Aquino vs. Civil Service Commission

Once an appointee has assumed the duties and functions of a position under a completed permanent appointment, the appointee acquires a legal right to security of tenure protected by the Constitution, and the appointment cannot be revoked by the appointing authority merely on the ground that a protestant is more qualified; an appointment issued to an office that is not vacant is null and void ab initio.

The Supply Officer I in the DECS Division of San Pablo City retired, leaving the position vacant. Victor A. Aquino, a Clerk II in the same division, was designated Officer-in-Charge of the Supply Office. Subsequently, the Schools Division Superintendent issued a promotional appointment to Leonarda D. de la Paz, also a Clerk II, as Supply Officer I effective September 30, 1986. Her appointment was approved as permanent by the Civil Service Regional Office, subject to certain conditions. De la Paz assumed the position and performed its functions. Aquino protested, questioning her qualifications, and the DECS Secretary revoked de la Paz’s appointment and ordered Aquino appointed instead. The Civil Service Commission later restored de la Paz, prompting Aquino to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.

• The Vacancy and Designation: The Supply Officer I in the DECS Division of San Pablo City retired. Victor A. Aquino, then holding the position of Clerk II, was designated Officer-in-Charge of the Supply Office on July 20, 1984, and had earlier served as Property Inspector/In-Charge from February to June 1984.
• De la Paz’s Appointment: On September 19, 1986, the Division Superintendent issued a permanent promotional appointment to Leonarda D. de la Paz as Supply Officer I, effective September 30, 1986. She had been a Clerk II and had served as Assistant to the Supply Officer from August 1976 to September 1983. The Civil Service Regional Office IV approved the appointment as permanent, “provided that there is no pending administrative case against the appointee, no pending protest against the appointment, nor any decision by competent authority that will adversely affect the approval of (the) appointment.” De la Paz assumed the duties and functions of the position and received the corresponding compensation and benefits.
• Aquino’s Protest and DECS Decision: On October 20, 1986, Aquino filed a protest with the DECS Secretary, claiming he was more qualified than de la Paz in terms of education, experience, and training. On May 4, 1987, the DECS Secretary sustained the protest, finding that Aquino had a “decided advantage” over de la Paz, and revoked her appointment while directing that Aquino be appointed in her stead. De la Paz’s motion for reconsideration was denied on August 11, 1987.
• Aquino’s Appointment and Assumption: On August 11, 1987, Aquino was issued a permanent appointment as Supply Officer I effective October 26, 1987. He assumed the duties and functions on the date of effectivity, and the CSC Regional Office approved the appointment on October 27, 1987.
• MSPB and CSC Rulings: De la Paz appealed to the MSPB, which on February 5, 1988 upheld Aquino’s appointment. On further appeal, the CSC in Resolution No. 88-820 revoked Aquino’s appointment and restored de la Paz to the position. The CSC found that de la Paz’s right to security of tenure had already attached, her appointment having been complete, and that she met the minimum qualification standards. The CSC denied reconsideration.

• Lack of CSC Authority to Substitute Judgment: Petitioner argued that the CSC had no authority to revoke his appointment on the ground that another person was more qualified, as this constituted an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the appointing authority, citing Santiago v. Civil Service Commission, Galura v. Civil Service Commission, Luego v. Civil Service Commission, Central Bank v. CSC, and Patagoc v. CSC.
• Wide Discretion of the Appointing Authority: Petitioner maintained that the appointing authority has a wide latitude of discretion in selecting among qualified candidates, and the CSC cannot direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice.

• Security of Tenure: Respondent CSC contended that de la Paz’s permanent appointment had become complete upon her assumption of duties and its approval by the CSC Regional Office, thereby vesting her with security of tenure. Her removal through revocation of a completed appointment, without lawful cause, violated the constitutional guarantee.
• Invalidity of Aquino’s Appointment: Respondent CSC argued that Aquino’s appointment was void because it was issued before the protest against de la Paz was finally resolved, in violation of CSC Resolution No. 83-343, and to a position that was not vacant. An appointment to a non-vacant office is null and void ab initio.

• Completion of Appointment and Security of Tenure: Whether de la Paz acquired security of tenure under a completed permanent appointment such that its revocation on the ground of Aquino’s superior qualifications was unlawful.
• Validity of the Protest Ground: Whether Aquino’s protest based on his alleged superior qualifications constituted a valid “for cause” ground for removal under the Civil Service Law and the Constitution.
• Validity of Aquino’s Appointment: Whether Aquino’s appointment was void for having been issued before the final resolution of the protest and to a position that was not vacant.

• Completion of Appointment and Security of Tenure: De la Paz’s appointment was deemed complete. Under the doctrine in Villanueva v. Balallo, as qualified by Favis v. Rupisan, an appointment is complete when the last act required of the appointing power and the Civil Service Commissioner, acting consecutively, has been performed. De la Paz was issued a permanent appointment, it was approved by the CSC Regional Office, she assumed the duties and functions of the office, and she received its compensation. Consequently, she acquired a legal right to the position protected by the Constitution and statute, and she could be removed only for cause with previous notice and hearing. The appointing authority could not indirectly remove her by revoking a completed appointment merely because a protestant was deemed more qualified, provided she met the minimum qualification standards.
• Validity of the Protest Ground: The ground relied upon by Aquino—that he was more qualified in education, experience, and training—did not fall within the meaning of “for cause” under Article IX-B, Section 2(3) of the 1987 Constitution, nor did it match any of the grounds for protest enumerated in Section 19(6) of P.D. 807 (appointee not qualified, not next-in-rank, or protestant not satisfied with the special reason in cases of transfer, reinstatement, or original appointment). The concept of “for cause” in removal requires a legal cause, not merely a cause the appointing power in its discretion may deem sufficient, and must relate to the administration of the office affecting the rights and interests of the public. Aquino’s protest therefore did not adversely affect the approval of de la Paz’s appointment.
• Validity of Aquino’s Appointment: Aquino’s appointment was tainted with procedural irregularity and was void. It was issued on August 11, 1987, the very day de la Paz’s motion for reconsideration was denied, before the decision on the protest became final. CSC Resolution No. 83-343 prohibits the issuance of an appointment to a protestant while the protest case is not yet finally resolved, as there is no vacancy. An appointment to a non-vacant position is null and void ab initio. The incumbent must first be legally removed or the appointment validly terminated before a new appointment can be made.

• Completion of Appointment — An appointment is complete when the last act required of the appointing power and the Civil Service Commissioner, acting consecutively, has been performed. The appointee’s acceptance and assumption of duties perfect the title to the office (Villanueva v. Balallo, as qualified by Favis v. Rupisan).
• Security of Tenure Upon Completed Appointment — Once an appointee assumes a position in the civil service under a completed appointment, a legal right to the office vests, protected by the Constitution and statute. The appointment cannot be revoked nor the officer removed except for cause, with previous notice and hearing. The appointing power cannot effect removal indirectly by rescinding a completed appointment.
• Limitation on Revocation of Appointment Based on Comparative Qualifications — The appointing authority cannot revoke a completed appointment on the sole ground that another person is more qualified, subject to the condition that the first appointee possesses the minimum qualifications required by law.
• Grounds for Protest and “For Cause” Removal — A protest against an appointment must be based on the grounds enumerated in Section 19(6) of P.D. 807: (1) the appointee is not qualified; (2) the appointee is not the next-in-rank; or (3) in case of appointment by transfer, reinstatement, or original appointment, the protestant is not satisfied with the written special reason. A claim of superior qualifications alone does not constitute a valid “for cause” ground for removal.
• Appointment to a Non-Vacant Position — An appointment to an office that is not vacant is null and void ab initio. The incumbent must first be legally removed or the appointment validly terminated before a vacancy exists.

• “It is well-settled that once an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee assumes a position in the civil service under a completed appointment, he acquires a legal, not merely equitable right (to the position), which is protected not only by statute, but also by the Constitution, and cannot be taken away from him either by revocation of the appointment, or by removal, except for cause, and with previous notice and hearing.”
• “There is thus reasonable ground for the rule that the moment the discretionary power of appointment has been exercised and the appointee assumed the duties and functions of the position, the said appointment cannot be revoked by the appointing authority on the ground merely that the protestant is more qualified than the first appointee, subject however to the condition that the first appointee should possess the minimum qualifications required by law. Otherwise, the security of tenure guaranteed by Article IX-B, Section 2 par. (3) of the 1987 Constitution would be rendered meaningless if the appointing authority is allowed to flip-flop in exercising its discretionary power of appointment.”
• “An appointment to an office which is not vacant is null and void ab initio.”

• Santiago v. Civil Service Commission, 178 SCRA 733, and Galura v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 85812, June 1, 1989 — Distinguished. In these cases, the CSC revoked an appointment solely because it believed another candidate was better qualified, thereby encroaching on the appointing authority’s discretion. Here, the CSC’s primary basis was the security of tenure of the first appointee, not a mere comparison of qualifications.
• Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327; Central Bank v. CSC, 171 SCRA 744; Patagoc v. CSC, 185 SCRA 411 — Recognized as establishing the wide discretionary latitude of the appointing authority, but held inapplicable where the competing claim rests on the vested security of tenure of a prior appointee.
• Villanueva v. Balallo, 9 SCRA 407, and Favis v. Rupisan, 17 SCRA 190 — Applied as the governing doctrine on when an appointment is deemed complete.
• Mitra v. Subido, 21 SCRA 127 — Applied for the principle that a completed appointment vests a legal right to the office protected by the Constitution and statute, removable only for cause.
• De los Santos v. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289 — Applied for the definition of “for cause” in removal of public officers: reasons which the law and sound public policy recognize as sufficient warrant, not merely causes the appointing power deems sufficient.
• Costin v. Quimbo, 120 SCRA 159, and Morata v. Court of Appeals, 11 SCRA 42 — Applied for the rule that an appointment to a non-vacant office is null and void ab initio.

• Article IX-B, Section 2(3), 1987 Constitution — Guarantees security of tenure to civil service employees, who may be removed only for cause provided by law. Applied to protect de la Paz’s completed appointment from revocation on a ground not recognized as legal cause.
• Section 9(h), Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Law) — Mandates that an appointee assumes the duties and receives the salary of the position upon issuance of the appointment; supported the finding that de la Paz validly assumed office and acquired rights to the position.
• Section 19(6), Presidential Decree No. 807 — Enumerates the exclusive grounds for a protest against an appointment. Aquino’s protest based on superior qualifications did not fall under any of these grounds.
• CSC Resolution No. 83-343 — Provides that an appointment contested takes effect immediately but shall become ineffective if the protest is finally resolved in favor of the protestant; prohibits the issuance of an appointment to a protestant pending final resolution of the protest because no vacancy exists. Applied to invalidate Aquino’s appointment, which was issued before the protest decision became final.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, and Nocon, JJ., concurred. Bellosillo, J., took no part.

• Justice Melencio-Herrera (joined by Justice Feliciano) — The dissenting opinion argued that de la Paz’s appointment never became complete because the CSC Regional Office’s approval was expressly conditional: “provided that there is no pending protest against the appointment… nor any decision by competent authority that will adversely affect the approval of the appointment.” A timely protest was filed and the DECS Secretary sustained it, which were supervening conditions that prevented the appointment from attaining permanency. Without a completed appointment, de la Paz acquired no security of tenure. Consequently, the CSC had simply substituted its judgment for that of the appointing authority by finding de la Paz “better qualified,” in violation of the settled rule that the CSC cannot revoke an appointment on that ground. The petition should have been granted and Aquino’s appointment upheld.