Antonino vs. Valencia

A public official who issues a defamatory press release against another public official is liable for libel, and the presumption of malice under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code applies where the imputations are not made privately or officially so as to be qualifiedly privileged, and where the defendant fails to show the truth of the statements or that they were published with good intentions and justifiable motive.

The parties were both leaders of the Liberal Party (LP) who had known each other since their student days at the U.P. College of Engineering. Plaintiff Gaudencio E. Antonino was a senator of the Republic and LP head in Davao, while defendant Brigido R. Valencia was the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. Their cordial relations became strained following the November 1963 local elections, when the LP's official candidate for governor in Davao lost, and plaintiff publicly attributed the loss to defendant's alleged support for an independent LP candidate, which divided the LP votes.

Plaintiff Gaudencio E. Antonino was a senator of the Republic and head of the Liberal Party in Davao, while defendant Brigido R. Valencia was the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. Following the November 1963 local elections, in which the LP's official candidate for governor in Davao lost to the Nacionalista Party standard bearer, plaintiff publicly stated that defendant had "sabotaged" and "double-crossed" the LP by supporting an independent LP candidate, which divided the LP votes. These statements were widely quoted in metropolitan newspapers, straining the cordial relations between the two LP leaders that had begun during their student days in the U.P. College of Engineering.

On February 28, 1964, while plaintiff was convalescing in the hospital from a heart attack suffered on January 27, 1964 while attending a Senate session, he filed a formal request with the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to investigate defendant's actions as Secretary of Public Works and Communications concerning certain alleged anomalous acquisitions of public works supplies and equipment. The charges specified: (1) the purchase of 100 jeep-rollers costing P1,398,500 from J.G.R. Enterprises covered by DPWC purchase order No. A-2563; (2) the purchase of road signs from Neils Enterprises making available the P8 million reimbursable funds of the DPWC; (3) the purchase of 250,000 metric tons of cement valued at $3,950,250 (M) from the Central Trust of China and the sale of such cement to private parties; and (4) the purchase of P194,500 worth of insulating transformers and accessories from Peninsula Enterprises. Copies of the charges were furnished on March 5, 1964 to the Commission on Appointments, with the request that they be considered in passing upon defendant's appointment to the Cabinet.

On the same day, March 5, 1964, a two-page press release was issued by the office of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, Exhibit A, and its contents were published on the front pages of six metropolitan papers: Bulletin, Chronicle, Times, Herald, Evening News, and Daily Record. Portions of the published press release included statements that plaintiff had "stubbornly continued telling lies," that defendant would file charges against the Senator before the Blue Ribbon Committee for "reportedly anomalous acts that can make him a disgrace to his Senate position," that plaintiff had taken advantage of his position as a member of the Monetary Board and as a Senator "for personal selfish reasons," that plaintiff had "suspicious connections with no less than 22 corporations," and that defendant could not avoid "unmasking certain alleged high anomalous activities of the Senator as a member of the Monetary Board and as a member of the Philippine Senate."

Plaintiff filed the present civil action on March 23, 1964. Defendant claimed in his answer that he did not issue or cause the publication of the press release; that at any rate, they were made in good faith and in self-defense; and that they were qualifiedly privileged in character. He sought by way of counterclaim P1.25 million as moral damages, P100,000 as exemplary or corrective damages, and P50,000 as litigation expenses and attorney's fees. After due trial, the lower court ruled against defendant, holding that he caused and was liable for the issuance of the libelous press release and its publication, and rejected his defenses of qualified privilege and defensive libel. The trial court found that the preponderance of evidence, documentary and circumstantial, supported the finding of liability, including the fact that the press release was marked "For release" with the date "March 5, 1964" on its upper left corner, that the first sentence indicated the source as the defendant, that the defendant admitted making the quoted statement in his office in the presence of several persons, and that the defendant did not make any correction or denial of the published news items despite their wide circulation.

• Factual Errors: Defendant-appellant raised questions of fact, claiming that the trial court erred in finding that he caused and was liable for the issuance and publication of the libelous press release, and in not giving credence to his denial and the testimonies of two newsmen who could not pinpoint the source of the press release.
• Qualified Privilege: Defendant claimed that the trial court erred in holding that the press release is libelous and that it is not protected as a qualifiedly privileged communication.
• Defensive Libel: Defendant argued that he had been libeled by the plaintiff and was therefore justified to hit back with another libel.

• Liability for Publication: Plaintiff-appellee maintained that the preponderance of evidence, documentary and circumstantial, supported the trial court's finding of liability on defendant's part for the issuance and publication of the offending press release.
• Presumption of Malice: Plaintiff-appellee argued that the defamatory imputations were not made privately or officially so as to be qualifiedly privileged under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, and that malice in law was presumed by virtue of their defamatory and libelous nature.
• Rejection of Defenses: Plaintiff-appellee contended that defendant had not overcome the presumption of malice, not having shown the truth of the statements or that they were published with good intentions and justifiable motive.

• Liability for Issuance and Publication: Whether the trial court erred in finding that defendant caused and was liable for the issuance and publication of the libelous press release.
• Libelous Nature of the Statements: Whether the trial court erred in holding that the press release is libelous.
• Qualified Privilege: Whether the trial court erred in holding that the press release is not protected as a qualifiedly privileged communication.
• Defensive Libel: Whether the trial court erred in rejecting defendant's claim of defensive libel.
• Counterclaim: Whether the trial court erred in dismissing defendant's counterclaim against plaintiff.

• Liability for Issuance and Publication: No. The trial court committed no error in finding that the press release, Exhibit A, issued by the office of defendant as Secretary of Public Works and Communications, was issued or caused to be issued by him and its contents published in the metropolitan press. The preponderance of evidence, documentary and circumstantial, clearly supported the finding of liability.
• Libelous Nature of the Statements: No. There can be no serious question as to the defamatory and libelous nature of the statements in defendant's press release, which depicted plaintiff as a consistent liar, prostituted his high public offices for personal ends and pecuniary gains, and imputed to him the commission of serious offenses in violation of the Constitution and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
• Qualified Privilege: No. The imputations were not made privately nor officially so as to be qualifiedly privileged under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, and malice in law was presumed.
• Defensive Libel: No. The trial court properly rejected defendant's claim of defensive libel, as the charges filed by plaintiff against defendant were privileged communications made to the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and the Commission on Appointments.
• Counterclaim: No. The record amply supported the trial court's finding that there was no evidence, direct or circumstantial, to hold plaintiff liable for the publication of his charges against defendant, which were at any rate qualifiedly privileged.

• Liability for Issuance and Publication: The Court found that the preponderance of evidence marshalled by the trial court clearly supported its finding of liability. The evidence included: (1) the issues of several Manila newspapers of March 5, 1964 reproduced the specific charges filed by plaintiff against defendant with the Blue Ribbon Committee, numbered correlatively; (2) on the upper left corner of Exhibit A was typewritten "For release" and immediately underneath was the date "March 5, 1964"; (3) at the bottom of the first page of Exhibit A appeared "Valencia answered point by point, the charges made against him, to wit:" followed on the second page numbered correlatively; (4) the first sentence of the press release indicated the source thereof as the defendant; (5) the second paragraph quoted a statement made by the defendant, which he admitted making in his office in the presence of several persons; (6) the first page made reference to two persons only — the plaintiff and the defendant; (7) the answer to the specific charges expressly stated that it was made by Brigido Valencia, and mentioned specific figures that only the defendant or one working in his office and under his authority could have obtained on short notice; and (8) the defendant did not make any correction or denial of the published news items, which was in effect an admission that he was correctly quoted and was the source of the facts mentioned in the news items.
• Libelous Nature of the Statements: The Court held that the statements in the press release were defamatory and libelous, as they depicted plaintiff as a consistent liar, prostituted his high public offices as monetary board member and senator for personal ends and pecuniary gains, and imputed to him the commission of serious offenses in violation of the Constitution and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Court quoted the principle that "words calculated to induce suspicion are sometimes more effective to destroy reputation than false charges directly made."
• Qualified Privilege: The Court held that since the imputations were not made privately nor officially as to be qualifiedly privileged under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, malice in law was presumed by virtue of their defamatory and libelous nature against the honor, integrity, and reputation of plaintiff. The defendant had not overcome such presumption of malice, not having shown the truth thereof, or that they were published with good intentions and with justifiable motive, or even from the most liberal standpoint, that they were made in the exercise of the right of fair comment on the character, good faith, ability, and sincerity of public officials. The trial court aptly observed that at the time of the publication, plaintiff was not a candidate for any public office, and had the defendant been prompted by a sense of duty and not malice, the charge should have been filed with the Senate or any of its Committees, not publicly aired in all the metropolitan newspapers in obvious retaliation.
• Defensive Libel: The Court rejected defendant's claim of defensive libel, adopting the trial court's observation that the emphasis laid on this defense was misplaced and based upon a wrong premise. The defendant was charged with anomalous transactions in his capacity as Secretary of Public Works and Communications, and the same were filed with the Investigation Committee (Blue Ribbon) of the Senate and the Commission on Appointments. Accordingly, the charges, even assuming they contained defamatory imputations, would not be libelous because the letter sent by the plaintiff was a privileged communication.
• Counterclaim: The Court found that the record amply supported the trial court's finding that there was no evidence, direct or circumstantial, to hold plaintiff liable for the publication in the metropolitan press of his charges against defendant with the Blue Ribbon Committee and the Commission on Appointments, which were at any rate qualifiedly privileged. The trial court had also observed that it was doubtful whether plaintiff's charges against defendant of political "sabotage" and "double-crossing" could be held to be defamatory or libelous, since no stigma of disgrace or disrepute befalls one who changes political parties.

• Presumption of Malice in Libel — Under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. The exceptions are: (1) a private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and (2) a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in the said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions. In this case, the defendant's imputations were not made privately or officially, so malice in law was presumed, and the defendant failed to overcome this presumption.
• Qualified Privilege — A communication is qualifiedly privileged when made in the performance of a legal, moral, or social duty, or when it is a fair and true report of official proceedings. The Court held that the defendant's press release did not fall within these exceptions, as the imputations were made publicly and not in the performance of any duty. The charges filed by the plaintiff against the defendant with the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and the Commission on Appointments, by contrast, were privileged communications.
• Defensive Libel — The Court rejected the doctrine of defensive libel as applied to the defendant's claim, holding that the defendant was not justified in hitting back with another libel. The charges filed by the plaintiff against the defendant were privileged communications, and the defendant's public retaliation through the press release was not a valid defense.

• "The Court finds that defendant-appellant has failed to discharge the burden of substantiating the errors of fact and of law allegedly committed by the trial court in its appealed decision and therefore affirms in toto the appealed judgment holding that defendant caused and was liable for the issuance and publication of the libelous press release attacking the honor, integrity and reputation of plaintiff and rejecting defendant's defense of qualified privilege and defensive libel." — This passage states the core ruling of the Court, affirming the trial court's judgment in its entirety and identifying the defendant's failure to substantiate his alleged errors as the basis for affirmance.
• "As defendant's imputations against plaintiff were not made privately nor officially as to be qualifiedly privilege under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, the trial court correctly held that by virtue of their defamatory and libelous nature against the honor, integrity and reputation of plaintiff, malice in law was presumed." — This passage articulates the application of the presumption of malice under Article 354 and the rejection of the qualified privilege defense.
• "Had the defendant been prompted by a sense of duty, and not because of malice, the charge at least with respect to the alleged threat made against an American, should have been filed with the Senate or any of its Committees. The defendant did not do so but instead made the accusations publicly by causing them to be given widest publication by all the metropolitan newspapers, obviously in retaliation to the charge filed against him by the plaintiff with the Blue Ribbon Committee of the Senate." — This passage, quoting the trial court's observation, explains why the defendant's public airing of the accusations demonstrated malice rather than a sense of duty.

• Aquino, Vol. II, R.P.C., p. 1694 — Cited for the principle that "words calculated to induce suspicion are sometimes more effective to destroy reputation than false charges directly made," supporting the finding that the defendant's statements were defamatory and libelous.

• Article 354, Revised Penal Code — Provides that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in cases of private communications made in the performance of a legal, moral, or social duty, and fair and true reports of official proceedings. The Court applied this provision to presume malice in the defendant's press release and to reject his defense of qualified privilege.
• Republic Act 5440 — Cited in the footnotes as the law that deleted the provision for direct appeal to the Supreme Court of all civil cases involving more than P200,000, with such appeals now going to the Court of Appeals. This was noted in the context of the direct appeal taken in this case under the Judiciary Act then in force.

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Esguerra, and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concurred. Makasiar, J., took no part.