Angeles vs. Gaite

Memorandum Circular No. 58, which bars the Office of the President from entertaining appeals from or petitions for review of DOJ resolutions on preliminary investigation of offenses not punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, is a valid exercise of the President’s power of control under the doctrine of qualified political agency; and a petition for review filed with the Office of the President in violation of that circular does not toll the 60-day period for seeking certiorari under Rule 65 from the Secretary of Justice’s resolution on preliminary investigation.

Petitioner Adoracion G. Angeles is a former Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121, Caloocan City. Respondent Emmanuel Y. Velasco is a State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice. The dispute traces to an administrative complaint petitioner filed against Velasco before the DOJ, which was elevated to the Office of the President; the President’s review of DOJ resolutions on preliminary investigation is governed by Memorandum Circular No. 58, which excepts only offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the DOJ is the government’s principal law agency and prosecution arm, and its functions are within the Chief Executive’s power of control.

In June 1999, petitioner Adoracion G. Angeles, then Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121, Caloocan City, was charged with child abuse by her grandniece Maria Mercedes Vistan. The preliminary investigation was assigned to State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco of the Department of Justice. In a Resolution dated June 20, 1999, Velasco filed a case against petitioner for 21 counts of Child Abuse under Republic Act No. 7610. Petitioner filed a petition for review with the DOJ Secretary, who, in a Resolution dated April 4, 2000, ordered the withdrawal of the Information against her.

On July 7, 2000, petitioner filed an administrative complaint against Velasco for Gross Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law, Incompetence and Manifest Bad Faith. The DOJ dismissed the complaint, and its Secretary denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated February 18, 2002. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review with the Office of the President assailing the DOJ resolutions. The OP asked Velasco to comment. In his Comment, Velasco stated, among others, a challenge to petitioner to agree to an investigation to determine the veracity of information from sources: (a) that Judge Angeles is still single because she belongs to the third sex; (b) that she is carrying on an affair with a lady lawyer; (c) that the lady lawyer is often seen with Judge Angeles even in her courtroom and is the conduit or connection of those with pending cases in her sala; and (d) that Judge Angeles was insecure and jealous when her grandniece Maria Mercedes Vistan was allegedly flirting with boys, and that this jealousy led to the abuse of the child.

Petitioner claimed these statements were a direct attack on her character and reputation as a public servant, and she filed a Complaint for four counts of libel against Velasco before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. In a Resolution dated August 13, 2003, Assistant City Prosecutor Adeliza Magno-Gingoyon recommended dismissal for insufficiency of evidence and/or lack of merit. The prosecutor reasoned that the statements were not shown to be defamatory because petitioner did not clearly manifest that being single, belonging to the third sex, having an affair with a lady lawyer, being seen with that lawyer in her courtroom, or feeling insecure and jealous of her grandniece was a crime, vice, defect, or omission tending to cause dishonor, discredit, or contempt; that Velasco did not categorically declare those matters but instead challenged petitioner to an investigation, making the disclosures more like questions begging for answers; and that, assuming defamation, the statements were privileged communications made in the course of official proceedings before the OP, akin to judicial proceedings, and relevant to petitioner’s moral fitness and credibility. The prosecutor also found no malice in fact because Velasco submitted his Comment in compliance with the OP’s Order dated June 10, 2002, and the statements were incidental to his defenses; if the matter charged as libelous is only an incident in an act with another objective, there is no libel. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated December 12, 2003, with Assistant City Prosecutor Marlina N. Manuel finding no concrete showing of a categorical or direct malicious accusation or imputation of crime or vice.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the DOJ Secretary. In a Resolution dated March 17, 2004, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño dismissed the petition, ruling that the statements were privileged because they were made in legitimate defense of Velasco’s own interest, bore reasonable relation or reference to the subject matter of the inquiry, and were possibly relevant; no malice or ill-will was shown, and Velasco informed the President of matters of public concern like petitioner’s conduct or character. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, with a motion for inhibition of Zuño, was denied with finality in a Resolution dated June 25, 2004. DOJ Acting Secretary Merceditas N. Gutierrez held that the Reply/Comment in OP Case No. 02-D-187 was motivated solely by a desire to defend against pending charges and was a privileged exercise of the natural right of an accused to bring to the President’s attention considerations that might influence her judgment, even if private character was incidentally disparaged; the test was good faith, and Velasco believed the language used would tend to move the President’s discretion. The Comment, made in the performance of a legal duty as an explanation of the matter in the OP’s order, although harsh and uncalled for, was excusable in the interest of public policy, and Velasco was not guilty of libel.

On July 15, 2004, petitioner filed a Petition for Review before the OP questioning the DOJ resolutions. In an Order dated July 29, 2004, the OP dismissed the petition under Memorandum Circular No. 58 dated May 29, 2003, which bars the OP from entertaining appeals from or petitions for review of the Secretary of Justice’s decisions or resolutions on preliminary investigation of criminal cases, except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, and directs outright dismissal of appeals not clearly falling within its jurisdiction. The OP noted that the complaint and appealed resolutions involved libel under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, which carries the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or fine or both under Article 355, and therefore did not fall under the exception. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated September 30, 2004. Petitioner then filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 assailing the OP orders. The CA denied the petition on August 30, 2006, and denied reconsideration on February 8, 2007. The investigating prosecutors and the DOJ found that Velasco’s statements were not categorical or direct imputations of crime or vice and were made in the course of official proceedings; these findings underlay the dismissal of petitioner’s libel complaint.

• Qualified Political Agency: Petitioner argued that the CA erred in applying the doctrine; the OP’s refusal to act on her petition could not be justified under qualified political agency, because while the DOJ Secretary is the President’s alter ego, the President’s absolute abandonment of the power of control by delegating exclusively to the DOJ Secretary the power to determine probable cause in complaints where the imposable penalty is less than reclusion perpetua is not justified.
• Validity of Memorandum Circular No. 58: Petitioner claimed that MC No. 58 ties the hands of the Chief Executive in the exercise of the constitutional power of control over all executive departments under the Constitution and the Administrative Code of 1987, and is therefore an invalid issuance of the OP; since the validity of MC No. 58 was the principal reason the OP dismissed her petition, it was a key issue that had to be resolved.
• Collateral Attack: Petitioner maintained that the CA erred in ruling that the validity of MC No. 58 cannot be collaterally attacked.
• Finality and Reglementary Period: Petitioner contended that the CA erred in holding that the DOJ resolutions dated March 17, 2004 and June 25, 2004 became final and executory when she failed to elevate them directly to the CA within 60 days.
• Office of the President’s Jurisdiction: Petitioner argued that the OP erred in not taking cognizance of her petition because of MC No. 58.
• Probable Cause for Libel: Petitioner argued that the DOJ erred in not finding probable cause for libel against respondent Velasco.

• Qualified Political Agency / Validity of MC No. 58: Whether the CA erred in applying the doctrine of qualified political agency and in upholding the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 58, which bars the Office of the President from entertaining appeals from DOJ resolutions on preliminary investigation of offenses not punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
• Collateral Attack on MC No. 58: Whether the CA erred in ruling that the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 58 cannot be collaterally attacked.
• Finality of DOJ Resolutions: Whether the CA erred in holding that the DOJ Resolutions dated March 17, 2004 and June 25, 2004 became final and executory because petitioner failed to elevate them directly to the CA within 60 days.
• Office of the President’s Jurisdiction: Whether the Office of the President erred in not taking cognizance of petitioner’s petition because of Memorandum Circular No. 58.
• Probable Cause for Libel: Whether the DOJ erred in not finding probable cause for libel against respondent Velasco.

• Qualified Political Agency / Validity of MC No. 58: No. MC No. 58 is valid; it is a permissible delegation of the President’s power of control under the doctrine of qualified political agency, and the President has not fully abdicated control because appeals remain for offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
• Collateral Attack on MC No. 58: No. The CA correctly refused to invalidate MC No. 58 in this proceeding; the circular was promulgated by the Office of the President and, not having been reprobated, is presumptively the act of the Chief Executive.
• Finality of DOJ Resolutions: Yes. The DOJ resolutions became final and executory; petitioner’s prohibited petition for review with the Office of the President did not toll the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
• Office of the President’s Jurisdiction: No. The OP did not err in dismissing the petition; MC No. 58 expressly bars it from entertaining appeals from DOJ resolutions on preliminary investigation of offenses not punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
• Probable Cause for Libel: Not reached. The Court found no need to discuss petitioner’s other arguments after resolving the validity of MC No. 58 and the finality of the DOJ resolutions.

• Qualified Political Agency / Validity of MC No. 58: The Court relied on Angeles vs. Gaite, where the same arguments were rejected. Under qualified political agency, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department; department heads are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; except where the Constitution or law requires the President to act personally or exigencies demand personal action, the multifarious executive and administrative functions are performed through the departments; acts of department secretaries in the regular course of business are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive unless disapproved or reprobated. MC No. 58, promulgated by the OP on June 30, 1993, reiterates and clarifies MC No. 1266 and bars OP review of DOJ Secretary resolutions on preliminary investigation except offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The President set the limits of his own review power to expedite disposition of cases, and the delegation to the Secretary of Justice, a cabinet secretary and alter ego, was within the doctrine. The power to delegate is not absolute: certain presidential powers arising from exceptional circumstances—such as declaration of martial law, suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the pardoning power—must be exercised exclusively by the President, and the executive power in question must be of similar gravitas and exceptional import. The power to review DOJ preliminary investigation resolutions is not of that class. The President did not fully abdicate control because MC No. 58 allows appeals for offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher, and requiring the President to review all preliminary investigations would hamper other duties. The DOJ, under the Administrative Code of 1987, is the government’s principal law agency and prosecution arm, and its functions are within the Chief Executive’s power of control. Petitioner’s claim that MC No. 58 violates the Constitution and Section 1, Chapter 1, Book III of EO No. 292 deserves scant consideration because MC No. 58 was promulgated by the OP and, not having been reprobated, is presumptively the act of the Chief Executive.
• Collateral Attack on MC No. 58: The CA’s ruling that the validity of MC No. 58 cannot be collaterally attacked was consistent with the Court’s treatment of the circular. The Court upheld the circular’s validity and applied it, noting that it was promulgated by the OP and not disapproved or reprobated by the President; it therefore has the approval of the President. No ground was shown to invalidate it in this proceeding.
• Finality of DOJ Resolutions: After petitioner received the DOJ Secretary’s resolution denying her motion for reconsideration of the resolution dismissing her petition for review of the prosecutors’ resolutions dismissing her libel complaint, she filed a petition for review with the OP on the pretext of exhausting administrative remedies. That action was fatal because MC No. 58 prohibits such a petition. There was no need to file it with the OP. In the determination of probable cause during preliminary investigation, the executive branch has full discretionary authority; the decision whether to dismiss a criminal complaint depends on the sound discretion of the investigating prosecutor and ultimately the Secretary of Justice. The prosecutor’s resolution is appealable to the Justice Secretary, who may affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify it. Petitioner appealed to the DOJ Secretary, but her appeal and motion for reconsideration were dismissed. With no more appeal or other remedy in the ordinary course, her remedy was a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. She failed to file it within 60 days from receipt of the DOJ resolution denying her motion for reconsideration. The prohibited OP petition did not toll the reglementary period. Thus, the DOJ resolutions became final and executory, and the CA correctly dismissed the petition for being filed beyond the reglementary period. The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on public policy and sound practice; final judgments must become final on a definite date fixed by law, at the risk of occasional error. The exceptions—correction of clerical errors, nunc pro tunc entries causing no prejudice, void judgments, and circumstances after finality rendering execution unjust or inequitable—are not present. Peña vs. Government Service Insurance System holds that final and executory judgments cannot be attacked or modified directly or indirectly, even by the highest court; the losing party has the right to appeal within the prescribed period, and the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy finality. The rule is not a question of technicality but of substance and merit, protecting the substantive rights of the winning party.
• Office of the President’s Jurisdiction: The OP did not err in dismissing the petition. MC No. 58, promulgated by the OP, expressly provides that no appeal from or petition for review of decisions, orders, or resolutions of the Secretary of Justice on preliminary investigations of criminal cases shall be entertained by the OP, except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The libel charge against Velasco carried only prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or fine or both under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, so it did not fall within the exception. The OP’s dismissal was therefore in accordance with the circular.
• Probable Cause for Libel: The Court found no need to discuss petitioner’s other arguments, including the claim that the DOJ erred in not finding probable cause for libel, because the validity of MC No. 58 and the finality of the DOJ resolutions already disposed of the petition.

• Qualified Political Agency — Under this doctrine, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department; the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; except where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments; and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. The Court applied the doctrine to uphold Memorandum Circular No. 58, issued by the Office of the President, as a valid delegation to the Secretary of Justice regarding preliminary investigation resolutions, and held that the President had not fully abdicated control because appeals remained for offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
• Limits on Delegation of Presidential Powers — Certain presidential powers arising out of exceptional circumstances, and which if exercised would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government, must be exercised exclusively by the President and cannot be delegated. Examples include the declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused. The list is not exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import. The Court held that the power to review DOJ resolutions on preliminary investigation is not of that exceptional class and may be delegated.
• Finality of Judgments — A decision, order, or resolution of a judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative body that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. The rule is not a question of technicality but of substance and merit, protecting the substantive rights of the winning party. The exceptions are correction of clerical errors, nunc pro tunc entries causing no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and circumstances transpiring after finality that render execution unjust and inequitable. The Court applied the doctrine because petitioner failed to file a Rule 65 petition within 60 days, and her prohibited OP petition did not toll the period, so the DOJ resolutions became final and executory.
• Probable Cause Determination in Preliminary Investigation — In the determination of probable cause during preliminary investigation, the executive branch has full discretionary authority. The decision whether to dismiss a criminal complaint depends on the sound discretion of the investigating prosecutor and ultimately the Secretary of Justice. The resolution of the investigating prosecutor is subject to appeal to the Justice Secretary, who exercises power of control and supervision over the prosecutor and may affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the ruling. After the DOJ Secretary’s denial of the motion for reconsideration, the remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. The Court applied this framework in holding that petitioner’s proper remedy was Rule 65, not a prohibited appeal to the Office of the President.

• "Under this doctrine, which primarily recognizes the establishment of a single executive, \"all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department; the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.\"" — This passage states the canonical formulation of the doctrine of qualified political agency, which the Court used to uphold Memorandum Circular No. 58 as a presumptive act of the Chief Executive.
• "There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power, notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import." — This passage defines the limits on delegable presidential powers and explains why the power to review DOJ preliminary investigation resolutions may be delegated.
• "Petitioner's filing of the petition for review with the OP, which is prohibited as discussed above, did not toll the running of the reglementary period for filing a petition with the CA. Accordingly, the DOJ resolutions became final and executory after the lapse of the period for assailing the same in the CA." — This passage is the ratio decidendi on finality: the prohibited OP petition did not toll the 60-day period for filing a Rule 65 petition, rendering the DOJ resolutions final and executory.
• "The rule on finality of decisions, orders or resolutions of a judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative body is \"not a question of technicality but of substance and merit,\" the underlying consideration therefore, being the protection of the substantive rights of the winning party. Nothing is more settled in law than that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land." — This passage states the finality doctrine and its policy basis, which the Court applied to bar further review of the DOJ resolutions.

• Angeles vs. Gaite, G.R. No. 165276, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 408 — The Court expressly relied on this prior decision involving the same petitioner and same arguments; it held MC No. 58 valid under qualified political agency and rejected the claim that it violated the Constitution and EO No. 292.
• Villena vs. Secretary of Interior — Cited as the 1939 case that recognized and adopted the doctrine of qualified political agency from American jurisprudence; also quoted for the principle that certain exceptional presidential powers cannot be delegated. No citation is provided in the text.
• Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 96409, February 14, 1992, 206 SCRA 290 — The CA applied this ruling on the President’s power of control and qualified political agency in upholding the OP’s reliance on MC No. 58.
• Peña vs. Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No. 159520, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 383 — Cited for the rule that final and executory judgments cannot be attacked or modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court, and that finality protects the substantive rights of the winning party.
• Alcaraz vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 164715, September 20, 2006, 502 SCRA 518 — Cited for the executive branch’s full discretionary authority in determining probable cause during preliminary investigation, the Justice Secretary’s power of control and supervision over prosecutors, and the Rule 65 remedy after DOJ review.
• Republic vs. Tango, G.R. No. 161062, July 31, 2009, 594 SCRA 560 — Cited for the exceptions to the finality of judgments: clerical errors, nunc pro tunc entries causing no prejudice, void judgments, and circumstances after finality rendering execution unjust or inequitable.
• Filadams Pharma, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 426 SCRA 460 (2004) — Cited in support of the Rule 65 remedy after the DOJ Secretary’s resolution.
• Sacdalan vs. Court of Appeals, 428 SCRA 586 (2004) — Cited for the immutability of final judgments.

• Memorandum Circular No. 58, Office of the President — Provides that no appeal from or petition for review of decisions, orders, or resolutions of the Secretary of Justice on preliminary investigations of criminal cases shall be entertained by the Office of the President, except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death; appeals not clearly falling within its jurisdiction shall be dismissed outright. Applied to dismiss petitioner’s appeal because libel is not punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
• Article 353, Revised Penal Code — Defines libel; the OP identified the complaint and appealed resolutions as involving libel under this article.
• Article 355, Revised Penal Code — Fixes the penalty for libel at prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or fine or both; used to show the offense did not fall within the exception to MC No. 58.
• Section 4, Rule 65, Revised Rules of Court — Provides the 60-day reglementary period for a petition for certiorari; petitioner failed to file within this period, rendering the DOJ resolutions final and executory.
• Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), Section 1, Chapter 1, Book III — Petitioner claimed MC No. 58 violated this provision by depriving the President of power of control; the Court rejected the claim. The Code also places the DOJ under the executive branch and within the Chief Executive’s power of control.
• Republic Act No. 7610 — The Special Protection of Children against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, under which petitioner was charged with 21 counts of child abuse; this charge preceded the administrative complaint and the libel complaint.

Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson), Conchita Carpio Morales, Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, and Arturo D. Brion concurred. The footnotes state that Carpio was designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad, and Brion was designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza. No separate concurring opinions are summarized in the text.