Araullo vs. Office of the Ombudsman

The Ombudsman’s finding of lack of probable cause is generally not reviewable by the Supreme Court, except upon a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. A labor arbiter’s order quashing a procedurally irregular writ of execution does not constitute an unjust interlocutory order under Article 206 of the Revised Penal Code, nor does it give rise to graft liability under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, where the order is in accordance with the NLRC Rules and there is no evidence of manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence.

Romeo R. Araullo, formerly employed as Maintenance Supervisor of Club Filipino, obtained a final judgment from the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court declaring his dismissal illegal and ordering his reinstatement with full backwages and monetary benefits. After the judgment became final, Araullo moved for a writ of execution before the Labor Arbiter. Club Filipino filed a motion to recompute the monetary award, which remained unresolved at the time the writ was issued. The Labor Arbiter who issued the writ later quashed it upon discovering the pending motion, and the NLRC affirmed the quashal. Araullo thereafter filed a criminal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against the labor arbiter, the NLRC commissioners, and three private lawyers, alleging that their actions delayed execution and were tainted with partiality. The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause.

• The Labor Judgment: Romeo R. Araullo began working for Club Filipino as an electrician and rose to Maintenance Supervisor. He was dismissed on December 23, 2000. His complaint for illegal dismissal was initially dismissed by Labor Arbiter Fedriel Panganiban and the NLRC, but on appeal, both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court ruled that he had been illegally dismissed. Club Filipino was ordered to reinstate him and pay full backwages and other monetary benefits.
• Execution and Quashal: Following the finality of the judgment, Araullo filed a motion for a writ of execution before Labor Arbiter Panganiban, who inhibited himself. The case was re-raffled to Labor Arbiter Arden S. Anni. Labor Arbiter Anni granted the motion and issued a writ of execution for P2,338,152.25, based on a computation by the Computation and Examination Unit. Club Filipino had, however, filed a Motion to Recompute the judgment award, which remained unresolved. Club Filipino then filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution. Before the motion could be heard, Labor Arbiter Anni issued an Order dated August 12, 2008, quashing the writ and lifting the notice of garnishment served on Club Filipino’s bank accounts. Labor Arbiter Anni subsequently inhibited himself, citing his fraternal ties with Club Filipino’s president and counsel, both fraternity brothers from San Beda College of Law.
• NLRC Affirmance: Araullo filed a petition to set aside Labor Arbiter Anni’s order. The NLRC First Division, composed of Chairman Gerardo C. Nograles, Commissioner Romeo L. Go, and Commissioner Perlita B. Velasco, denied the petition in a Resolution dated October 29, 2008. The NLRC affirmed the quashal and ordered the records remanded to the arbitration branch of origin for resolution of pending incidents and proper recomputation. Araullo’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
• Criminal Complaint: Araullo then charged Labor Arbiter Anni, the three NLRC commissioners, and Club Filipino’s lawyers—Atty. Roberto F. De Leon, Atty. Ernesto P. Tabao, and Atty. Filomemo B. Balbin—before the Office of the Ombudsman. He alleged that Labor Arbiter Anni’s order quashing the writ was an unjust interlocutory order under Article 206 of the Revised Penal Code because it was issued without hearing and without notice to his counsel, and was motivated by partiality toward his fraternity brothers. He further claimed that Atty. Balbin’s late appearance as Club Filipino’s counsel was irregular and intended to influence the labor officials, given Balbin’s former position as Executive Assistant IV to a retired NLRC Chairman. The NLRC commissioners were accused of issuing their own unjust interlocutory order by affirming the quashal, thereby conspiring to delay execution and causing Araullo undue injury. All respondents were also charged with violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for allegedly giving Club Filipino unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality.
• Prior Supreme Court Ruling: In a related administrative case, Romeo R. Araullo v. Office of the Ombudsman (G.R. No. 194169, December 4, 2013), the Supreme Court had already ruled that Labor Arbiter Anni’s writ of execution was procedurally irregular because a motion for recomputation was pending and no order approving the computation had been issued, as required by the NLRC Rules. The Court declared the writ void and held that its quashal was proper, with no indication of malice, bad faith, or negligence on the part of the labor officials.

• Unjust Interlocutory Order: Petitioner argued that Labor Arbiter Anni’s order quashing the writ of execution was an unjust interlocutory order under Article 206 of the Revised Penal Code because it was issued without hearing and without furnishing his counsel a copy of Club Filipino’s motion, thereby denying him due process. He maintained that the order was issued hastily and purposely to delay execution of a final judgment in his favor.
• Partiality and Conspiracy: Petitioner contended that Labor Arbiter Anni acted with manifest partiality toward Club Filipino because its president and counsel were his fraternity brothers, and that Anni’s subsequent inhibition confirmed this improper interest. He asserted that the NLRC commissioners tolerated and supported this partiality by affirming the unjust order, making them liable for their own unjust interlocutory order. Petitioner further alleged that the late appearance of Atty. Balbin as Club Filipino’s counsel was a device to influence the proceedings, and that the labor officials and the private lawyers conspired to delay execution, causing him undue injury, pain, and stress.

• No Unjust Order: The Office of the Ombudsman, through its assailed Resolution, found that the deferral in execution could not be attributed to any criminal design. The labor officials acted pursuant to Rule XI, Section 4 of the 2005 NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure, which prohibits issuance of a writ of execution while a motion for recomputation is pending. Thus, the quashal was necessary to correct a procedural error and could not be characterized as unjust.
• Absence of Graft: The Ombudsman determined that petitioner failed to establish probable cause for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 because there was no evidence that the respondents gave Club Filipino undue advantage or acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty was not overcome.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint for lack of probable cause.
• Probable Cause — Unjust Interlocutory Order: Whether probable cause existed to charge the respondents with violation of Article 206 of the Revised Penal Code (unjust interlocutory order).
• Probable Cause — Graft: Whether probable cause existed to charge the respondents with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No grave abuse of discretion was committed. The Ombudsman’s resolution clearly explained the grounds supporting its finding of lack of probable cause. The finding was consistent with the NLRC Rules and with the Supreme Court’s own prior declaration that the writ of execution was void and its quashal proper. The Ombudsman’s determination of probable cause is a function belonging to that office, and the Court does not interfere absent a clear showing of capricious, arbitrary, or despotic exercise of judgment, which petitioner failed to demonstrate.
• Probable Cause — Unjust Interlocutory Order: Probable cause was not established. The elements of Article 206 require that the order be unjust and that it was knowingly rendered or rendered through inexcusable negligence or ignorance. The quashal was not unjust; it was mandated by Rule XI, Section 4 of the 2005 NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure, which prohibits issuance of a writ of execution until after a pending recomputation has been approved after due hearing. The writ issued by Labor Arbiter Anni was procedurally irregular and void. Its subsequent quashal merely rectified that error. The Supreme Court had already ruled in Araullo v. Office of the Ombudsman that the quashal was proper and that no malice, bad faith, misconduct, or negligence attended the labor officials’ actions. Without probable cause against the labor officials, the charges against the private lawyers, who were not shown to have conspired with them, likewise failed.
• Probable Cause — Graft: Probable cause for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 was lacking. The offense requires proof that the accused public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence and that such action caused undue injury or gave unwarranted benefits to a private party. Because the quashal was legally correct, no undue injury was suffered; moreover, the NLRC’s remand for recomputation ensured Araullo retained a remedy to enforce his judgment. There was no showing of manifest partiality, which requires a clear or plain predilection to favor one side; evident bad faith, which requires a palpably fraudulent and dishonest purpose or conscious wrongdoing; or gross inexcusable negligence, which denotes a willful and intentional omission with conscious indifference to consequences. Petitioner adduced no evidence that the labor officials were impelled by any such motive; the records indicated they merely sought to follow procedural rules.

• Non-interference with the Ombudsman’s Prosecutorial Discretion — The Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 endow the Office of the Ombudsman with wide latitude to determine whether probable cause exists and whether a criminal case should be filed. As a general rule, the Supreme Court does not interfere with this exercise of discretion and respects the Ombudsman’s independence, except where there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Court’s review is limited to the question of whether the Ombudsman acted in a capricious, arbitrary, or despotic manner.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or the exercise of power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility. The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
• Probable Cause — Probable cause consists of such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the person charged is probably guilty thereof. It can only find support in facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonable mind to believe that prosecution is warranted.
• Elements of Unjust Interlocutory Order (Article 206, Revised Penal Code) — To establish a violation, the complainant must prove that (1) the order in question was unjust, and (2) it was knowingly rendered or rendered through inexcusable negligence or ignorance. An order issued in accordance with law and procedural rules is not unjust.
• Elements of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019 — A violation requires proof that: (1) the accused is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions; (2) the officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) the action caused undue injury to any party or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference.
• Manifest Partiality, Evident Bad Faith, and Gross Inexcusable Negligence Defined — “Manifest partiality” exists when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side over another. “Evident bad faith” connotes not only bad judgment but a palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for a perverse motive or ill will; it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest, ill will, or ulterior purposes. “Gross inexcusable negligence” refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to the consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.

• “The Court reiterates its policy of non-interference with the rulings of the Office of the Ombudsman, except in a clear case of grave abuse of discretion. x x x The determination of whether probable cause exists is a function that belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman. Whether a criminal case, given its attendant facts and circumstances, should be filed or not is basically its call.” — Establishes the limited scope of judicial review over Ombudsman determinations.
• “Since the Writ of Execution was issued in contravention of the law, it is irregular and defective, and there was no need to further hear Club Filipino’s motion to quash the writ; [LA] Anni’s issuance of the August 12, 2008 Order quashing the writ ahead of the scheduled August 20, 2008 hearing is therefore not improper. ‘A void judgment or order has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-existent. x x x.’” — The Court’s prior pronouncement that the writ was void and that its quashal was not only proper but required no prior hearing.
• “Time and again, the Court has emphasized that ‘[p]rocedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have prejudiced a party’s substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed.’” — Reaffirms the mandatory character of procedural rules, including the NLRC rule on execution pending recomputation.

• Casing v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 192334, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 500 — Cited as authority on the general rule of non-interference with the Ombudsman’s investigatory and prosecutory powers, and on the exception for grave abuse of discretion.
• Angeles v. Gutierrez, G.R. Nos. 189161 & 189173, March 21, 2012, 668 SCRA 803 — Cited for the definition of grave abuse of discretion as used in reviewing Ombudsman rulings.
• Romeo R. Araullo v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 194169, December 4, 2013 — A prior ruling involving the same parties and the same quashal order; the Court had already held the writ void and the quashal proper, and found no malice or misconduct. This decision effectively precluded a contrary finding in the criminal complaint.
• People v. Atienza, G.R. No. 171671, June 18, 2012, 673 SCRA 470 — Adopted to define manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and gross inexcusable negligence for purposes of determining liability under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.

• Article 206, Revised Penal Code — Penalizes any judge who knowingly renders an unjust interlocutory order, or who does so through inexcusable negligence or ignorance. Applied to labor officials by analogy, the Court held that no violation occurred because the order quashing the writ was not unjust but rather necessary to correct a void writ.
• Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — Prohibits public officers from causing undue injury to any party or giving unwarranted benefits to a private person through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. The second and third elements were absent because no injury resulted from the legally correct quashal and no improper motive was shown.
• Rule XI, Section 4, 2005 NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure — Provides that where further computation of the award is necessary during execution, no writ of execution shall be issued until after the computation has been approved by the Labor Arbiter in an order issued after the parties have been duly notified and heard. This provision rendered the initial writ procedurally irregular and the subsequent quashal legally mandated.

Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Chairperson), Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, and Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr.