Angelita Jones vs. Felix Hortiguela

A marriage contracted after the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years, without knowledge that the former spouse is living, and with the general repute and belief that the former spouse is dead, is valid and lawful even without a prior judicial declaration of absence, which serves only for the administration of the absentee's estate. Failure to record a marriage in the municipal register does not invalidate the marriage, as the transmission of the marriage certificate is not a requisite for validity. A court loses jurisdiction to set aside its final orders after they have become final and no appeal was taken therefrom.

Marciana Escaño died intestate, leaving properties that became the subject of intestate proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Cebu. She was survived by her daughter from her first marriage, Angelita Jones, and her alleged widower from a second marriage, Felix Hortiguela. The central dispute concerned the validity of the second marriage, which determined Hortiguela's status as an heir and his entitlement to a usufructuary share in the estate. The applicable law was General Orders No. 68, the civil marriage law in force at the time, and article 186 of the Civil Code governing judicial declarations of absence.

Marciana Escaño married Arthur W. Jones in December 1914 in the suburban Catholic church of San Nicolas, Province of Cebu. On January 10, 1918, Jones secured a passport to go abroad, and thereafter nothing was ever heard of him. In October 1919, proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Maasin, Leyte, at the instance of Marciana Escaño, to have her husband judicially declared an absentee. On October 25 of that month, the court issued an order declaring Arthur W. Jones an absentee pursuant to article 186 of the Civil Code, with the proviso that the declaration would not take effect until six months after its publication in the official newspapers. The order was published in the Official Gazette from December 1919 through June 1920. On April 23, 1921, the court issued another order for the taking effect of the declaration of absence.

On May 6, 1927, Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escaño were married before the justice of the peace of Malitbog, Leyte, and they signed the certificate of marriage. For some unknown reason not attributable to the fault or negligence of either party, the marriage did not appear recorded in the marriage register of the municipality of Malitbog.

Marciana Escaño died intestate. Her widower Felix Hortiguela was appointed judicial administrator of her entire estate. In an order issued on May 9, 1932, Angelita Jones, her daughter by her first marriage, and Felix Hortiguela, her widower by her second marriage, were declared her only heirs. In a motion filed with the conformity of the guardian of the heiress Angelita Jones, Hortiguela, as administrator, prayed that his fees be fixed at P10,000, which was granted by the court in its order of January 10, 1933. The administrator later presented an inventory of the properties, a final account of his administration, and a project of partition wherein he adjudicated to himself a part of the estate in payment of his share of the conjugal properties and his usufructuary right, and the remaining part to Angelita Jones. The project of partition and final account were approved in an order of June 26, 1933, and the properties were turned over to the respective grantees.

On May 3, 1934, Angelita Jones, then married to Ernesto Lardizabal, filed a motion alleging that she was the only heir of her mother; that there never was a valid marriage between her mother and Felix Hortiguela, or that had such marriage been celebrated, it was null and void; and even granting that it were valid, Hortiguela was not entitled to a share in usufruct of one-third of the inheritance. She further alleged that she was a minor and had not been assisted by counsel during the hearing but was represented by the same attorney of Hortiguela; that many errors and inaccuracies had been committed which impaired her rights; and that the fees of P10,000 charged by the administrator were highly unreasonable and unconscionable. She prayed for the reopening of the proceedings, the appointment of her husband as special administrator without bond, the declaration of nullity of the marriage, the nullification of the partition, and her declaration as the only universal heir.

Angelita Jones contended that the declaration of absence must be understood to have been made not in the order of October 25, 1919, but in that of April 23, 1921, and that from the latter date to May 6, 1927, only 6 years and 14 days elapsed, making the marriage null and void under section III, paragraph 2, of General Orders No. 68. The evidence also showed that of the P10,000 granted to Hortiguela as administrator's fees, he had paid the sum of P8,000 to Attorney Faelnar for professional services in the intestate proceedings as well as in other cases affecting the estate.

• Validity of the Marriage: Angelita Jones contended that the declaration of absence must be understood to have been made in the order of April 23, 1921, not October 25, 1919, and that from the former date to the celebration of the marriage on May 6, 1927, only 6 years and 14 days elapsed, making the marriage null and void under section III, paragraph 2, of General Orders No. 68.
• Failure to Record the Marriage: Angelita Jones assigned as error the court's declaration that failure to record the marriage in the municipal register does not affect the efficacy and validity thereof.
• Administrator's Fees: Angelita Jones objected that she had no reason to contribute to the payment of Attorney Faelnar's fees, which formed part of the P10,000 administrator's fees.
• Nullity of Proceedings: Angelita Jones alleged that during the proceedings she had not been assisted by counsel but was represented by the same attorney of Felix Hortiguela, and that many errors and inaccuracies had been committed which impaired her rights.

• Jurisdiction of the Court: Felix Hortiguela raised the question of whether the court had jurisdiction to set aside the order of January 10, 1933, approving the administrator's fees, and the order of June 26, 1933, approving the partition and final account, arguing that since no appeal was ever taken from said orders, the court had lost jurisdiction over the case and could not resume it under section 113 or section 598 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

• Validity of the Second Marriage: Whether the marriage between Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escaño was valid despite the absence of a prior judicial declaration of absence of the former spouse for the full period required by law.
• Effect of Failure to Record the Marriage: Whether the failure to record the marriage in the municipal register of Malitbog affected the validity of the marriage.
• Entitlement to Usufruct: Whether Felix Hortiguela, as the lawful widower of Marciana Escaño, was entitled to inherit in usufruct from the deceased.
• Jurisdiction to Set Aside Final Orders: Whether the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction to set aside its orders of January 10, 1933, and June 26, 1933, after they had become final and no appeal was taken therefrom.

• Validity of the Second Marriage: Yes. The marriage was valid and lawful, the absence of the former spouse having been counted from January 10, 1918, the date of the last news concerning Arthur W. Jones, to May 6, 1927, a period of more than nine years, which satisfied the seven-year requirement of section III, paragraph 2, of General Orders No. 68.
• Effect of Failure to Record the Marriage: No. Failure to record the marriage does not invalidate it, as the transmission of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary is not a requisite for the validity of the marriage under section VIII of General Orders No. 68, as amended.
• Entitlement to Usufruct: Yes. Felix Hortiguela, being lawfully married to Marciana Escaño and not divorced from her at the time of her death, was entitled to inherit in usufruct in intestate succession.
• Jurisdiction to Set Aside Final Orders: No. The court had lost jurisdiction over the case after its orders became final and no appeal was taken therefrom, and it could not resume jurisdiction under section 113 or section 598 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as those sections refer to grounds other than those upon which Angelita Jones' motion was based.

• Validity of the Second Marriage: The Court held that for the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead, and that the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The absence of Marciana Escaño's former husband was counted from January 10, 1918, the date on which the last news concerning Arthur W. Jones was received, and from said date to May 6, 1927, more than nine years elapsed. The marriage was therefore valid and lawful.
• Effect of Failure to Record the Marriage: The Court quoted with approval the lower court's statement that section VIII of General Orders No. 68, as amended, provides that the person solemnizing the marriage must transmit the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, and failure to transmit such certificate shall be fined, but does not provide that failure to transmit such certificate annuls the marriage. The Court cited the decisions in Madridejo vs. De Leon and U.S. vs. De Vera, which held that failure to send a copy of the marriage certificate does not invalidate the marriage, and that marriages recorded in municipal registers are not the only ones that can attest to and prove such facts. Furthermore, Marciana Escaño believed Arthur W. Jones to be dead when she contracted her second marriage, and her daughter Angelita Jones herself was of the same belief, having lived with her mother after the latter had married Hortiguela and treated Hortiguela as her true stepfather. According to section 334, No. 24, of the Code of Civil Procedure, a person not heard from in seven years is presumed to be dead.
• Entitlement to Usufruct: Since Felix Hortiguela was lawfully married to Marciana Escaño and was not divorced from her at the time of her death, he was entitled to inherit in usufruct, not only in testate but also in intestate succession, citing 6 and 7 Manresa, pages 497-499 and 134-141, respectively. There was therefore no reason to annul the order of May 9, 1932, declaring the heirs of the deceased, nor the order of June 26, 1933, approving the partition of the properties.
• Jurisdiction to Set Aside Final Orders: The Court held that since no appeal was ever taken from the orders of January 10, 1933, and June 26, 1933, the court had lost jurisdiction over the case and could not resume it under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure or under section 598 thereof, because those sections refer to grounds other than those upon which Angelita Jones' motion of May 3, 1934, was based. The Court also noted that the inaccuracies and errors attributed to the administrator in Angelita Jones' motion were not assigned as errors on appeal, and it was therefore considered that she had desisted from her intention relative to that alleged ground for nullity of the proceedings. As to the administrator's fees, the Court found that of the P10,000 granted, P8,000 was paid to Attorney Faelnar for professional services rendered for the benefit of the administration of the estate, which was a reasonable and moderate compensation, and the remaining P2,000 was an adequate compensation for the administrator's services.

• Judicial Declaration of Absence Not Required for Second Marriage — For the celebration of a valid civil marriage after the disappearance of a former spouse, a prior judicial declaration of absence is not necessary. The declaration of absence under the Civil Code serves only to enable the taking of precautions for the administration of the absentee's estate. The requirements for a valid second marriage are: (a) the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage; (b) the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living; (c) the former spouse is generally reputed to be dead; and (d) the spouse present believes the former spouse to be dead at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
• Failure to Record Marriage Does Not Affect Validity — The failure of the person solemnizing a marriage to transmit the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, as required by section VIII of General Orders No. 68, does not annul the marriage. The forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate is not a requisite for the validity of the marriage, and marriages recorded in municipal registers are not the only ones that can attest to and prove the fact of marriage.
• Presumption of Death After Seven Years — Under section 334, No. 24, of the Code of Civil Procedure, a person not heard from in seven years is presumed to be dead. This presumption supports the validity of a second marriage contracted after the former spouse's absence of more than seven years.
• Finality of Orders and Loss of Jurisdiction — A court loses jurisdiction over a case after its orders have become final and no appeal was taken therefrom. The court cannot resume jurisdiction under sections 113 and 598 of the Code of Civil Procedure where the grounds for reopening are not among those provided in said sections.

• "For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believe at the time of the celebration of the marriage." — This passage articulates the controlling doctrine that a judicial declaration of absence is not a prerequisite for a valid second marriage, distinguishing the purpose of the Civil Code declaration from the requirements of the marriage law.
• "The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's natural father and mother, while the latter was in articulo mortis failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, does not invalidate said marriage, since it does not appear that in the celebration thereof all requisites for its validity were not present, the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate not being one said requisites." — This quotation from Madridejo vs. De Leon establishes that failure to transmit the marriage certificate does not invalidate the marriage, a principle applied to uphold the validity of the marriage in this case.
• "Inasmuch as Felix Hortiguela was lawfully married to Marciana Escaño and was divorced from her at the time of her death there is no doubt that he is entitled to inherit in usufruct, not only in testate but also in intestate succession, as in the present case." — This passage confirms the widower's entitlement to a usufructuary share in the estate of the deceased, which was the basis for affirming the declaration of heirs.

• Madridejo vs. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1 — Cited as controlling precedent for the principle that failure to transmit a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary does not invalidate a marriage, as the forwarding of the certificate is not a requisite for validity.
• U.S. vs. De Vera, 28 Phil. 105 — Cited for the principle that marriages recorded in municipal registers are not the only ones that can attest to and prove the fact of marriage, and that other proofs established by law may be presented when the marriage was not duly recorded due to the omission or fault of the municipal secretary or the person who solemnized the marriage.

• Section III, paragraph 2, General Orders No. 68 — The civil marriage law provision requiring that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years, that the spouse present does not know the former spouse to be living, that the former spouse is generally reputed to be dead, and that the spouse present believes the former spouse to be dead at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Applied to uphold the validity of the second marriage.
• Section VIII, General Orders No. 68, as amended — The provision requiring the person solemnizing the marriage to transmit the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, with a fine for failure to do so. Interpreted as not providing for the annulment of the marriage for failure to transmit the certificate.
• Article 186, Civil Code — The provision governing judicial declarations of absence. Interpreted as having for its sole purpose the taking of necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee, not as a prerequisite for a valid second marriage.
• Section 334, No. 24, Code of Civil Procedure — The provision creating the presumption that a person not heard from in seven years is dead. Applied to support the belief of Marciana Escaño and her daughter that Arthur W. Jones was dead.
• Section 113, Code of Civil Procedure — The provision governing the grounds for reopening or setting aside final orders. Held to refer to grounds other than those upon which Angelita Jones' motion was based.
• Section 598, Code of Civil Procedure — The provision cited by the Court as another basis for jurisdiction to resume a case, but held to refer to grounds other than those upon which Angelita Jones' motion was based.

Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Diaz, and Laurel, JJ., concurred.