cannot be the proper subject of an appeal or certiorari until a final judgment on the merits is rendered. Recourse to certiorari or mandamus is nonetheless appropriate (a) when the trial court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction; (b) where there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the trial court; or (c) where appeal would not prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy, as when an appeal would not promptly relieve a defendant from the injurious effects of a patently mistaken order. All three situations were present, and the issue raised concerned the jurisdiction of the RTC, so certiorari was the proper remedy.

• Timeliness of the Petition: The assailed Order dated October 2, 1998 was received by Ark Travel on October 16, 1998; the Motion for Reconsideration was filed fourteen days later, on October 30, 1998; and on November 27, 1998 Ark Travel received the Order denying the motion. Under the then-prevailing Rule 65, the petition should have been filed on the forty-sixth day from November 27, 1998, or on January 12, 1999, but it was filed on January 26, 1999. However, during the pendency of the petition, the Court promulgated A.M. No. 00-2-03, amending Section 4, Rule 65 effective September 1, 2000, so that in case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, the 60-day period is counted from notice of the denial of said motion. Under the amended rule, the filing on January 26, 1999 was the 60th day from November 27, 1998. Because statutes regulating the procedure of the courts are construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, procedural laws are retroactive in that sense, and the petition was considered timely filed.

• Hierarchy of Courts: The case presented a clear exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts. The Court has full discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition filed directly with it for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised. Since the case commenced in the MTC in 1996 and still pended, the Court set aside the principle for this particular case in the interest of speedy justice.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion by the MTC: When confronted with a motion to withdraw an Information on the ground of lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the Secretary of the Department of Justice, the bounden duty of the trial court is to make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion. Having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not bound by such resolution but is required to evaluate it before proceeding further with the trial, and should embody such assessment in the order disposing of the motion. The MTC Order dated June 10, 1998 showed that the Motion to Withdraw Informations was denied solely on the basis of the DOJ ruling that probable cause existed, while the July 21, 1998 Order denied reconsideration on the basis of the Crespo doctrine and the allegations of the Informations. The MTC should have made an independent evaluation and embodied its assessment in at least one of its assailed orders, especially since the DOJ had issued contradicting rulings on probable cause. On this point, the RTC correctly found that the MTC committed grave abuse of discretion.

• Jurisdiction of the RTC: The RTC, acting on the petition for certiorari before it, not only committed grave abuse of discretion but acted in excess of or beyond its jurisdiction in considering the criminal cases pending in the MTC as withdrawn, which in effect caused the dismissal of the two criminal cases. First, the subject cases were not within the jurisdiction of the RTC to dismiss; the only issue brought to it was whether the MTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to withdraw without making an independent evaluation of probable cause. Second, while ruling that the MTC should have made an independent assessment of the merits of the Motion to Withdraw Informations, the RTC itself omitted to do the very thing it prescribed, unceremoniously considering the criminal cases as withdrawn without evaluation or determination of probable cause. The RTC should have only nullified the subject MTC Order and remanded the case to the MTC for its determination of the existence of probable cause pursuant to the Crespo and Ledesma cases.

• Prejudicial Question: To constitute the crime of False Testimony in a Civil Case under Article 182 of the Revised Penal Code, the following requisites must concur: (1) the testimony must be given in a civil case; (2) the testimony must relate to the issues presented in the case; (3) the testimony is false; (4) the false testimony must be given by the defendant knowing the same to be false; and (5) such testimony must be malicious and given with intent to affect the issues presented in the case. There was no doubt that the first two requisites were extant, since Ark Travel filed the collection complaint against NFMA and Rivera and private respondents were presented as witnesses who testified that NFMA had no outstanding obligation because the claims had been paid in full. The existence of the last three requisites was quite dubious, because the falsity of the testimonies was yet to be established; at the time of the filing of the criminal complaints, the civil case was still pending decision, and Ark Travel had yet to prove the validity of its monetary claims and damages. Only after trial could the RTC assess the veracity or falsity of the testimony. The civil case was thus so intimately connected with the subject crime that it was determinative of the guilt or innocence of the respondents, and whether the testimonies were false was a prejudicial question. The elements of a prejudicial question under Section 7, Rule 111 were present: the previously instituted civil action involved an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and the resolution of such issue determined whether the criminal action may proceed. Pending determination of the falsity of the testimonies, the criminal action for false testimony must perforce be suspended; although no motion to suspend was filed, the orderly administration of justice dictated that the criminal cases should be suspended.

• Independent Assessment of a Motion to Withdraw Information — When a motion to withdraw an Information is grounded on a resolution of the Secretary of the Department of Justice finding lack of probable cause, the trial court, having acquired jurisdiction over the case, is not bound by such resolution but is required to evaluate it independently before proceeding further with the trial, and must embody that assessment in the order disposing of the motion. The Court applied this doctrine against the MTC, which denied the Motion to Withdraw Informations solely on the basis of the DOJ ruling and the Crespo doctrine without any independent evaluation, especially where the DOJ had issued contradicting rulings on probable cause.

• Interlocutory Order Rule and Its Exceptions — The denial of a motion to withdraw an Information, like a motion to dismiss a complaint, is an interlocutory order and therefore cannot be the proper subject of an appeal or certiorari until a final judgment on the merits is rendered. Recourse to certiorari or mandamus is nonetheless appropriate (a) when the trial court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction; (b) where there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the trial court; or (c) where appeal would not prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy, as when an appeal would not promptly relieve a defendant from the injurious effects of a patently mistaken order maintaining a baseless action and compelling the defendant needlessly to go through a protracted trial. All three situations were present, making certiorari the proper remedy.

• Prejudicial Question — Under Section 7, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The Court applied the doctrine because the falsity of the private respondents' testimony — the very issue pending in the civil case — was determinative of their guilt or innocence in the criminal action for false testimony, warranting suspension of the criminal proceedings under Section 6, Rule 111.

• Retroactivity of Procedural Laws — Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts are construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage; procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The Court applied A.M. No. 00-2-03, which amended Section 4, Rule 65 to count the 60-day period from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration, to the petition pending at the time of its passage, thereby treating the petition as timely filed.

• Hierarchy of Courts — The principle requires respect for the hierarchy of courts, but the Court has full discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition filed directly with it for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised. The Court set aside the principle in this case in the interest of speedy justice, since the case commenced in the MTC in 1996 and still pended.

• "It is settled that when confronted with a motion to withdraw an Information on the ground of lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the Secretary of the Department of Justice, the bounden duty of the trial court is to make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the MTC's grave abuse of discretion and is the canonical formulation of the trial court's duty when a withdrawal motion rests on a DOJ resolution.

• "The RTC should have only nullified the subject MTC Order and remanded the case to the MTC for its determination of the existence of probable cause pursuant to the aforementioned Crespo and Ledesma cases." — This passage defines the proper scope of the RTC's certiorari jurisdiction and explains why the RTC acted in excess of jurisdiction in ordering the criminal cases withdrawn.

• "To constitute the crime of False Testimony in a Civil Case under Article 182 of the Revised Penal Code, the following requisites must concur: 1. the testimony must be given in a civil case; 2. the testimony must relate to the issues presented in the case; 3. the testimony is false; 4. the false testimony must be given by the defendant knowing the same to be false; and 5. such testimony must be malicious and given with and intent to affect the issues presented in the case." — This passage enumerates the elements of the offense and is the analytical framework the Court used to conclude that the falsity of the testimony was yet to be established.

• "Thus, the civil case is so intimately connected with the subject crime that it is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the respondents in the criminal cases. In other words, whether or not the testimonies of private respondents in the civil cases are false is a prejudicial question." — This passage articulates the prejudicial-question ruling that justified suspending the criminal proceedings.

• Crespo vs. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462, 471 (1987) — Cited for the doctrine that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case such as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the court; the Court clarified that this doctrine does not relieve the trial court of its duty to make an independent assessment of a motion to withdraw grounded on a DOJ resolution.
• Ledesma vs. CA, 278 SCRA 656, 665 (1997) — Cited for the rule that the trial court must make an independent assessment of the merits of a motion to withdraw an Information and must embody such assessment in the order disposing of the motion.
• Emergency Loan Pawnshop Incorporated vs. Court of Appeals, 353 SCRA 89, 92-93 (2001) — Cited for the exceptions to the interlocutory-order rule permitting recourse to certiorari or mandamus.
• Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 277 SCRA 518 (1997) — Cited for the general rule that the denial of a motion to withdraw an Information is an interlocutory order not subject to appeal or certiorari until final judgment.
• U.S. vs. Isidoro Aragon, 5 Phil. 469, 476 (1905) — Cited for the requisites of the crime of false testimony.
• Unity Fishing Development Corporation vs. CA, 351 SCRA 140, 143 (2001) — Cited for the retroactivity of procedural laws.
• PCGG vs. Desierto, 349 SCRA 767, 772 (2001) — Cited for the same rule on the retroactive application of procedural rules.
• Fortich vs. Corona, 289 SCRA 624, 645 (1998) — Cited for the Court's discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition filed directly with it for compelling reasons.
• Eugenio vs. Drilon, 252 SCRA 106, 110 (1996) — Cited for the exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts.

• Article 182, Revised Penal Code — Defines and punishes false testimony in a civil case; the Court enumerated its five requisites and found the first two extant while the last three remained dubious because the falsity of the testimony had not yet been established.
• Section 7, Rule 111, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Provides the elements of a prejudicial question: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The Court found both elements present.
• Section 6, Rule 111, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Governs suspension by reason of a prejudicial question, allowing a petition for suspension to be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation, and, when the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests. The Court relied on it to direct suspension of the criminal proceedings.
• Section 4, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-03 — Fixes the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari, counted from notice of the denial of a timely motion for reconsideration or new trial; applied retroactively to render the petition timely.

Bellosillo (Chairman), Quisumbing, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.