Arimao vs. Taher

A promotional appointment disapproved with finality invalidates dependent appointments in the same chain of promotions and automatically reverts the incumbents, but a reverted employee subsequently declared absent without leave and dropped from the rolls loses any right to reinstatement by executive directive, while the invalidated successor remains only a de facto officer who must vacate. The 4 August 2000 memorandum was thus issued with grave abuse of discretion and was properly enjoined.

Petitioner and respondent were both public school personnel under the Department of Education, Culture and Sports in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, holding the positions of Director II and Education Supervisor II in a promotional chain where respondent succeeded petitioner. Executive power in the ARMM is vested by Republic Act No. 6734 in the Regional Governor with control over regional offices, while appointments and personnel actions in the civil service are governed by Executive Order No. 292 and subject to Civil Service Commission approval. The Education Supervisor II position was later devolved from DECS-ARMM to TESDA-ARMM.

On 22 March 1995 petitioner was appointed Director II, Bureau of Non-formal Education, DECS-ARMM, and on 17 July 1995 respondent was appointed Education Supervisor II, the post petitioner formerly held. A certain Alibai T. Benito protested petitioner's appointment for lack of evaluation by the personnel selection board, and the CSC-Field Office, Cotabato City disapproved petitioner's appointment for failure to meet the experience requirement. By Resolution No. 96-3101 dated 02 May 1996, the CSC affirmed and ordered petitioner reverted to Education Supervisor II. Reconsideration was denied, and the Court of Appeals denied due course to her petition for review on 10 June 1998, with finality entered on 17 October 1998.

In the interim, petitioner in her capacity as Education Supervisor II was granted a one-year academic scholarship with pay effective 30 October 1996. The Education Supervisor II position occupied by respondent was devolved from DECS-ARMM to TESDA-ARMM. On 2 December 1998 petitioner informed the CSC Regional Office that TESDA-ARMM allowed her to report for duty but both she and respondent were reporting to the same position, prompting a 10 December 1998 directive enjoining respondent from reporting, which respondent disregarded. Unaware of petitioner's study leave, respondent complained of petitioner's prolonged absence, and on 24 December 1998 the ARMM Executive Secretary, by authority of the Regional Governor, declared petitioner absent without leave for failure to report for at least a year after expiration of study leave and ordered her dropped from the payroll. Petitioner's appeal was denied in Resolution No. 001-99 dated 17 March 1999, which found failure to report from 30 October 1996 through the first semester of school year 1997-1998 and unauthorized enrollment in the second semester in violation of Republic Act No. 4670 guidelines, while noting dropping from the rolls is non-disciplinary and does not bar future appointment at the appointing authority's discretion.

Thereafter conflicting executive issuances followed. On 20 July 2000 Acting Regional Governor Datu Guimid P. Matalam ordered petitioner to reassume Education Supervisor II and revoked the 24 December 1998 resolution, but on 1 August 2000 the same officer directed implementation of the 17 March 1999 resolution and maintenance of the status quo for respondent as permanent Education Supervisor II, superseding inconsistent orders. On 4 August 2000 Regional Governor Nur P. Misuari issued a memorandum to TESDA-ARMM directing reinstatement of petitioner to Education Supervisor II pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 96-3101 and CSC-ARMM directive of 26 July 2000. Respondent filed prohibition in the RTC, which enjoined the memorandum on the ground that the relied-upon CSC resolutions had been superseded by the AWOL and dropping orders, a matter within CSC exclusive jurisdiction. Meanwhile the CSC issued Resolution No. 01-0132 on 15 January 2001 ordering implementation of Resolution No. 96-3101, then Resolution No. 020743 on 22 May 2002 declaring TESDA-ARMM under no legal obligation to reinstate petitioner because she had already been separated effective 24 December 1998 and had concealed that fact when obtaining the earlier order. The trial court found the AWOL order final and the 4 August 2000 memorandum unenforceable.

• Prohibition and Primary Jurisdiction: Petitioner argued that prohibition did not lie to enjoin the ARMM Governor's directive implementing a CSC reinstatement resolution, and that the trial court gravely erred in taking cognizance thereof in disregard of primary jurisdiction since personnel actions are within CSC exclusive jurisdiction.
• Automatic Reversion: Petitioner maintained that disapproval of her appointment invalidated respondent's appointment to Education Supervisor II, so that both were automatically restored to former positions by operation of law.
• Revocation of AWOL Order: Petitioner contended that the 24 December 1998 AWOL order had been revoked on 20 July 2000 by Acting Regional Governor Matalam.
• Uncertainty of AWOL Finding: Petitioner argued that it was unknown from which position she was declared AWOL, since she was ordered to revert to Education Supervisor II already occupied by respondent who refused to yield, while she was also prevented from functioning as Director II.

• Finality of AWOL Order: Respondent countered that no appeal having been taken from the AWOL and dropping order, it became final and executory and could not be revoked by mere memorandum.
• Purely Legal Question: Respondent argued that primary jurisdiction did not apply because the case raised a purely legal question — the propriety of assuming a former position despite AWOL status and dropping from the rolls — well within judicial competence.
• Urgency and Futility: Respondent maintained that recourse through the same officials who issued the conflicting memoranda would be futile given the urgency and immediacy of threatened removal after more than five years in office, with no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy.

• Reinstatement by Executive Directive: Whether a writ of prohibition lies to enjoin the directive of the ARMM Governor to reinstate petitioner to Education Supervisor II despite petitioner's having been declared on AWOL and dropped from the roll.
• Cognizance and Primary Jurisdiction: Whether the trial court erred in taking cognizance of the petition for prohibition and whether filing thereof violated the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
• Effect of AWOL Order on Occupancy: Whether the AWOL order against petitioner validated respondent's occupancy of the position of Education Supervisor II.
• Entitlement to Position: Whether petitioner or respondent is entitled to the position of Education Supervisor II.

• Reinstatement by Executive Directive: Yes. Prohibition properly enjoined the 04 August 2000 memorandum, the ARMM Governor having acted with grave abuse of discretion by ordering reinstatement on an outdated CSC resolution despite final AWOL and separation.
• Cognizance and Primary Jurisdiction: No. Cognizance was proper, the validity of the Governor's memorandum being a purely legal question within judicial competence and an exception to primary jurisdiction and exhaustion.
• Effect of AWOL Order on Occupancy: No. The AWOL order did not validate respondent's occupancy, her appointment having already been invalidated as a dependent promotion upon final disapproval of petitioner's promotion.
• Entitlement to Position: Neither is entitled. Petitioner lost the right through final dropping from the rolls, and respondent, a mere de facto officer after 17 October 1998 without reappointment, cannot continue unauthorized occupancy.

• Reinstatement by Executive Directive: The memorandum expressly relied on CSC Resolution No. 96-3101 and the 26 July 2000 CSC-ARMM directive, but those directives were rendered functus officio by CSC Resolution No. 020743 holding TESDA-ARMM under no obligation to reinstate because separation was effective 24 December 1998. Resolution No. 01-0132 was issued only because concealment of the AWOL and dropping misled the Commission, and was effectively revoked. With finality of the AWOL order, the right to Education Supervisor II was legally lost, petitioner having already received salaries for October 1996 to 1997 while the post was still with DECS-ARMM. The 20 July 2000 revocation of the AWOL order was itself recalled by the 01 August memorandum, leaving the 24 December 1998 order in full force on 04 August 2000.
• Cognizance and Primary Jurisdiction: Prohibition requires direction against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising judicial or ministerial functions, action without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and absence of other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Although the Governor acted under control and supervision powers under Republic Act No. 6734, reliance on a superseded reinstatement order despite separation constituted grave abuse amounting to excess of jurisdiction. Primary jurisdiction, which initially lodges controversies with an administrative body of special competence, admits an exception for purely legal questions within court competence, likewise excusing exhaustion of administrative remedies, especially where resort to the same office that issued conflicting directives would be self-defeating and cause delay.
• Effect of AWOL Order on Occupancy: Under Section 13, Rule 6 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, disapproval of a higher promotion invalidates lower promotions in the chain and automatically restores affected persons, with pay only for services actually rendered at promotional rates. Under Section 19, a contested appointment takes effect immediately but becomes ineffective if the protest is finally resolved against the protestee, who is reverted. Respondent's permanent appointment bore the annotation making it subject to the outcome of Benito's protest against petitioner, so final denial on 17 October 1998 invalidated respondent's appointment as a chain reaction dependent on petitioner's promotion.
• Entitlement to Position: As of 17 October 1998 both were reverted: petitioner should have reassumed Education Supervisor II until dropped in 1999, and respondent should have returned to her former post. Respondent's tenure as Education Supervisor II therefore ended on reversion, reducing subsequent occupancy to de facto status — possession under color of authority without legal right, authority resting on reputation rather than right. A rightful incumbent may recover salaries from a de facto officer who takes them at risk, but where no de jure officer exists a good-faith de facto officer who discharged duties is legally entitled to emoluments. Respondent thus may retain salaries for actual service, it being iniquitous to deny compensation, yet absent reappointment after petitioner was dropped she cannot continue occupancy of the position vacant since 1999.

• Prohibition — requisites — Prohibition lies to prevent encroachment, excess, usurpation or assumption of jurisdiction, to ensure orderly administration of justice, prevent oppressive use of legal process, or stop multiplicity of actions. Requisites are (a) direction against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising judicial or ministerial functions; (b) action without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) no appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Applied to enjoin the ARMM Governor's reinstatement memorandum issued with grave abuse of discretion.
• Primary jurisdiction — purely legal question exception — Courts may not arrogate authority initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence, except when the issue is a purely legal question within judicial competence and not requiring administrative expertise. Applied to sustain judicial resolution of whether the Governor's memorandum exceeded jurisdiction, likewise excusing exhaustion of administrative remedies where resort to the issuing office would be futile and delaying.
• Chain of promotions — Section 13, Rule 6, Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V, Executive Order No. 292 — All appointments in a chain of promotions must be submitted simultaneously; disapproval of the higher appointment invalidates lower promotions and automatically restores affected persons to former positions, with entitlement only to salaries for services actually rendered at promotional rates. Applied to invalidate respondent's Education Supervisor II appointment upon final disapproval of petitioner's Director II promotion.
• Contested appointments — Section 19 — A contested appointment takes effect immediately if duties are assumed, with entitlement to salary, but must be submitted with the department head's decision within 30 days and becomes ineffective if the protest is finally resolved against the protestee, who is reverted. Applied because respondent's appointment was expressly subject to the protest against petitioner.
• De facto officer — A de facto officer has the reputation of being the officer assumed without being a good officer in law, being in possession and discharging duties under color of authority derived from an irregular election or appointment, not as a mere volunteer; de jure authority rests on right, de facto on reputation. Applied to characterize respondent's holdover after 17 October 1998.
• Recovery of salaries from and by de facto officers — A rightful incumbent may recover from a de facto officer salaries received during wrongful tenure, the latter taking them at risk and being bound to account to the de jure officer. Conversely, where there is no de jure officer, a good-faith de facto officer who possessed the office and discharged its duties is legally entitled to its emoluments. Applied to order respondent to turn over emoluments from 17 October 1998 to 17 March 1999 to petitioner yet allow retention on equitable grounds for actual service, following Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary and Monroy vs. Court of Appeals.

• "All appointments involved in a chain of promotions must be submitted simultaneously for approval by the Commission. The disapproval of the appointment of a person proposed to a higher position invalidates the promotion of those in lower positions and automatically restores them to their former positions. However, the affected persons are entitled to the payment of salaries for services actually rendered at a rate fixed in their promotional appointments." — States the controlling chain-promotion rule that invalidated respondent's dependent appointment upon disapproval of petitioner's promotion.
• "for a party to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, he must establish the following requisites: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." — Defines the prohibition test applied to sustain the injunction against the Governor's memorandum.
• "[I]n cases where there is no de jure officer, a de facto officer who, in good faith, has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office." — States the equitable basis for allowing respondent to retain compensation for actual service despite lack of title.

• Longino vs. General, G.R. No. 147956, 16 February 2005, 451 SCRA 423, 436 — Cited as authority for the requisites of prohibition.
• Gala vs. Ellice Agro-Industrial Corporation, G.R. No. 156819, December 11, 2003, 418 SCRA 431 — Cited for the doctrine of primary jurisdiction lodging initial authority in the competent administrative body.
• Miriam College Foundation, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 401 Phil. 431 (2000) — Cited, together with Philippine Global Communications, Inc. vs. Relova, for the purely legal question exception to primary jurisdiction.
• Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 159139, 13 January 2004, 419 SCRA 141, 162 — Cited, together with Paat vs. Court of Appeals, to excuse exhaustion of administrative remedies for purely legal issues.
• Corpuz vs. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 801, 811 (1998) — Cited for when an appointment becomes complete and for respondent's resulting de facto status.
• Civil Service Commission vs. Joson, Jr., G.R. No. 154674, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 773, 786 — Cited for the classic definition of a de facto officer and the distinction between authority resting on right versus reputation.
• Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 127 Phil. 1, 7 (1967) — Cited, through General Manager, Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) vs. Monserate, 430 Phil. 832, 847 (2002), for the right of the de jure officer to recover salaries from the de facto officer.
• Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, 22 February 1991, 194 SCRA 317 — Cited for the rule that a good-faith de facto officer with no de jure counterpart is entitled to emoluments for services rendered.

• Article VIII, Section 18, Republic Act No. 6734 — Vests ARMM executive power in the Regional Governor with control over regional commissions, boards, bureaus and offices and supervision over local units; invoked to characterize the Governor's memorandum as an exercise of control and supervision tainted by grave abuse of discretion.
• Section 13, Rule 6, Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V, Executive Order No. 292 — Requires simultaneous submission of chain promotions and provides automatic invalidation and reversion upon disapproval of the higher appointment; applied to invalidate respondent's appointment following petitioner's disapproved promotion.
• Section 19, same Rules — Provides immediate effect of a contested appointment but ineffectiveness upon final resolution of the protest against the protestee with reversion; applied given respondent's appointment was subject to the protest against petitioner.
• Republic Act No. 4670, Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, implementing guidelines — Cited in the 17 March 1999 resolution as violated by unauthorized enrollment without approved extension of study leave, supporting the AWOL finding.
• Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 12, Series of 1994 — Provides that absence for at least thirty days without approved leave constitutes absence without leave warranting dropping from service without prior notice; basis for petitioner's AWOL status and dropping.

Quisumbing, J. (Chairperson), Carpio, J., Carpio Morales, J. and Velasco, Jr., J., concur.