Aquino vs. Municipality of Malay, Aklan

A municipal mayor acts in a quasi-judicial capacity when issuing demolition orders under Section 444(b)(3)(vi) of the Local Government Code, as such orders require a determination of illegality affecting property rights and necessitate prior notice and hearing; consequently, certiorari—not declaratory relief—lies to challenge such orders once implemented, and the mayor’s finding of illegality based on non-compliance with permit requirements and zoning ordinances constitutes valid exercise of police power.

Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc., represented by petitioner Crisostomo Aquino as president and CEO, operated a resort in Sitio Diniwid, Barangay Balabag, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, on land covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). In January 2010, the company applied for zoning clearance to construct a three-storey hotel within a 25-meter "no build zone" from the shoreline as defined under Municipal Ordinance 2000-131. The municipal zoning administrator denied the application, citing the ordinance’s prohibition on permanent structures within the zone. Despite this denial and pending administrative appeals, the company proceeded with construction and operation without securing building permits, zoning clearances, or business permits.

• Nature of the Property and Business: Petitioner is the president and CEO of Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc., which operates a resort on a 998-square-meter parcel in Sitio Diniwid, Barangay Balabag, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan. The property is covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the DENR.
• Zoning Application and Denial: On January 7, 2010, the company applied for zoning compliance and a building permit for a three-storey hotel. On January 20, 2010, the Municipal Zoning Administrator denied the application under Municipal Ordinance 2000-131, which designates a "no build zone" 25 meters from the mean high water mark.
• Administrative Inaction: Petitioner appealed to the Office of the Mayor on February 1, 2010, and followed up on May 13, 2010, but the mayor took no action on the appeal.
• Continued Construction and Tax Assessment: Despite the pending appeal and lack of permits, petitioner continued construction and operation. On April 5, 2011, the municipal treasurer issued a Notice of Assessment demanding payment of unpaid taxes and threatening closure for operating without zoning clearance, building permit, and business permits. Petitioner tendered payment, but the treasurer refused to accept it.
• Demolition Orders: On March 28, 2011, the municipality issued a Cease and Desist Order against the expansion. On June 7, 2011, the Mayor issued Executive Order No. 10 ordering the closure and demolition of the hotel. Partial demolition occurred on June 10, 2011, with further demolitions in February 2014.
• Lower Court Findings: The Court of Appeals found that the mayor acted in an executive capacity, not quasi-judicial, and that declaratory relief was the proper remedy.

• Propriety of Certiorari: Petitioner maintained that certiorari was the proper remedy because the mayor acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing EO 10, and declaratory relief was no longer available since the order had already been implemented and caused actual demolition.
• Quasi-Judicial Function: Petitioner argued that the mayor exercised quasi-judicial functions in determining the illegality of the structure and adjudicating property rights, making the action subject to certiorari.
• Due Process Violation: Petitioner contended that judicial proceedings were required before demolition, citing Asilo, Jr. v. People, and that the summary demolition violated due process.
• Primary Jurisdiction of DENR: Petitioner asserted that because the land is forestland under a FLAgT, the DENR—not the LGU—has primary jurisdiction over the area, and the DENR Regional Executive Director had issued a favorable opinion supporting petitioner’s position.
• FLAgT Preemption: Petitioner argued that the FLAgT granted the right to construct permanent improvements and that Sections 6 and 8 of Municipal Ordinance 2000-131, which allow DENR authorization for construction on slopes and swamps, should apply by analogy to exempt the hotel from the "no build zone" restriction.
• LGU Delay: Petitioner claimed that the mayor’s failure to act on the zoning appeal justified proceeding with construction, and that the LGU could not subsequently demand demolition after delaying the permit process.

• Executive vs. Judicial Function: Respondents countered that the mayor issued EO 10 in the exercise of executive functions under the Local Government Code, not quasi-judicial functions, rendering certiorari improper.
• Declaratory Relief as Proper Remedy: Respondents argued that declaratory relief under Rule 63 was the appropriate vehicle to challenge the validity of EO 10 before its implementation.
• Nuisance and Police Power: Respondents maintained that the hotel constituted a nuisance and that under Section 444(b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, the mayor had express authority to order demolition of illegally constructed buildings without prior judicial proceedings.
• Non-Compliance with Permits: Respondents emphasized that petitioner failed to secure zoning clearance, building permits, and business permits, and that the FLAgT did not exempt petitioner from compliance with Municipal Ordinance 2000-131 or Presidential Decree No. 1096 (National Building Code).
• DENR Jurisdiction: Respondents argued that the controversy involved building permit violations and zoning compliance, not environmental protection or forest management, placing jurisdiction with the LGU rather than the DENR.

• Availability of Declaratory Relief: Whether declaratory relief remained available to petitioner after the implementation of EO 10 and partial demolition of the hotel.
• Nature of Mayoral Function: Whether the municipal mayor exercised quasi-judicial functions in issuing the demolition order, rendering certiorari the proper remedy.
• Procedural Due Process: Whether petitioner was denied due process by the summary demolition without prior judicial proceedings.
• Validity of Permit Denial: Whether the LGU’s refusal to issue building permits and clearances was justified under the "no build zone" ordinance.
• Hierarchy of Laws: Whether rights under the FLAgT prevail over the municipal zoning ordinance and the National Building Code.
• Administrative Jurisdiction: Whether the DENR has primary jurisdiction over the controversy to the exclusion of the LGU.

• Availability of Declaratory Relief: Declaratory relief was no longer viable because the action presupposes no actual breach or violation; since EO 10 had been enforced and substantial demolition occurred, the controversy had ripened beyond the scope of declaratory relief under Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.
• Nature of Mayoral Function: The mayor exercised quasi-judicial functions in issuing EO 10, as the order required a determination of illegality affecting property rights and necessitated notice and hearing. Citing City Engineer of Baguio v. Baniqued, the determination of whether a structure is illegal involves quasi-judicial powers, not merely executive functions.
• Procedural Due Process: No due process violation occurred because petitioner received notices on March 7 and 28, 2011, and the Municipal Ordinance provided a 10-day grace period for voluntary demolition before government intervention. The presumption of regularity in official acts applied, and petitioner failed to prove denial of opportunity to be heard.
• Power to Order Demolition: Section 444(b)(3)(vi) of the LGC authorizes municipal mayors to order the demolition of illegally constructed structures after due notice and hearing. This power is distinct from the power to summarily abate nuisances per se and does not require prior judicial approval.
• Classification of Structure: The hotel was not a nuisance per se (which requires no hearing) but a nuisance per accidens, as its objectionable character derived from its location in the "no build zone" rather than inherent qualities. However, the demolition was valid under the LGC provision regarding illegal constructions, not the nuisance abatement power.
• Hierarchy of Laws: The FLAgT did not exempt petitioner from local zoning laws or the National Building Code. Forestlands remain subject to municipal territorial jurisdiction, and the FLAgT and ordinance provisions are cumulative, not mutually exclusive. The DENR opinion was not binding on the courts.
• Administrative Jurisdiction: The DENR does not have primary jurisdiction over building permit and zoning violations. The controversy involved compliance with construction permits, not environmental protection or forest management. The LGU’s power under Section 444(b)(3)(vi) of the LGC is separate from the DENR’s supervisory role over community-based forestry projects under Section 17(b)(2)(ii).

• Declaratory Relief Limitation — An action for declaratory relief is available only before an actual breach or violation of the instrument or statute occurs; once enforcement actions have been taken and rights have been invaded, the remedy becomes unavailable, and certiorari or other appropriate actions lie instead.
• Quasi-Judicial Function Test — An officer exercises quasi-judicial functions when required to investigate facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions as a basis for official action affecting property rights, regardless of the executive character of the office; the nature of the act performed, not the office itself, determines whether judicial or quasi-judicial functions are involved.
• Nuisance Classification — Nuisances are classified as per se (nuisances under all circumstances, summarily abatable) or per accidens (nuisances depending on location and circumstances, requiring judicial determination before abatement). Local government units generally cannot declare a thing a nuisance per accidens and order its summary demolition without judicial proceedings.
• Police Power and Building Regulation — Under the general welfare clause and police power, local government units may regulate property rights to protect public safety. Section 444(b)(3)(vi) of the LGC specifically empowers municipal mayors to order the closure and demolition of illegally constructed establishments after notice and hearing, without requiring prior judicial intervention.
• Cumulative Compliance Requirements — Rights granted under special use agreements (such as FLAgT) from national agencies do not exempt holders from compliance with local zoning ordinances, building codes, and permit requirements; contractual agreements cannot amend statutory or regulatory requirements.

• "An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of the rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained before the breach or violation of the statute, deed or contract to which it refers." — Defining the temporal limitation of declaratory relief.
• "It is not essential that the challenged proceedings should be strictly and technically judicial, in the sense in which that word is used when applied to courts of justice, but it is sufficient if they are quasi-judicial." — Establishing the standard for determining when certiorari lies.
• "There is no gainsaying that a city mayor is an executive official nor is the matter of issuing demolition notices or orders not a ministerial one. In determining whether or not a structure is illegal or it should be demolished, property rights are involved thereby needing notices and opportunity to be heard as provided for in the constitutionally guaranteed right of due process. In pursuit of these functions, the city mayor has to exercise quasi-judicial powers." — Articulating the quasi-judicial nature of demolition orders.
• "Nuisances are of two kinds: nuisance per se and nuisance per accidens. The first is recognized as a nuisance under any and all circumstances, because it constitutes a direct menace to public health or safety, and, for that reason, may be abated summarily under the undefined law of necessity. The second is that which depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing does in law constitute a nuisance." — Distinguishing between types of nuisances for purposes of abatement procedures.
• "Forestlands, although under the management of the DENR, are not exempt from the territorial application of municipal laws, for local government units legitimately exercise their powers of government over their defined territorial jurisdiction." — Affirming the concurrent application of local and national regulations over forestlands.

• City Engineer of Baguio v. Baniqued, G.R. No. 150270, November 26, 2008 — Controlling precedent establishing that mayors exercise quasi-judicial functions when issuing demolition orders affecting property rights, requiring notice and hearing.
• AC Enterprises v. Frabelle Properties Corp., G.R. No. 166744, November 2, 2006 — Controlling precedent holding that local legislative bodies cannot declare a thing a nuisance per accidens and order its extrajudicial condemnation; such determinations require judicial proceedings.
• Salao v. Santos, 67 Phil. 550 (1939) — Cited for the definition and distinction between nuisance per se and nuisance per accidens.
• Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation v. Bonifacio, G.R. No. 167391, June 8, 2011 — Cited regarding the nature and purpose of declaratory relief under Rule 63.
• Yusay v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156684, April 6, 2011 — Cited for the requisites of certiorari under Rule 65.
• Galicto v. Aquino, G.R. No. 193978, February 28, 2012 — Cited for the definition of quasi-judicial function as applied to administrative bodies.
• Asilo, Jr. v. People, G.R. Nos. 159017-18, 159059, March 9, 2011 — Distinguished; petitioner cited this for the requirement of judicial proceedings before demolition, but the Court noted it applied to nuisances per accidens, whereas the present case involved illegal construction under the LGC.

• Section 1, Rule 63, Rules of Court — Governs declaratory relief actions, limiting them to controversies arising before breach or violation of the instrument or statute.
• Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court — Governs certiorari, requiring that the writ be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions who has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
• Section 444(b)(3)(vi), Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Authorizes municipal mayors to require owners of illegally constructed structures to obtain permits or to order their demolition after due notice and hearing.
• Section 447(a)(5)(i), Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Grants the Sangguniang Bayan power to provide for the establishment, maintenance, and protection of communal forests and similar projects, emphasizing concurrent jurisdiction with the DENR.
• Section 17(b)(2)(ii), Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Devolves implementation of community-based forestry projects to municipalities subject to DENR supervision and review.
• Section 30, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Provides for the review of executive orders by the provincial governor, deemed inadequate given the urgency of demolition.
• Article 694, Civil Code of the Philippines — Defines nuisance as any act, omission, or establishment that injures health, safety, or property, or obstructs public ways.
• Section 301, Presidential Decree No. 1096 (National Building Code of the Philippines) — Requires building permits before construction, which petitioner failed to obtain.

Diosdado M. Peralta, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Bienvenido L. Reyes, Francis H. Jardeleza