Aquino vs. Court of Appeals

Mere receipt, after expiration of a recruitment license, of carry-over payments for recruitment services rendered while licensed does not constitute illegal recruitment, and criminal liability requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of actual recruitment without license. Recruitment was completed when inducements, advertising, and applications occurred during the license period; winding-up collections and closure of the agency negated continued operation without license.

Aurora T. Aquino operated as a licensed labor contractor in 1973-1974, holding a Labor Contractor's License dated May 22, 1973 and acting under appointment as Philippine representative of Guam and London employers, including George J. Viegas. Presidential Decree No. 442 required a license or authority from the Department of Labor to operate a private fee-charging or non-fee-charging employment agency, with Article 24 prohibiting unlicensed operation and Article 25 prohibiting travel agencies from recruiting for overseas employment.

Aurora T. Aquino, a 51-year-old businesswoman, held a Labor Contractor's License (New) dated May 22, 1973 for 1973-1974 and claimed appointment as Philippine representative of Guam and London employers under a Special Power of Attorney from George J. Viegas dated November 29, 1973. Operating from an office at the Manila Hotel annex and the Greenwich Travel Agency, she advertised and accepted applications for employment in Guam, charging the usual P1,500.00 in recruitment fees. Sometime in January 1973 Rodrigo Nicolas applied as carpenter and paid P1,000.00, with a second payment of P500.00 on September 24, 1974; on or about March 12, 1973 Braulio Sapitula applied as carpenter and paid P500.00 initially, with a second payment of P1,000.00 on February 5, 1975; sometime in May 1973 Aurelio Costales applied and paid P800.00 partially, with a second payment of P550.00 on September 24, 1974; and sometime in June 1974, according to the prosecution, Benito Vertudez applied, paid P70.00 for mailing expenses, then P500.00 in September 1974 and another P500.00, for a total claimed of P1,070.00.

When the workers failed to leave for Guam, allegedly because Viegas encountered trouble with his Guam government contract, Aquino made refunds and issued checks. Nicolas was refunded P1,000.00 directly with the P500.00 balance claimed included in a group refund check for P5,270.00 that could not be cashed for lack of funds; Costales received P700.00 with the P650.00 balance claimed included in the same dishonored group check; Vertudez was issued a P1,070.00 check likewise dishonored; Sapitula was claimed to have been refunded P500.00. According to Aquino, her license expired on May 18, 1974 and was not renewed due to a Ministry phase-out policy, she sought renewal by letters dated July 4, 1974, February 4, 1975, March 3, 1975 and April 29, 1975, was told by Undersecretary Amado Inciong to proceed until Secretary Blas Ople returned, then closed her Manila Hotel annex office, moved winding-up to her Quezon City residence, and stopped operations in 1976. For his part, Vertudez testified he applied sometime in June 1974, while Aquino testified he and the other complainants applied in 1973 before expiration. Aurelio Costales and Rodrigo Nicolas later executed affidavits of desistance in a related estafa case arising from the same facts, admitting satisfaction of P650.00 and P500.00 respectively.

The trial court found the prosecution witnesses credible, convicted Aquino under Article 25 penalized under Article 39, paragraph (b), and ordered indemnification of P5,270.00, service at the National Penitentiary, and costs. The Court of Appeals affirmed in full.

• Jurisdiction: Petitioner argued that the Regional Trial Court of Manila lacked jurisdiction and the case should have been dismissed on that ground.
• No Illegal Recruitment After Expiration: Petitioner maintained that she did not illegally recruit after her license expired on May 18, 1974, because she was a duly licensed contractor when she acted on the 1973 applications as representative of George Viegas, non-renewal resulted from a Ministry phase-out policy rather than violation, and post-expiration receipts were winding-up collections evidenced by receipts dated October 24, 1973, August 15, 1973, December 15, 1973, August 14, 1974 and June 19, 1974 and renewal follow-ups.
• Civil Indemnity: Petitioner argued that the P5,270.00 indemnification was erroneous because she had reimbursed complainants through a group check, and if the check allegedly bounced, complainants should have presented the dishonored check or bank return slip.

• Applicable Provision and Continued Collection as Recruitment: Respondent, through the Solicitor General, countered that while the charge cited Article 25, Article 24 was really violated, and that continued charging and collecting of fees from applicants after May 18, 1974 constituted engagement in illegal recruitment without the required license or authority.

• Jurisdiction and Estoppel: Whether the Regional Trial Court of Manila had jurisdiction, and whether petitioner, having failed to raise lack of jurisdiction below, is estopped from assailing it after affirmance by the Court of Appeals.
• Illegal Recruitment After License Expiration: Whether receipt of payments after May 18, 1974 for services rendered before expiration, and the alleged June 1974 recruitment of Benito Vertudez, constitute illegal recruitment without license under Article 24 (charged as Article 25) of Presidential Decree No. 442.
• Civil Liability: Whether petitioner remains liable to indemnify complainants in the amount of P5,270.00 despite issuance of a group refund check, and whether affidavits of desistance require deduction.

• Jurisdiction and Estoppel: No. Jurisdiction is determined by the information's allegation of situs, and active participation without objection estops a party from assailing jurisdiction after conviction, pursuant to Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy.
• Illegal Recruitment After License Expiration: No. Post-expiration collection of carry-over accounts is winding-up, not operation without license, and uncorroborated testimony on Vertudez's alleged June 1974 recruitment failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt under strict construction of penal laws.
• Civil Liability: Yes, with modification. Mere issuance of a check is not payment until encashed, but P650.00 and P500.00 admitted satisfied per affidavits of desistance must be deducted, leaving P4,170.00 with legal interest from December 1, 1978.

• Jurisdiction and Estoppel: Jurisdiction is tested by the information's allegation that the crime was committed in Manila, where the court sat, under Colmenares vs. Villar and People vs. Galano. Because lack of jurisdiction was never raised before the trial court or Court of Appeals and was invoked only after affirmance, sanctioning the belated objection would waste valid proceedings. Having invoked the courts' jurisdiction throughout, petitioner was estopped under Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, Echaus vs. Blanco, Crisostomo vs. Court of Appeals, Libudan vs. Gil, and People vs. Casuga from denying it to escape penalty.
• Illegal Recruitment After License Expiration: Although Court of Appeals findings are generally conclusive, re-examination was warranted where relevant facts were misconstrued, under Moran vs. Court of Appeals, Sacay vs. Sandiganbayan, and Manlapaz vs. Court of Appeals. Recruitment — offering inducements to enter employment through advertising, promises, and solicitation — occurred in January, March, and May 1973 while licensed; other than carry-over payments, no recruiting activity after May 18, 1974 was shown. To require a licensed agency at midnight on expiration to refuse all unpaid accounts ignores necessary winding-up, and the payments were for administrative, business, and travel expenses of overseas placement. As to Vertudez, the negative element of recruiting without license had to be proved by the prosecution as to date; his sole uncorroborated testimony of application sometime in June 1974, flatly denied by petitioner as a 1973 application, left guilt unclear. With the agency closed, advertisements and solicitation ceased, operations moved to petitioner's home for winding-up, and Costales and Nicolas executed affidavits of desistance creating serious doubt under People vs. Lim, acquittal was required under the presumption of innocence, proof beyond reasonable doubt, and liberal construction of penal laws in favor of the accused under People vs. Yu Hai.
• Civil Liability: Issuance of a check, though a negotiable instrument regarded as a substitute for money, is not money itself and mere delivery does not operate as payment, under PAL vs. Court of Appeals. Petitioner presented no evidence that the P5,270.00 group check was honored and deducted from her account, so non-payment was sustained. However, the affidavits of desistance, though generally given little credit and filed in the estafa case, arose from the same facts and admitted satisfaction of P650.00 to Costales and P500.00 to Nicolas, warranting deduction of P1,100.00.

• Jurisdiction determined by allegations; estoppel by participation — Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the information as to situs; a party who actively participates and invokes jurisdiction to seek affirmative relief is estopped from later denying that jurisdiction to escape an adverse judgment. Applied to reject the belated jurisdictional attack raised only after affirmance, citing Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy.
• Exceptions to conclusiveness of Court of Appeals findings of fact — Findings of fact are generally conclusive but may be reviewed when inferences are manifestly mistaken, judgments rest on misapprehension of facts, or relevant undisputed facts were overlooked that would justify a different conclusion. Applied to justify re-examining when recruitment occurred and whether post-expiration acts were recruitment.
• Illegal recruitment as unlicensed operation; winding-up collections excluded — Article 24 punishes operating a private fee-charging employment agency without license; where recruitment inducements and applications occurred while licensed and the agency thereafter closed solicitation and advertisements, mere collection of unpaid carry-over accounts is winding-up and not criminal operation without license. Applied to acquit where Sapitula, Nicolas, and Costales were recruited in 1973 and only payments followed expiration.
• Burden of proof and strict construction of penal laws — Guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt with the accused presumed innocent; where a negative element such as absence of license at the time of recruitment is essential, the prosecution must establish the date, and penal laws are strictly construed against the government and liberally for the accused. Applied to resolve the conflicting testimony on Vertudez's June 1974 versus 1973 application in favor of acquittal.
• Check as payment; affidavits of desistance — Delivery of a check does not by itself operate as payment until encashed and charged against the drawer's account; affidavits of desistance are generally given little credit but may create serious doubt and support civil deductions when arising from the same facts and admitting satisfaction. Applied to sustain civil liability but deduct P1,100.00 admittedly satisfied.

• "The jurisdiction of a Court is determined by the allegations of the information as to the situs of the crime." — States the test for jurisdiction applied to sustain the Manila court's authority where the information placed the offense in Manila.
• "a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court to secure an affirmative relief, may not afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty." — Recites the Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy estoppel rule barring the belated jurisdictional challenge after full participation.
• "it is asking too much to expect a licensed agency to absolutely at the stroke of midnight stop all transactions on the day its license expires and refuse to accept carry-over payments after the agency is closed." — Articulates the winding-up rationale for holding post-expiration collections non-criminal.
• "Although a check, as a negotiable instrument, is regarded as a substitute for money, it is not money. Hence, its mere delivery does not, by itself, operate as payment." — States the negotiable-instrument rule sustaining civil liability absent proof of encashment.

• Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 [1968] — Controlling precedent for estoppel; a party invoking jurisdiction is barred from later denying it to escape penalty.
• Colmenares vs. Villar, 33 SCRA 186 [1970]; People vs. Galano, 75 SCRA 193 [1977] — Followed on jurisdiction being determined by information's situs allegation.
• Echaus vs. Blanco, 179 SCRA 704 [1989]; Crisostomo vs. Court of Appeals, 32 SCRA 54 [1970]; Libudan vs. Gil, 45 SCRA 17 [1972]; People vs. Casuga y Munar, 53 SCRA 278 [1973] — Cited as additional support for estoppel by active participation.
• Moran vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 88 [1984]; Sacay vs. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]; Manlapaz vs. Court of Appeals, 147 SCRA 236 [1987] — Followed as exceptions allowing review of Court of Appeals factual findings.
• People vs. Yu Hai, 99 Phil. 725 [1956] — Followed for strict construction of penal laws against the government and liberally for the accused.
• People vs. Lim, 190 SCRA 706 [1990] — Applied on affidavits of desistance creating serious doubt warranting a second look at conviction.
• PAL vs. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 557 [1990] — Controlling on checks; mere delivery without encashment is not payment, sustaining civil award.

• Article 25, Presidential Decree No. 442 (Labor Code) — Prohibits travel agencies from recruiting for overseas employment and governs renewal of existing hiring authorities; charged in the information but clarified as referring in substance to unlicensed recruitment.
• Article 24, Presidential Decree No. 442 (Labor Code) — Prohibits operating a private fee-charging or non-fee-charging employment agency without license or authority; treated as the provision actually violated by alleged post-expiration operation, but held unsatisfied where only winding-up collections remained.
• Article 39, paragraph (b), Labor Code — Penal provision under which the trial court imposed four to seven years imprisonment and P20,000.00 fine; penalty set aside upon acquittal.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied by the trial court in imposing the indeterminate penalty; rendered moot by reversal and acquittal, with only modified civil indemnity retained.

Fernan, C.J., Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur. No separate concurring opinions with additional reasoning appear in the text.