Antonio B. Baltazar vs. Honorable Ombudsman

A complainant before the Ombudsman who is not a real party in interest has no locus standi to file a petition before the Supreme Court assailing the Ombudsman's dismissal of a criminal complaint. The real-party-in-interest rule under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure applies to criminal and administrative cases, and a mere complainant who stands to be neither benefited nor injured by the judgment cannot pursue the action.

Petitioner Antonio Baltazar filed a Complaint-Affidavit before the Office of the Ombudsman against private respondents—Pampanga Provincial Adjudicator Toribio E. Ilao, Jr., Chief Legal Officer Eulogio M. Mariano, Legal Officer Jose D. Jimenez, Jr. (both of the DAR Legal Division in San Fernando, Pampanga), and Ernesto R. Salenga—for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The complaint arose from an underlying agrarian dispute (DARAB Case No. 552-P 93) involving a seven-hectare fishpond owned by Paciencia Regala. The Ombudsman is mandated under RA 6770 to investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person any act or omission of any public officer that appears illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

Paciencia Regala owns a seven-hectare fishpond located at Sasmuan, Pampanga. Her Attorney-in-Fact Faustino R. Mercado leased the fishpond for PhP 230,000.00 to Eduardo Lapid for a three-year period, from August 7, 1990 to August 7, 1993. Lessee Eduardo Lapid in turn sub-leased the fishpond to Rafael Lopez for PhP 50,000.00 during the last seven months of the original lease, from January 10, 1993 to August 7, 1993. Respondent Ernesto Salenga was hired by Eduardo Lapid as fishpond watchman (bante-encargado), and in the sub-lease, Rafael Lopez rehired respondent Salenga.

On March 11, 1993, respondent Salenga, through a certain Francis Lagman, sent his January 28, 1993 demand letter to Rafael Lopez and Lourdes Lapid for unpaid salaries and non-payment of the 10% share in the harvest. On June 5, 1993, sub-lessee Rafael Lopez wrote a letter to respondent Salenga informing the latter that for the last two months of the sub-lease, he had given the rights over the fishpond to Mario Palad and Ambit Perez for PhP 20,000.00. This prompted respondent Salenga to file a Complaint before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB), Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga, docketed as DARAB Case No. 552-P 93, entitled "Ernesto R. Salenga vs. Rafael L. Lopez and Lourdes L. Lapid" for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession, Collection of Sum of Money and Supervision of Harvest. The Complaint was signed by respondent Jose D. Jimenez, Jr., Legal Officer of the DAR Region III Office, as counsel for respondent Salenga, while respondent Eulogio M. Mariano was the Chief Legal Officer of DAR Region III. The case was assigned to respondent Toribio E. Ilao, Jr., Provincial Adjudicator of DARAB, Pampanga.

On May 10, 1993, respondent Salenga amended his complaint, including a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction. Before the prayer for the TRO could be acted upon, on June 16, 1993, respondent Salenga filed a Motion to Maintain Status Quo and to Issue Restraining Order, set for hearing on June 22, 1993. In the hearing, only respondent Salenga with his counsel appeared despite notice to the other parties. Consequently, the ex-parte presentation of respondent Salenga's evidence in support of the prayer for the issuance of a restraining order was allowed since the motion was unopposed, and on July 21, 1993, respondent Ilao, Jr. issued a TRO. Thereafter, respondent Salenga asked for supervision of the harvest, which the board sheriff did; defendants Lopez and Lapid received their respective shares while respondent Salenga was given his share under protest. In the subsequent hearing for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, again, only respondent Salenga appeared and presented his evidence for the issuance of the writ.

Pending resolution of the case, Faustino Mercado, as Attorney-in-Fact of the fishpond owner Paciencia Regala, filed a motion to intervene, which was granted by respondent Ilao, Jr. through the November 15, 1993 Order. After the trial, respondent Ilao, Jr. rendered a Decision on May 29, 1995 dismissing the Complaint for lack of merit; but losing plaintiff, respondent Salenga, appealed the decision before the DARAB Appellate Board.

On November 24, 1994, pending resolution of the agrarian case, petitioner Antonio Baltazar, an alleged nephew of Faustino Mercado, instituted the instant case through a Complaint-Affidavit before the Office of the Ombudsman, docketed as OMB-1-94-3425, charging private respondents with conspiracy through the issuance of the TRO in allowing respondent Salenga to retain possession of the fishpond, operate it, harvest the produce, and keep the sales under the safekeeping of other private respondents. Petitioner maintained that respondent Ilao, Jr. had no jurisdiction to hear and act on DARAB Case No. 552-P 93 as there was no tenancy relation between respondent Salenga and Rafael L. Lopez, and thus, the complaint was dismissible on its face. Through the December 14, 1994 Order, the Ombudsman required private respondents to file their counter-affidavits, affidavits of their witnesses, and other controverting evidence. While the other respondents submitted their counter-affidavits, respondent Ilao, Jr. instead filed his February 9, 1995 motion to dismiss, February 21, 1995 Reply, and March 24, 1995 Rejoinder.

• Misplaced Counter-Affidavit: Petitioner argued that the Ombudsman erred in giving due course to a misplaced counter-affidavit filed by respondent Ilao, Jr. after the termination of the preliminary investigation and/or after the case was already filed before the Sandiganbayan.
• Reversal of Resolution on Jurisdiction: Petitioner argued that the Ombudsman erred in reversing his own resolution where it was resolved that respondent Ilao, Jr., as Provincial Agrarian Adjudicator, had no jurisdiction over a complaint where there existed no tenancy relationship, considering that complainant Salenga was not a tenant but a "bante-encargado" or watchman-overseer hired for a salary of P3,000.00 per month as alleged in his own complaint.
• Locus Standi: Petitioner asserted that he was duly authorized by Faustino Mercado to institute the suit and presented a Special Power of Attorney from Mercado.

• Lack of Legal Standing: Respondents argued that petitioner had no locus standi to pursue the petition, being a stranger to the agrarian case and not a real party in interest.
• Re-investigation Ordered by Sandiganbayan: Respondents argued that it was the Sandiganbayan, not the Ombudsman, that ordered the re-investigation and allowed respondent Ilao, Jr. to submit his Counter-Affidavit.
• Jurisdiction Determined by Allegations: Respondents argued that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint, and respondent Salenga's complaint clearly spelled out jurisdictional allegations that he was an agricultural tenant in possession of the fishpond.

• Locus Standi: Whether petitioner has legal standing to pursue the instant petition before the Supreme Court.
• Submission of Counter-Affidavit: Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing respondent Ilao, Jr. to submit his Counter-Affidavit after the preliminary investigation was concluded and an Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan.
• Agrarian Dispute Jurisdiction: Whether DARAB Case No. 552-P 93 is an agrarian dispute within the jurisdiction of the DARAB, and whether respondent Ilao, Jr. properly exercised his discretion in issuing the TRO.

• Locus Standi: No. Petitioner has no locus standi to pursue the petition. He is not a real party in interest under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, being a stranger to the agrarian case and not a party who will be benefited or injured by the results of both the agrarian and criminal cases.
• Submission of Counter-Affidavit: No. The Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion. It was the Sandiganbayan that granted the prayed-for re-investigation and ordered the OSP to conduct the re-investigation through its August 29, 1997 Order; the OSP simply followed the graft court's directive.
• Agrarian Dispute Jurisdiction: No. Respondent Ilao, Jr. correctly assumed jurisdiction over DARAB Case No. 552-P 93. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint, which clearly spelled out jurisdictional allegations that respondent Salenga was an agricultural tenant in possession of the fishpond.

• Locus Standi: Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." In private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in-interest" rule found in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest—the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. The same concept is applied in criminal and administrative cases. While petitioner may be the complainant in OMB-1-94-3425, he is not a real party in interest. The undisputed owner of the fishpond is Paciencia Regala, who intervened in DARAB Case No. 552-P 93 through her Attorney-in-Fact Faustino Mercado. Petitioner's Special Power of Attorney from Mercado is unavailing because Mercado, being an agent himself, cannot further delegate his agency to another under the maxim potestas delegata non delegare potest. While Article 1892 of the Civil Code allows the agent to appoint a substitute, the SPA clearly delegates the agency to petitioner to pursue the case and not merely as a substitute. Petitioner is neither a real party in interest with regard to the agrarian case nor in the criminal proceedings. He cannot be likened to an injured private complainant in a criminal complaint who has direct interest in the outcome of the criminal case. Even if the petition were considered a public suit, petitioner has not adequately shown that he is entitled to seek judicial protection as a "citizen" or "taxpayer," more so when there is no showing that he was injured by the dismissal of the criminal complaint.

• Submission of Counter-Affidavit: The facts clearly show that it was not the Ombudsman through the OSP who allowed respondent Ilao, Jr. to submit his Counter-Affidavit. It was the Sandiganbayan that granted the prayed-for re-investigation and ordered the OSP to conduct the re-investigation through its August 29, 1997 Order. The OSP simply followed the graft court's directive. Petitioner did not contest nor question the August 29, 1997 Order of the graft court, and he did not file any reply-affidavit in the re-investigation despite notice. Furthermore, the graft court cannot be faulted in granting the prayed-for re-investigation as respondent Ilao, Jr. was not given the opportunity to file his Counter-Affidavit—his motion to dismiss was not resolved before the Resolution finding cause to bring respondents to trial was issued. Courts are given wide latitude to accord the accused ample opportunity to present controverting evidence even before trial as demanded by due process. As held in Villaflor vs. Vivar, "[a] component part of due process in criminal justice, preliminary investigation is a statutory and substantive right accorded to the accused before trial."

• Agrarian Dispute Jurisdiction: It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint. The nature of an action is determined by the material averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, not by the defenses asserted in the answer or motion to dismiss. Respondent Salenga's complaint and its attachments clearly spell out the jurisdictional allegations that he is an agricultural tenant in possession of the fishpond and is about to be ejected from it, which allegations characterize an agricultural dispute. As regards the issuance of the TRO, considering the proper assumption of jurisdiction, the issuance was a proper exercise of discretion: the averments with evidence as to the existence of the need for the restraining order were manifest in respondent Salenga's Motion to Maintain Status Quo and to Issue Restraining Order, the attached Police Investigation Report, and Medical Certificate; and only respondent Salenga attended the June 22, 1993 hearing despite notice to parties, making the motion unopposed and his evidence adduced ex-parte adequate. Finally, the Court will not delve into the merits of the Ombudsman's reversal of its initial finding of probable cause, as petitioner has not shown that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering such reversal, and the function of determining the existence of probable cause is proper for the Ombudsman, an executive function the Court will not tread upon.

• Locus standi / real-party-in-interest rule — A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. The same concept is applied in criminal and administrative cases. A mere complainant before the Ombudsman who is a stranger to the underlying case and who will not be benefited or injured by the results of the case has no locus standi to pursue a petition before the Supreme Court.

• Potestas delegata non delegare potest — A power once delegated cannot be re-delegated. While applied primarily in political law to the exercise of legislative power, this is also a principle of agency. An agent cannot delegate to another the same agency, and a re-delegation would be detrimental to the principal as the second agent has no privity of contract with the former.

• Jurisdiction determined by allegations of the complaint — Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint. The nature of an action is determined by the material averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, not by the defenses asserted in the answer or motion to dismiss.

• Court will not review prosecutor's determination of probable cause — The function of determining the existence of probable cause is proper for the public prosecutor (in this case, the Ombudsman), and the Court will not tread on the realm of this executive function to examine and assess evidence supplied by the parties, which is supposed to be exercised at the start of criminal proceedings.

• "While petitioner may be the complainant in OMB-1-94-3425, he is not a real party in interest." — This states the core ratio decidendi on the preliminary issue of locus standi, establishing that being a complainant before the Ombudsman does not automatically confer legal standing to pursue a petition before the Supreme Court.

• "An agent cannot delegate to another the same agency. The legal maxim potestas delegata non delegare potest; a power once delegated cannot be re-delegated, while applied primarily in political law to the exercise of legislative power, is a principle of agency." — This articulates the Court's application of the agency principle to defeat petitioner's claim of authority through the Special Power of Attorney from Faustino Mercado, who was himself an agent.

• "It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint." — This is the controlling rule applied to reject petitioner's argument that respondent Ilao, Jr. had no jurisdiction over the DARAB case, as the complaint's allegations characterized an agricultural dispute.

• "The function of determining the existence of probable cause is proper for the Ombudsman in this case and we will not tread on the realm of this executive function to examine and assess evidence supplied by the parties, which is supposed to be exercised at the start of criminal proceedings." — This articulates the Court's refusal to review the Ombudsman's reversal of its initial finding of probable cause, absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion.

• Salonga vs. Warner Barnes & Co., G.R. No. L-2246, January 31, 1951, 88 Phil. 125 — Cited for the definition of "real-party-in-interest" as "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit."
• People vs. Vera, G.R. No. 45685, November 16, 1937, 65 Phil. 56 — Cited for the origin, development, and application of the legal maxim potestas delegata non delegare potest.
• Villaflor vs. Vivar, G.R. No. 134744, January 16, 2001, 349 SCRA 194 — Cited for the rule that preliminary investigation is a statutory and substantive right accorded to the accused before trial, and denying it would deprive them of the full measure of their right to due process.
• Sta. Clara Homeowners' Association vs. Gaston, G.R. No. 141961, January 23, 2002, 374 SCRA 396 — Cited for the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint.
• Sarne vs. Maquiling, G.R. No. 138839, May 9, 2002, 382 SCRA 85 — Cited for the rule that the nature of an action is determined by the material averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought.
• Gochan vs. Young, G.R. No. 131889, March 12, 2001, 354 SCRA 207 — Cited for the rule that jurisdiction cannot be made dependent upon the allegations of the defendant in an answer or motion to dismiss.
• Perez vs. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 126210, March 9, 2000, 327 SCRA 588 — Cited for the rule that the Court cannot pass upon the sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence to determine the existence of probable cause.
• Longos Rural Waterworks and Sanitation Association, Inc. vs. Hon. Desierto, G.R. No. 135496, July 30, 2002, 385 SCRA 392 — Cited in relation to Perez vs. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc. on the Court's refusal to review the prosecutor's determination of probable cause.
• Roberts vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113930, March 5, 1996, 254 SCRA 307 — Cited for the rule that the Supreme Court refrains from passing over the propriety of finding probable cause as this function is proper to the public prosecutor.

• Section 2, Rule 3, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Defines a real party in interest as "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Applied to hold that petitioner, being a stranger to the agrarian case, lacks locus standi.
• Section 34, Rule 138, Rules of Court — Provides that in any court other than a justice of the peace court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. Applied to assess petitioner's capacity to appear before the Court.
• Section 3(e), RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — Prohibits causing undue injury to any party or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of official functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. This was the offense charged against private respondents.
• Section 15(1), RA 6770 — Mandates the Ombudsman to "investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." Applied to acknowledge that any complainant may be entertained by the Ombudsman.
• Section 26, RA 6770 — Allows the Ombudsman to act on anonymous complaints and motu proprio inquire into alleged improper official acts or omissions from whatever source.
• Article 1892, Civil Code — Allows the agent to appoint a substitute if the principal has not prohibited him from doing so, but the agent shall be responsible for the acts of the substitute in certain cases. Applied to distinguish between a substitute and a delegation of agency, the latter being what the SPA in this case effected.

• Quisumbing, J. (Chairperson)
• Carpio, J.
• Carpio Morales, J.
• Tinga, J.