Antone vs. Beronilla

A judicial declaration of nullity of a prior marriage obtained after the celebration of a subsequent marriage is immaterial in a prosecution for bigamy because, under Article 40 of the Family Code, the crime is consummated by the mere act of contracting a second marriage without a prior final judgment declaring the first marriage void. In resolving a motion to quash an Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the court cannot consider evidence contradicting the allegations in the Information; such matters of defense must be raised at trial.

In 1978, Myrna P. Antone and Leo R. Beronilla were married. In 1991, while that marriage remained subsisting and without any judicial decree of nullity, Beronilla contracted a second marriage with Cecile Maguillo. On 12 March 2007, Antone filed an affidavit-complaint for bigamy against Beronilla. After the prosecution filed an Information before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Beronilla moved to quash on the ground that the facts charged did not constitute an offense. He presented a final judgment rendered on 26 April 2007 by the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran, declaring his marriage to Antone void ab initio, and argued that, the marriage being void from the beginning, no first valid marriage existed. The trial court quashed the Information, relying primarily on Morigo v. People. The prosecution’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Antone then sought relief from the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari, which was dismissed on procedural grounds and on a finding of double jeopardy. Antone thereafter elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.

• Nature of the Case: Petitioner Myrna P. Antone filed an affidavit-complaint for Bigamy against respondent Leo R. Beronilla, alleging that he contracted a second marriage while his marriage to her remained subsisting and undissolved.

• The Marriages: Petitioner and respondent were married on 18 November 1978. On 16 February 1991, respondent contracted a second marriage with Cecile Maguillo. No judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage had been obtained at the time of the second marriage.

• The Information: On 21 June 2007, an Information for Bigamy was filed before the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City. The accusatory portion alleged that respondent, “having been united in lawful marriage with one Myrna A. Beronilla, which marriage is still in force and subsisting and without having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with one Cecile Maguillo, which subsequent marriage … has all the essential requisites for validity.”

• The Nullity Proceedings and Motion to Quash: Prior to arraignment, respondent moved to quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged did not constitute an offense. He presented documents showing that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran, had declared his marriage to petitioner null and void on 26 April 2007; that the decision became final and executory on 15 May 2007; and that the decree had been registered with the Municipal Civil Registrar on 12 June 2007. Respondent argued that because the marriage was void ab initio, there was no first valid marriage, and thus the elements of bigamy were incomplete.

• Prosecution’s Opposition: The prosecution, through petitioner, maintained that all essential requisites of bigamy were present. It argued that the crime had already been consummated when respondent contracted the second marriage in 1991, long before the nullity decree, and that a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the Information; contrary facts are matters of defense to be raised only during trial.

• Trial Court Rulings: The trial court granted the motion to quash on 20 September 2007, relying on Morigo v. People. It ruled that, under the principle of retroactivity, the declaration of nullity meant respondent was never legally married to petitioner, so the first element of bigamy—a legally contracted marriage—was missing. On 6 December 2007, the court denied reconsideration, stating that Mercado v. Tan had been superseded by Morigo.

• Parallel Nullity Proceedings: Meanwhile, petitioner questioned the validity of the nullity proceedings in Biliran. On 24 March 2008, the Biliran court set aside its 26 April 2007 decision and required petitioner (respondent in that civil case) to file her answer. On 21 July 2008, the petition for nullity was dismissed for respondent’s failure to file a pre-trial brief. Respondent challenged that dismissal before the Court of Appeals, and the matter remained pending.

• Court of Appeals Proceedings: Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion by the trial court. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on 29 April 2008 on three grounds: (a) the verification was defective; (b) the petition should have been filed by the Office of the Solicitor General on behalf of the People of the Philippines; and (c) the dismissal of the criminal case was tantamount to an acquittal, thus further prosecution would violate double jeopardy. Reconsideration was denied on 18 July 2008.

• Juridical Personality and Verification: Petitioner argued that the defective verification was a mere formal defect that could be relaxed in the interest of justice, and that the Office of the Solicitor General subsequently ratified and adopted the petition, curing any lack of authority.

• Double Jeopardy: Petitioner contended that double jeopardy did not attach because respondent had not been arraigned and the Information was dismissed upon his own motion.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion in Quashal: Petitioner maintained that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion by considering evidence of a post-factum nullity decree on a motion to quash, in violation of the rule that a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the allegations in the Information. Matters of defense, including the effect of a subsequent nullity declaration, should be ventilated at trial. Petitioner further asserted that under Article 40 of the Family Code and prevailing jurisprudence, a judicial declaration of nullity must be obtained before a subsequent marriage; otherwise, the crime of bigamy is already consummated.

• Absence of a Valid First Marriage: Respondent argued that the judicial declaration of nullity retroactively rendered the first marriage void ab initio, so no first valid marriage existed, and consequently the Information did not charge an offense. He relied on Morigo v. People to support the position that a void marriage does not constitute the first marriage required for bigamy.

• Applicability of Morigo: Respondent maintained that Morigo superseded Mercado v. Tan, and that under Morigo, a marriage that is void ab initio needs no judicial decree to establish its invalidity, thereby rendering the Information fatally defective.

• Double Jeopardy and Standing: Respondent contended that the dismissal of the Information was tantamount to an acquittal, barring further prosecution, and that the petition for certiorari should be dismissed because it was not initiated by the Office of the Solicitor General.

• Propriety of the Petition and Standing: Whether the petition should be dismissed due to a defective verification and the failure of the Office of the Solicitor General to initiate the certiorari proceedings.

• Double Jeopardy: Whether the filing of the petition for certiorari violated respondent’s right against double jeopardy, given that the trial court quashed the Information on a finding that the facts charged did not constitute an offense.

• Quashal of the Information: Whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in quashing the Bigamy Information by considering evidence of a subsequent judicial declaration of nullity, contrary to the rule that a motion to quash constitutes a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged and that matters of defense may not be raised at that stage.

• Propriety of the Petition and Standing: The formal defect in the verification was relaxed; a pleading lacking proper verification is treated as unsigned, but the Court has discretion to dispense with strict compliance in the interest of justice. As to the absence of the Solicitor General’s participation, while only the Office of the Solicitor General may represent the People in appellate criminal proceedings, the Court, following precedents such as Labaro v. Panay, opted not to dismiss on this technical ground. The Office of the Solicitor General subsequently filed a comment effectively ratifying and adopting the petition on behalf of the People of the Philippines.

• Double Jeopardy: Jeopardy did not attach. For jeopardy to arise, a valid arraignment or plea is required, and the case must be dismissed without the express consent of the accused. Here, respondent had not yet been arraigned and the dismissal was precisely at his instance. An order sustaining a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense, as expressly provided under Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.

• Quashal of the Information: The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion. A motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense operates as a hypothetical admission of the allegations in the Information; the court cannot consider evidence contradicting those allegations. The judicial declaration of nullity obtained after the second marriage was a matter of defense that could not be adjudicated at the motion-to-quash stage. Moreover, under Article 40 of the Family Code, a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void is an indispensable requirement before a subsequent marriage may be validly contracted. The crime of bigamy was already consummated in 1991 when respondent married Cecile Maguillo without any prior judicial decree of nullity; the belated nullity declaration was immaterial. The Court distinguished Morigo, where no marriage ceremony at all was performed, and affirmed the controlling doctrine in Mercado v. Tan and Tenebro v. Court of Appeals: a void ab initio marriage may still produce legal consequences, including criminal liability for bigamy, when the second marriage is contracted without a prior judicial declaration of nullity. The exceptions to the hypothetical-admission rule, such as when evidence presented by both parties destroys the prima facie truth of the allegations and renders trial a useless formality, did not apply; the documents presented did not negate the prima facie sufficiency of the Information.

• Hypothetical Admission Rule in a Motion to Quash — A motion to quash an Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense admits the facts alleged in the Information hypothetically. The court cannot consider evidence that contradicts those allegations; such matters are proper subjects of defense to be raised at trial. An exception exists where both parties present evidence during the hearing that destroys the prima facie truth of the allegations and renders further prosecution a wasteful formality (People v. Dela Rosa), but that exception must be narrowly applied and did not obtain here.

• Article 40, Family Code — Requirement of Prior Judicial Declaration of Nullity — Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such marriage void. Accordingly, a person who contracts a second marriage without a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage commits bigamy, and a subsequent nullity decree is immaterial because the crime had already been consummated. A void ab initio marriage, despite its retroactive nullity, may still produce legal consequences, including criminal liability for bigamy.

• Double Jeopardy and a Motion to Quash — Double jeopardy requires, among others, a valid arraignment or plea and a dismissal without the express consent of the accused. An order granting a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense.

• Standing in Criminal Appeals — The Office of the Solicitor General is the exclusive representative of the People in criminal proceedings before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. However, the Court may relax this rule and treat the petition as properly filed when the Solicitor General subsequently ratifies and adopts the petition, especially where a strict application would defeat the ends of justice.

• “A motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the Information, for which reason, the court cannot consider allegations contrary to those appearing on the face of the Information.”

• “Under the Family Code a subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage is immaterial in a bigamy case because, by then, the crime had already been consummated.”

• “Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.”

• “It would be pure technicality for the court to close its eyes to said facts and still give due course to the prosecution of the case already shown to be weak even to support possible conviction xxx.” (The Court, quoting People v. Dela Rosa, emphasized that this exception did not apply because the belated nullity did not destroy the prima facie sufficiency of the charge.)

• “Jeopardy does not attach in favor of the accused on account of an order sustaining a motion to quash.”

• Morigo v. People, G.R. No. 145226, 6 February 2004 — Distinguished. In Morigo, no marriage ceremony was performed; the parties merely signed a marriage contract. Thus, there was no ostensible valid marriage and no need for a judicial declaration of nullity. Here, a marriage ceremony was solemnized, making Article 40 of the Family Code applicable.

• Mercado v. Tan, G.R. No. 137110, 1 August 2000 — Followed and reaffirmed. It established that Article 40 of the Family Code requires a judicial declaration of nullity before a subsequent marriage may be validly contracted; a subsequent nullity decree is immaterial to a bigamy charge.

• Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, 18 February 2004 — Followed. It held that a void ab initio marriage under the Family Code may still produce legal consequences, including criminal liability for bigamy, reinforcing the requirement of a prior judicial declaration.

• People v. Dela Rosa, No. L-34112, 25 June 1980 — Distinguished. The exception allowing the consideration of evidence destroying the prima facie truth of the allegations during a motion to quash did not apply because the evidence of a subsequent nullity decree did not render the prosecution futile.

• Labaro v. Panay, G.R. No. 129567, 4 December 1998 — Followed. The Court relaxed the rule requiring the Office of the Solicitor General to initiate the petition and allowed ratification, treating the petition as properly filed.

• Javier v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 147026-27, 11 September 2009 — Cited for the four requisites of double jeopardy.

• People v. Consulta, No. L-41251, 31 March 1976 — Cited for the rule that an order sustaining a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense is not a bar to another prosecution.

• Article 349, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes bigamy. The Information sufficiently alleged all four elements: (1) offender was legally married; (2) the first marriage had not been legally dissolved; (3) he contracted a second marriage; and (4) the second marriage had all essential requisites for validity.

• Article 40, Family Code — The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void. Applied to rule that contracting a second marriage without such a prior judgment consummates the crime of bigamy, rendering a subsequent nullity decree immaterial.

• Section 4, Rule 7, Rules of Court — A pleading lacking proper verification is treated as an unsigned pleading. The Court relaxed this rule in the interest of justice, treating the defect as merely formal.

• Sections 35(1) and 35(8), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV, Administrative Code of 1987 — Define the function of the Office of the Solicitor General to represent the Government in appellate criminal proceedings and to deputize legal officers. The Court held that the absence of the Solicitor General’s imprimatur at the outset could be cured by subsequent ratification.

• Sections 2 and 8, Rule 117 (now Sections 3 and 6 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure) — Govern motions to quash and the effect of an order sustaining them. An order sustaining a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense does not bar another prosecution for the same offense.

Chief Justice Renato C. Corona (Chairperson), Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro (Acting Working Chairperson per Special Order No. 916), Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, and Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad (Additional Member per Special Order No. 917) concurred.