Apura vs. People of the Philippines

A person who cooperates in the execution of an offense by previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to its commission is liable as an accomplice under Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code, provided there is community of design, cooperation with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in an efficacious way, and a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the accomplice. Where the quantum of proof required to establish conspiracy is lacking, the doubt as to whether the accused acted as principal or accomplice is resolved in favor of the milder form of criminal liability.

The case arose from a fatal shooting incident at Unibeersities Resto Bar in Cebu City. The petitioner, Anthony John Apura, and his co-accused Sherwin "Bungot" Que were charged with Murder under an Information alleging conspiracy, treachery, and evident premeditation. The prosecution and defense presented divergent accounts of the incident, with the defense claiming self-defense and accident, while the prosecution maintained that the attack was concerted and deliberate.

On July 18, 2003, the victim, Mark James Enriquez, was at Unibeersities Resto Bar in Cebu City with his cousin Bobit and Mark Pua. Christian Elly Labay, a waiter at the bar, saw a man walk behind Enriquez and strike him on the head with a bottle. That man was later identified as petitioner Apura. After Apura stepped aside, three other persons who were with accused Que struck Enriquez with beer bottles. Accused Que then approached Enriquez and shot him; the gun misfired on the first attempt, but on the second attempt, Enriquez was hit in the head and fell to the ground. A commotion followed, and Apura, Que, and the three other companions walked through the big exit towards the gate and boarded a white van with plate number GJM-961.

Enriquez was brought to the hospital and attended to by Dr. Wyben Briones, but eventually died from the gunshot wound in the head. Dr. Briones found a lacerated wound on the right forehead caused by a blunt object, a fracture on the proximal phalanx of the right hand caused by a bullet that went through and through, and a small metal fragment imbedded in the wound.

An Information was filed against Apura, Que, and their companions for Murder, alleging that they connived, confederated, and mutually helped one another, armed with an unlicensed handgun, with deliberate intent, intent to kill, treachery, and evident premeditation. All accused pleaded not guilty, and trial ensued.

The prosecution presented the testimonies of Labay, another waiter Mark Anthony Lapatis, customer Jose Wilfredo Cala, Dr. Briones, and Dr. Gil Macato who conducted the autopsy. The defense presented the testimonies of Apura, Que, and Hanzel Lauron.

According to Apura, he went to the bar through the invitation of a certain Jose Perez. Around 12:30 a.m., Perez pointed to someone sitting near the bar and said "Oy, the one who boxed me is here." When Apura was about one and a half meters from the man pointed by Perez, the latter said "unsa man" (What?) and appeared to be pulling something from his side that looked like a black hunting knife. Apura swung the bottle of beer he was holding towards Enriquez, hitting him in the right temple. Afraid that the victim's companions might retaliate, Apura ran out of the bar and hailed a taxi.

Accused Que admitted bringing a gun to the bar, claiming a fight erupted between his fraternity and a rival fraternity. He fired his handgun during the commotion, misfiring the first shot and then firing another aiming at the chest of an attacker. He disposed of the firearm and learned the following morning that somebody was shot. He declared that what happened was an accident. Witness Lauron corroborated Que's testimony.

The RTC found Que guilty as principal and Apura guilty as accomplice. The CA affirmed with modifications. Petitioner then elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

• Incredibility of Witness: Petitioner argued that prosecution witness Lapatis was an incredible witness whose testimonies were full of inconsistencies and self-contradictions, and therefore did not deserve any consideration.
• Lack of Community of Criminal Design: Petitioner argued that the prosecution failed to show a community of criminal intent between him and Que and the latter's group, that he agreed to the criminal purpose of Que and his group, and that he cooperated in the accomplishment of the crime.
• Inapplicability of Accomplice Doctrine: Petitioner argued that the requisites for accomplice liability were wanting, that the cases relied upon by the CA were inapplicable, and that he should be held separately and individually liable only for physical injuries.
• Unsubstantiated Actual Damages: Petitioner questioned the award of actual damages, arguing that the expenses incurred were not proven with reasonable certainty.

N/A — The decision does not separately recount the arguments of the respondent People of the Philippines beyond the prosecution's evidence presented at trial.

• Credibility of Witness: Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in giving credit to the testimony of Lapatis during direct examination despite alleged inconsistencies and self-contradictions.
• Community of Criminal Design: Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in ruling, on the basis of Lapatis' testimony, that there was community of criminal design between Apura and the group of Que.
• Liability as Accomplice: Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in its application of the law on accomplices and in holding Apura liable as an accomplice rather than separately and individually liable for physical injuries.
• Award of Actual Damages: Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in awarding actual damages inconsistently with relevant laws and jurisprudence.

• Credibility of Witness: No. The inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecution witness were minor and insignificant and did not affect the credibility of the witness. The Court deferred to the trial court's factual findings and evaluation of witness credibility, especially when affirmed by the CA.
• Community of Criminal Design: Yes, there was community of criminal design. The acts of Apura and Que occurred in close proximity, and Apura was seen leaving the locus criminis with Que and the others after the shooting, constituting convincing evidence of unity of purpose.
• Liability as Accomplice: Yes, Apura was properly held liable as an accomplice. All the requisites for accomplice liability under Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code were present: community of design, cooperation by previous act, and a relation between the acts of the principal and those of the accomplice.
• Award of Actual Damages: No. The actual damages were not substantiated by receipts, but temperate damages of P50,000.00 were properly awarded in lieu thereof since the heirs suffered a loss but failed to fully substantiate their expenditures.

• Credibility of Witness: The Court found no need to deviate from the findings of both the RTC and the CA regarding the credibility of prosecution witnesses. The alleged inconsistencies were minor and insignificant. Citing People vs. Retuta, the Court noted that absolute uniformity in every detail cannot be expected because witnesses react differently to what they see and hear depending upon their situation and state of mind. Labay's answer on cross-examination that he saw petitioner "no more" when the shooting occurred could mean that he did not see petitioner but not necessarily that petitioner was no longer around during the shooting. Lapatis' account was more specific: petitioner stood at the side after striking the victim with a bottle, and when the others threw bottles and Que shot the victim, petitioner exited the bar with them. The Court also reiterated that it defers to the trial court's factual findings and evaluation of witness credibility, especially when affirmed by the CA, because the trial court has the first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses.

• Community of Criminal Design: The Court held that a close analysis of the events prior and simultaneous to the crime showed that Apura was indeed an accomplice. He struck the victim in the head with a beer bottle, an act that indicated he cooperated in the execution of the crime by a previous act that was not indispensable in the killing but nevertheless aided Que in pursuing his criminal design. The RTC's ruling was quoted with approval: Apura struck Enriquez with a beer bottle in the head from behind, and was the first to assault the victim. Even if he was not a co-conspirator, he did an act which started the chain of events that culminated in the shooting. The CA appropriately distinguished the case from People vs. Tilos, where the sequence of events posed significant doubt on unity of purpose. In the present case, the acts occurred in close proximity, and after the shooting, Apura was seen leaving the locus criminis with Que and the others.

• Liability as Accomplice: The Court applied the requisites for accomplice liability: (1) community of design — knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, the accomplice concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) cooperation in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice. All elements were present. The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly or intentionally rendered, which cannot exist without previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. The prosecution was able to prove such cooperation and unity of purpose. Citing People vs. Samudio, the Court stressed that the failure of the prosecution to prove conspiracy does not eliminate criminal liability; where the quantum of proof required to establish conspiracy is lacking, the doubt as to whether the appellant acted as principal or accomplice is resolved in favor of the milder form of criminal liability.

• Award of Actual Damages: The Court found merit in petitioner's contention regarding actual damages. Only expenses supported by receipts and which appear to have been actually expended in connection with the death of the victim may be allowed. The heirs failed to substantiate their claims with itemized receipts. Nevertheless, temperate damages of P50,000.00 were properly awarded in lieu of actual damages since the heirs suffered a loss but failed to fully substantiate their expenditures. The Court also applied the rule from People vs. Tampus that due to the difference in participation, the principal is liable for two-thirds of the total damages and the accomplice for one-third. The Court could not increase the moral and exemplary damages to their full extent under People vs. Jugueta because Que, who as principal would shoulder two-thirds of the increase, did not join the appeal; under Section 11(a) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, the judgment in this appeal cannot prejudice Que.

• Accomplice Liability under Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code — Accomplices are persons who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. The requisites are: (1) community of design — knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, the accomplice concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) cooperation in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice. The cooperation punished is the assistance knowingly or intentionally rendered, which cannot exist without previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. In this case, Apura's act of striking the victim with a beer bottle, which started the chain of events culminating in the shooting, constituted cooperation by a previous, non-indispensable act.

• Resolution of Doubt in Favor of Milder Liability — Where the quantum of proof required to establish conspiracy is lacking, the doubt created as to whether the appellant acted as principal or as an accomplice will always be resolved in favor of the milder form of criminal liability — that of a mere accomplice. This doctrine, cited from People vs. Samudio, was applied to uphold the trial court's finding that Apura's criminal liability was that of an accomplice only.

• Proportional Liability of Principal and Accomplice for Damages — Due to the difference in participation of the principal and accomplice, the principal is liable for two-thirds of the total amount of the damages and the accomplice is ordered to pay one-third of the amount. This rule from People vs. Tampus was applied in modifying the damages awarded.

• Temperate Damages in Lieu of Unsubstantiated Actual Damages — Only expenses supported by receipts and which appear to have been actually expended in connection with the death of the victim may be allowed as actual damages. Where the heirs suffered a loss but failed to fully substantiate their expenditures, temperate damages of P50,000.00 are properly awarded in lieu of actual damages under Article 2224 of the Civil Code.

• "In order that a person may be considered an accomplice, the following requisites must concur: (1) that there be community of design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice." — This passage states the canonical formulation of accomplice liability under Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code, which the Court applied to uphold Apura's conviction.

• "By his act of striking Enriquez with a beer bottle in the head, he is deemed by this court to have cooperated in the execution of the offense by a previous act, albeit not indispensable as it was not necessary for him to do it in order that Que could carry out his criminal design to kill Enriquez." — This quotation from the RTC, adopted by the Supreme Court, identifies the specific act that fixed Apura's liability as an accomplice rather than a principal.

• "Where the quantum of proof required to establish conspiracy is lacking, the doubt created as to whether the appellant acted as principal or as an accomplice will always be resolved in favor of the milder form of criminal liability - that of a mere accomplice." — This passage from People vs. Samudio, quoted by the CA and adopted by the Court, articulates the rule for resolving doubt between principal and accomplice liability.

• "The Court has held that only expenses supported by receipts and which appear to have been actually expended in connection with the death of the victims may be allowed." — This passage states the rule on actual damages, which led the Court to substitute temperate damages for the unsubstantiated actual damages awarded by the CA.

• People vs. Templonuevo, G.R. No. L-12280, January 30, 1960 — Controlling precedent cited by the RTC and adopted by the Court. In that case, the appellant struck the deceased on the forehead with a piece of wood, rendering him unconscious and facilitating the subsequent slaying by the co-accused; the Court held the appellant responsible as an accomplice because he cooperated by previous or simultaneous acts, albeit non-indispensable ones.

• People vs. Tampus, 607 Phil. 296 (2009) — Controlling precedent for the proportional liability rule: the principal is liable for two-thirds of the total damages and the accomplice for one-third.

• People vs. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016) — Cited for the rule that when the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, the amounts awarded as civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages shall be P75,000.00 each.

• People vs. Samudio, et al., cited through the CA decision — Cited for the rule that failure to prove conspiracy does not eliminate criminal liability, and doubt as to whether the accused acted as principal or accomplice is resolved in favor of the milder form.

• People vs. Retuta, cited through the CA decision — Cited for the principle that absolute uniformity in witness testimony cannot be expected because witnesses react differently depending on their situation and state of mind.

• People vs. Tilos — Distinguished. In that case, the inconsistency in the sequence of events posed significant doubt on unity of purpose, unlike the present case where the acts occurred in close proximity.

• Saldua vs. People, G.R. No. 210920, December 10, 2018 — Cited for the requisites of accomplice liability.

• Rustia, et al. vs. People, 796 Phil. 722 (2016) — Cited for the principle that the cooperation punished is the assistance knowingly or intentionally rendered, which cannot exist without previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed.

• Medina, Jr. vs. People, 724 Phil. 226 (2014) — Cited for the rule that the Court defers to the trial court's factual findings and evaluation of witness credibility, especially when affirmed by the CA.

• People vs. Salibad, 773 Phil. 631 (2015) — Cited for the rule that only expenses supported by receipts may be allowed as actual damages.

• Article 18, Revised Penal Code — Defines accomplices as persons who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. Applied to hold Apura liable as an accomplice for striking the victim with a beer bottle, a previous act not indispensable to the killing.

• Article 2224, Civil Code of the Philippines — Provides that temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. Applied to award P50,000.00 temperate damages in lieu of unsubstantiated actual damages.

• Section 11(a), Rule 122, Rules of Court — Provides that an appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter. Applied to prevent the Court from increasing the moral and exemplary damages to their full extent under Jugueta because Que, who as principal would shoulder two-thirds of the increase, did not join the appeal.

Caguia, Carandang, Zalameda, and Gaerlan, JJ., concurred in the decision.

N/A — No dissenting opinions are noted in the provided case text.