Aratea vs. Commission on Elections and Antipolo

A false certification of eligibility in a certificate of candidacy constitutes a material misrepresentation that renders the certificate void ab initio; the candidate whose certificate is cancelled on this ground is deemed never to have been a candidate, making all votes cast for him stray and entitling the sole remaining qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes to be proclaimed.

Romeo D. Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for the May 2010 elections on 1 December 2009. Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo promptly filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to cancel Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy, alleging that Lonzanida had been elected and had served as mayor for four consecutive terms, in violation of the three-term limit. Lonzanida had also been convicted by final judgment of ten counts of falsification and sentenced to imprisonment of prisión mayor, an accessory penalty of which is perpetual special disqualification from the right to vote and to be elected to public office. Before the election, the COMELEC Second Division cancelled Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy. On election day, Lonzanida nonetheless received the highest number of votes and was proclaimed Mayor; Efren Racel Aratea was proclaimed Vice-Mayor. The COMELEC En Banc subsequently affirmed the cancellation and added the ground of final conviction. Estela D. Antipolo, the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes, intervened and sought her own proclamation as the sole qualified candidate. The COMELEC En Banc granted intervention, nullified Lonzanida’s proclamation, and ordered Aratea to cease and desist from acting as Mayor. Aratea challenged the resolution via certiorari.

• The Candidacy and Petition for Cancellation: Romeo D. Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales on 1 December 2009, certifying under oath that he was eligible for the office. On 8 December 2009, Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to cancel Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy on the ground of false material representation: Lonzanida had been elected and had served as mayor for four consecutive terms — 1998 to 2001, 2001 to 2004, 2004 to 2007, and 2007 to 2010 — in violation of the three-term limit under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code.

• The COMELEC Second Division Resolution: On 18 February 2010, the COMELEC Second Division granted Rodolfo’s petition, cancelled Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy, and ordered his name stricken from the list of official candidates. The Division ruled that Lonzanida had served more than three consecutive terms and could not run anew. Lonzanida sought reconsideration from the COMELEC En Banc.

• The May 2010 Elections and Proclamation: The motion for reconsideration remained unresolved when the 10 May 2010 elections were held. Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea garnered the highest number of votes and were proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor, respectively.

• Aratea’s Assumption as Acting Mayor: Aratea took his oath as Acting Mayor on 5 July 2010. Relying on DILG Legal Opinion No. 117, S. 2010, and subsequent correspondence with the DILG Secretary, Aratea asserted that Lonzanida’s disqualification created a permanent vacancy that he, as duly elected Vice-Mayor, was legally mandated to fill.

• The COMELEC En Banc Resolution: On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc denied Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration. The En Banc confirmed that Lonzanida was disqualified on two independently sufficient grounds: first, violation of the three-term limit; and second, final conviction for ten counts of falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. The Sandiganbayan judgment, affirmed by the Supreme Court in Lonzanida v. People, sentenced Lonzanida to imprisonment of four years and one day of prisión correccional as minimum to eight years and one day of prisión mayor as maximum for each count. Under Articles 42, 30, 31, and 32 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of prisión mayor carried the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, the latter perpetually depriving him of the right to be elected or to hold any public office. The finality of conviction on 23 October 2009 — before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy — thus rendered him perpetually ineligible.

• Antipolo’s Intervention and COMELEC’s Order and Resolution: On 25 August 2010, Estela D. Antipolo, who had received the second highest number of votes, moved to intervene, arguing that she had a legal interest as the only remaining qualified candidate. On 12 January 2011, the COMELEC En Banc granted intervention. In its 2 February 2011 Resolution, the En Banc held that Lonzanida’s disqualification was notorious in fact and in law on election day, that he was never a candidate because his certificate of candidacy had been cancelled, and that all votes for him were stray. Consequently, Antipolo, the sole qualified candidate with the highest number of votes, was ordered proclaimed as duly elected Mayor. Aratea was directed to cease and desist from exercising the functions of Mayor.

• Nature of the Petition: Aratea argued that the petition filed against Lonzanida was in the nature of a disqualification case under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, not a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78. He maintained that violation of the three-term limit and final conviction are disqualifications under Section 68, or at least should be treated as such, and that Lonzanida therefore remained a valid candidate on election day.

• Finality of Disqualification: Aratea contended that since no final judgment of disqualification had been rendered before the elections, Lonzanida’s votes could not be declared stray, and his proclamation was valid.

• Succession by Vice-Mayor: Aratea insisted that any permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor arising from Lonzanida’s subsequent disqualification must be filled by succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code. As the duly elected Vice-Mayor, he was entitled to assume the position.

• Rejection of the Second Placer: Aratea argued that Antipolo, as the candidate who received the second highest number of votes, could never be proclaimed under the established doctrine that the second placer is not entitled to the office upon the disqualification of the winner. The electorate’s will could not be substituted.

• False Material Representation: Respondents contended that Lonzanida committed a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy when he certified under oath that he was eligible to run for Mayor, despite having served more than three consecutive terms and being perpetually disqualified by a final conviction. These are ineligibilities that render the representation in the certificate false, squarely within Section 78.

• Void Certificate of Candidacy: Respondents maintained that the cancellation of Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy meant he was never a candidate in the eyes of the law; consequently, all votes cast for him were stray votes. Antipolo, as the only qualified candidate, was the proper recipient of the highest number of valid votes and should be proclaimed.

• Notoriety Exception: Respondents invoked the doctrine that where the disqualification of the winning candidate is notorious in fact and in law at the time of the election, the electorate is deemed to have deliberately wasted their votes, entitling the second placer to be proclaimed. They asserted that Lonzanida’s two-pronged disqualification was widely known, given the COMELEC rulings and his public criminal conviction.

• Nature of the Petition: Whether the petition filed against Lonzanida was properly a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code or a petition for disqualification under Section 68.

• Effect of Void Certificate of Candidacy: Whether the cancellation of Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy rendered all votes cast for him stray, thus entitling the second‑placer Antipolo to be proclaimed as Mayor.

• Right to the Office: Whether the vice‑mayor, by succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code, or the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes, should occupy the Office of the Mayor.

• Nature of the Petition: The petition was correctly treated as one for cancellation of certificate of candidacy under Section 78. Violation of the three‑term limit rule and perpetual special disqualification by reason of final conviction are both ineligibilities, not mere disqualifications under Section 68, which exclusively enumerates specific election offenses and the condition of permanent residence in a foreign country. A candidate who, despite these ineligibilities, certifies under oath that he is eligible for the office makes a false material representation within the meaning of Section 78, read in relation to Section 74. The distinction between the two remedies — cancellation under Section 78 and disqualification under Section 68 — is fundamental: the former is predicated on a false statement in the certificate of candidacy regarding eligibility, while the latter concerns prohibited election acts or traits that render a candidate unfit despite a valid certificate. Jurisprudence in Fermin v. COMELEC, Loong v. COMELEC, Munder v. COMELEC, and Codilla, Sr. v. de Venecia confirms that the grounds enumerated in Section 68 are exclusive, and ineligibilities such as the three‑term limit and perpetual special disqualification are cognizable exclusively under Section 78.

• Effect of Void Certificate of Candidacy: A certificate of candidacy that is cancelled on the ground of false material representation is void ab initio. The candidate is deemed never to have been a candidate at all. All votes cast for Lonzanida were therefore stray. As there remained only one qualified candidate — Antipolo — she effectively garnered the highest number of valid votes. The doctrine of rejection of the second placer does not apply where, as here, the disqualified candidate was never a candidate; the second placer becomes the sole candidate receiving lawful votes. The notoriety of Lonzanida’s ineligibility, established both by the earlier COMELEC orders and by the final criminal conviction long before the elections, reinforced the conclusion that the electorate could not have validly voted for him.

• Right to the Office: Because Lonzanida was never a candidate, no valid election to the Office of the Mayor took place, and no permanent vacancy arose that would trigger succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code. Antipolo, the only qualified candidate who received the highest number of votes, is entitled to be proclaimed. Section 44 contemplates a vacancy in an office filled by a duly elected official; it does not govern a situation where no candidate was ever validly elected.

• Distinction between Section 68 and Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code: A petition for disqualification under Section 68 lies exclusively for the commission of specific prohibited election acts enumerated therein or for possession of permanent resident or immigrant status in a foreign country. A petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78, on the other hand, lies when the candidate makes a false material representation required by Section 74 — including the sworn statement that he is eligible for the office sought. Ineligibilities such as violation of the three‑term limit rule and perpetual special disqualification arising from a final criminal conviction are not among the grounds for Section 68 disqualification; they are false material representations cognizable under Section 78 because they render the certification of eligibility false.

• Material Representation and Eligibility: A false representation in the certificate of candidacy is “material” when it relates to a qualification or eligibility for elective office. The candidate’s sworn certification that he is eligible for the office, as required by Section 74, is a material matter; any falsity therein — whether concerning age, citizenship, residence, or an ineligibility such as the three‑term limit or perpetual special disqualification — triggers the remedy under Section 78.

• Perpetual special disqualification as ineligibility: Under Articles 27, 30, 31, 32, and 42 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of prisión mayor carries the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, which perpetually deprives the convict of the right to vote and to be elected to or hold any public office. This ineligibility takes effect upon finality of the judgment of conviction. A convict who thereafter files a certificate of candidacy and certifies under oath that he is eligible to run makes a false material representation.

• Three-term limit rule as ineligibility: The constitutional and statutory prohibition against serving more than three consecutive terms in the same local elective office renders the candidate ineligible for the same position in the immediately succeeding election. Stating in the certificate of candidacy that he is eligible despite having served three consecutive terms constitutes false material representation.

• Effect of void ab initio certificate of candidacy: When a certificate of candidacy is cancelled on the ground of false material representation, it is void from the beginning; the person never became a candidate. All votes cast for him are stray. The qualified candidate who received the highest number of valid votes must be proclaimed, and the rule on succession does not apply because no valid office-holder was elected.

• COMELEC’s duty to enforce perpetual special disqualification: Even without a petition under Section 78, the COMELEC is under a constitutional duty, pursuant to Section 2(1), Article IX‑C of the Constitution, to enforce and administer all laws relative to elections. A final judgment of conviction imposing perpetual special disqualification is judicial notice to the COMELEC of the convict’s ineligibility, and the COMELEC must accordingly cancel his certificate of candidacy.

• “Violation of the three-term limit rule, or his conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code, does not constitute a ground for a petition under Section 68.” — This excerpt crystallizes the majority’s holding that such grounds belong exclusively to Section 78, not Section 68.

• “Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.” — The dispositive reasoning on why the second placer was proclaimed.

• “The distinction between a petition under Section 68 and a petition under Section 78 was discussed in Loong v. Commission on Elections with respect to the applicable prescriptive period. … Despite the overlap of the grounds, one should not confuse a petition for disqualification using grounds enumerated in Section 68 with a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78.” — Linking the procedural consequences to the substantive distinction.

• “Perpetual special disqualification means that ‘the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification,’ which is perpetually.” — Clarifying the permanent nature and immediate effect of the accessory penalty.

• Lacuna v. Abes, 133 Phil. 770 (1968) — Established that perpetual special disqualification deprives the convict perpetually of the right to vote and to be elected to or hold any public office, and that this accessory penalty takes effect upon finality of judgment. Applied to hold that Lonzanida’s certification of eligibility was false.

• Fermin v. Commission on Elections, 574 SCRA 782 (2008) — Distinguished between petitions under Section 68 and Section 78, holding that failure to meet a substantive qualification (such as the residency requirement) is a ground for a Section 78 petition, not a Section 68 disqualification. Extended to the three‑term limit and perpetual special disqualification.

• Loong v. Commission on Elections, 216 SCRA 760 (1992) — Emphasized that a petition based on false representation as to age is governed by Section 78 and subject to the 25‑day prescriptive period, not Section 68. Reinforced the separation of the two remedies.

• Munder v. Commission on Elections, 659 SCRA 256 (2011) — Reaffirmed that lack of a qualification (voter registration in the locality) is inappropriate for a disqualification petition under Section 68; the proper remedy is under Section 78. Applied to reinforce that the three‑term limit is a matter of eligibility, not disqualification under Section 68.

• Latasa v. Commission on Elections, 463 Phil. 296 (2003) — Involved cancellation of certificate of candidacy for violation of the three‑term limit after the candidate served three terms as municipal mayor. Although not explicitly framed as false representation, the cancellation was affirmed, supporting the majority’s treatment.

• Rivera III v. Commission on Elections, 525 SCRA 41 (2007) and Ong v. Alegre, 515 Phil. 442 (2006) — Both upheld cancellation of certificates of candidacy under Section 78 on the basis of violation of the three‑term limit rule, even where the petition was couched as one for both disqualification and cancellation.

• Section 74, Omnibus Election Code — Specifies the contents of a certificate of candidacy, including the candidate’s sworn statement that he is eligible for the office sought. This provision anchors the requirement that a candidate truthfully certify his eligibility; a false certification renders the certificate vulnerable to cancellation under Section 78.

• Section 78, Omnibus Election Code — Provides that a certificate of candidacy may be denied due course or cancelled exclusively on the ground that any material representation required under Section 74 is false. Applied as the governing provision for Lonzanida’s false representation of eligibility.

• Section 68, Omnibus Election Code — Enumerates specific prohibited election acts and permanent residence in a foreign country as grounds for disqualification. The Court held that this provision does not cover ineligibilities such as the three‑term limit or perpetual special disqualification.

• Section 8, Article X, 1987 Constitution; Section 43(b), Local Government Code — Prohibit a local elective official from serving more than three consecutive terms in the same position. Violation of this prohibition renders the official ineligible and, when accompanied by an oath of eligibility, constitutes false material representation.

• Articles 27, 30, 31, 32, and 42, Revised Penal Code — Define the penalties of prisión mayor and its accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from suffrage, the latter perpetually barring the convict from being elected to or holding any public office. Applied to establish Lonzanida’s perpetual ineligibility as of the finality of his conviction.

• Section 44, Local Government Code — Governs succession in cases of permanent vacancy in the office of the governor or mayor. The Court ruled it inapplicable because Lonzanida was never a valid office-holder; there was no “vacancy” but an election in which no valid candidate was elected.

• Section 2(1), Article IX‑C, 1987 Constitution — Mandates the COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections. The Court invoked this provision to support the COMELEC’s independent duty to cancel the certificates of candidacy of convicts suffering perpetual special disqualification, even without a private petition.

Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ.

• Justice Brion — Dissented on the ground that violation of the three‑term limit rule is properly a disqualification, not a ground for cancellation of a certificate of candidacy. He maintained that the petition should have been treated as one for disqualification under Section 68; consequently, the cancellation of Lonzanida’s certificate was erroneous. Because the disqualification could only take effect after the election where Lonzanida won, his votes were valid, he remained a candidate, and the doctrine of rejection of the second placer applied. The vice‑mayor, Aratea, should succeed under Section 44 of the Local Government Code.

• Justice Reyes — Dissented on substantially similar grounds, emphasizing the distinction between eligibility requirements (which must be stated in the certificate of candidacy and whose falsity justifies cancellation under Section 78) and disqualifications (which restrict a candidate despite compliance with eligibility requirements). The three‑term limit rule is a disqualification; the COMELEC therefore erred in cancelling the certificate. Because no final judgment of disqualification existed before the elections, Lonzanida’s votes were not stray. Following settled jurisprudence, the second placer cannot be proclaimed, and the vice‑mayor succeeds by operation of law.