Angat vs. Republic

A final and executory judgment may no longer be modified or reversed, even by the Supreme Court, regardless of errors therein; and when reconstitution is based on the owner's duplicate certificate of title under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 26, notice to adjoining property owners is not a jurisdictional requirement — only publication and posting under Section 9, as incorporated through Section 10, are required.

Federico Angat and Enriquita Angat, siblings, sought the judicial reconstitution of the original copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4399, which they claimed was issued on October 6, 1955 by the Register of Deeds of Cavite in their names, covering a 3,033,846-square-meter parcel of land in Sapang, Ternate, Cavite. The original copy was allegedly destroyed when the old Provincial Capitol Building of Cavite, housing the office of the Register of Deeds, burned down on June 7, 1959. Judicial reconstitution of lost or destroyed Torrens titles is governed by Republic Act No. 26, as incorporated through Section 110 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (the Property Registration Decree), which prescribes the sources, procedures, and jurisdictional requirements for such proceedings.

Sometime in February 1999, Federico Angat and his sister Enriquita Angat filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch XV, Naic, Cavite, a verified Petition for Reconstitution of the original copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4399, docketed as LRC Case No. 1331. They claimed that since October 6, 1955, a 3,033,846-square-meter parcel of land in Sapang, Ternate, Cavite had been registered in their names under TCT No. T-4399, covered by plan PSU-91002. The original copy of the title was allegedly destroyed on June 7, 1959 when the old Provincial Capitol Building of Cavite, housing the office of the Register of Deeds, burned to the ground. Petitioners attached to their Petition a photocopy of the owners' duplicate of TCT No. T-4399 and a Certification dated March 25, 1998 from the Register of Deeds of Cavite confirming that the original copy no longer existed due to the fire.

The RTC issued an Order on February 16, 1999 setting the initial hearing for June 10, 1999. The Order was published twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette (May 3 and May 10, 1999) and posted on the bulletin boards of the Provincial Capitol Building in Trece Martires City, the Municipal Building of Ternate, and the Barangay Hall where the subject property was located. Copies of the Petition and the RTC Order were served by registered mail on the Office of the Solicitor General, the provincial prosecutor, the Director of Lands, the Register of Deeds of Cavite, and the adjoining lot owners — Ambrocio Arca, heirs of Mariano Angat, Santiago de Guia, and the Office of the Provincial Governor representing Palikpikan Creek. All notices to the adjoining owners were returned unserved: Arca was unlocated with no such name; the heirs of Mariano Angat were deceased; de Guia was unlocated with no such name; and the Office of the Provincial Governor refused to receive.

At the ex parte hearing on January 19, 2000, Federico testified that the subject property was previously owned by his grandfather, Mariano Angat, to whom Original Certificate of Title No. 391 was issued. After Mariano's death, the property was inherited by Federico's father, Gregorio Angat. Sometime in 1955, under unexplained circumstances, Gregorio delivered to Federico and Enriquita TCT No. T-4399, already registered in their names. Federico presented a Certification from the Municipal Treasurer of Ternate showing that real property taxes for 1998 were paid in the name of Mariano Angat under Tax Declaration No. 97-03524. On July 6, 2000, Ternate Development Corporation filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and a Complaint-in-Intervention, claiming that a portion of the subject property — 1,783,084 square meters — was already registered in its name under TCT No. (T-97541) RT-19915. The RTC denied the motion on November 10, 2000, ruling that TDC's challenge would constitute a collateral attack on title, and that reconstitution proceedings were not the proper forum to resolve questions of authenticity or ownership.

On November 27, 2000, the RTC granted the Petition for Reconstitution and ordered the Register of Deeds of Cavite to reconstitute the original copy of TCT No. T-4399. The Republic, through the OSG, appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction because notices to adjoining property owners were returned unserved and that petitioners failed to prove their valid interest in the property. On December 5, 2005, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC and dismissed the Petition for Reconstitution. The appellate court declared the decision final and executory on July 3, 2006, noting that no motion for reconsideration had been filed. Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration only on September 6, 2006, claiming their counsel received a copy of the decision only on September 5, 2006. The Court of Appeals denied the motion on December 4, 2006, the decision having already attained finality. Registry receipts and Post Office certifications, however, indicated that a copy of the December 5, 2005 Decision was received on December 14, 2005 by one Melanie Angat — a person of suitable age and discretion bearing the same surname and residing at the same address as petitioners — after the notice was redirected to petitioners' address when their counsel of record could not be located due to a change of address.

• Compliance with Legal Requirements: Petitioners insisted that their Petition for Reconstitution complied with all legal requirements under Republic Act No. 26, Sections 2 and 3, and that the Court of Appeals committed serious error in dismissing it.
• Notice to Adjoining Owners Not Required: Petitioners argued, citing Puzon vs. Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc., that notice to adjoining property owners is not necessary where reconstitution is based on the owner's duplicate certificate of title, following Section 10 in relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 26.
• Substantial Compliance: Assuming arguendo that notice to adjoining owners was mandatory, petitioners contended that they substantially complied with the requirement, the notices having been sent but returned unserved for reasons beyond their control.
• Timeliness of Motion for Reconsideration: Petitioners asserted that their counsel secured a copy of the Court of Appeals Decision dated December 5, 2005 only on September 5, 2006, implying the motion for reconsideration was filed within the reglementary period.

• Failure to Comply with Notice Requirements: The Republic, through the OSG, argued that the RTC gravely erred in assuming jurisdiction despite petitioners' failure to comply with the notice requirements under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 26, the notices to adjoining property owners having been returned unserved.
• Strict Compliance Required: The OSG maintained that nothing but strict compliance with the requirements of the law would suffice, and that failure to comply prevented the RTC from acquiring jurisdiction and voided the entire reconstitution proceedings.
• Failure to Prove Ownership: The OSG asserted that Federico and Enriquita failed to show that they were the only owners of the subject property at the time of the loss of TCT No. T-4399.
• Finality of Judgment: The OSG argued that the Petition before the Supreme Court deserved outright dismissal because the Court of Appeals Decision dated December 5, 2005 had already become final and executory.

• Finality of Judgment: Whether the Court of Appeals Decision dated December 5, 2005 had become final and executory, precluding the Supreme Court from reviewing the merits of the reconstitution proceedings.
• Notice to Adjoining Owners: Whether notice to adjoining property owners is a jurisdictional requirement in a petition for reconstitution based on the owner's duplicate certificate of title under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 26.
• Sufficiency of Evidence for Reconstitution: Whether petitioners presented sufficient evidence to warrant the reconstitution of TCT No. T-4399.

• Finality of Judgment: Yes. The Court of Appeals Decision dated December 5, 2005 became final and executory on December 30, 2005, the motion for reconsideration having been filed only on September 6, 2006 — well beyond the 15-day reglementary period under Section 1, Rule 52 of the Revised Rules of Court.
• Notice to Adjoining Owners: No, notice to adjoining property owners is not a jurisdictional requirement when reconstitution is based on the owner's duplicate under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 26. Section 10, in relation to Section 9, requires only publication and posting; Sections 12 and 13 apply to reconstitution from sources enumerated under Sections 2(c)–(f) and 3(c)–(f).
• Sufficiency of Evidence for Reconstitution: No. Petitioners failed to prove their chain of ownership, laches attached from the 40-year delay in filing, and the LRA report supporting their petition was found to be spurious — all casting serious doubt on the authenticity of the owner's duplicate of TCT No. T-4399.

• Finality of Judgment: The Court found that the copy of the December 5, 2005 Decision was received on December 14, 2005 by Melanie Angat, a person of suitable age and discretion residing at petitioners' address, after the notice was redirected from counsel of record — who could not be located due to an unnotified change of address — to petitioners' address by registered mail. Under Section 2, Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court, service upon counsel is required, but the court may order service upon the party himself when the attorney of record cannot be located. The registry return receipt stated that a registered article must not be delivered to anyone but the addressee or upon the addressee's written order, and the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed applied, petitioners having failed to prove any irregularity. The 15-day reglementary period under Section 1, Rule 52 is non-extendible, and strict compliance with procedural rules prescribing time periods is mandatory and imperative. A motion for reconsideration filed beyond the reglementary period does not toll the finality of the judgment and forecloses the right to appeal. The final and executory decision constitutes res judicata, and the Court is without jurisdiction to modify or reverse it. The Court found no strong and compelling reasons to disregard the procedural lapse, especially since petitioners did not admit the motion was filed out of time and attempted to mislead the Court on the true date of receipt.

• Notice to Adjoining Owners: The Court clarified that petitioners sought reconstitution based on the owner's duplicate of TCT No. T-4399 — a source enumerated under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 26. Section 10 of the same Act provides that when a petition is filed directly with the court based on sources enumerated in Sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and/or 4(a), the court need only cause the notice to be published in the manner stated in Section 9. Section 9 requires publication twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette and posting on the main entrance of the provincial building and the municipal building. Sections 12 and 13, which require notice to adjoining property owners, apply only to petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated under Sections 2(c)–(f) and 3(c)–(f). Citing Puzon vs. Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc., the Court explained that when reconstitution is based on an extant owner's duplicate TCT, the main concern is the authenticity and genuineness of the certificate, which can best be determined by the government agencies concerned — not by adjoining owners or occupants, whose participation is not indispensable and to whom notice is not jurisdictional. The Court noted, however, that this error by the Court of Appeals would not necessarily result in a judgment favorable to petitioners, given the other grounds supporting dismissal.

• Sufficiency of Evidence for Reconstitution: The Court found that petitioners failed to establish the chain of transfers of the subject property from Mariano Angat to Gregorio Angat and finally to themselves. Although succession operates by law without any positive act by the heirs, petitioners were not exempt from proving that they became owners by legal succession to the exclusion of all others — Mariano had several children, as did Gregorio, and thus multiple legal heirs could have succeeded to the property. The Court found it contrary to common human experience that Federico, a real estate broker, would let 44 years pass without introducing any improvements on a 300-hectare property he claimed to co-own. Petitioners also failed to explain why it took 40 years from the 1959 fire before instituting reconstitution proceedings, and laches attached from this procrastination — citing Heirs of Eulalio Ragua vs. Court of Appeals, where reconstitution was denied on the ground of laches after only 19 years. The real property tax receipts in Federico's name for 1989–1998 had little probative value, as Federico himself admitted he first paid real estate taxes only in 1989, and realty tax payments are mere indicia of possession, not conclusive evidence of ownership. Most critically, a Manifestation by the Acting Register of Deeds of Cavite and a Certification from the LRA revealed that the LRA report dated October 28, 1999 — which petitioners had relied upon — was spurious and not prepared or issued by the LRA. The genuine LRA report, dated December 14, 1999, stated that the technical description of plan PSU-91002 inscribed on the submitted xerox copy of TCT No. T-4399 was found to be an open polygon, and several parcels of land applied under other record numbers were found inside it, with no decree of registration having been issued to those applications. These circumstances raised serious doubt as to the authenticity and genuineness of the owner's duplicate of TCT No. T-4399.

• Finality of Judgments — A judgment that has become final and executory may no longer be modified or reversed, even by the Supreme Court, regardless of any errors therein. The perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is not only mandatory but jurisdictional; failure to interpose a timely appeal renders the assailed decision final and executory and deprives the appellate body of any jurisdiction to alter it. The rule is grounded on public policy and sound practice that judgments must become final at some definite date fixed by law.

• Reconstitution Based on Owner's Duplicate (Section 3(a), RA 26) — When reconstitution is based on the owner's duplicate certificate of title under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 26, the jurisdictional requirements are governed by Section 10 in relation to Section 9, which mandate only publication twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette and posting on the main entrance of the provincial building and the municipal building. Notice to adjoining property owners under Sections 12 and 13 is required only for reconstitution from sources enumerated under Sections 2(c)–(f) and 3(c)–(f), not for those under Sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and 4(a). The main concern when the owner's duplicate is the source is the authenticity and genuineness of the certificate, which adjoining owners are not in a position to determine.

• Laches in Reconstitution Proceedings — Laches — the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned or declined to assert it — bars reconstitution when the petitioner unreasonably delays filing the petition. In Heirs of Eulalio Ragua vs. Court of Appeals, reconstitution was denied on the ground of laches after a 19-year delay; in the present case, a 40-year delay was held sufficient for laches to attach.

• Purpose and Nature of Reconstitution — Reconstitution of title merely restores the instrument supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original form and condition; it is not a remedy to confirm or adjudicate ownership. Courts must scrutinize and verify carefully all supporting documents, deeds, and certifications, and should not hastily or recklessly grant petitions for reconstitution, especially when they involve vast properties. If a petition for reconstitution is denied for lack of sufficient basis, the petitioner may still file an application for confirmation of title under the Land Registration Act.

• "We are without jurisdiction to modify, much less reverse, a final and executory judgment." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the finality issue: the Supreme Court cannot review a decision that has attained finality, even if it contains errors, because the perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is jurisdictional.

• "It is evident from a perusal of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 26, as quoted above, that it does not mandate that notice be specifically sent to adjoining property owners; it only necessitated publication and posting of the notice of the Petition for Reconstitution in accordance with Section 9 of the same Act." — This passage clarifies the jurisdictional requirements for reconstitution based on the owner's duplicate under Section 3(a), distinguishing Section 10 (which requires only publication and posting) from Sections 12 and 13 (which require notice to adjoining owners but apply only to other sources).

• "Once again, we caution the courts against the hasty and reckless grant of petitions for reconstitution, especially when they involve vast properties, such as in this case." — This passage articulates the Court's policy directive that reconstitution proceedings must be scrutinized carefully, given the danger that reconstitution could be the source of anomalous titles or unscrupulously availed of as a substitute for original registration.

• Puzon vs. Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc., 406 Phil. 263 (2001) — Controlling precedent followed. The Court relied on Puzon to hold that when reconstitution is based on an extant owner's duplicate TCT under Section 3(a), notice to adjoining property owners is not jurisdictional, because the main concern is the authenticity and genuineness of the certificate, which adjoining owners are not in a position to determine.

• Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership vs. Velasco, 343 Phil. 115 (1997) — Followed for the proposition that failure to comply with any of the jurisdictional requirements for a petition for reconstitution renders the proceedings null and void.

• Heirs of Eulalio Ragua vs. Court of Appeals, 381 Phil. 7 (2000) — Followed for the proposition that laches bars reconstitution when the petition is filed only after an unreasonable delay; in Ragua, a 19-year delay was held sufficient for laches to attach.

• Republic of the Philippines vs. Holazo, 480 Phil. 828 (2004) — Followed for the definition of reconstitution as the restoration of the instrument in its original form and condition, and for the proposition that realty tax payments are mere indicia of possession, not conclusive evidence of ownership, and are insufficient to warrant reconstitution.

• Paramount Vinyl Products Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 81200, Oct. 17, 1990, 190 SCRA 525 — Followed for the rule that perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is mandatory and jurisdictional, and that failure to interpose a timely appeal renders the assailed decision final and executory.

• Republic vs. Santua, G.R. No. 155703, Sept. 8, 2008, 564 SCRA 331 — Followed for the proposition that if a petition for reconstitution is denied for lack of sufficient basis, the petitioner may still file an application for confirmation of title under the Land Registration Act.

• Section 110, Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), as amended by Republic Act No. 6732 — Provides that original copies of certificates of titles lost or destroyed in the offices of the Register of Deeds shall be reconstituted judicially in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Republic Act No. 26. Petitioners availed of judicial reconstitution by filing their petition with the RTC.

• Sections 2 and 3, Republic Act No. 26 — Enumerate the sources for reconstitution of original certificates of title (Section 2) and transfer certificates of title (Section 3), in hierarchical order. Petitioners based their petition on Section 3(a) — the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title.

• Section 10, Republic Act No. 26 — Allows a registered owner to file a petition for reconstitution directly with the court based on sources enumerated in Sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and/or 4(a), requiring only publication under Section 9. The Court held this provision governs petitioners' petition, not Sections 12 and 13.

• Section 9, Republic Act No. 26 — Prescribes the publication and posting requirements for the notice of the petition: twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette and posting on the main entrance of the provincial building and the municipal building, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing.

• Sections 12 and 13, Republic Act No. 26 — Require notice to adjoining property owners and other interested parties for petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated under Sections 2(c)–(f) and 3(c)–(f). The Court held these provisions are inapplicable to petitioners' case, which was based on Section 3(a).

• Section 1, Rule 52, Revised Rules of Court — Provides that a party may file a motion for reconsideration within 15 days from notice thereof. The Court applied this provision to hold that petitioners' motion for reconsideration, filed on September 6, 2006, was beyond the reglementary period.

• Sections 2 and 9, Rule 13, Revised Rules of Court — Govern service of judgments and final orders. The Court applied these provisions to uphold the validity of service by registered mail to petitioners' address when counsel of record could not be located, and receipt by Melanie Angat as a person of suitable age and discretion.

Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (Associate Justice, Chairperson), Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Associate Justice), Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura (Associate Justice), Arturo D. Brion (Associate Justice, designated to sit as additional member replacing Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta per Raffle dated June 22, 2009).