Anido vs. Republic of the Philippines

In a petition for recognition of a foreign divorce decree under Article 26(2) of the Family Code, the foreign law that must be proven is the law of the state that issued the divorce decree, not the national law of the alien spouse, and such foreign law must be established either by an official publication or by a duly attested copy accompanied by the certificate of the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country, in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25 of the Rules of Court.

Rosary Kristine I. Anido is a Filipino citizen who married Enrique Martin Gomez Pomar, a Peruvian citizen, in New Jersey, USA, on May 17, 2012. Both were medical doctors training in pediatrics at the time they met in 2010. After completing their training in 2013, they transferred their residence to Kentucky, USA. The marriage deteriorated after Anido failed to conceive despite counseling and fertility therapy. Enrique subsequently filed for divorce before the Fayette County Circuit Court of Kentucky, which was docketed as 15-CI-3743. The interaction between Philippine law (which does not allow divorce) and foreign divorce law is governed by Article 26(2) of the Family Code, which creates an exception to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, allowing a Filipino spouse to remarry if the alien spouse validly obtains a divorce abroad capacitating him or her to remarry.

Rosary Kristine I. Anido, a Filipino citizen, met Enrique Martin Gomez Pomar, a Peruvian citizen, in New Jersey, USA, sometime in 2010, while both were medical doctors training in pediatrics. They were married on May 17, 2012, at Parsippany, New Jersey. After graduating from their training program in 2013, the spouses transferred their residence to Kentucky, USA. According to Anido, the marriage turned sour after she failed to conceive despite counseling and fertility therapy. Enrique subsequently filed for divorce before the Fayette County Circuit Court of Kentucky, docketed as 15-CI-3743, and on November 18, 2015, the Kentucky Court granted a decree of absolute divorce.

On February 6, 2017, Anido filed a Petition for Enforcement of a Foreign Decree of Divorce and Correction of Record in the Civil Registry with the RTC of Quezon City, docketed as R-QZN-17-01806-CV. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Notice of Appearance on March 3, 2017, and deputized the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City (OCP) to represent the State. The RTC scheduled a hearing for January 30, 2018, for the presentation of Anido's evidence, notifying all parties including the OSG. During that hearing, Anido testified and made an oral offer of evidence; the State was represented by the OCP.

Anido's evidence consisted of several exhibits. To prove the marriage, she offered the Certificate of Marriage issued by the New Jersey Department of Health, the Report of Marriage Contracted Abroad issued by the Philippine Consul General in New York, and the Report of Marriage issued by the Philippine Statistics Authority. To prove the divorce decree, she presented the Divorce Certificate issued by Paul F. Royce, State Registrar of the Office of Vital Statistics of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, along with Certificates of Authentication from the Secretary of State of Kentucky and the Vice Consul of the Philippines in Washington, D.C. To prove the foreign law allowing the divorce, she offered copies of the Peru Civil Code in Spanish with English translations, and printouts of the Kentucky laws on divorce, marriages, and separation, accompanied by an attestation personally prepared and signed by Anido before a notary public in Kentucky, stating that the pages "had not been altered."

The RTC granted the petition on February 14, 2018, recognizing the divorce decree and directing the civil registrar to annotate the order on the Certificate of Marriage. The OSG sought reconsideration, which the RTC denied on April 27, 2018. The OSG appealed to the CA, raising as its sole issue the insufficiency of Anido's evidence proving the foreign law that allowed Enrique to obtain a divorce decree and remarry. The OSG did not question the existence or authenticity of the divorce decree, nor Enrique's Peruvian citizenship or the spouses' legal residence in Kentucky. The CA reversed the RTC on September 8, 2020, finding that the copies of the Kentucky and Peruvian laws were unauthenticated mere printouts, that the translation of the Peruvian law was dubious, and that Anido failed to provide any provision of Peruvian law capacitating Enrique to remarry or to present any expert witness. The CA dismissed the petition for failure to prove the foreign law in the manner required by the Rules of Court.

• Sufficiency of Evidence of Foreign Law: Petitioner argued that she was able to present an authenticated copy of the applicable foreign law, particularly the Peru Civil Code and the relevant marriage laws of Kentucky, USA, as they were accompanied by self-authenticating notarized attestations concerning their accuracy and authenticity.
• Specific Provisions Identified: Petitioner maintained that she pointed out specific provisions of the said foreign laws which capacitate Enrique to remarry following the divorce decree issued by the Kentucky Court.
• No Requirement for Expert Witness: Petitioner argued that there is nothing in the rules of procedure that requires her to present an expert witness to prove the specific provision of the Peruvian and Kentucky laws allowing Enrique to validly obtain a divorce decree and to remarry thereafter.
• Due Process of the OSG: Petitioner insisted that the OSG was never deprived of due process because it received notice of the RTC hearing held on January 30, 2018, and it was during that hearing when she testified and orally offered her evidence. The OSG cannot decry any deprivation of due process because it failed to appear despite notice, and the State was represented by the OCP, which the OSG had deputized.

• Insufficiency of Proof of Foreign Law: Respondent, through the OSG, argued that the CA correctly ordered the dismissal of the Petition for Enforcement because Anido failed to present competent proof of Enrique's foreign law allowing divorce and capacitating him to remarry thereafter.
• Deprivation of Due Process: Respondent emphasized that the OSG was deprived of the opportunity to object to Anido's evidence because it did not receive a copy of the report thereon and the RTC Order admitting such evidence.

• Which Foreign Law to Prove: Whether, in a petition for recognition of a foreign divorce decree under Article 26(2) of the Family Code, the petitioner must prove the national law of the alien spouse (Peru) or the law of the state that issued the divorce decree (Kentucky).
• Sufficiency of Evidence of Foreign Law: Whether the evidence presented by Anido — printouts of Kentucky laws accompanied by her own notarized attestation — constitutes competent proof of the foreign law under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25 of the Rules of Court.
• Probative Value of Notarized Documents: Whether a notarized document is prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein, or merely of its due execution and authenticity.
• Propriety of Remand: Whether the case should be remanded for reception of evidence despite the insufficiency of the evidence initially presented.

• Which Foreign Law to Prove: The law of the state that issued the divorce decree (Kentucky) must be proven, not the national law of the alien spouse (Peru). A textual analysis of Article 26(2) requires a divorce "validly obtained abroad," meaning the foreign law of the country or state that issued the decree is the material law, supported by the principle of comity of nations.
• Sufficiency of Evidence of Foreign Law: No. The printouts of Kentucky laws prepared and signed by Anido herself, accompanied only by her own notarized attestation, are manifestly inadequate. They were not attested by the legal custodian of the records and lacked the required certificate from the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippines, contrary to Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25.
• Probative Value of Notarized Documents: A notarized document is prima facie evidence only of its due execution and authenticity, not of the facts stated therein, unless it is a voluntary written act or deed embodying an undertaking that creates, transmits, modifies, or extinguishes rights — in which case it is evidence of the fact which gave rise to its execution under Rule 132, Section 23.
• Propriety of Remand: Yes. The case was remanded to the CA for reception of evidence on the Kentucky marriage laws, in the interest of substantial justice, given that the divorce decree was undisputed, the OSG had not challenged its validity, and the Filipino spouse stood to be left as the only remaining party in a dissolved marriage.

• Which Foreign Law to Prove: The Court grounded its analysis on the text of Article 26(2) of the Family Code, which requires a divorce "validly obtained abroad" by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The phrase "validly obtained abroad" necessarily refers to the law of the foreign country or state that issued the divorce decree, because validity is determined by the issuing court's jurisdiction over the subject matter and the authority to grant the relief sought under its own laws. The principle of comity of nations further supports this conclusion: a foreign judgment is presumed valid and binding in the country from which it comes, and the foreign court is presumed to have acted in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction. The goal of comity is to produce friendly intercourse with the sovereignty that rendered the decree. The Court emphasized that comity extends not only to decrees over citizens of the issuing state but also to persons under the protection of its laws — including domiciliaries. Because Enrique was domiciled in Kentucky, and the Kentucky Court issued the decree, Kentucky law is determinative of whether the divorce is effective where it was rendered. The Court distinguished its prior cases where the alien spouse's national law was examined: in those cases, the divorce decree originated from the same country of the alien spouse's citizenship, so there was no variance between nationality and the issuing state. Here, Enrique was Peruvian but obtained the divorce in Kentucky, creating a divergence. The Court also noted that examining Peruvian law to determine the validity of the Kentucky decree would amount to a relitigation or review of the merits of the foreign judgment, which Philippine courts cannot do in a petition for recognition. Philippine courts adopt a policy of limited review, determining only whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with public policy or whether an extrinsic ground to repel it exists. Even if the Kentucky Court erred in applying its conflict-of-laws rules, such error would be an error of judgment correctable only by direct review, not collateral attack, and the judgment remains valid and binding until reversed.

• Sufficiency of Evidence of Foreign Law: The marriage laws of Kentucky, as official acts of a sovereign authority, must be proven under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25 — either by an official publication or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody, accompanied by a certificate from the proper Philippine diplomatic or consular officer. Anido's Exhibits "N-1" to "N-26" were mere printouts prepared by Anido herself, not by the legal custodian of Kentucky laws. Her Attestation, notarized before a Kentucky notary public, stated only that the pages "had not been altered" — it did not certify that they were correct copies of the official records. Moreover, the Certificate of Authentication from the Philippine Vice Consul in Washington, D.C. (Exhibit "L") pertained to the divorce decree, not to the Kentucky laws. None of the recognized alternative means of proving foreign law — expert testimony, certification by the foreign state's consular officer in the Philippines, or translation authorized by the proper foreign official — was availed of. The OCA Circular No. 157-2022 compilation of foreign divorce laws on the Court's website, which includes the Kentucky Code, does not dispense with the authentication requirement, as held in Republic vs. Ng, because foreign laws may be repealed or amended, rendering the compilation outdated.

• Probative Value of Notarized Documents: The Court clarified a persistent confusion in its jurisprudence regarding the probative value of notarized documents. While all notarized documents are prima facie evidence of their due execution and authenticity, not all are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Under Rule 132, Section 23, a notarized document is prima facie evidence only of the fact which gave rise to its execution and the date thereof. This rule, derived from Article 1218 of the Spanish Civil Code, applies to acknowledged written acts, deeds, or instruments executed voluntarily by a party to embody an undertaking, obligation, or concurrent rights and obligations — such as deeds of sale, contracts of lease, deeds of donation, promissory notes, and deeds of mortgage. In such cases, the Parol Evidence Rule and estoppel apply, making the instrument the repository of the truth. The Attestation presented by Anido does not fall into this category: nothing therein involves the creation, transmission, modification, or extinguishment of rights. Anido is not the legal custodian of Kentucky laws, and her attestation that the printout accurately reflects those laws cannot be taken as proof of that fact. The notary public's function is to administer an oath and attest to the affiant's identity and voluntary execution — not to validate the truthfulness of the contents.

• Propriety of Remand: Although Anido's evidence of foreign law was manifestly incompetent and would ordinarily warrant dismissal, the Court found persuasive reasons to remand. First, Anido had already sufficiently proven the divorce decree itself with a duly attested Divorce Certificate and consular authentication. Second, the OSG no longer disputed the existence of the absolute divorce decree, the jurisdiction of the Kentucky Court, or the validity of the divorce proceedings on grounds of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake. Third, affirming the dismissal would require Anido to refile and present anew her evidence on the divorce decree, causing further delay and waste of resources. Fourth, with the divorce decree established, justice dictates that Anido be given the opportunity to properly prove the appropriate foreign law so that she may be freed from a marriage where she is the only remaining party. The Court invoked its policy of liberality in cases involving recognition of foreign decrees involving Filipinos in mixed marriages, particularly where the divorce has been proven as a fact. The CA possesses the authority to receive evidence on factual matters, and upon remand, it must receive and evaluate evidence on the relevant Kentucky laws in accordance with the Court's decision.

• Comity of Nations — Comity is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws. It is neither a matter of absolute obligation nor of mere courtesy. In this case, the Court applied comity to hold that a foreign divorce decree issued by a state where the alien spouse is domiciled — even if not a citizen of that state — may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the law of the issuing state is properly proven. The doctrine supports the conclusion that the law to be proven is that of the issuing state, not the alien spouse's national law.

• Nationality Principle and Its Exception under Article 26(2) of the Family Code — Under Article 15 of the Civil Code, laws relating to family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity are binding on Philippine citizens even while living abroad. Article 26(2) of the Family Code creates an exception: where a marriage between a Filipino and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. The purpose is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married while the alien spouse is no longer married after a foreign divorce decree effective in the country where rendered. The Court applied this provision to hold that the foreign law to be proven is that of the state issuing the divorce decree, because the provision requires a divorce "validly obtained abroad."

• Proof of Foreign Law as a Matter of Fact — Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. In actions for recognition of a foreign divorce judgment, the petitioner must prove both the foreign judgment granting the divorce and the foreign law allowing it. The foreign law must be proven like any other fact, in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25 of the Rules of Court: either by an official publication or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody, accompanied by a certificate from the proper Philippine diplomatic or consular officer. Alternative means recognized by case law include: (1) expert testimony from a qualified witness; (2) a copy certified as correct by the appropriate consular officer of the foreign state stationed in the Philippines; and (3) a translation prepared upon the authorization of the proper officer of the foreign state. The Court found that Anido availed of none of these means.

• Probative Value of Notarized Documents — A notarized document is admissible in evidence without need of further authentication, as the certificate of acknowledgment is prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument. However, a notarized document is prima facie evidence only of its due execution and authenticity — not of the truth of the facts stated therein — unless it falls under Rule 132, Section 23 as a voluntary written act or deed embodying an undertaking that creates, transmits, modifies, or extinguishes rights, in which case it is evidence of the fact which gave rise to its execution. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by the notary public applies only to the jurat or acknowledgment portion — the notary's official acts — not to the statements made by the affiant. The Court clarified that the fact of notarization per se is not a guarantee of the validity of the contents, because it is not the function of the notary public to validate the statements contained in the document.

• Limited Review of Foreign Judgments — In petitions for recognition of a foreign judgment, Philippine courts adopt a policy of limited review and refrain from delving into the merits of the foreign judgment. Courts will only determine: (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the judgment (want of jurisdiction, want of notice, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact). If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should recognize it by default as part of comity. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that examining Peruvian law to determine the validity of the Kentucky divorce decree would constitute an impermissible review of the foreign judgment's merits.

• "our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws." — This passage states a foundational principle governing petitions for recognition of foreign divorce decrees: the petitioner bears the burden of proving both the foreign judgment and the governing foreign law, which must be established like any other fact.

• "the foreign law that must be proven by the applicant in a petition for recognition of a foreign divorce decree must be the law of the foreign country or state that issued the divorce decree." — This is the ratio decidendi on the central issue: when the alien spouse's nationality differs from the state that issued the divorce decree, it is the law of the issuing state — not the alien spouse's national law — that must be proven.

• "while a notarized document is admissible in evidence without need for authentication, its probative value is another matter." — This passage articulates the Court's clarification of the distinction between admissibility and probative value of notarized documents, a point of recurring confusion in jurisprudence.

• "courts should endeavor to give all the leeway to the petitioner to prove the matter of divorce, even going to lengths to instruct and use every provision of the rules for the petitioner to obtain a favorable ruling or at least provide a relaxation of rules." — This directive to the CA upon remand reflects the Court's policy of liberality in cases involving recognition of foreign divorce decrees affecting Filipinos in mixed marriages.

• Republic vs. Manalo, 831 Phil. 33 (2018) — Recognized the purpose of Article 26(2) of the Family Code to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married while the alien spouse is no longer married. The Court relied on this case to support the remand and the policy of liberality in recognition of foreign divorce decrees.

• Garcia vs. Recio, 418 Phil. 723 (2001) — Established as early as 2001 that in actions for recognition of a foreign divorce judgment, the petitioner must prove both the foreign judgment and the foreign law allowing it. The case was remanded because the divorce decree contained a restriction on remarriage. The Court cited it as the foundational case on the burden of proving foreign law and as precedent for remand.

• Racho vs. Tanaka, 834 Phil. 21 (2018) — The Court determined that the former spouses were capacitated to remarry because the pertinent laws of Japan, the state that issued the divorce decree, as well as the certificate of acceptance of the report of divorce, did not state any qualifications restricting remarriage. Cited to illustrate that the divorce decree or the applicable foreign law must allow remarriage, and that the law of the issuing state is the proper foreign law to prove.

• Sarto vs. People, 826 Phil. 745 (2018) — The divorce was not recognized because neither the divorce decree nor the appropriate foreign law satisfactorily demonstrated the type of divorce secured. Distinguished as a case where the foreign law was insufficiently proven.

• Philippine Trust Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 650 Phil. 54 (2010) — Explained that notarized documents are merely proof of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date thereof, but are not prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The presumption of regularity applies only to the jurat or acknowledgment portion. Cited as the key authority on the probative value of notarized documents.

• Bank of the Philippine Islands Securities Corp. vs. Guevara, 755 Phil. 434 (2015) — A foreign judgment was recognized over objections raising mere errors of judgment, which should have been corrected through timely appeal. Applied to hold that any error by the Kentucky Court in applying its conflict-of-laws rules would be an error of judgment correctable only by direct review, not collateral attack.

• Republic vs. Ng, G.R. No. 249238, Feb. 27, 2024 — Held that the OCA's compilation of foreign divorce laws is helpful for preliminary reference but does not dispense with the requirement to comply with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25. Applied to reject reliance on the OCA compilation as sufficient proof of Kentucky law.

• Basa-Egami vs. Bersales, 925 Phil. 391 (2022) — The Court refused to take judicial notice of Japanese divorce laws even though a copy had been previously recognized in Racho vs. Tanaka, because laws are dynamic and evolving. Applied to reinforce that foreign laws must be proven in each case and cannot be judicially noticed from prior proceedings.

• J.A. Sison vs. Board of Accountancy, 85 Phil. 276 (1949) — Defined comity as the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the acts of foreign governments and their tribunals, having due regard to international duty and convenience and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons under the protection of its laws. Cited as the foundational definition of comity applied to hold that a foreign decree may be recognized even if the parties are not citizens of the issuing state, provided they are under the protection of its laws.

• Article 26(2), Family Code — Provides that where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. The Court interpreted the phrase "validly obtained abroad" to require proof of the law of the state that issued the divorce decree, not the national law of the alien spouse.

• Article 15, Civil Code — Embodies the nationality principle, providing that laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition, and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad. The Court noted that Article 26(2) of the Family Code creates an exception to this principle.

• Rule 132, Section 19, Rules of Court — Classifies documents as public or private. Public documents include (a) written official acts or records of sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines or of a foreign country; and (b) documents acknowledged before a notary public. The Court distinguished between these classes to determine the applicable authentication requirements.

• Rule 132, Section 23, Rules of Court — Provides that documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, while all other public documents are evidence of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date thereof. The Court clarified that this provision applies to acknowledged written acts, deeds, or instruments that create, transmit, modify, or extinguish rights — not to attestations like the one Anido presented.

• Rule 132, Section 24, Rules of Court — Governs proof of official records, requiring that the record of public documents under Section 19(a) be evidenced by an official publication or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody, accompanied by a certificate from the proper Philippine diplomatic or consular officer if the record is kept in a foreign country. The Court found that Anido's printouts of Kentucky laws did not comply with this requirement.

• Rule 132, Section 25, Rules of Court — Requires that the attestation of a copy state that it is a correct copy of the original or a specific part thereof, under the official seal of the attesting officer. The Court found that Anido's Attestation did not satisfy this requirement because it was prepared by Anido herself, not by the legal custodian of the Kentucky laws.

• Rule 132, Section 30, Rules of Court — Provides that every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved. The Court clarified that this provision governs admissibility, not probative value.

Caguioa (Chairperson), Gaerlan, Dimaampao, and Singh, JJ., concurred.