Antipolo Ining vs. Leonardo R. Vega

A person related to the decedent only by affinity is not an heir and cannot become a co-owner of the decedent’s property; consequently, he cannot effect a valid repudiation of the co-ownership formed among the decedent’s heirs, and prescription does not run against the true co-owners. Since no co-owner made a valid repudiation, an heir may seek partition of the property at any time.

Leon Roldan, married to Rafaela Menez, owned a 3,120-square meter parcel of land in Kalibo, Aklan covered by Original Certificate of Title No. (24071) RO-630. Leon and Rafaela died without issue. Leon was survived by his siblings Romana Roldan and Gregoria Roldan Ining. Romana’s line included her daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson Leonardo R. Vega, while Gregoria’s line included six children, among them Natividad, Dolores, Antipolo, and Pedro. The dispute concerns the succession to Leon’s estate and the co-ownership that arose among the heirs of his two siblings, with the Family Code’s exclusion of affinity from family relations and the Civil Code’s rules on co-ownership, partition, and prescription as the statutory backdrop.

Leon Roldan, married to Rafaela Menez, owned a 3,120-square meter parcel of land in Kalibo, Aklan covered by Original Certificate of Title No. (24071) RO-630. Leon and Rafaela died without issue. Leon was survived by his siblings Romana Roldan and Gregoria Roldan Ining, both now deceased. Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson Leonardo R. Vega, also both deceased; Leonardo was in turn survived by his wife Lourdes and children Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M. Vega, Milbuena Vega-Restituto, and Lenard Vega, the substituted respondents. Gregoria was survived by six children: Natividad Ining-Ibea, Dolores Ining-Rimon, Antipolo Ining, Pedro Ining, Jose, and Amando. Amando died without issue, and the records are unclear whether Jose was made a party or is alive. Petitioners, except Ramon Tresvalles and Roberto Tajonera, are Gregoria’s grandchildren or their spouses.

In 1995, Leonardo filed Civil Case No. 4983 for partition with the RTC of Kalibo, but the case was dismissed and referred to the Kalibo MTC as Civil Case No. 1366. On March 4, 1997, the MTC dismissed Civil Case No. 1366 for lack of jurisdiction and declared that only the RTC could take cognizance of the partition case. In 1997, Leonardo filed Civil Case No. 5275 with the RTC of Kalibo, Branch 8, for partition, recovery of ownership and possession, with damages, against Gregoria’s heirs. In his Amended Complaint, Leonardo alleged that on several occasions he demanded partition but Gregoria’s heirs refused; that the matter reached the Lupon Tagapamayapa, which issued a certification to file a court action sometime in 1980; that Gregoria’s heirs claimed sole ownership of the property; that portions of the property were sold to Tresvalles and Tajonera and must be collated; that in 1979 Lucimo Francisco, Sr., husband of petitioner Teodora Villanueva-Francisco, illegally claimed absolute ownership and transferred the tax declaration covering the property in his name; and that from 1988 Lucimo Sr. and Teodora deprived him of the fruits of the property estimated at ₱1,000.00 per year. Leonardo prayed that he be declared owner of half of the subject property, that it be partitioned after collation, that Gregoria’s heirs execute the necessary documents, and that he be awarded actual damages of ₱1,000.00 per year from 1988, attorney’s fees of ₱50,000.00, and lawyer’s appearance fees of ₱500.00 per hearing.

Teodora, Camilo, Adolfo, Lucimo Jr., and Herminigildo answered with a counterclaim, claiming that Leonardo had no cause of action; that they had become sole owners through Lucimo Sr., who acquired the property in good faith by sale from Juan Enriquez, who in turn acquired it from Leon; that Leonardo was aware of this; that they were in continuous, actual, adverse, notorious, and exclusive possession with just title; that they had been paying taxes; that Leonardo’s claim was barred by estoppel and laches; and that they suffered damages and were forced to litigate. They prayed for dismissal, a declaration that Leonardo had no right to the property, surrender of the certificate of title, ₱20,000.00 moral damages, ₱10,000.00 temperate and nominal damages, ₱20,000.00 attorney’s fees, and double costs. The other Gregoria heirs, as well as Tresvalles and Tajonera, were declared in default. During pre-trial, the trial court commissioned Geodetic Engineer Rafael M. Escabarte to identify the metes and bounds of the property; the resulting Commissioner’s Report and Sketch and Supplementary Commissioner’s Report were approved by the parties. The parties submitted for resolution whether Leonardo was entitled to a share in Leon’s estate, whether Leon sold the subject property to Lucimo Sr., and whether Leonardo’s claim had prescribed or was barred by estoppel or laches. Leonardo later died and was substituted by respondents.

Additional facts came to light during the proceedings. The property was allegedly sold by Leon to Enriquez through an unnotarized document dated April 4, 1943, and Enriquez allegedly sold it to Lucimo Sr. on November 25, 1943 through another private sale document. Petitioners were in sole possession of the property for more than 30 years, while Leonardo acquired custody of OCT RO-630. On February 9, 1979, Lucimo Sr. executed an Affidavit of Ownership of Land claiming sole ownership, which he used to secure Tax Declaration No. 16414 in his name and to cancel Tax Declaration No. 20102 in Leon’s name. Lucimo Sr. died in 1991, and the property was partitioned among petitioners to the exclusion of Leonardo.

The trial court found the April 4, 1943 and November 25, 1943 deeds of sale spurious. It concluded that Leon never sold the property to Enriquez and that Enriquez never sold it to Lucimo Sr., so the property remained part of Leon’s estate at the time of his death in 1962. It found that Leon’s siblings, Romana and Gregoria, inherited the property in equal shares, and that Leonardo and the respondents were entitled to Romana’s share as her successors. The trial court also found that petitioners had been in sole possession of the property for more than 30 years and that Lucimo Sr. had executed the Affidavit of Ownership of Land and obtained TD 16414 in his name on February 9, 1979.

• Repudiation and Acquisitive Prescription: Petitioners insisted that Lucimo Sr.’s purchase of the property in 1943 and his possession thereof amounted to a repudiation of the co-ownership, and that Leonardo’s admission and acknowledgment of Lucimo Sr.’s possession for such length of time bestowed upon petitioners, as Lucimo Sr.’s successors-in-interest, the benefits of acquisitive prescription arising from the repudiation.
• Laches: Petitioners contended that Leonardo’s inaction from Lucimo Sr.’s taking possession in 1943 up to 1995, when Leonardo filed Civil Case No. 4983, amounted to laches or neglect. They added that during the Lupon Tagapamayapa proceedings in 1980, Leonardo was informed of Lucimo Sr.’s 1943 purchase, yet Leonardo did not act against Lucimo Sr. until 1995, while Lucimo Sr. occupied the property and claimed all its fruits.

• Procedural Non-Compliance: Respondents argued that petitioners failed to file the required number of legible copies and to furnish two copies each to the concerned parties and offices, as confirmed by the affidavit of Meridon F. Olandesca, and that no action should be taken on pleadings, briefs, memoranda, motions, and other papers that failed to comply with those requisites.

• Ownership and Co-Ownership: Whether the subject property remained part of Leon Roldan’s estate and passed to the heirs of Romana and Gregoria as co-owners.
• Repudiation by a Non-Co-Owner: Whether Lucimo Sr., merely related by affinity to the decedent, could validly repudiate the co-ownership among the decedent’s heirs so as to commence prescription against Leonardo.
• Prescription and Laches: Whether Leonardo’s action for partition was barred by prescription or laches.

• Ownership and Co-Ownership: Yes. The finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr. became final; under Article 777 of the Civil Code, the property passed at Leon’s death to his siblings Romana and Gregoria, and their heirs became co-owners.
• Repudiation by a Non-Co-Owner: No. Lucimo Sr. was not a co-owner; he was Antipolo’s son-in-law, related by affinity, which Article 150 of the Family Code excludes from family relations. He could not repudiate a co-ownership he never belonged to.
• Prescription and Laches: No. Since no co-owner made a valid repudiation, prescription did not run under Article 494, fifth paragraph, of the Civil Code, and Leonardo could seek partition at any time; laches did not bar the action.

• Ownership and Co-Ownership: The trial court found the April 4, 1943 and November 25, 1943 deeds of sale spurious and concluded that no sale from Leon to Lucimo Sr. ever took place. Petitioners did not appeal that finding, so it became final and settled. Because the property remained part of Leon’s estate, and because Leon died without issue, his heirs were his siblings Romana and Gregoria, who inherited the property in equal shares. Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death. Romana’s and Gregoria’s heirs therefore became co-owners of the property, with the rights and obligations of co-owners under Articles 486, 493, and 494 of the Civil Code.
• Repudiation by a Non-Co-Owner: The rule is that no prescription runs in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner. As held in Robles vs. Court of Appeals, the requisites are: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing. Here, while Lucimo Sr. may have performed acts that could be characterized as repudiation, he was not a co-owner. He was not an heir of Gregoria; he was merely Antipolo’s son-in-law, married to Antipolo’s daughter Teodora. Under Article 150 of the Family Code, family relations, the primary basis for succession, exclude relations by affinity. Lucimo Sr. therefore could not validly effect a repudiation of a co-ownership he was never part of, and prescription did not run adversely against Leonardo.
• Prescription and Laches: The trial court erred in reckoning the prescriptive period from Leon’s death in 1962. The CA held that prescription began only in 1979 or 1980, when Lucimo Sr. executed the Affidavit of Ownership of Land, obtained a new tax declaration in his name, and informed Leonardo before the Lupon Tagapamayapa of his alleged 1943 purchase. The decisive point, however, is that Lucimo Sr. was not a co-owner, so his acts could not start prescription against Leonardo. Leonardo’s admission that Lucimo Sr. was in possession since 1943 was unavailing because in 1943 Leon remained the rightful owner, the property was registered under the Torrens system in Leon’s name, and Leon’s ownership ceased only in 1962 upon his death when the property passed to his heirs by operation of law. Since none of the co-owners made a valid repudiation of the existing co-ownership, Leonardo could seek partition at any time, and laches did not defeat that right.

• Affinity and Succession — Under Article 150 of the Family Code, family relations include only those between husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters; relations by affinity are excluded. Because succession is primarily based on family relations, one merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit and cannot become a co-owner of the decedent’s property. In this case, Lucimo Sr., as Antipolo’s son-in-law and Teodora’s husband, was not an heir or co-owner; he could not repudiate the co-ownership among Leon’s heirs.
• Co-ownership and Prescription — Under Article 494, fifth paragraph, of the Civil Code, no prescription runs in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. For title to prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing. The Court applied this by holding that because Lucimo Sr. was not a co-owner, his acts could not constitute a valid repudiation and prescription did not run against Leonardo.
• Transmission of Succession — Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death. Leon’s ownership ceased upon his death in 1962, when the property passed by operation of law to his heirs, Romana and Gregoria, and in turn to their heirs as co-owners.
• Partition by Co-Owners — Under Article 494, first paragraph, of the Civil Code, no co-owner is obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. Because no valid repudiation occurred, Leonardo’s right to seek partition was not lost.
• Laches — Laches is controlled by equitable considerations and cannot be used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud; it cannot deprive heirs of their rightful inheritance. The Court affirmed the CA’s holding that laches did not bar Leonardo’s action, since the co-ownership was never validly repudiated.

• "One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the latter and cannot become a co-owner of the decedent’s property. Consequently, he cannot effect a repudiation of the co-ownership of the estate that was formed among the decedent’s heirs." — This passage states the core ratio decidendi: Lucimo Sr.’s affinity to the decedent’s family prevented him from being an heir or co-owner and from repudiating the co-ownership.
• "For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner." — This concise formulation identifies the decisive requirement that the Court used to reject petitioners’ prescription argument.
• "In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing." — This is the canonical three-part test for prescription in favor of a co-owner, cited from Robles vs. Court of Appeals and applied to the facts.
• "In fine, since none of the co-owners made a valid repudiation of the existing co-ownership, Leonardo could seek partition of the property at any time." — This concluding statement ties the Court’s reasoning to the result: because no valid repudiation occurred, the action for partition was not barred.

• Robles vs. Court of Appeals, 384 Phil. 635, 649-650 (2000) — Cited for the requisites that must concur before title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, including unequivocal acts of repudiation, notice to the other co-owners, and clear and convincing evidence. The Court relied on this formulation in holding that no prescription ran because Lucimo Sr. was not a co-owner.
• Bargayo vs. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857, 872 (1920) — Cited by the CA for the rule that possession by a co-owner is not presumed adverse to the other co-owners but is held to benefit all, unless there is clear evidence of ouster or repudiation made known to them.
• Segura vs. Segura, 247-A Phil. 449, 458 (1988) — Cited by the CA for the principle that a co-owner or co-heir in possession of an inheritance pro-indiviso administers it for himself and in representation of his co-owners or co-heirs, with the obligation to deliver their shares.

• Article 150, Family Code — Defines family relations as those between husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters. The Court applied it to exclude relations by affinity, holding that Lucimo Sr., as son-in-law, was not a co-owner of the estate.
• Article 777, Civil Code — Provides that rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death. Applied to hold that Leon’s property passed to his siblings Romana and Gregoria upon his death in 1962, and then to their heirs.
• Article 486, Civil Code — Provides that a co-owner may use the thing owned in common in accordance with its purpose and without injuring the co-ownership or preventing other co-owners from using it. Cited to describe the rights of the parties as co-owners.
• Article 493, Civil Code — Provides that each co-owner has full ownership of his part and the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto and may alienate, assign, or mortgage it, subject to the effects of partition. Cited in the Court’s discussion of co-ownership.
• Article 494, first paragraph, Civil Code — Provides that no co-owner is obliged to remain in the co-ownership and each may demand partition at any time insofar as his share is concerned. Applied to hold that Leonardo could seek partition.
• Article 494, fifth paragraph, Civil Code — Provides that no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. Applied to hold that prescription did not run absent a valid repudiation by a co-owner.
• Article 1141, Civil Code — Provides that real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years. The trial court applied it to dismiss the complaint, but the CA and Supreme Court found the prescriptive period had not run because no valid repudiation by a co-owner occurred.

Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson), Arturo D. Brion, Jose Portugal Perez, and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe.