Angel del Rosario vs. Republic of the Philippines

The submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan duly approved by the Bureau of Lands is a mandatory requirement in applications for original registration of land, and its non-submission is fatal to the application. Equally, an applicant for confirmation of imperfect title must prove open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession in the concept of owner for the period fixed by law, counted only from the date the land was declared alienable and disposable; possession of public land, however long, never confers title unless that statutory period is shown.

Angel del Rosario is a Filipino businessman, married to Agustina Catalasan and a resident of Poblacion, Ternate, Cavite, who claimed ownership of a 772,329-square-meter parcel in Barangay Pinagsanhan, Maragondon, Cavite, identified as Lot No. 1891, Cad-457-D, Maragondon Cadastre, Ap-04-0011601, by inheritance from his grandfather and by the long possession of his predecessors-in-interest. Original registration of such land is governed by Act No. 496, as amended by P.D. No. 1529, while confirmation of imperfect titles rests on C.A. No. 141, §48(b), as amended, which fixes the period of possession required. The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General through the Bureau of Lands, is the statutory opponent in proceedings of this character.

On October 13, 1997, Angel del Rosario filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch XV, Naic, Cavite, an application for registration of a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 1891, Cad-457-D, Maragondon Cadastre, Ap-04-0011601, consisting of 772,329 square meters in Barangay Pinagsanhan, Maragondon, Cavite. In the application he stated that he was a Filipino, married to Agustina Catalasan, and a resident of Poblacion, Ternate, Cavite; that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land, which was alienable and disposable, under a bona fide claim of ownership since the 1920s or even earlier; and that the land was being occupied and cultivated by him and his family. He alleged that the land carried no mortgage or encumbrance, was not bound by any public or private road, river, or creek, and that no other person had any legal or equitable interest in or possession of it. He identified the owners or claimants of the adjoining properties — the Municipal Engineer of Ternate, Cavite on the northern boundary; Juan Angeles or his heirs for Lot 1890; Madiano Villanueva or his heirs for Lots 1286 and 1291; Agripino Villanueva or his heirs for Lot 1290; Lucas Arcival or his heirs for Lot 1482; Danilo Sisayan for Lot 1287; and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources for the Republic of the Philippines as to Lot 1692.

Annexed to the application were an advance survey plan of the land with technical descriptions, Survey Plan Ap-04-0011601; the Technical Description of Lot No. 1891; a certification in lieu of the Geodetic Engineer's certification issued for registration purposes attesting to the genuineness of the survey plan; a certification dated August 14, 1997 that the subject land is alienable and disposable; a certification dated October 7, 1997 that the property is not covered by any public land application or patent; Tax Declaration No. 7414, Series of 1998; and Official Receipt No. 1038951S dated September 9, 1997 showing payment of realty taxes on the lot up to 1997. On the same day he filed his application, petitioner submitted the original tracing cloth plan for Lot No. 1891 to the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Jameswell M. Resus. Two days later, on October 15, 1997, the clerk of court transmitted to the Land Registration Authority the duplicate copy of the application, the original tracing cloth plan, and the other supporting documents.

During the initial hearing on February 24, 1998, no oppositor appeared except the provincial prosecutor of Maragondon, Cavite, who appeared for the Solicitor General in representation of the Republic of the Philippines through the Bureau of Lands. The trial court accordingly issued an order of general default against the whole world, with the exception of the Bureau of Lands, after which petitioner submitted documentary evidence to establish the jurisdictional facts and the case was referred to a trial commissioner for the reception of further evidence. Aside from himself, petitioner presented Raymundo Telia to prove his claim of ownership and title. Both witnesses were cross-examined by the provincial prosecutor.

Petitioner reiterated the allegations of his application and identified the annexed documents. He claimed that he and his family had planted mango and bamboo trees on the lot and raised animals there, and that he had inherited the land from his grandfather, who had caused the survey of the lot to be made in his own name as the original claimant. He testified that he had possessed the property from 1984, when the cadastral survey was made thereon, but also claimed that the first survey on the land was made in 1930, and that his predecessors-in-interest had started cultivating the property in 1940 and planting kakawati trees along its boundaries. He asserted that he and his family alone gathered the fruits and forest products of the land, and that no one had ever disturbed his possession or questioned his ownership. Telia, then fifty-nine years old, testified that he had personally known the property since he went there with petitioner, whom he recognized as its owner; that when he was still young the property was already planted with kakawati trees along its boundaries; and that anyone who needed to get bamboo, gather firewood, or do kaingin farming could do so only upon petitioner's permission. Telia and his parents had stayed on the property during the Japanese occupation and settled there until the 1950s with leave from petitioner, after which he remained about three years more engaging in kaingin farming. Although he did not personally know Madiano Villanueva, Lucas Arcival, and Danilo Sisayan, he said it was public knowledge that they owned the adjoining lots.

The record disclosed that the land subject of the application had been declared for taxation purposes only on September 8, 1997, that the taxes due thereon covered only a period of ten years beginning 1988, and that they were paid only on September 9, 1997, a little more than a month before the application was filed; no other tax declaration or receipt for tax payments by petitioner's predecessors-in-interest was presented. The certification submitted by petitioner further showed that the land became alienable and disposable only on certain dates: the area shaded in orange, within the alienable or disposable Project No. 15 of Maragondon, Cavite per LC Map No. 2720, was certified on November 12, 1971, while the remaining portion, within the alienable or disposable Block-1, Project No. 15-A of Maragondon, Cavite per LC Map No. 3091, was certified on June 21, 1983. The trial court nonetheless granted the application on August 25, 1998, and it was this grant that the Court of Appeals reversed on January 31, 2001.

• Non-Submission of the Tracing Cloth Plan Not Attributable to Him: Petitioner argued that the denial of his application because of his failure to submit the original tracing cloth plan in evidence was unjustified, since he should not be faulted for that failure — he had turned the plan over to the trial court on the day he filed his application, but the branch clerk of court transmitted it to the Land Registration Authority, so it could not be produced during the trial.
• Reopening of Proceedings / Newly Discovered Evidence: Petitioner prayed that the trial court proceedings be reopened so that he could present in evidence either the original tracing cloth plan or the "sepia copy" (Diazo Polyester Film) in lieu thereof pursuant to NALDTRA (LRC) Circular No. 66 dated May 2, 1985, contending that the plan or its sepia copy may be considered newly discovered evidence which, if admitted, would alter the result of the case.
• Interest of Justice: Petitioner maintained that, in the interest of justice, the proceedings should have been reopened to admit the original tracing cloth plan in evidence in order to avoid a repetition of the same proceedings already had in the application.

• Failure to Submit the Original Tracing Cloth Plan: Respondent maintained on appeal that petitioner failed to submit in evidence the original tracing cloth plan for Lot No. 1891, a submission required for original registration.
• Failure to Establish the Required Period of Possession: Respondent likewise put in issue petitioner's failure to establish that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, and notorious possession of the land applied for registration for the period required by law.

• Mandatory Submission of the Original Tracing Cloth Plan: Whether the submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan duly approved by the Bureau of Lands is a mandatory requirement in an application for original registration of land, such that its non-submission is fatal to the application.
• Reopening of Proceedings / Newly Discovered Evidence: Whether the trial court proceedings should be reopened to allow petitioner to present the original tracing cloth plan or its "sepia copy" as newly discovered evidence under Rule 53, §1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
• Sufficiency of Proof of Possession: Whether petitioner established that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership for the period required by C.A. No. 141, §48(b), as amended.

• Mandatory Submission of the Original Tracing Cloth Plan: Yes. The submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan duly approved by the Bureau of Lands is a mandatory requirement in applications for original registration of land, and the failure to comply with it is fatal to the application.
• Reopening of Proceedings / Newly Discovered Evidence: No. The original tracing cloth plan was already available upon the filing of the application and could not qualify as newly discovered evidence under Rule 53, §1, its non-presentation being attributable to petitioner's own lack of reasonable diligence.
• Sufficiency of Proof of Possession: No. Petitioner failed to establish the thirty-year open, notorious, and conclusive possession in the concept of an owner required by C.A. No. 141, §48(b), as amended, the property having remained unclassified when the alleged possession began and the evidence showing only casual cultivation.

• Mandatory Submission of the Original Tracing Cloth Plan: The submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, in cases for application of original registration of land is a mandatory requirement. The reason for the rule is to establish the true identity of the land, to ensure that it does not overlap a parcel of land or a portion thereof already covered by a previous land registration, and to forestall the possibility that it will be overlapped by a subsequent registration of any adjoining land. Petitioner's claim that he had turned over the plan to the branch clerk of court, who in turn submitted it to the LRA, does not excuse the omission; petitioner was duty-bound to retrieve the tracing cloth plan from the LRA and to present it in evidence in the trial court. The Court of Appeals appropriately quoted Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, where, on a similar claim that the plan had been forwarded to the Land Registration Authority, the Court through Justice Nocon held that the omission is fatal, and quoted Director of Lands vs. Reyes to the effect that it is not the function of the Land Registration Commission to check the original survey plan, having no authority to approve original survey plans, and that if for any reason the original tracing cloth plan was forwarded there, the applicant may easily retrieve it and submit it in evidence. The contention that petitioner waived objection to the blueprint copy of the survey plan when it was offered in evidence was rejected, Rule 143 of the Rules of Court providing that the rules do not apply to land registration, cadastral, and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not therein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. Neither did the advance survey plan attached to the application and marked in evidence suffice; although a mere blueprint copy of the cloth plan, together with the lot's technical description, was held sufficient in one case, both the blueprint copy and the technical description there were certified as to their correctness by the Director of Lands, whereas in this case the advance survey plan and the technical description marked in evidence lacked the necessary certification from the Bureau of Lands.

• Reopening of Proceedings / Newly Discovered Evidence: For evidence to be admitted under Rule 53, §1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the following requisites must concur: (a) the evidence was discovered after the trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, it will probably change the judgment. The original tracing cloth plan could not be considered newly discovered evidence because it was already available upon the filing of the application for registration; although it could not be produced during the trial because it was then in the custody of the LRA, it was petitioner's failure to exercise reasonable diligence in producing it that accounted for its non-presentation. As to the "sepia copy" of the cloth plan, the prayer to allow its presentation was a mere afterthought, it never having been offered in evidence during the trial, and petitioner having already turned over his original tracing cloth plan to the branch clerk of court for submission to the LRA. Petitioner should have submitted in evidence the "sepia copy" duly approved by the Bureau of Lands in lieu of the original tracing cloth plan while the case was still on trial, and not belatedly on appeal. The Court noted that although NALDTRA (LRC) Circular No. 66 mandates that clerks of court shall not accept survey plans submitted in connection with original and cadastral registration proceedings unless said plans are reproduced on Diazo Polyester Films, it also states that tracing cloth plans approved by the LRC shall continue to be accepted for registration purposes, with the authenticated print copy of the same and the corresponding technical descriptions.

• Sufficiency of Proof of Possession: From the testimonies of petitioner and his witness, it appeared that petitioner is a businessman who, while born in Maragondon, Cavite, had actually been a resident of Poblacion, Ternate, Cavite from childhood until the present. The land was only planted with bamboo trees, which do not require much tending, and doubt existed as to how many mango trees, if any, were on the land or as to the volume of fruits harvested, there being no testimony to that effect and the tax declaration offered in evidence stating that the improvements found on the land were only bamboo trees. Raymundo Telia remembered that some coconut trees had existed on the land but these were no longer there at the time of his testimony, and he testified that the land was planted with palay not by petitioner or his predecessors or his family but by kaingeros, including himself, who only asked permission from petitioner to use the land. Assuming that petitioner had planted bamboo and mango trees thereon, this would hardly suffice to prove possession, as it would constitute a mere casual cultivation of that large tract; a mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under claim of ownership, and for him possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State. The possession of public land, however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers title upon the possessor, because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years. Although petitioner claimed possession by himself and through his predecessors-in-interest since the 1930s, his tax declaration and tax payment receipt belied the claim: the land was declared for taxation purposes only on September 8, 1997, and the taxes due thereon covered only a period of ten years beginning 1988 and were paid only on September 9, 1997, a little more than a month prior to the filing of the application, with no other tax declaration or receipt for tax payments by his predecessors-in-interest; moreover, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership but are merely indicia of a claim of ownership. The certification submitted by petitioner showed that one portion of the land was certified as alienable and disposable on November 12, 1971, and the remaining portion on June 21, 1983; as the application was filed only on October 13, 1997, almost twenty-six years from the first certification and fourteen years from the second, the property was still unclassified at the time petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest allegedly began their possession. As held in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, a person cannot enter into forest land and, by the simple act of cultivating a portion of that land, earn credits towards the eventual confirmation of imperfect title; the Government must first declare the forest land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land before the year of entry, cultivation, and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title. Hence, in view of the lack of sufficient evidence of the thirty-year open, notorious, and conclusive possession in the concept of an owner required by C.A. No. 141, §48(b), as amended, petitioner's application for original registration of Lot No. 1891 cannot be granted.

• Mandatory Submission of the Original Tracing Cloth Plan — In every application for original registration of land, the applicant must submit in evidence the original tracing cloth plan duly approved by the Bureau of Lands. The rule is mandatory because the plan establishes the true identity of the land, ensures that it does not overlap a parcel or portion already covered by a previous land registration, and forestalls the possibility that it will be overlapped by a subsequent registration of adjoining land. Non-compliance is fatal to the application. The applicant bears the burden of retrieving the plan from the Land Registration Authority if it was forwarded there, and neither the advance survey plan nor an uncertified technical description may substitute for it.
• Requisites of Newly Discovered Evidence (Rule 53, §1) — Evidence may be admitted as newly discovered only if (a) it was discovered after the trial; (b) it could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and of such weight that, if admitted, it will probably change the judgment. A document already available at the time of filing, but not produced through the party's own want of diligence, does not qualify.
• Casual Cultivation Is Not Possession Under Claim of Ownership — The mere planting of bamboo or mango trees, or the cultivation of portions of a large tract, amounts to no more than casual cultivation and does not constitute the exclusive and notorious possession that can give rise to a presumptive grant from the State.
• Possession of Public Land Does Not Run Against the State — Possession of public land, however long extended, never confers title upon the possessor, because the statute of limitations does not operate against the State unless the occupant proves possession and occupation under a claim of ownership for the number of years required by law.
• Alienability Must Precede the Counting of the Possession Period — A person cannot enter forest or unclassified land and, by the simple act of cultivating a portion of it, earn credits toward the eventual confirmation of an imperfect title. The Government must first declare the land alienable and disposable agricultural land; only then can the year of entry, cultivation, and exclusive and adverse possession be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.
• Tax Declarations as Mere Indicia — Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership; they are merely indicia of a claim of ownership, and their belated execution and the limited period of payment may be considered against the applicant.
• Rules of Court in Land Registration Proceedings — Under Rule 143 of the Rules of Court, the Rules do not apply to land registration, cadastral, and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not therein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. Hence, the failure to object to an incompetent substitute for the tracing cloth plan does not operate as a waiver of the mandatory requirement.

• "The submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, in cases for application of original registration of land is a mandatory requirement." — This is the ratio decidendi on the first ground of denial; it states the controlling rule whose violation alone sufficed to defeat the application.
• "The reason for this rule is to establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it does not overlap a parcel of land or a portion thereof already covered by a previous land registration, and to forestall the possibility that it will be overlapped by a subsequent registration of any adjoining land." — This passage supplies the policy justification for the mandatory character of the requirement and is the formulation ordinarily cited when the rule is invoked.
• "A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under claim of ownership. For him, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the state." — This states the doctrine on the quality of possession required for confirmation of imperfect title, applied to petitioner's planting of bamboo and mango trees over a large tract.
• "A person cannot enter into forest land and, by the simple act of cultivating a portion of that land, earn credits towards the eventual confirmation of imperfect title. The Government must first declare the forest land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land before the year of entry, cultivation, and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title." — Quoted from Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, this passage fixes the reckoning point for the statutory possession period and is the doctrinal core of the third ground of denial.

• Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 219 SCRA 339 (1993) — Controlling precedent on the mandatory character of the submission of the original tracing cloth plan; the Court of Appeals quoted it, and the Supreme Court relied on it in rejecting the excuse that the plan had been forwarded to the Land Registration Authority.
• Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177, 189 (1975) — Quoted within Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court; held that the Land Registration Commission has no authority to approve original survey plans and that an applicant may easily retrieve a plan forwarded there and submit it in evidence.
• Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Isabel Tesalona, 236 SCRA 336 (1994) — Cited for the rule that the applicant is duty-bound to retrieve the tracing cloth plan from the LRA and present it at trial, and for the conclusion that the failure to do so reflects a want of reasonable diligence.
• Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 158 SCRA 568 (1988) — Cited for the purpose of the mandatory requirement, namely, to establish the true identity of the land and prevent overlapping registrations.
• Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 167 SCRA 150 (1988) — Distinguished; there a mere blueprint copy of the cloth plan sufficed because both the blueprint copy and the technical description were certified as to correctness by the Director of Lands, a certification absent in this case.
• Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 476, 482 (1987) — Quoted as the controlling authority that forest land must first be declared alienable and disposable agricultural land before the year of entry, cultivation, and exclusive and adverse possession may be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.
• Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 140 (1984) — Cited for the rule that tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership but merely indicia of a claim of ownership.
• Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210 (1983) — Cited, through Republic vs. Court of Appeals, for the rule that possession of public land, however long, never confers title unless the occupant proves possession and occupation under claim of ownership for the required number of years.
• Villanueva vs. People, 330 SCRA 695 (2000) and Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. A. Soriano Corporation, 267 SCRA 313 (1997) — Cited for the requisites of newly discovered evidence under Rule 53, §1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
• Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 457 (1992) — Cited in support of the conclusion that the application for original registration cannot be granted for lack of sufficient evidence of the required possession.

• C.A. No. 141, §48(b), as amended — Governs the confirmation of imperfect titles and requires open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable land of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership for the statutory period. The Court applied it to hold that petitioner's evidence fell short of the thirty-year possession required, and that the period could not be counted from a time when the land was still unclassified.
• Rule 53, §1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides for the admission of newly discovered evidence upon the requisites of post-trial discovery, reasonable diligence, and materiality. The Court applied it in rejecting both the original tracing cloth plan and the "sepia copy" as newly discovered evidence.
• Rule 143, Rules of Court — Provides that the Rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral, and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not therein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. The Court invoked it to reject the argument that petitioner waived objection to the blueprint copy of the survey plan.
• Act No. 496, as amended by P.D. No. 1529 — The law governing original registration of land under the Torrens system, cited in the trial court's dispositive portion as the basis for decreeing registration in petitioner's name; the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of relief under it.
• NALDTRA (LRC) Circular No. 66, dated May 2, 1985 — Authorizes the use of drafting film and Diazo Polyester Film as materials for subdivision, consolidation, original, and cadastral survey plans approved by the Bureau of Lands. The Court noted that while it mandates that clerks of court shall not accept survey plans unless reproduced on Diazo Polyester Films, tracing cloth plans approved by the LRC continue to be accepted for registration purposes with the authenticated print copy and the corresponding technical descriptions.

Bellosillo (Acting C.J., Chairman), Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., and Corona, JJ.