Araullo vs. Araullo

An order that reverses a prior order for partition and denies a motion to compel third-party adverse occupants to submit to partition is interlocutory and not appealable, as it does not finally determine the rights of the parties or dispose of the action; the case remains pending for further proceedings. Partition under the Code of Civil Procedure cannot proceed when the property is in the actual adverse possession of third persons claiming ownership, because the statutory duties of the commissioners to view and examine the land cannot be performed without violating the possessors’ right to be respected in their possession.

The parties were members of the same family who had been in joint possession of extensive real property for many years. Plaintiffs sought to sever the common ownership through partition under the Code of Civil Procedure. Defendants admitted all material allegations. The trial court found a legal right to the property and entered an order for partition, appointing commissioners. When the commissioners went to the land to perform their duties, they encountered third persons occupying nine parcels who claimed ownership by title adverse to both plaintiffs and defendants. This discovery raised the question whether partition could lawfully proceed against persons not impleaded and prompted the procedural steps that led to this appeal.

• Nature: Action for partition of twenty-one parcels of real property, brought under sections 181 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs and defendants were members of the same family who had jointly possessed the lands for many years.
• Admissions and Initial Order: Defendants answered admitting all allegations of the complaint. At trial, defendants did not appear. The Court of First Instance found plaintiffs had a legal right to the property and, on June 21, 1902, entered an order for partition under section 184, appointing three commissioners to make the partition.
• Commissioners’ Report: When the commissioners examined the twenty-one parcels, they found that nine parcels were in the possession of persons not parties to the suit, who claimed to be the owners by title adverse to that of plaintiffs and defendants. In their report of February 4, 1903, the commissioners stated they did not think partition could proceed and submitted the matter to the court.
• Show-Cause Order: On February 5, 1903, the court directed plaintiffs to show that the persons in possession recognized plaintiffs as owners.
• Plaintiffs’ Motion: On March 30, 1903, plaintiffs filed a petition praying that the court order compliance with the June 21, 1902 judgment by compelling the occupants to submit to partition, without prejudice to the occupants’ right to bring an appropriate action for recovery should they believe themselves injured.
• Challenged Order: On June 12, 1903, the trial court issued an order that reversed the June 21, 1902 judgment and denied plaintiffs’ petition. The order stated: “Wherefore I reverse the judgment rendered by this court on the 21st of June, 1902, and deny the petition of the plaintiffs which occasions this order.”
• Appeal: Plaintiffs excepted to the order and removed the case to the Supreme Court via bill of exceptions. No appearance was entered for defendants-appellees.

• Finality and Appealability: Plaintiffs-appellants maintained that the June 12, 1903 order effectively terminated the partition action, as it reversed the prior declaration of their right and denied their motion to proceed, and thus constituted a final judgment subject to appeal. They sought reversal of the order and execution of the original partition ruling.

No appearance for appellees. No arguments were presented.

• Appealability: Whether the order of June 12, 1903, which reversed a prior judgment ordering partition and denied plaintiffs’ motion to compel third-party occupants to submit to partition, is a final judgment that may be appealed by bill of exceptions.
• Partition and Adverse Third-Party Possession: Whether partition proceedings may lawfully continue when it appears that portions of the property are in the actual adverse possession of third persons claiming ownership and who are not parties to the action.

• Appealability: The order of June 12, 1903, was not a final judgment; consequently, the bill of exceptions was dismissed. The refusal to grant plaintiffs’ motion to proceed with execution and to compel third-party occupants to submit to partition did not put an end to the action. Nor did the vacation of the June 21, 1902 order constitute a final determination—it merely left the case as if that order had never been entered, with the action still pending for further proceedings by either party. Under Sections 123 and 143 of the Code of Civil Procedure, only a final judgment that finally determines the action may be appealed; interlocutory orders may be challenged only upon an appeal from a final judgment, not independently. Because no final judgment had been rendered, the appeal was premature.
• Partition and Adverse Third-Party Possession: By way of guidance for further proceedings, the Court stated that partition cannot proceed when the property is in the actual adverse possession of third persons who claim ownership and are not parties to the suit. Section 185 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires commissioners to “view and examine the estate after due notice to the parties,” and Section 446 ordains that every possessor must be respected in his possession. The commissioners and the parties have no right to enter the nine adversely occupied parcels for the statutory examination. It would thus be physically impossible to perform the duties mandated by law. In the absence of any express provision to the contrary, the law could not have intended partition to proceed under such circumstances. The adverse claims of the actual occupants must first be settled—whether by impleading them in the partition suit or through an independent action was a question the Court declined to resolve, noting a conflict among American authorities.

• Final Judgment Rule (Code of Civil Procedure, Sections 123 and 143) — An appeal lies only from a final judgment that finally disposes of the action or proceeding. An order that merely vacates a prior interlocutory order and does not terminate the litigation is not appealable. Interlocutory orders may be reviewed only upon appeal from the final judgment. The dismissal of this appeal illustrates that a party must await a final determination before seeking appellate review.
• Suspension of Partition Pending Resolution of Third-Party Adverse Claims — In an action for partition where commissioners are appointed and the land is found to be in the actual adverse possession of third persons claiming ownership, the partition proceedings cannot continue. The commissioners’ statutory duty to view and examine the estate cannot be lawfully discharged because entering upon property held adversely would violate the possessor’s possessory rights under Section 446. The adverse claims of such third parties must be resolved first; otherwise, it is physically impossible for the commissioners to perform their duties as required by Section 185. This principle flows from the structure of the partition law and the absence of any express provision permitting partition despite outstanding adverse claims.

• “Neither one of the thing accomplished by the order of June 12 put an end to the action. The refusal to grant the motion of the plaintiffs that the execution be proceeded with and the tenants be compelled to submit to the partition certainly was not a final judgment in favor of one party or the other. Nor was that part of the order which vacated the order made on June 21, 1902. The vacation of that order left the case as if no such order had ever been made. It replaced it in the condition in which it was before the order was entered, and left the action still pending for such further proceedings therein as either party might desire to take.” — Defines the absence of finality and explains why an order setting aside a prior order does not terminate the action.
• “In the case at bar the commissioner and the parties had no right to go upon the nine parcels adversely occupied, for the purpose of making the examination required by the law. In this case and in all other similar cases where commissioners have to be appointed, and the land is adversely held by third persons, it would be impossible to comply with the law. In the absence of any express provision to the contrary, this is a sufficient reason for holding that the law did not intend to allow a partition in such cases.” — Articulates the substantive limitation that partition cannot proceed where third parties hold adverse possession, grounded on the impossibility of lawful statutory compliance.

• No specific judicial precedents were cited in the majority opinion. The decision notes a conflict in American authorities on whether adverse claims to ownership can be determined in a partition suit, but does not name specific cases.

• Section 123, Code of Civil Procedure — Interlocutory and incidental orders do not stay the progress of an action; only a ruling, order, or judgment that finally determines the action may be appealed. Applied to hold the challenged order interlocutory and not appealable.
• Section 143, Code of Civil Procedure — Upon rendition of final judgment, either party may perfect a bill of exceptions for review of all rulings, orders, and judgments made in the action to which objection was duly taken. Applied to show that review of interlocutory matters must await final judgment.
• Section 185, Code of Civil Procedure — Requires commissioners to “view and examine the estate after due notice to the parties” and to make partition with due regard to improvements, situation, and quality. Relied on to demonstrate the physical and legal impossibility of partition when property is adversely occupied.
• Section 446, Code of Civil Procedure — “Every possessor must be respected in his possession.” Invoked to support the conclusion that commissioners and parties had no right to enter land held by third persons claiming ownership.
• Section 184, Code of Civil Procedure — Governs the order for partition when the court finds the plaintiff has a legal right to a share of the property. The initial order was entered under this section; its vacatur did not create a final disposition.
• Section 181, Code of Civil Procedure (cited in dissent) — Defines who may bring a partition suit as “a person having or holding real estate with others, in any form of joint tenancy, or tenancy in common.”
• Section 196, Code of Civil Procedure (cited in dissent) — Declares that a judgment in partition is not binding on persons not parties to the action; dissent argued this adequately protects adverse claimants.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Mapa, and Johnson, JJ., concurred.

• Justice McDonough, joined by Justice Cooper — Dissented on the primary ground that the order should be considered appealable because it effectively dismissed the partition case and stayed the progress of the action, thus functioning as a final judgment. The commissioners’ report contained no sworn testimony or legal proof of adverse ownership; accepting unsworn, hearsay statements of third-party claimants to halt partition would allow any squatter to defeat the court’s equitable jurisdiction without proof. The proper course was to proceed with partition, as section 196 protected adverse claimants by making the partition judgment non-binding on non-parties. The dissenting opinion would have reversed the order and allowed partition to continue.