Aratuc vs. Commission on Elections

Certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over decisions, orders, and rulings of the Commission on Elections under the 1973 Constitution and the 1978 Election Code is confined to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process; it is not a broad review of the merits. The COMELEC, as sole judge of pre-proclamation controversies and as the body with direct control and supervision over boards of canvassers, may do directly what a board of canvassers ought to have done, and its factual conclusions supported by substantial evidence are not reviewable by certiorari.

Petitioners Tomatic Aratuc, Sergio Tocao, Ciscolario Diaz, Fred Tamula, Mangontawar Guro, Bonifacio Legaspi, and Linang Mandangan were independent candidates for representatives to the Interim Batasang Pambansa in Region XII (Central Mindanao) under the Kunsensiya ng Bayan, which was not registered as a political party or group under the 1976 Election Code, P.D. No. 1296. Private respondents included KBL candidates and Ernesto Roldan. The governing backdrop was the 1973 Constitution, which provided that COMELEC decisions, orders, or rulings may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari, and the 1978 Election Code, which made the COMELEC the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies and its decisions final and executory. The cases were sequels to G.R. No. L-48097, in which the Court had earlier acted on the canvass and issued guidelines for its resumption.

On April 7, 1978, elections for representatives to the Interim Batasang Pambansa were held in Region XII (Central Mindanao), covering the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Maguindanao, North Cotabato, and Sultan Kudarat, and the cities of Marawi, Iligan, and Cotabato. Petitioners were independent candidates under the Kunsensiya ng Bayan, which was not registered as a political party or group under the 1976 Election Code, P.D. No. 1296. Private respondents included candidates of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan and Ernesto Roldan. The region had a total of 4,107 voting centers, of which 1,966 had already been canvassed in the initial partial count.

Petitioners complained of irregularities in the election records in all voting centers in Lanao del Sur, the whole City of Marawi, eight towns of Lanao del Norte, seven towns of Maguindanao, ten towns of North Cotabato, and eleven towns of Sultan Kudarat. A supervisory panel headed by Commissioner Venancio S. Duque conducted hearings on these complaints. The canvass was suspended, but after the panel presented its report on May 15, 1978, the COMELEC lifted the suspension and directed resumption of the canvass in Manila. This order led to G.R. No. L-48097 and to the Supreme Court's guidelines for the resumed canvass.

During the resumed canvass, petitioners presented objections supported by handwriting and fingerprint experts who had examined the voting records and lists of voters in 878 voting centers out of 2,700 specified in their complaints. For 501 voting centers, the records consisting of voters' lists and voting records were unavailable and could not be brought to Manila; petitioners asked that the results in those centers be completely excluded from the canvass. On July 11, 1978, the Regional Board terminated its canvass and declared its results.

Before the COMELEC, the Commission examined additional records and received reports from NBI-Comelec fingerprint and signature experts. The COMELEC excluded a total of 1,267 returns under four categories: 1,001 under the Diaz ruling, 79 because of 90–100% turnout despite military operations, 105 as palpably manufactured, and 82 as excluded by the Board on other grounds. For voting centers whose CE Forms 1 and 5 were unavailable, the COMELEC examined the returns on their faces and excluded 141 while including 271. It denied petitioners' motion to open the corresponding ballot boxes. It also excluded returns from areas affected by military operations and where voting centers had been transferred to the poblaciones. On January 13, 1979, the COMELEC rendered its final resolution declaring Valdez, Dimaporo, Amparo, Badoy, Baga, Pangandaman, Sinsuat, and Roldan as the winners.

The COMELEC found proof of massive substitute voting in the records examined, high percentages of voting, and unavailability of records in certain voting centers. It stated that it examined the Books of Voters and Voters Records itself and referred to experts those needing further examination, and that it could pass upon returns using common sense and perception. In Marawi and Lanao del Sur, of 1,065 voting centers with high percentage of voting, the COMELEC excluded returns from 867 and included only 198. The Court found that these factual conclusions were supported by substantial evidence and that no grave abuse of discretion attended the COMELEC's actions.

• Aratuc et al. — Grave Abuse and Lack of Jurisdiction: Petitioners alleged that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in eight specifications.
• Failure to Pursue Examination: The COMELEC did not pursue further examination of registration and voting records from other voting centers after finding proof of massive substitute voting in all records examined by COMELEC and NBI experts.
• Missing Records: The COMELEC included returns from voting centers whose books of voters and voting records could not be recovered despite repeated efforts.
• High Turnout and Manufactured Returns: The COMELEC did not exclude returns showing a very high percentage of voting and did not consider high turnout coupled with massive substitution as proof of manufactured election returns.
• Ballot Box Opening: The COMELEC denied petitioners' motion to open ballot boxes from voting centers whose records were unavailable to determine whether voting had occurred.
• Defective Ballot Boxes: The COMELEC did not identify ballot boxes without padlocks, especially those found empty when shipped to Manila.
• Thumbprint Mismatches: The COMELEC did not exclude returns where thumbprints in CE Form 5 did not correspond to registered voters in CE Form 1.
• Weight of Affidavits: The COMELEC gave more credence to affidavits of chairmen, members, municipal treasurers, and election officials than to KB watchers' affidavits.
• April 26 Memorandum: The COMELEC did not include among those questioned before the Board returns included in petitioners' April 26, 1978 memorandum, which the Court's guidelines said should be considered.
• Mandangan — Diaz vs. Bashier: Mandangan argued that the COMELEC erroneously applied Diaz vs. Commission on Elections instead of Bashier vs. Comelec, and that the Diaz total-exclusion rule was unfair, unjust, and oppressive.
• Mandangan — Correct Diaz Doctrine: Mandangan maintained that the real Diaz doctrine was not total exclusion simply because total votes exceeded the highest possible valid votes, but required showing that even adding unascertained votes to a candidate still left him below the votes credited to him; the later Bashier/Basman standard of 40% substitute votes should apply.
• Mandangan — Excess Jurisdiction and Due Process: The COMELEC exceeded its appellate jurisdiction and denied due process by examining records in more than 878 voting centers, totaling 1,085, beyond those passed upon by the Regional Board, with the KBL informed only in December 1978 after the case had been submitted for decision.
• Mandangan — Military Operations and High Turnout: The COMELEC excluded returns from areas with unsettled peace and order or military operations and 90–100% voter turnout without evidence submitted before the Regional Board, violating due process.

• Scope of Review: Respondents maintained that COMELEC decisions in pre-proclamation controversies are final, executory, and inappealable, and that certiorari lies only for grave abuse of discretion.
• Missing Records: The Solicitor General stated that returns from missing-record voting centers were examined by the COMELEC and that 141 were excluded while 271 were included.
• Previously Canvassed Returns: As to Aratuc's eighth error, respondents commented that the results in the voting centers mentioned had already been canvassed at the regional canvass center in Cotabato City.
• KBL Position: The KBL candidates argued that the COMELEC's resolution should be limited to the precincts and municipalities involved in the KB petitions and the evidence submitted; they stood by the COMELEC/NBI experts' reports as confirmed by the Regional Board and did not comment further due to lack of time.

• Scope of Certiorari over COMELEC: Whether the Supreme Court's certiorari jurisdiction over COMELEC decisions under the 1973 Constitution and the 1978 Election Code is limited to grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process.
• Mandangan — Diaz and Bashier Standards: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse in applying Diaz vs. Commission on Elections rather than Bashier vs. Comelec in excluding returns.
• Mandangan — COMELEC Jurisdiction and Due Process: Whether the COMELEC exceeded jurisdiction or denied due process by extending its inquiry beyond the records passed upon by the Regional Board and by excluding returns from military-operation areas with high turnout.
• Aratuc — Missing Records and Ballot Boxes: Whether the COMELEC gravely abused discretion in including returns from voting centers with unavailable CE Forms 1 and 5 and in denying the motion to open their ballot boxes.
• Aratuc — High Turnout, Substitute Voting, and Expert Examination: Whether the COMELEC gravely abused discretion in its treatment of returns based on high voting percentages, massive substitute voting, and expert findings.
• Aratuc — Weight of Evidence and Other Errors: Whether the COMELEC gravely abused discretion in crediting affidavits of election officials over watchers, in not identifying defective ballot boxes, and in not including returns from the April 26 memorandum.
• Aratuc — Date of Election: Whether the COMELEC gravely abused discretion in finding that elections were held on April 7, 1978.
• Aratuc — Previously Canvassed Returns: Whether the COMELEC gravely abused discretion in not setting aside and repeating the canvass already made in Cotabato City.

• Scope of Certiorari over COMELEC: Limited. Under the 1973 Constitution and the 1978 Election Code, COMELEC decisions may be brought to the Supreme Court only on certiorari, confined to grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process; it is not broad review.
• Mandangan — Diaz and Bashier Standards: No grave abuse. Diaz and Bashier are not mutually exclusive; both derive from Lagumbay's statistical improbability rationale. The COMELEC could treat returns as spurious where votes for the highest candidate exceed the highest possible valid votes, even without 40% excess.
• Mandangan — COMELEC Jurisdiction and Due Process: No. The COMELEC has direct control and supervision over boards of canvassers under Section 168 and is sole judge of pre-proclamation controversies under Section 175; it may do directly what the Board ought to have done. Judicial notice of notorious peace-and-order conditions did not deny due process.
• Aratuc — Missing Records and Ballot Boxes: No grave abuse. The COMELEC examined returns on their faces to avoid disenfranchisement and had discretion to determine when ballot boxes should be opened; petitioners failed to timely specify centers under the June 1, 1978 guidelines.
• Aratuc — High Turnout, Substitute Voting, and Expert Examination: No grave abuse. The COMELEC examined all 2,775 voting centers using common sense and perception and referred some to experts; it excluded 1,267 returns, including 1,001 under Diaz and 867 of 1,065 high-turnout centers in Marawi and Lanao del Sur.
• Aratuc — Weight of Evidence and Other Errors: No grave abuse. Findings were supported by substantial evidence; errors, if any, were errors of judgment not reviewable in certiorari. The defective ballot boxes issue was moot and secondary.
• Aratuc — Date of Election: No grave abuse. Petitioners did not seriously press the issue; the COMELEC carefully considered the evidence, and any errors were errors of judgment.
• Aratuc — Previously Canvassed Returns: No grave abuse. The guidelines referred to resumption of the canvass, not setting aside and repeating the canvass already made in Cotabato City.

• Scope of Certiorari over COMELEC: The 1935 Constitution made COMELEC decisions subject to review by the Supreme Court; the 1973 Constitution instead provided that any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. The 1978 Election Code made the COMELEC the sole judge of pre-proclamation controversies and its decisions final and executory. The Court reasoned that certiorari is narrower than review: review digs into the merits and unearths errors of judgment, while certiorari deals with grave abuse of discretion, which may not exist even if the decision is otherwise erroneous. Thus, certiorari over the COMELEC is confined to grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process, and the Court accords the COMELEC's actuations the greatest measure of presumption of regularity.
• Mandangan — Diaz and Bashier Standards: The Court held that Diaz and Bashier are not mutually exclusive; both are outgrowths of the basic rationale of statistical improbability in Lagumbay vs. Comelec. Which applies depends on the situation. In the factual milieu found by the COMELEC, there was no cogent reason why returns showing that the votes of the candidate obtaining the highest number of votes exceeded the highest possible number of valid votes cast should not be deemed spurious and manufactured merely because the total excess votes were not more than 40%. The Court considered the historical antecedents of questionable elections in the involved provinces, of which it took judicial notice.
• Mandangan — COMELEC Jurisdiction and Due Process: Under Section 168 of the 1978 Election Code, the COMELEC has direct control and supervision over boards of canvassers; under Section 175, it is the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies. Although the procedure is loosely called an appeal, the COMELEC's authority to review board actuations does not spring from appellate jurisdiction but from plenary control and supervision; a superior body with control may do directly what the subordinate ought to have done. Thus, the COMELEC did not exceed jurisdiction by extending its inquiry beyond the Board. As to military-operation areas, the COMELEC took cognizance that voting centers had been transferred to the poblaciones; for pre-proclamation purposes, it did not deny due process to take into account a matter so publicly notorious as unsettled peace and order, capable of unquestionable demonstration and subject to judicial notice under Rule 129. The Court declined to extend scrutiny to all other voting centers in the same municipalities or provinces absent prima facie evidence that conditions were identical.
• Aratuc — Missing Records and Ballot Boxes: For voting centers whose CE Forms 1 and 5 were unavailable, the COMELEC chose to include returns after examining them on their faces to avoid total disenfranchisement; it excluded 141 and included 271. The Court noted that the COMELEC had discretion to determine when ballot boxes should be opened, as the guidelines said ballot boxes shall be opened only upon orders of the Board or Commission after the need became evident. The June 1, 1978 modified guidelines required petitioners to specify by June 3, 1978 the voting centers whose ballot boxes they wanted opened; petitioners did not timely do so and filed their motion only on January 9, 1979. The COMELEC therefore did not gravely abuse discretion in adhering to the guidelines. The Court also cited Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez that honest ballots should not be nullified by election officials' noncompliance.
• Aratuc — High Turnout, Substitute Voting, and Expert Examination: The Court found petitioners' claim that the COMELEC did not examine 1,694 of 2,775 voting centers inaccurate. The COMELEC excluded 1,267 returns under four categories: 1,001 under Diaz, 79 due to 90–100% turnout despite military operations, 105 palpably manufactured, and 82 excluded by the Board on other grounds. It sustained 45.45% of petitioners' objections and almost doubled the Board's exclusions. In Marawi and Lanao del Sur, of 1,065 voting centers with high percentage of voting, the COMELEC excluded returns from 867 and included only 198. The COMELEC stated it examined Books of Voters and Voters Records itself and referred to experts those needing further examination; it could pass upon returns using common sense and perception. The Court would not substitute its judgment absent grave abuse.
• Aratuc — Weight of Evidence and Other Errors: The seventh and eighth errors did not require extended discussion. On the date of election, petitioners apparently did not seriously press the issue; the COMELEC considered the evidence in detail over nineteen pages. The Court was not prepared to hold that the COMELEC acted wantonly or arbitrarily; errors, if any, were errors of judgment not reviewable in certiorari if founded on substantial evidence. On the eighth error, respondents said the returns had already been canvassed in Cotabato City; the guidelines referred to resumption only, not repetition of the prior canvass. The fifth assignment on defective ballot boxes was moot and academic because the related records were examined; deeper inquiry would be for an electoral protest.
• Aratuc — Date of Election: The Court noted that petitioners did not seriously press the issue, as shown by the absence of reference during oral argument and the cavalier discussion in the petition. The COMELEC carefully considered all contentions relative to the weight of evidence. No wanton or arbitrary action was shown; any errors were errors of judgment not reviewable in certiorari.
• Aratuc — Previously Canvassed Returns: The Court held that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse discretion in sustaining the Board. The guidelines referred to resumption of the canvass, which did not necessarily include setting aside and repeating the canvass already made in Cotabato City.

• Limited certiorari over COMELEC — Under the 1973 Constitution, any decision, order, or ruling of the COMELEC may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. This is narrower than review; it is confined to grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process. The Court applied this to dismiss both petitions absent such abuse.
• COMELEC's direct control and supervision over boards of canvassers — Section 168 of the 1978 Election Code gives the COMELEC direct control and supervision over boards of canvassers. Its authority to review board actuations is not appellate but plenary; a superior body with control may do directly what the subordinate ought to have done. The COMELEC could therefore extend its inquiry beyond the Board's examination.
• COMELEC as sole judge of pre-proclamation controversies — Section 175 makes the COMELEC the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies, and its decisions are final and executory. The Court will not substitute its judgment for the COMELEC's absent grave abuse of discretion.
• Statistical improbability in election returns — From Lagumbay vs. Comelec, returns may be excluded when the votes credited to the candidate with the highest votes exceed the highest possible number of valid votes cast. Diaz vs. Commission on Elections and Bashier vs. Comelec are not mutually exclusive; the 40% excess-vote standard in Bashier and the Diaz rule depend on the situation. The Court upheld the COMELEC's application of Diaz despite the absence of more than 40% excess.
• Extreme caution in rejecting returns — Canvassing boards must exercise extreme caution in rejecting returns; they may reject only palpably irregular returns and only upon the most convincing proof. Absent strong evidence, returns are accorded prima facie validity as bona fide reports to avoid disenfranchisement, without prejudice to an election protest. The Court applied this to uphold inclusion of returns from missing-record centers and denial of ballot box opening.
• Judicial notice of notorious peace-and-order conditions — A matter so publicly notorious as unsettled peace and order in localities, capable of unquestionable demonstration, may be taken judicial notice of under Rule 129. The COMELEC did not deny due process by considering military operations and transfer of voting centers without presentation of evidence in pre-proclamation proceedings.
• Election irregularities as proper subject of election protest — Where the grievance is the commission of irregularities and violation of election law, the proper remedy is an election protest. The Court noted that defective ballot boxes and deeper factual questions were better ventilated in an electoral protest.

• "We hold, therefore that under the existing constitution and statutory provisions, the certiorari jurisdiction of the Court over orders, and decisions of the Comelec is not as broad as it used to be and should be confined to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process." — This is the Court's canonical formulation of the scope of certiorari review over the COMELEC under the 1973 Constitution and the 1978 Election Code.
• "A review includes digging into the merits and unearthing errors of judgment, while certiorari deals exclusively with grave abuse of discretion, which may not exist even when the decision is otherwise erroneous." — This passage distinguishes ordinary review from certiorari and explains why the Court would not examine the merits of the COMELEC's factual findings.
• "While nominally, the procedure of bringing to the Commission objections to the actuations of boards of canvassers has been quite loosely referred to in certain quarters, even by the Commission and by this Court, such as in the guidelines of May 23,1978 quoted earlier in this opinion, as an appeal, the fact of the matter is that the authority of the Commission in reviewing such actuations does not spring from any appellate jurisdiction conferred by any specific provision of law, for there is none such provision anywhere in the Election Code, but from the plenary prerogative of direct control and supervision endowed to it by the above-quoted provisions of Section 168." — This defines the source and breadth of the COMELEC's authority over boards of canvassers and supports its power to extend its inquiry beyond the Board.
• "In the case of Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 39 Phil. 208, the Supreme Court ruled that when voters have honestly cast their ballots, the same should not be nullified because the officers appointed under the law to direct the election and guard the purity of the ballot have not complied with their duty." — This passage, quoted from the COMELEC resolution, supplies the rationale for including returns from voting centers whose records were unavailable rather than disenfranchising voters.

• Lagumbay vs. Comelec, 16 SCRA 175 — Source of the basic rationale of statistical improbability; the foundation for the Diaz and Bashier standards on excluding returns.
• Diaz vs. Commission on Elections, 42 SCRA 426 — Rule that returns are spurious when the votes of the highest candidate exceed the highest possible valid votes; applied by the COMELEC and upheld by the Court.
• Bashier vs. Comelec, 43 SCRA 238 — 40% excess votes standard; held not mutually exclusive with Diaz and cited for the prima facie validity of returns and the election protest remedy.
• Lucman vs. Dimaporo, 33 SCRA 387 — Cited by petitioner; the Court declined to follow any contrary implication because the COMELEC's control and supervision allowed it to extend its inquiry beyond the Board.
• Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 39 Phil. 208 — Honest ballots should not be nullified by election officials' noncompliance; cited to justify inclusion of returns from missing-record centers.
• Anni vs. Isquierdo, L-35918, June 28, 1974 — Extreme caution in rejecting returns; irregularities are proper for election protest.
• Villavon vs. Comelec, L-32008, August 31, 1970 — Extreme caution in rejecting returns.
• Tagoranao vs. Comelec, 22 SCRA 978 — Extreme caution in rejecting returns.

• Section 11, Article XII, 1973 Constitution — Any decision, order, or ruling of the COMELEC may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari within thirty days from receipt. This provision is the basis for the Court's limited certiorari review.
• Section 2(2), Article XII, 1973 Constitution — The COMELEC is the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all members of the National Assembly and elective provincial and city officials. This supports the COMELEC's exclusive authority over electoral matters.
• Section 193, Election Code of 1978 — COMELEC decisions in pre-proclamation controversies are final and executory, and its decisions in election contests are final, executory, and inappealable. This reinforced the limited scope of certiorari.
• Section 168, Revised Election Code of 1978 — The COMELEC has direct control and supervision over boards of canvassers. This was the basis for holding that the COMELEC may do directly what the Board ought to have done.
• Section 175, Revised Election Code of 1978 — The COMELEC is the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies and may, motu proprio or upon written petition, after due notice and hearing, suspend a proclamation or annul a proclamation. This was cited for the COMELEC's authority over the controversy.
• Rule 129, Rules of Court — Judicial notice of matters capable of unquestionable demonstration. The Court cited this to uphold the COMELEC's notice of peace-and-order conditions without presentation of evidence.
• P.D. No. 1296, 1976 Election Code — The Kunsensiya ng Bayan was not registered as a political party or group under this Code, providing context for petitioners' status as independent candidates.

Fernando, Antonio, Concepcion Jr., Santos Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concurred. Teehankee, Aquino, and Abad Santos, Jr., JJ., took no part. De Castro, J., filed a separate concurring opinion. In that opinion, De Castro, J. emphasized that the new Constitution limited Supreme Court intervention over the COMELEC to constitutional questions and grave abuse, that the COMELEC's powers over the electoral process are exclusive, that the due process claim failed, and that the other matters were political questions or showed no grave abuse.

• Castro, C.J. — Dissented. He questioned why the COMELEC refused to subject the remaining 1,659 voting centers to the same scrutiny after annulling 31.84% of votes in 1,116 centers; why it did not examine 164 voting centers in Lanao del Sur and 19 in Lanao del Norte with 100% turnout despite military operations; and why it denied opening ballot boxes for 408 voting centers with missing records. He noted the absence of any statement that resolving his questions would not materially alter the results. He rejected the majority's reliance on election protest and no grave abuse, citing the protracted and expensive nature of election protests and the need to preserve faith in the electoral process. He would remand the cases to the COMELEC with guidelines.