Anonymous vs. Judge Bernardo

A judge may be disciplined for prejudicial conduct that gravely besmirches or taints the reputation of the service even when the act occurs outside official duties and even if the damage was accidental, where the judge's reckless conduct and lack of restraint fall below the exacting ethical standards of the judicial office. Under Canon VII, Section 18(k) of the 2025 Code of Judicial Conduct and Accountability, such conduct is a serious offense.

Judge Elmer R. Bernardo was the presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Batac City, Ilocos Norte. The anonymous complainant was a member of the public who reported his alleged conduct involving driving under the influence and damage to private property. The case proceeded under the Court's administrative disciplinary framework for judges, with the 2025 Code of Judicial Conduct and Accountability taking effect during the pendency of the case and superseding Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

On August 18, 2023, the Court received an email from an anonymous complainant charging Judge Elmer R. Bernardo with unprofessional conduct involving driving under the influence of alcohol and habitually causing damage to private properties. The complainant alleged that Judge Bernardo, while driving his vehicle, hit a tricycle, causing leg injuries to its driver; that he had caused damage to seven private vehicles by throwing stones, destroying windshields, and pushing some vehicles into a ditch; and that these incidents were recorded in the police blotter but remained unacted upon, with no amicable settlement or compensation. The complainant also narrated a specific incident involving a Ford EcoSport and an Isuzu Crosswind, alleging that Judge Bernardo admitted causing the damage while under the influence of alcohol and ordered PSSg. Edward Rabanal of the Batac Philippine National Police to manipulate the police blotter entry relating to the incident.

The Office of the Court Administrator investigated the anonymous Complaint. Its Legal Office sent an email to the anonymous complainant proposing to meet and obtain more information, but the complainant did not respond. The investigating team went to Batac, Ilocos Norte, on October 17 to 20, 2023, and secured an extract copy of the police blotter regarding one of the incidents. The excerpt stated that at or about 3:32 a.m. of July 29, 2023, Allan Paul Paraoan y Cabaccang and Richelle Joy Wronski y Paraoan came to the station and lodged a complaint against Judge Bernardo for damage to property. They averred that at around 2:30 a.m. of that date, their neighbor Judge Bernardo arrived at his residence allegedly under the influence of liquor and, with no apparent reason, threw a piece of wood and stone towards their respective vehicles parked outside their house along the barangay road. As a result, the Ford vehicle bearing plate no. IDI 2305 incurred dents on top and a detached rain visor on the driver's side, while the Isuzu Crosswind bearing plate no. XGF 628 incurred dents on the hood and a detached rain visor on the passenger side. Right after the incident, the reporting persons talked to Judge Bernardo, and he admitted that he was the one who threw the piece of wood and stone while it was being recorded on video through a cellphone.

The team also talked to Paraoan, who confirmed that the police blotter entry was accurate but was reluctant to execute an affidavit because he had already settled the matter with Judge Bernardo. He mentioned that Richelle Joy Wronski had already left the country. The JIB later requested the Batac PNP to provide a certified true copy of the police blotter entry pertaining to the alleged incident involving Judge Bernardo and a tricycle driver. In its February 23, 2023 Letter, the Batac PNP stated that there were no recorded incidents that Judge Bernardo ran over a tricycle driver at the Pik-a-Bun Terminal.

In his Comment, Judge Bernardo denied that he was intoxicated when the incident occurred on July 29, 2023. He asserted that he was able to carefully maneuver his vehicle past the illegally parked Isuzu Crosswind and Ford EcoSport. He admitted throwing the piece of wood and the stone but never admitted that he intentionally targeted the vehicles; he claimed they were accidentally hit. He explained that he threw the two items toward a rodent the size of a cat that he saw moving on the pavement toward the drainage canal, as an instinctive reaction after grabbing the items from the floor of his veranda. He described driving home southbound on a 4-meter wide street and barely squeezing his car into his garage because three vehicles were parked facing south and obstructing the southbound lane. He claimed he did not fall into the drainage canal because half of the width of his tire stayed on the pavement. He said that while standing on his veranda, he saw the rat, threw a piece of wood, failed to hit it, then threw a stone, and again missed; his neighbors were alerted and saw dents in the Isuzu Crosswind and broken sun visors on the Ford EcoSport, blaming the wood and stone. Though unsure which item caused the damage, he admitted throwing the stone, said he did not intentionally target the illegally parked vehicles, and volunteered to pay, apologized, and expressed willingness to talk about it the following morning.

Judge Bernardo also denied convincing the Batac PNP to manipulate the police blotter. He explained that he met the vehicle owners the day after the incident; they agreed that the car owners would have their vehicles repaired at Honda Ilocos and that he would pay for the cost. He went to Honda Ilocos to hand over a copy of the police blotter and give instructions for the repair of the vehicles. He claimed he later received a call from Honda Ilocos's manager informing him that the vehicle owners presented a different police blotter entry with what appeared to be additional damages. He went to the police station and talked to the chief of police, and learned that after he settled the matter, the owners asked the desk officer to include additional items requiring repair even if those purported damages did not arise from the incident involving him; he and the Batac PNP agreed to disregard the padded police blotter. He also included "background facts" stating that he resides on a street with a narrow concrete road, that his neighbors own large vehicles but have no space inside their houses and use the narrow road for parking, that he made repeated requests to move the vehicles, and that his neighbors resented him and branded him demanding. He narrated that he asked traffic enforcers to advise drivers not to park and apprehend violators for traffic obstruction under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code and a Batac City Ordinance, but his neighbors continued to park indiscriminately. The JIB OED found that only one incident was duly established and that Judge Bernardo's explanation that he only threw the piece of wood and stone because he saw a huge rat was difficult to believe; the JIB adopted the recommendation.

• Driving Under Influence and Property Damage: The anonymous complainant alleged that Judge Bernardo, while driving under the influence of alcohol, hit a tricycle and caused leg injuries to its driver, and habitually caused damage to private vehicles by throwing stones, destroying windshields, and pushing some vehicles into a ditch.
• Failure to Settle or Compensate: The complainant claimed that although these incidents were recorded in the police blotter, they remained unacted upon and Judge Bernardo never amicably settled or paid compensation for the property damage he caused.
• Blotter Manipulation: The complainant alleged that in the incident involving a Ford EcoSport and an Isuzu Crosswind, Judge Bernardo admitted causing the damage while under the influence of alcohol and ordered PSSg. Edward Rabanal of the Batac PNP to manipulate the police blotter entry relating to the incident.
• Systemic Concern: The complainant stated that the justice system in their town was corrupt, especially when the accused is a judge or member of the judiciary.

• No Intoxication: Judge Bernardo denied that he was intoxicated when the incident occurred on July 29, 2023, and asserted that he was able to carefully maneuver his vehicle past the illegally parked Isuzu Crosswind and Ford EcoSport.
• Accidental Damage and Rodent Defense: He admitted throwing the piece of wood and the stone but maintained that he never admitted intentionally targeting the vehicles; he claimed the vehicles were accidentally hit because he threw the items toward a rodent the size of a cat as an instinctive reaction.
• No Blotter Manipulation: He denied convincing the Batac PNP to manipulate the police blotter, explaining that he met the vehicle owners, agreed to pay for repairs at Honda Ilocos, later learned that the owners presented a different blotter entry with additional damages, and agreed with the Batac PNP to disregard the padded police blotter.
• Neighbor Resentment and Illegal Parking: He claimed that his neighbors resented his repeated requests to move their illegally parked vehicles from the narrow street, and he provided "background facts" about the parking situation and his efforts to enforce traffic obstruction rules.
• Remorse and Reparation: He expressed remorse and offered reparations to the owners of the vehicles for the damages he caused.

• Prejudicial Conduct: Whether Judge Bernardo's conduct—throwing a piece of wood and a stone that damaged two parked vehicles—constitutes prejudicial conduct that gravely besmirches or taints the reputation of the service.
• Intent and Quantum of Proof: Whether the respondent deliberately caused the damage and whether the police blotter and anonymous complaint sufficiently establish intoxication or intentional targeting under the substantial evidence standard.
• Penalty: Whether the penalty of a fine of PHP 50,001.00 is proper given the first offense as a mitigating circumstance.
• Bar Liability: Whether Judge Bernardo should be sanctioned as a member of the Philippine Bar under Canon II, Section 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability.

• Prejudicial Conduct: Yes. Under Canon VII, Section 18(k) of the 2025 Code of Judicial Conduct and Accountability, conduct unbecoming of a judge or prejudicial conduct that gravely besmirches or taints the reputation of the service is a serious offense.
• Intent and Quantum of Proof: Not established by the police blotter or anonymous complaint alone, but not necessary. Even assuming respondent's version is accurate, his recklessness in throwing items in an area where private property could be damaged falls below the standard of behavior expected of members of the Judiciary.
• Penalty: Yes. The first offense is a mitigating circumstance, and with no aggravating circumstance, the Court may impose a fine not less than half of the minimum prescribed; the fine of PHP 50,001.00 is proper.
• Bar Liability: A stern reminder suffices. Considering that only one incident was duly established, that respondent was already held liable as a member of the Judiciary, and that he expressed remorse and offered reparations, he is sternly reminded to observe Canon II, Section 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability.

• Prejudicial Conduct: Judges are held to the highest standards of conduct, both in and outside the courtroom, and are expected to conduct themselves in a manner beyond reproach. The 2025 Code of Judicial Conduct and Accountability applies to this pending case under its transitory clause. Canon IV, Sections 1 and 2 require judges to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety, to accept personal restrictions, and to conduct themselves consistently with the dignity of the judicial office. The Court relied on Obiedo vs. Santos and Ambassador Angping vs. Judge Ramos to stress that judges must be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence, and that their conduct must be free of any whiff of impropriety. The undisputed fact is that respondent's conduct caused damage to two vehicles. Although the police blotter and anonymous complaint did not by themselves establish deliberate intent or intoxication, respondent's own submissions and his implausible rodent defense, coupled with his "background facts" showing resentment over parking and lack of remorse, painted a vivid picture of the incident. The Court found it entirely reasonable to conclude that the incident was not completely without malice and was driven by a judge's inability to exercise restraint. Even if respondent's version were accurate, his recklessness in throwing items in an area where private property could be, and was in fact, damaged still constituted conduct below the standard expected of judges. His conduct created an appearance of impropriety, exposed him to public ridicule, and diminished public confidence in the Judiciary.

• Intent and Quantum of Proof: In administrative cases for the discipline of judges, the quantum of proof is substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Technical rules of procedure and evidence do not strictly apply, and administrative due process is not fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense, but the parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present evidence. The police blotter entry and the anonymous Complaint did not suffice to establish that respondent purposely damaged the vehicles or that he was intoxicated. However, Paraoan's confirmation of the blotter entry, coupled with respondent's statements before the JIB, showed what truly transpired. Respondent's story—that he threw a piece of wood and a stone at early dawn at a rodent, with the items conveniently available on his veranda, and that his neighbors were roused by the commotion—was implausible. His decision to invoke this incredible story worsened his position. The Court also noted that his "background facts" about illegal parking were unnecessary to his central defense and betrayed his lack of remorse and resentment toward his neighbors. Thus, the conduct was penalized regardless of whether deliberate intent was fully established.

• Penalty: Under Canon VII, Section 22 of the 2025 Code of Judicial Conduct and Accountability, serious offenses are punishable by dismissal from service, suspension, and/or a fine of more than PHP 101,000.00 but not exceeding PHP 500,000.00. Canon VII, Section 24 identifies first offense as a mitigating circumstance, and Canon VII, Section 25 provides that where there is one or more mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance, the Court may impose the penalties of suspension or fine for a period or amount not less than half of the minimum prescribed. This is respondent's first offense. The Court agreed with and adopted the JIB's recommendation that he be imposed a fine of PHP 50,001.00.

• Bar Liability: Under Canon II, Section 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability, a lawyer shall respect the law, the courts, and other government agencies, their officials, employees, and processes, and act with courtesy, civility, fairness, and candor toward fellow members of the bar. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on one's fitness to practice law, nor behave in a scandalous manner, whether in public or private life, to the discredit of the legal profession. In this case, only one incident was duly established, and respondent was already held liable as a member of the Judiciary. He expressed remorse and offered reparations to the owners of the vehicles. Thus, a stern reminder sufficed.

• Judicial conduct and appearance of propriety — Judges are held to the highest standards of conduct, both in and outside the courtroom, and must conduct themselves in a manner beyond reproach. They must avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety, accept personal restrictions that may be burdensome to ordinary citizens, and act consistently with the dignity of the judicial office. The Court applied this doctrine to Judge Bernardo, finding that his conduct in throwing objects that damaged vehicles, even if outside official duties, created an appearance of impropriety and diminished public confidence in the Judiciary.

• Prejudicial conduct that gravely besmirches or taints the reputation of the service — This is a serious offense under Canon VII, Section 18(k) of the 2025 Code of Judicial Conduct and Accountability. It covers acts that tarnish the image and integrity of a public office without a direct relation to or connection with the performance of official duties. It was reformulated from "conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service" to avoid becoming a blanket offense. The Court applied it because respondent's act of throwing a piece of wood and a stone that damaged two vehicles was not connected to his official duties but still gravely tarnished the Judiciary's reputation.

• Substantial evidence in administrative cases — In administrative cases for the discipline of judges, the quantum of proof is substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Technical rules of procedure and evidence do not strictly apply, and administrative due process is not fully equated with strict judicial due process, but the parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to be heard. The Court used this standard in evaluating the police blotter, the anonymous complaint, Paraoan's confirmation, and respondent's submissions.

• First offense as a mitigating circumstance — Under Canon VII, Section 24 of the 2025 Code of Judicial Conduct and Accountability, first offense is a mitigating circumstance. Under Canon VII, Section 25, where there is one or more mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance, the Court may impose suspension or fine for a period or amount not less than half of the minimum prescribed. The Court treated respondent's first offense as mitigating and imposed a fine of PHP 50,001.00.

• Dignified conduct for lawyers — Under Canon II, Section 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability, a lawyer shall respect the law, the courts, and other government agencies, and act with courtesy, civility, fairness, and candor. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on one's fitness to practice law, nor behave in a scandalous manner, whether in public or private life, to the discredit of the legal profession. The Court applied this by sternly reminding respondent, as a member of the Bar, to maintain dignified conduct.

• Transitory application of the 2025 Code — Under Section 1 of the General Provisions of the 2025 Code of Judicial Conduct and Accountability, the Code shall be applied to all pending and future cases, except to the extent that retroactive application would not be feasible or would work injustice. The Court applied the 2025 Code because it took effect during the pendency of this case.

• "Judges are held to the highest standards of conduct, both in and outside the courtroom. The duties and responsibilities of a judge are some of the most exacting in public service. Judges are seen as the embodiment of justice and are expected to conduct themselves, both in their public and private lives, in a manner that is beyond reproach." — This passage states the foundational standard of judicial ethics applied to Judge Bernardo and explains why conduct outside the courtroom may still be disciplined.

• "Further, even if the Court were to gratuitously assume that the respondent's version is accurate, his recklessness in throwing items in an area where private property could be, and was in fact, damaged still constitutes conduct falling below the standard of behavior expected of members of the Judiciary." — This is the ratio decidendi on why the penalty does not depend on proving deliberate intent; reckless conduct damaging property is enough to fall below judicial standards.

• "When judges who patently disregard the exacting standards of judicial ethics remain unpunished because they are able to deploy legal maneuverings and use their legal knowledge to wriggle their way out of liability, the integrity of the entire Judiciary is jeopardized." — This passage explains the institutional stakes of disciplining erring judges and supports the Court's refusal to accept respondent's implausible defense.

• "Under Canon VII, Section 18(k) of the 2025 Code of Judicial Conduct and Accountability, 'conduct unbecoming of a judge or prejudicial, vulgar or scandalous conduct that gravely besmirches or taints the reputation of the service' is a serious offense." — This identifies the specific serious offense for which respondent was found guilty and the controlling provision.

• Obiedo vs. Santos, 893 Phil. 264 (2021) — The Court cited this to explain the exacting standards of judicial conduct: judges must adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct, be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence, and be like Caesar's wife—not only pure but above suspicion. It was followed in finding respondent's conduct below the required standard.

• Ambassador Angping vs. Judge Ramos, 700 Phil. 503 (2012) — The Court reiterated that judges must personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service, and that their conduct must be free of any whiff of impropriety in the performance of their duties and their behavior outside the sala. It was followed in this case.

• Re: Anonymous Complaint Against Judge Edmundo T. Acuña, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1891, July 28, 2005 — The Court reiterated the admonition that judges must always be temperate, patient, and courteous in conduct and language, and that propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to all judicial activities. It was followed in holding respondent liable.

• Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Reyes, 889 Phil. 622 (2020) — The Court cited this for the rule that in administrative cases for the discipline of judges, the quantum of proof is substantial evidence. It was applied in evaluating the evidence against respondent.

• Dela Cruz vs. Malunao, 684 Phil. 493 (2012) — The Court cited this for the rule that technical rules of procedure and evidence do not strictly apply in administrative proceedings and that administrative due process is not fully equated with strict judicial due process, although parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to be heard. It was applied in assessing respondent's defense.

• Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas vs. Castro, 759 Phil. 68 (2015) — The Court cited this in the annotation to Rule 140 for the definition of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service: acts that tarnish the image and integrity of a public office without a direct relation to or connection with the performance of official duties. It was used to explain the reformulated offense.

• 2025 Code of Judicial Conduct and Accountability, General Provisions, Section 1 — The transitory clause provides that the Code shall be applied to all pending and future cases, except to the extent that retroactive application would not be feasible or would work injustice. The Court applied the 2025 Code to this pending case.

• 2025 Code of Judicial Conduct and Accountability, Canon IV, Sections 1 and 2 — These provisions require judges to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety, to freely and willingly embrace personal restrictions that may be burdensome to ordinary citizens, to conduct themselves consistently with the dignity of the judicial office, and to ensure their conduct is beyond reproach and conforms to the highest ethical standards. They were applied to Judge Bernardo's conduct.

• 2025 Code of Judicial Conduct and Accountability, Canon VII, Section 18(k) — This provision defines "conduct unbecoming of a judge or prejudicial, vulgar or scandalous conduct that gravely besmirches or taints the reputation of the service" as a serious offense. It is the basis for respondent's guilt.

• 2025 Code of Judicial Conduct and Accountability, Canon VII, Section 22 — This provision prescribes the penalties for serious offenses: dismissal from service, forfeiture of benefits and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment in government service; suspension from office without salary and other benefits for one year and one day up to three years; and/or a fine of more than PHP 101,000.00 but not exceeding PHP 500,000.00. It supplies the range from which the fine was taken.

• 2025 Code of Judicial Conduct and Accountability, Canon VII, Section 24 — This provision identifies first offense as a mitigating circumstance. The Court treated respondent's first offense as mitigating.

• 2025 Code of Judicial Conduct and Accountability, Canon VII, Section 25 — This provision states that where there is one or more mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance, the Court may impose suspension or fine for a period or amount not less than half of the minimum prescribed. It authorized the fine of PHP 50,001.00.

• Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability, Canon II, Section 2 — This provision requires a lawyer to respect the law, the courts, and other government agencies, their officials, employees, and processes, and to act with courtesy, civility, fairness, and candor toward fellow members of the bar. It also prohibits conduct that adversely reflects on one's fitness to practice law or scandalous behavior in public or private life. It is the basis for the stern reminder to respondent as a member of the Bar.

• Rule 140, Rules of Court (superseded by the 2025 Code of Judicial Conduct and Accountability) — The annotation to Rule 140 was cited to explain that "conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service" refers to acts that tarnish the image and integrity of a public office without a direct relation to or connection with the performance of official duties, and that the offense was reformulated to "prejudicial conduct that gravely besmirches or taints the reputation of the service."

Gesmundo, C.J., Caguioa, Hernando, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, Gaerlan, Lopez, Dimaampao, Marquez, Kho, Jr., and Singh, JJ., concur. Villanueva, J., took no part.

• Justice Leonen (SAJ) — Justice Leonen agreed with the finding that Judge Bernardo is guilty of prejudicial conduct that gravely besmirches or taints the reputation of the service, but dissented on the penalty. He argued that dismissal from public service should be imposed despite the charge being respondent's first offense, maintaining that the appreciation of mitigating circumstances under Rule 140, Sections 19 and 20 is discretionary and that a single instance of misconduct may be grave enough to cause irreparable harm to the Judiciary's image. He found that Judge Bernardo's incredible excuse of attempting to repel a large rodent, his lack of remorse, his resentment toward his neighbors, and his admission of convincing the police to make changes to the blotter entry showed a serious defect of character inconsistent with the high standard of conduct required of judges. He voted to affirm the finding of guilt but modify the penalty from fine and reprimand to dismissal from public service.