Aparri vs. Court of Appeals

The fixing of a term of office by the Board of Directors under paragraph 2, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 1160 is not a removal or dismissal without cause; the officer's right to hold office ceases upon expiration of the fixed term.

NARRA was created by Republic Act No. 1160, approved June 18, 1954, and operated under the supervision and control of the President of the Philippines through the Office of Economic Coordinator. Under paragraph 2, Section 8 of that law, the NARRA Board of Directors had the power to appoint and fix the term of office of the General Manager, subject to the recommendation of the Office of Economic Coordination and the approval of the President. Republic Act No. 3844, the Agricultural Land Reform Code, later abolished NARRA and transferred its functions and powers to the Land Authority, which was substituted as respondent.

On January 15, 1960, the Board of Directors of NARRA, composed of private respondents Remedios O. Fortich as Chairman and Angelino M. Banzon, Rafael B. Hilao, Valeriano Plantilla, and Severo Yap as members, approved Resolution No. 13 (Series of 1960), appointing Bruno O. Aparri as General Manager with all the rights, prerogatives, and compensation appurtenant thereto, effective January 16, 1960, and resolving to inform the President of the Philippines of the appointment. Pursuant to that resolution, Fortich, as Chairman, appointed Aparri by letter dated January 22, 1960, at a compensation rate of P12,000 per annum, effective January 16, 1960.

Republic Act No. 1160, under which NARRA was created, provided in paragraph 2, Section 8 that the Board of Directors had the power to appoint and fix the term of office of the General Manager, subject to the recommendation of the Office of Economic Coordination and the approval of the President. The same provision authorized the Board, by majority vote of all members, for cause, upon recommendation of the Office of Economic Coordination and with the approval of the President, to suspend and/or remove the General Manager and/or Assistant General Manager.

On March 15, 1962, the Board approved Resolution No. 24 (Series of 1962). The resolution recited that the Chairman had transmitted to the Board the desire of the Office of the President to fix the term of office of the incumbent General Manager up to the close of office hours on March 31, 1962, in accordance with Section 8, sub-section 2 of Republic Act No. 1160. The Board then resolved to fix the term of office of the incumbent General Manager to March 31, 1962.

Aparri filed a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction in the Court of First Instance of Manila on March 29, 1962. He prayed to annul the March 15, 1962 resolution, to command the Board to allow him to continue in office as General Manager until he vacates said office in accordance with law, and to sentence the private respondents jointly and severally to pay actual damages of P95,000 plus costs.

While the case was pending, Republic Act No. 3844, the Agricultural Land Reform Code, took effect on August 8, 1963. It abolished NARRA under Section 73 and transferred its functions and powers to the Land Authority. The Court of Appeals later found that Aparri had accepted the position without a fixed term and that the Board fixed his term to March 31, 1962.

• Removal Without Cause: Whether Board Resolution No. 24 (Series of 1962) was a removal or dismissal of petitioner without cause.

• Removal Without Cause: No. Board Resolution No. 24 did not remove or dismiss petitioner without cause; it fixed his term of office to March 31, 1962 pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 1160, and his right to hold office ceased upon expiration of that term.

• Removal Without Cause: The Board had statutory power to appoint and fix the term of the General Manager, subject to recommendation and presidential approval. Resolution No. 13 appointed petitioner but lacked presidential approval, rendering the appointment incomplete; petitioner was at best a de facto officer. Resolution No. 24, approved March 15, 1962, corrected that lack and, pursuant to the President's desire, fixed petitioner's term to March 31, 1962. A "term" is a fixed and definite period during which an office may be held; upon expiration, unless the officer is authorized by law to hold over, his rights, duties, and authority ipso facto cease. Removal, by contrast, entails ouster before expiration of the term. Petitioner was not removed before expiration; his right to hold office ceased by expiration on March 31, 1962. The statute being clear, no construction was needed. Thus the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the dismissal.

• Public Office Is Not a Vested Right — A public office is a right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government for the benefit of the public. The right to hold public office is not a natural right; it exists only by virtue of law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it. Except for constitutional offices with special immunity as to salary and tenure, no one has a vested right in an office or its salary. Applied: petitioner had no absolute right to continue as General Manager after his fixed term expired.
• Appointment Complete Only Upon Last Required Act — An appointment is the act of designation by the executive officer, board, or body to whom the power has been delegated. Where the assent or confirmation of another officer or body is required, the appointment is complete only when such assent or condition is obtained; the appointment becomes complete when the last act required of the appointing power is performed. Applied: Resolution No. 13 lacked the President's approval required by Republic Act No. 1160, so petitioner's appointment was incomplete and he was at best a de facto officer; Resolution No. 24 supplied the missing requisite and fixed his term.
• Term of Office vs. Removal — A "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office. Upon expiration of the officer's term, unless he is authorized by law to hold over, his rights, duties, and authority as a public officer must ipso facto cease. Removal entails the ouster of an incumbent before the expiration of his term. Applied: the Board fixed petitioner's term to March 31, 1962; his cessation was by expiration, not removal.
• Board's Power to Fix Term — Under paragraph 2, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 1160, the NARRA Board of Directors had the power to appoint and fix the term of office of the General Manager, subject to the recommendation of the Office of Economic Coordination and the approval of the President. Applied: Resolution No. 24 was a valid exercise of that power.

• "The only legal issue sought to be reviewed is whether or not Board Resolution No. 24 (series of 1962) was a removal or dismissal of petitioner without cause." — This frames the sole legal question resolved by the Supreme Court.
• "The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office" — This defines the controlling concept that distinguishes expiration of term from removal.
• "Removal entails the ouster of an incumbent before the expiration of his term (Manalang vs. Quitoriano, 50 O.G. 2515)." — This states the ratio for holding that petitioner's cessation was not a removal.
• "Lacking such approval by the President as required by the law (par. 2, Sec. 8 of R.A. 1160), the appointment of petitioner was not complete." — This supports the finding that petitioner was at best a de facto officer until Resolution No. 24 supplied the requisite approval.

• Alba vs. Hon. Jose N. Evangelists, 100 Phil. 683 — Cited in the Court of Appeals decision for the proposition that an officer continues only for so long as the term of his office has not ended.
• Manalang vs. Quitoriano, 50 O.G. 2515 — Cited by the Supreme Court for the rule that removal entails the ouster of an incumbent before the expiration of his term.
• People vs. Bissell, 49 Cal. 407 — Cited for the rule that where assent or confirmation of another officer or body is required, the appointment is complete only when such assent or condition is obtained.
• State vs. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449, 9 Am. Rep. 409 — Cited for the definition of a de facto officer.
• Sueppel vs. City Council of Iowa City, 136 N.W. 2D 523 — Cited for the definition of "term" as a fixed and definite period of time.
• Molnar vs. City of Aurora, 348 N.E. 2d 262, 38 III App. 3d 580 — Cited for the rule that an appointment is complete when the last act required of the appointing authority has been performed.

• Paragraph 2, Section 8, Republic Act No. 1160 — Vests the NARRA Board of Directors with power to appoint and fix the term of office of the General Manager, subject to recommendation of the Office of Economic Coordination and approval of the President; also allows suspension or removal for cause by majority vote, upon recommendation, and with presidential approval. Applied: the Board's power to fix petitioner's term and the distinction between removal and expiration.
• Section 2, Republic Act No. 1160 — Created NARRA under the supervision and control of the President through the Office of Economic Coordinator, headed by a General Manager and Assistant Manager appointed as provided. Applied: established NARRA's statutory framework.
• Section 73, Republic Act No. 3844 — Abolished NARRA and transferred its functions and powers to the Land Authority. Applied: caused the lower court to dismiss the petition as academic and led to Land Authority's substitution as respondent.

Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, and Escolin, JJ., concurred. Aquino, J., concurred in the result.