Aquino vs. Commission on Elections

The term “residence” in the constitutional qualification for a member of the House of Representatives is synonymous with “domicile”; the one-year residence requirement is satisfied only by proof of a change of domicile through actual removal, bona fide intention to abandon the old domicile and establish a new one, and corresponding acts. The COMELEC retains jurisdiction over a petition to disqualify a congressional candidate for ineligibility even after the elections, as long as the candidate has not been proclaimed and has not assumed office, pursuant to Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act No. 6646. Where the electorate votes in good faith for a candidate later declared ineligible, the candidate receiving the second highest number of votes is not entitled to be proclaimed elected; votes for the disqualified candidate are not stray and the second placer has been repudiated by the voters.

Petitioner Agapito A. Aquino had served two consecutive terms as Senator and was constitutionally barred from seeking a third consecutive term. On January 2, 1995, Republic Act No. 7854 converted the Municipality of Makati into a highly urbanized city and created a second legislative district. On March 20, 1995, Aquino filed a certificate of candidacy for Representative of that new Second District, listing his residence as 284 Amapola cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati and stating he had resided in the constituency for only “10 months.” On April 24, 1995, Move Makati (a registered political party) and Mateo Bedon filed a petition to disqualify him for lack of the one-year residence qualification required by Article VI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution. A day later, Aquino amended his certificate to claim residence of “one (1) year and thirteen (13) days.” The COMELEC Second Division conducted a hearing at which Aquino adduced a lease contract dated April 1, 1994, affidavits, and his own testimony, and on May 6, 1995 dismissed the petition and declared him eligible. The elections proceeded on May 8, 1995; Aquino obtained 38,547 votes against 35,910 for Agusto Syjuco. Private respondents moved for reconsideration and suspension of proclamation before the COMELEC En Banc. The En Banc suspended Aquino’s proclamation on May 15, 1995, and on June 2, 1995 reversed the Second Division, declared Aquino ineligible, and directed the board of canvassers to proclaim the winner among the remaining qualified candidates. Aquino elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari.

• The Candidacy and Disqualification Petition: On March 20, 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the newly created Second Legislative District of Makati City. Item 8 stated his residence in the constituency as “10 Months,” while Item 7 listed his address as 284 Amapola cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati. On April 24, 1995, Move Makati and Mateo Bedon filed SPA No. 95‑113 before the COMELEC Second Division, seeking Aquino’s disqualification for lack of the one‑year residence requirement under Article VI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution. A day later, Aquino amended his certificate to claim a residence of “one (1) year and thirteen (13) days.”

• Aquino’s Evidence of Residence: At the COMELEC hearing on May 2, 1995, Aquino adduced a lease contract dated April 1, 1994 covering a condominium unit at Palm Village, Makati, for a period of two years; his own Affidavit dated May 2, 1995; an Affidavit of lessor Leonor Feliciano dated April 28, 1995; and an Affidavit of Daniel Galamay, also dated April 28, 1995. Aquino testified that he intended to reside in the leased unit for only one year because he maintained other residences in Manila or Quezon City. In his 1992 Certificate of Candidacy for Senator, Aquino had declared Concepcion, Tarlac as his residence for 52 years and stated he was a registered voter there. His birth certificate likewise showed both his parents were from Concepcion, Tarlac.

• COMELEC Division and En Banc Resolutions: On May 6, 1995, the Second Division dismissed the disqualification petition and declared Aquino eligible. After the May 8 elections, private respondents moved for reconsideration and for suspension of proclamation. On May 15, 1995, the COMELEC En Banc suspended Aquino’s proclamation. On June 2, 1995, the En Banc reversed the Second Division, finding that Aquino had not abandoned his domicile of origin in Tarlac; the lease contract, short‑term intention, and maintenance of other Metro Manila residences indicated that the sole purpose of his physical transfer was to qualify as a candidate. The En Banc declared Aquino ineligible and disqualified, made the suspension of proclamation permanent, and directed the board of canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the winner among the remaining qualified candidates.

• Election Results: In the May 8, 1995 elections for the Second District of Makati City, three candidates vied for the seat. Aquino received 38,547 votes; Agusto Syjuco received 35,910 votes.

• COMELEC Jurisdiction: Petitioner contended that under Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its members. Once the election was held and he emerged as the winning candidate, the COMELEC was automatically divested of jurisdiction to determine his qualifications, and the matter lay exclusively with the HRET.

• Cessation of Jurisdiction After Elections: Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC initially had jurisdiction, such jurisdiction ceased upon the conduct of the elections and the ascertainment of the winning candidate. The remedy for his opponents should have been a quo warranto petition before the HRET.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion in Suspending Proclamation: Petitioner argued that the COMELEC En Banc acted with grave abuse of discretion when it suspended his proclamation despite its own recognition that the threshold jurisdictional issue required more judicious study, and when it did so without notice, in violation of the ministerial duty to proclaim the winning candidate and thereby thwarting the people’s will.

• Residence Requirement: Petitioner maintained that the COMELEC’s finding of non‑compliance with the one‑year residency requirement was contrary to the evidence and to applicable laws and jurisprudence. He asserted that domicile is a matter of personal intention and that he was free to transfer his legal residence to qualify for public office.

• Legal Impossibility: Petitioner posited that it was legally impossible to enforce the one‑year residence requirement in a newly created political district that had been in existence for barely four months at the time of the election. The constitutional qualification, he argued, could not be applied to the Second District of Makati because no one could have resided there for one year when the district itself was less than a year old.

• Second Placer Rule: The COMELEC committed serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ordered the board of canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates. Such a directive disregarded the well‑settled doctrine that a second‑place candidate is a loser who was repudiated by the electorate and cannot be proclaimed as a substitute winner.

• Lack of One‑Year Residence: Private respondents contended that petitioner failed to satisfy the constitutional residence requirement. Material representations in his certificate of candidacy and his prior electoral documents showed that his domicile of origin was Concepcion, Tarlac, which he had not effectively abandoned. The lease of a condominium unit for two years, his stated intention to stay only one year, and his admission of maintaining other residences in Manila and Quezon City demonstrated the absence of a bona fide intention to establish a new domicile in Makati.

• COMELEC’s Continuing Jurisdiction: The COMELEC maintained that under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the Commission retains jurisdiction to continue hearing a disqualification case even after the elections and may suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate when evidence of guilt is strong. Section 7 of the same Act makes the provision applicable to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy based on false material representation, and, by COMELEC procedural rules, to disqualifications grounded on ineligibility.

• Votes for Disqualified Candidate Not Counted: The Solicitor General and certain justices in their separate opinions argued that Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 explicitly commands that votes cast for a candidate declared by final judgment to be disqualified “shall not be counted.” Consequently, the disqualified candidate receives zero votes, and the qualified candidate with the highest number of valid votes should be proclaimed. Thus, the directive for the board of canvassers to proclaim the winner among the remaining qualified candidates was legally proper.

• COMELEC Jurisdiction Post-Election: Whether the COMELEC retained jurisdiction to hear and decide the disqualification case against petitioner for lack of constitutional qualifications after the conduct of the May 8, 1995 elections and after petitioner had obtained the highest number of votes.

• Residence Requirement: Whether petitioner proved that he had been a resident of the Second Legislative District of Makati City for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election, as required by Article VI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution.

• Legal Impossibility: Whether the one‑year residence requirement can be validly imposed in a newly created legislative district that had been in existence for less than one year at the time of the election.

• Second Placer Rule: Whether the COMELEC correctly ordered the Board of Canvassers of Makati City to determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates after petitioner was declared ineligible and disqualified.

• COMELEC Jurisdiction Post-Election: The COMELEC correctly retained jurisdiction. Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution vests the HRET with sole jurisdiction over contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of Members of the House only when the candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office. Petitioner had not been proclaimed; therefore, he was not yet a member of the House and the HRET’s jurisdiction had not attached. Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 expressly allows the continuation of disqualification proceedings after the elections and authorizes suspension of proclamation when evidence of guilt is strong. Section 7 of the same Act extends this procedure to petitions akin to those under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, and Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended, covers disqualifications based on ineligibility. Furthermore, petitioner was estopped from challenging COMELEC’s jurisdiction because he had actively participated in the proceedings, sought affirmative relief, and raised jurisdictional grounds only after the Second Division dismissed the petition.

• Residence Requirement: The constitutional requirement was not satisfied. “Residence” for election law purposes is synonymous with “domicile.” Petitioner’s domicile of origin, as shown by his own certificates of candidacy and birth records, was Concepcion, Tarlac. To change domicile, three elements must concur: (1) actual removal or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) a bona fide intention to abandon the old domicile and establish a new one; and (3) acts consistent with that intention. Petitioner’s evidence—a short‑term lease for a condominium unit, his testimony that he intended to stay for only one year because he maintained other residences in Manila and Quezon City, and the suspicious timing of the lease coinciding with the start of the residence period—failed to establish a clear and positive abandonment of his Tarlac domicile. The lease contract was deemed executed primarily to manufacture a qualification. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin is deemed to continue.

• Legal Impossibility: The theory was rejected. A new legislative district is carved from an existing, real geographic area—the old Municipality of Makati—in which people actually resided and were domiciled. The creation of a new district does not render the constitutional requirement inapplicable; to hold otherwise would invite candidates to transplant themselves into new districts to the prejudice of genuine residents. Petitioner’s own act of amending his certificate of candidacy to claim more than one year’s residence belied his reliance on this argument.

• Second Placer Rule: The COMELEC’s directive to proclaim the candidate with the next highest number of votes among the remaining qualified candidates was set aside. The prevailing doctrine, as consistently affirmed from Topacio v. Paredes through Geronimo v. Ramos and Labo v. COMELEC, is that the ineligibility of the candidate receiving the majority or plurality of votes does not entitle the second placer to be proclaimed elected. Votes cast in the sincere belief that the disqualified candidate was eligible are not stray, void, or meaningless. To treat them as such would disenfranchise the electorate and impose a repudiated candidate upon a constituency that did not choose him. The second placer remains a loser; the sovereign will expressed in good faith cannot be overridden by judicial or administrative fiat. Thus, while petitioner’s disqualification was affirmed, the runner‑up could not be proclaimed, and the Court made permanent its temporary restraining order against such proclamation.

• Residence as Domicile in Election Law — In all Philippine Constitutions, including the 1987 Constitution, the word “residence” for purposes of candidate qualifications is synonymous with “domicile.” Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when one is absent for business, pleasure, or like reasons, one intends to return. To effect a change of domicile, there must concur: (1) an actual removal or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former domicile and establishing a new one; and (3) acts that correspond with that purpose. Domicile of origin is not easily lost; in the absence of clear and positive proof of these elements, the domicile of origin is deemed to continue. The manifest purpose of the residency requirement is to prevent strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of a community from exploiting favorable circumstances for electoral gain.

• COMELEC Jurisdiction Over Post-Election Disqualification Cases — Under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the COMELEC or the appropriate court shall continue the trial and hearing of a disqualification case even after the elections, and may, upon motion, suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate when the evidence of guilt is strong. Section 7 of the same Act applies this procedure to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, as well as to disqualification cases based on ineligibility under the amended Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Jurisdiction over the qualifications of a congressional candidate remains with the COMELEC until the candidate is proclaimed, takes an oath, and becomes a member of the House, at which point jurisdiction shifts to the HRET under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution.

• Second Placer Rule (Good-Faith Voter Doctrine) — The ineligibility of the candidate who received the highest number of votes does not entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared elected. Votes cast in good faith for a candidate believed to be qualified are not stray, void, or meaningless. The second placer has been repudiated by the electorate; to proclaim him would disenfranchise the voters and violate the fundamental principle that elective offices must be filled by those who have received the majority or plurality of votes cast. This doctrine, rooted in Topacio v. Paredes (1912) and reaffirmed in Geronimo v. Ramos, Labo v. COMELEC, Abella v. COMELEC, and Benito v. COMELEC, abandons the contrary ruling in Santos v. COMELEC.

• Estoppel Against Challenging Jurisdiction — A party who voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of a tribunal, participates in the proceedings, and seeks affirmative relief cannot later question the tribunal’s jurisdiction upon receiving an adverse decision. Doing so constitutes double‑dealing and runs afoul of the principles of estoppel and sound judicial administration.

• “The sanctity of the people’s will must be observed at all times if our nascent democracy is to be preserved. … When a challenge to a winning candidate’s qualifications however becomes inevitable, the ineligibility ought to be so noxious to the Constitution that giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately do harm to our democratic institutions.”

• “Clearly, the place ‘where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,’ where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.”

• “The absence of clear and positive proof showing a successful abandonment of domicile under the conditions stated above, the lack of identification — sentimental, actual or otherwise — with the area, and the suspicious circumstances under which the lease agreement were effected all belie petitioner’s claim of residency for the period required by the Constitution.”

• “A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a republican government those laws are themselves ordained by the people. Through their representatives, they dictate the qualifications necessary for service in government positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks one of the essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of the Second District of Makati City would substitute for a requirement mandated by the fundamental law itself.”

• “The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. … We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under such circumstances.”

• Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692 (1991) — Relied upon as controlling authority that “residence” in the constitutional qualification is synonymous with “domicile,” based on the records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission.

• Topacio v. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 (1912) — Followed; established the early doctrine that votes cast in good faith for a disqualified candidate are valid and the wreath of victory cannot be transferred to an ineligible second placer.

• Geronimo v. Ramos, 136 SCRA 435 (1985) — Followed and characterized as the “more logical and democratic rule”; held that a minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected when the winner is disqualified.

• Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1 (1989) and Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, 211 SCRA 297 (1992) — Followed; the ineligibility of the highest vote‑getter does not entitle the second placer to the office.

• Abella v. COMELEC, 201 SCRA 253 (1991) — Followed; applied squarely; a candidate who lost in the election and was repudiated by the electorate cannot replace the disqualified winner.

• Benito v. COMELEC, 235 SCRA 436 (1994) — Followed; unanimous reiteration of the second placer rule.

• Santos v. COMELEC, 137 SCRA 740 (1985) — Implicitly abandoned; the Court held that the decision should be reversed in favor of Geronimo v. Ramos.

• Ticson v. COMELEC, 103 SCRA 687 (1981) — Abandoned; it had treated votes for a disqualified candidate as invalid and nonexistent, contrary to the good‑faith voting principle.

• Article VI, Section 6, 1987 Constitution — Prescribes the qualifications for Members of the House of Representatives, including the requirement that the candidate must be “a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.” Applied as the core substantive standard for disqualification; construed to mean domicile.

• Article VI, Section 17, 1987 Constitution — Establishes the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal as the “sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective Members.” Held to vest jurisdiction in the HRET only upon proclamation and assumption of office, not before.

• Republic Act No. 6646, Section 6 — Governs the effect of a disqualification case; allows continuation of the trial and hearing after the election and authorizes suspension of proclamation when evidence of guilt is strong. Applied to sustain COMELEC’s post‑election jurisdiction and suspension order.

• Republic Act No. 6646, Section 7 — Makes the procedure under Section 6 applicable to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Applied, in conjunction with amended Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules, to extend the same procedure to disqualification cases based on ineligibility.

• Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), Sections 68, 72, 78 — Section 72 provided the original rule that disqualification cases should be decided before the election, and that a candidate not disqualified by final judgment could be proclaimed. Section 78 covers petitions to cancel a certificate of candidacy based on false material representation. Cited in analyzing the interplay of statutory provisions and the scope of COMELEC jurisdiction.

Regalado, Melo, Puno, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concurred without separate opinion. Justice Padilla concurred in the result but wrote a separate opinion maintaining that the residency requirement demands actual and physical presence in the district, not just domicile, although he agreed petitioner failed to prove such physical presence. Justice Francisco concurred with the majority ponencia on jurisdiction, domicile, and legal impossibility but dissented on the second placer rule, advocating that the votes for the disqualified candidate be treated as stray and the remaining qualified candidate with the highest votes be proclaimed. Justice Vitug, in a separate opinion, expressed reservations about the Court’s role vis‑à‑vis the Electoral Tribunal but concurred in the dismissal. Justice Mendoza, joined by Chief Justice Narvasa, concurred in the result solely on jurisdictional grounds but opined that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction at all over the disqualification based on ineligibility, which belonged exclusively to the HRET.

• Justice Davide, Jr., joined by Justices Romero and Bellosillo — Dissented on the ground that the COMELEC lacked jurisdiction to continue hearing the disqualification case and to suspend petitioner’s proclamation. The petition in SPA No. 95‑113 was not a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code because it did not allege a false material representation, nor was it a disqualification under Sections 12 or 68. Amended Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules did not authorize post‑election continuation of the case. Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 applies only to disqualifications under Section 68 and cannot be extended by Section 7, which refers only to the procedure for nuisance candidates. The suspension of proclamation was void because it was issued at a time when the Second Division had already dismissed the petition and there was no finding of strong evidence of guilt. Once petitioner obtained the highest number of votes, he should have been proclaimed, and any further challenge should have been directed to the HRET.

• Justice Mendoza, joined by Chief Justice Narvasa — Voted to grant the petition and annul the COMELEC proceedings. The COMELEC had no jurisdiction over the disqualification petition because it was based on ineligibility, not on a false material representation in the certificate of candidacy under Section 78, nor on any prohibited campaigning act under Section 68. The suspension of proclamation under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 was a grave abuse of discretion because that provision applies solely to disqualifications grounded on election offenses involving “guns, goons, or gold.” The qualifications of a congressional candidate may be inquired into only by the HRET.