Araneta, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

In the absence of conspiracy, each accused is criminally liable only for the consequences of his own acts; an accused who inflicts a slight wound that neither causes nor materially contributes to the victim’s death is liable for attempted homicide, not homicide, if intent to kill is shown by the use of a firearm. Self-defense and defense of strangers require unlawful aggression, which was absent.

Eliseo Araneta, Jr. and Benjamin Bautista were among the individuals implicated in the death of Manuel Esteban, Jr., together with Eden Ng and Joselito Santiago. The Revised Penal Code provisions on self-defense and defense of strangers under Article 11, homicide under Article 249, and attempt under Article 51 frame the criminal liability issues. The doctrine that, absent conspiracy, each accused is responsible only for the consequences of his own acts is central to the resolution.

At about a little past midnight of March 22, 1972, Manuel Esteban, Jr. and his companions Jaime Roque, Eduardo Saguil, Jesus Dizon, and Charles Go were having a drinking spree at the mezzanine floor of the Sands Kitchenette on Rizal Avenue, Manila. A napkin container was thrown at their table from a group of three or four persons that included Eliseo Araneta, Jr. and Benjamin Bautista. Esteban approached Araneta’s group, and a heated argument ensued.

Bautista pushed Esteban’s left shoulder, causing him to spin. Araneta, Jr., whose right hand was atrophied, then fired his gun with his left hand and hit Esteban, who was stooping, at the back. Having been shot, Esteban drew his gun and fired indiscriminately, hitting Manuel de Guzman, a companion of Araneta, on the left thigh. The bullet that wounded De Guzman hit the wall and ricocheted, hitting Eden Ng along his umbilical cord. Bautista then held Esteban, who was bent forward, by the right wrist and poked a gun at him. At that point, Bautista suddenly fired his gun, hitting Esteban in the chest. Roque and Saguil, together with a bouncer from a nearby Soda Fountain, brought Esteban to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital, where he was pronounced dead on arrival.

Post-mortem findings prepared by Dr. Abelardo B. Lucero, Medico Legal Examiner of the Manila Metropolitan Police, stated that the victim died of “shock and hemorrhage due to multiple (2) gunshot wounds in the anterior and posterior chest lacerating the diaphragm, liver, stomach and spleen.” Dr. Lucero testified that wound No. 1, located at the anterior right chest, was a contact wound because the muzzle of the gun touched the skin, and was fatal, while wound No. 2, found at the back, was a slight wound that made it possible for the victim to fire a gun even after sustaining it. In his opinion, the wounds were caused by bullets of different caliber, or at least by different firearms, with wound No. 2 inflicted ahead of wound No. 1.

The post-mortem report detailed entry wound I and exit wound I-A, and entry wound II and exit wound II-A. The report was read as showing four gunshot wounds. The gunshot fired by Bautista produced entry wound I at the anterior right chest and exit wound I-A at the left lateral chest, lacerating the diaphragm, liver, stomach, and spleen, and was fatal. The gunshot fired by Araneta, Jr. caused entry wound II at the left posterior midlateral chest and exit wound II-A at the lateral posterior left shoulder; the bullet only lacerated the skin and subcutaneous tissues and was classified by Dr. Lucero as a slight injury. The “two gunshot wounds” stated as the cause of death referred to the entry and exit wounds produced by Bautista’s gunshot.

The trial court found that wound No. 2 was caused by Araneta’s gun, which was established to have fired first, and that wound No. 1 was inflicted by Bautista. No conspiracy between the petitioners was claimed or shown; there was no concerted action pursuant to a common criminal design. The prosecution witnesses Eduardo Saguil and Jaime Roque identified Bautista as the person who pushed the victim during the confrontation and as the person who last shot him. Saguil’s statements before the Manila Metropolitan Police and later before the National Bureau of Investigation differed, but he explained that he signed the MMP statement because he was intimidated by investigating officers who did not want him to implicate Bautista, their comrade; when he insisted that Bautista shot the victim, the investigating officer stopped taking his statement and indicated that Saguil refused to continue. Saguil and Roque then went to the NBI to give another sworn statement disclosing the whole truth. Bautista claimed he was in the vicinity because he had given his compadre Arsenio Sanchez a ride to La Loma, but Sanchez was never presented to corroborate him; the trial court treated the non-presentation as wilfully suppressed evidence that would be adverse to Bautista. Bautista also invoked the negative result of a paraffin test taken nine hours after the shooting, while the ballistics examination showed that his gun had traces of thick oil and that one chamber had smoke rings.

• Slight Physical Injuries Only (Araneta): Araneta argued that on the basis of the facts and findings in the decision itself, he could not be convicted of homicide but at most only of slight physical injuries, because wound No. 2 was a slight wound and not fatal, and had Bautista not subsequently shot the victim, the victim would not have died.
• No Conspiracy (Araneta): Araneta asserted that no conspiracy was established and that his liability should therefore be limited to the slight injury he caused.
• Self-Defense/Defense of Strangers (Araneta): Araneta maintained that he should be acquitted on the ground of self-defense and/or defense of strangers, claiming that the victim was under the heavy influence of liquor, suddenly accosted their group because of the napkin container, and was the first to fire the shot.
• Thru-and-Thru Wounds (Araneta): Araneta retorted that the two gunshot wounds were “thru and thru,” resulting in four wounds, two of entry and two of exit, so the “two gunshot wounds” causing death referred to those caused by Bautista’s gunshot.
• Factual Errors and Speculation (Bautista): Bautista assigned as errors that the conclusions of the Court of Appeals were contrary to law or jurisprudence, were grounded on speculation, surmises, and conjectures, rested on misapprehension of facts and grave abuse of discretion, failed to reject conflicting statements of prosecution witnesses, and overlooked circumstances of weight and influence that would lead to acquittal.
• Negative Paraffin Test (Bautista): Bautista decried that the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not give weight to the negative result of the paraffin test taken nine hours after the shooting and instead speculated that he could have removed gunpowder; he contended that the supposition that, as a policeman, he knew gunpowder could be removed by vinegar or soap and water was unfounded and unsupported by evidence.
• Witness Credibility (Bautista): Bautista discounted the testimony of Eduardo Saguil because of conflicting statements before the Manila Metropolitan Police and the National Bureau of Investigation, and deplored the crediting of Jaime Roque’s testimony placing him at the scene before the shooting while disregarding his version that he merely responded as a police officer after hearing the shots. He also capitalized on Roque’s failure to identify him and his co-accused in the NBI sworn statement.

• Two Gunshot Wounds Caused Death: The State, through the Solicitor General, opposed Araneta’s theory, arguing that the denomination of wound No. 2 as “slight” merely referred to the gunshot wound of entry and that the medical findings showed the victim died of shock and hemorrhage caused by two gunshot wounds, wound No. 1 and wound No. 2.
• No Thru-and-Thru Wounds: The Solicitor General contended that since none of the wounds was “thru and thru,” one could not be the wound of entry while the other the wound of exit; the conclusion was ineluctable that the two gunshot wounds, one in front and one at the back, caused the shock, hemorrhage, and laceration of internal organs.

• Self-Defense/Defense of Strangers: Whether Araneta should be acquitted on the ground of self-defense and/or defense of strangers.
• Criminal Liability for Death: Whether Araneta can be convicted of homicide for the victim’s death when he inflicted only a slight wound and no conspiracy existed, or only of slight physical injuries or attempted homicide.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy existed between the petitioners.
• Sufficiency of Evidence Against Bautista: Whether the Court of Appeals and trial court erred in finding Bautista liable for homicide based on the prosecution evidence, despite the negative paraffin test and alleged inconsistencies of prosecution witnesses.
• Review of Factual Findings: Whether the Supreme Court should review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.

• Self-Defense/Defense of Strangers: No. Self-defense and defense of strangers under Article 11, paragraphs 1 and 3, Revised Penal Code require unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, and none was present.
• Criminal Liability for Death: Araneta is not liable for homicide. Absent conspiracy, each accused is responsible only for the consequences of his own acts; his slight wound did not cause or materially contribute to the victim’s death, but the use of a firearm showed intent to kill, making him liable for attempted homicide.
• Conspiracy: None. No concerted action pursuant to a common criminal design between the petitioners was shown.
• Sufficiency of Evidence Against Bautista: No error. The conviction of Bautista for homicide was affirmed; positive identification by prosecution witnesses and corroborating circumstances established that he inflicted the fatal wound.
• Review of Factual Findings: No. Factual findings of the trial court and Court of Appeals, especially on credibility, are binding absent grave abuse of discretion or obvious misapprehension of facts, and no such exception was shown.

• Self-Defense/Defense of Strangers: The rule is well-settled that an indispensable requirement of self-defense and defense of strangers under paragraphs 1 and 3, respectively, of Article 11, Revised Penal Code is unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. For unlawful aggression to be present in self-defense, there must be an assault or at least a threatened assault of an immediate and imminent kind on the person defending himself. In this case, there was no actual physical assault on Araneta or any member of his group. Neither was it shown that the victim exhibited an intimidating attitude that was offensive and positively strong, showing a wrongful intent to cause injury. When the victim approached Araneta’s group, presumably to confront them about the napkin container, he was not yet brandishing his gun. A mere threatening attitude on the part of the victim would not constitute unlawful aggression. If there was any unlawful aggression, it came from Araneta’s group when Bautista pushed the victim’s shoulder, after which Araneta fired the first shot hitting the victim; only then did the victim draw his gun and fire indiscriminately. Araneta, as the accused, had to establish self-defense by clear and convincing evidence and rely on the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence. Because there was no unlawful aggression, the justifying circumstance could not absolve him.
• Criminal Liability for Death: The post-mortem findings showed that the victim died of shock and hemorrhage due to multiple (2) gunshot wounds in the anterior and posterior chest lacerating the diaphragm, liver, stomach, and spleen. Dr. Lucero testified that wound No. 1 at the anterior right chest was a contact wound and fatal, while wound No. 2 at the back was a slight wound. The post-mortem report detailed four gunshot wounds: entry wound I and exit wound I-A produced by Bautista’s gunshot, which lacerated the diaphragm, liver, stomach, and spleen and was fatal; and entry wound II and exit wound II-A produced by Araneta’s gunshot, which only lacerated the skin and subcutaneous tissues and was classified as a slight injury. The “two gunshot wounds” indicated as the cause of death therefore referred to the entry and exit wounds produced by Bautista’s gunshot. There was no conspiracy between the petitioners; no concerted action pursuant to a common criminal design was shown. In the absence of conspiracy, each accused was responsible only for the consequences of his own acts. The gunshot wound inflicted by Araneta was slight and did not cause the victim’s death nor materially contribute to it. His liability should therefore be limited to the slight injury he caused. However, the fact that Araneta inflicted a gunshot wound on the victim showed intent to kill; the use of a gun fired at another certainly led to no other conclusion than that there was intent to kill. He was therefore liable for attempted homicide, not merely slight physical injury. The penalty was under Article 249 in relation with Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
• Conspiracy: There was no pretension that there was any conspiracy between the petitioners. There was no concerted action pursuant to a common criminal design. In the absence of conspiracy, each of the accused was responsible only for the consequences of his own acts. The Court cited cases where one accused inflicted the mortal wound while others inflicted lesser injuries; the former was held guilty of murder or homicide while the latter were held liable only for slight or less serious physical injuries. Applied to the facts, Araneta’s slight wound did not make him liable for the death caused by Bautista’s fatal wound.
• Sufficiency of Evidence Against Bautista: The issues raised by Bautista involved questions of fact, namely whether he shot the victim and whether he was present at the inception of the shooting, which the Supreme Court would not ordinarily review. Except in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher, appeals to the Supreme Court are not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, allowed only on questions of law distinctly set forth in the petition and only when there are special and important reasons. Bautista invoked exceptions—speculation, misapprehension of facts, and grave abuse of discretion—but the records showed other circumstances supporting the conclusion that he fired his gun. The ballistics results showed that his gun was newly oiled and had traces of thick oil, which he failed to refute or explain; the obvious purpose of oiling was to remove traces of gunpowder. The ballistics test also showed that one chamber of his gun had smoke rings, which appear in the chamber of a revolver whose bullet was fired; only one chamber had smoke rings, showing he fired one shot, consistent with prosecution witnesses. His explanation that the smoke ring was due to his participation in quelling student demonstrations in February failed to explain why the smoke ring was still present despite the newly oiled gun. These circumstances were nevertheless of no moment because of the positive identification of Bautista by prosecution witness Eduardo Saguil. Saguil’s apparent inconsistency—failing to identify the person who fired the fatal shot before the MMP on March 23, 1972, but identifying Bautista before the NBI on March 24, 1972—was satisfactorily explained at trial. He testified that he had no choice but to sign the MMP sworn statements because he was intimidated by investigating officers who did not want him to implicate Bautista, their comrade; when he insisted that Bautista shot the victim, investigating officer Rolando Atanacio stopped taking the statement and indicated that Saguil refused to continue. Saguil and Jaime Roque then went to the NBI to give another sworn statement disclosing the truth. Roque affirmatively identified Bautista as the person who pushed the victim on the shoulder during the confrontation. Bautista claimed he was in the vicinity because he gave his compadre Arsenio Sanchez a ride to La Loma, but Sanchez was never presented to corroborate him; the trial court properly observed that the non-presentation of Sanchez was evidence wilfully suppressed which, if presented, would be adverse to Bautista. Bautista also capitalized on Roque’s failure to identify him and his co-accused in the NBI sworn statement, but this was explained by the fact that Roque did not know their names at the start and merely recognized their faces; he learned their names only when their pictures were shown. The trial court’s conclusion on the credibility of Saguil and Roque was sustained because the trial court was in a better position to decide the question, having seen and heard the witnesses and observed their behavior and manner of testifying. Its impressions were binding unless there appeared grave abuse of discretion or obvious misapprehension of facts. No evil or bad motive was shown to have existed before the incident that would prompt Roque and Saguil to testify as they did if their testimony were not true. The absence of evidence of improper motive actuating the principal prosecution witnesses strongly tended to sustain that no improper motive existed and that their testimony was worthy of full faith and credit. The positive testimony of the prosecution witnesses that Bautista was at the crime scene at the inception of the incident and was the person who confronted and last shot the victim, together with all attendant circumstances, could not be overcome by his mere denials. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals were upheld, and Bautista was held liable for the death of the victim by inflicting the fatal wound.
• Review of Factual Findings: The factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, particularly on the credibility of witnesses, are generally binding on the Supreme Court. Appeals to the Supreme Court in criminal cases are not a matter of right except where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher; they are allowed only on questions of law and only for special and important reasons. The exceptions invoked by Bautista—that the findings were grounded on speculation, surmises, or conjectures, that the judgment was based on a misapprehension of facts, or that there was grave abuse of discretion—were not shown. The trial court’s assessment of the witnesses’ credibility, based on its opportunity to see and hear them, was therefore sustained.

• Unlawful Aggression as Indispensable Requirement of Self-Defense and Defense of Strangers — Under Article 11, paragraphs 1 and 3, Revised Penal Code, self-defense and defense of strangers require unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Unlawful aggression means an assault or at least a threatened assault of an immediate and imminent kind on the person defending himself; a mere threatening attitude is not enough. In this case, the victim had not assaulted or threatened Araneta’s group when he approached them, and if there was any unlawful aggression, it came from Araneta’s group when Bautista pushed the victim and Araneta fired first. The justifying circumstances therefore did not apply.
• Individual Criminal Liability Absent Conspiracy — In the absence of conspiracy, each accused is responsible only for the consequences of his own acts. No concerted action pursuant to a common criminal design was shown between Araneta and Bautista. Thus, Araneta could not be held liable for the death caused by Bautista’s fatal gunshot wound.
• Slight Wound Not Causing or Materially Contributing to Death — An accused who inflicts a wound that is slight and neither causes nor materially contributes to the victim’s death cannot be convicted of homicide for that death. Araneta’s gunshot wound only lacerated the skin and subcutaneous tissues and was classified as a slight injury; it did not cause or materially contribute to the victim’s death.
• Intent to Kill from Use of a Firearm — The use of a gun fired at another person leads to no other conclusion than that there is intent to kill. Although Araneta’s wound was slight, his act of firing a gun at the victim established intent to kill, making him liable for attempted homicide rather than merely slight physical injuries.
• Attempted Homicide Under Article 249 in Relation to Article 51 — When intent to kill is present but the wound inflicted is not fatal and does not cause death, the accused may be liable for attempted homicide, penalized under Article 249 in relation with Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code. Araneta was convicted of attempted homicide and sentenced to ten (10) months of prision correccional, with voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance.
• Appellate Review of Factual Findings and Credibility — Factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, especially on witness credibility, are binding on the Supreme Court absent grave abuse of discretion or obvious misapprehension of facts. Appeals to the Supreme Court in criminal cases are not a matter of right except where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher; they are allowed only on questions of law and for special and important reasons. Bautista’s factual challenges were rejected under this rule.
• Negative Paraffin Test Not Conclusive — A negative paraffin test is not conclusive proof that an accused did not fire a gun. In this case, the finding that Bautista fired a shot was upheld based on positive identification by prosecution witnesses and corroborating ballistics circumstances, including the newly oiled gun with traces of thick oil and the presence of smoke rings in one chamber of his revolver.
• Credibility of Witnesses and Absence of Improper Motive — The trial court’s assessment of witness credibility is entitled to great weight because it has seen and heard the witnesses and observed their demeanor. Absence of evidence of improper motive on the part of principal prosecution witnesses tends to sustain their testimony and make it worthy of full faith and credit. The positive testimony of Saguil and Roque prevailed over Bautista’s mere denials.

• "The rule is well-settled that an indispensable requirement of self-defense and defense of strangers under paragraphs 1 and 3, respectively, of Article 11, Revised Penal Code is unlawful aggression on the part of the victim." — This states the controlling requisite for the justifying circumstances invoked by Araneta and explains why his self-defense claim failed.
• "In the absence of conspiracy, each of the accused, herein petitioners, is responsible only for the consequences of his own acts." — This is the ratio decidendi for limiting Araneta’s liability to his own act rather than the death caused by Bautista’s fatal shot.
• "The gunshot wound inflicted by petitioner Araneta, Jr. was a slight wound which did not cause the death of the victim nor materially contributed to it in order that he may be held liable for homicide." — This applies the individual-liability rule to the medical evidence and excludes Araneta from liability for homicide.
• "However, the fact that petitioner Araneta Jr. inflicted a gunshot wound on the victim shows the intent to kill. The use of a gun fired at another certainly leads to no other conclusion than that there is intent to kill. He is therefore liable for the crime of attempted homicide and not merely for slight physical injury." — This defines the doctrinal basis for convicting Araneta of attempted homicide despite the slight nature of the wound.

• People vs. Yuman, 61 Phil. 786 (1935); People vs. Apolinario, 58 Phil. 586 (1933) — Cited for the rule that unlawful aggression is indispensable in self-defense and defense of strangers.
• People vs. Pasco, Jr., 137 SCRA 137 (1985); People vs. Crisostomo, 108 SCRA 288 (1981); People vs. Alconga and Bracamonte, 78 Phil. 366 (1947) — Cited for the definition of unlawful aggression as an assault or at least a threatened assault of an immediate and imminent kind.
• U.S. vs. Guy-Sayco, 13 Phil. 292 (1906) — Cited for the principle that a mere threatening attitude on the part of the victim does not constitute unlawful aggression.
• People vs. Abarintos, 81 Phil. 238 (1948); People vs. Tamayo, et al., 44 Phil. 38 (1922) — Cited for the rule that in the absence of conspiracy, each accused is responsible only for the consequences of his own acts.
• People vs. Tividad, 20 SCRA 549 (1967); People vs. Portugueza, 20 SCRA 901 (1967) — Cited as examples where one accused inflicted the mortal wound and was convicted of murder while the other accused who inflicted lesser injuries was held liable only for less serious or slight physical injuries.
• U.S. vs. Abiog and Abiog, 37 Phil. 137 (1917) — Cited for the principle that a slight wound that did not cause death nor materially contribute to it limits the accused’s liability to the injury caused.
• Balde vs. Court of Appeals, 150 SCRA 365 (1987) — Cited for the rule that appeals to the Supreme Court are not a matter of right except in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher, and are allowed only on questions of law with special and important reasons.
• People vs. Ancheta, 148 SCRA 178 (1987); People vs. Cabiling, 74 SCRA 288 (1976) — Cited for the rule that the trial court’s assessment of witness credibility is binding on the Supreme Court absent grave abuse of discretion or misapprehension of facts.
• People vs. Angeles, 92 SCRA 432 (1979); People vs. Mercado, 38 SCRA 168 (1971); People vs. Amiscua, 37 SCRA 813 (1971) — Cited for the principle that absence of evidence of improper motive on the part of prosecution witnesses tends to sustain their credibility.
• People vs. Parilla, 144 SCRA 454 (1986); People vs. Canada, 144 SCRA 121 (1986); People vs. Chavez, 117 SCRA 221 (1982) — Cited for the rule that positive testimony of prosecution witnesses prevails over mere denials of the accused.

• Article 11, paragraphs 1 and 3, Revised Penal Code — Provides the justifying circumstances of self-defense and defense of strangers, both of which require unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. The Court found no unlawful aggression by the victim, so Araneta could not invoke either circumstance.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes homicide. Bautista was convicted of homicide for inflicting the fatal gunshot wound.
• Article 51, Revised Penal Code — Provides the penalty for attempted felonies. Araneta was convicted of attempted homicide under Article 249 in relation with Article 51.
• Rule 131, Section 5(e), Rules of Court — Provides that evidence wilfully suppressed would be adverse if produced. The trial court applied this to Bautista’s failure to present Arsenio Sanchez to corroborate his claim.

Narvasa, C.J.; Cruz, J.; Griño-Aquino, J.; Medialdea, J.