Ang Lam vs. Rosillosa

A judgment rendered against a person who had died before the action was commenced is void for lack of jurisdiction over her person, and such void judgment may be assailed at any time, directly or collaterally, by any person affected thereby. An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real property is an action in personam, not in rem, and binds only the parties properly impleaded and duly heard.

Potenciano Rosillosa had acquired a 145,957-square-meter parcel of coconut land in Unisan, Quezon, by homestead, obtaining Homestead Title No. 3201 and Patent No. 18102, issued January 30, 1932. He sold the land to Maximo Alpay on May 22, 1944, for P10,000 in Japanese military notes. Alpay in turn sold it to Eugenia Peregrina in July 1944 for P25,000, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 19539 was issued in her name on July 29, 1944. Peregrina was the wife of petitioner Ang Lam. The Public Land Act, under which Rosillosa sought to redeem the property, provided the statutory framework for the dispute.

Potenciano Rosillosa owned a 145,957-square-meter parcel of coconut land in Unisan, Quezon, acquired by homestead under Homestead Title No. 3201 and Patent No. 18102, issued January 30, 1932. On May 22, 1944, he sold the property to Maximo Alpay for P10,000, paid in Japanese military notes. In July 1944, Alpay in turn sold the same parcel to Eugenia Peregrina for P25,000, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 19539 was issued in her name on July 29, 1944.

On or about October 22, 1947, Rosillosa instituted Civil Case No. 4820 in the Court of First Instance of Quezon against Alpay and Peregrina to redeem the property under the Public Land Act. The complaint was amended on October 21, 1948. In the meantime, Rosillosa moved to dismiss the case against Alpay on the ground that the latter had ceased to have any interest in the property sought to be redeemed. On December 4, 1948, Rosillosa alleged that Peregrina could not be found and served with summons at her known address, prompting the respondent judge to order service of summons by publication in The Manila Chronicle. Peregrina failed to appear within the period fixed in the summons and was declared in default. After hearing evidence for the plaintiff, the court rendered judgment on April 2, 1949, ordering Peregrina to execute a deed of resale in favor of Rosillosa upon payment of P50, which the court found to be the equivalent in Philippine currency of the original price of P10,000 in Japanese military notes, at the rate of P1 Philippine currency for every P200 of Japanese fiat money.

It subsequently emerged that Eugenia Peregrina had died in the City of Manila on April 1, 1945 — more than two years before Civil Case No. 4820 was even commenced. On September 22, 1949, Ang Lam, alleging under oath that he had been appointed on September 21, 1949, by the Court of First Instance of Manila as administrator of Peregrina's estate, filed a petition in Civil Case No. 4820 praying that the judgment be set aside on the ground that the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the deceased defendant. The respondent judge denied the petition on three grounds: first, that the action was by its nature one in rem; second, that Ang Lam was the surviving husband of Peregrina and had administration of the land in litigation; and third, that the decision was handed down on April 2, 1949, whereas the petition to set it aside was presented only on September 26, 1949, after the lapse of the periods mentioned in Section 3 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.

• Lack of Jurisdiction over the Person of the Defendant: Petitioner Ang Lam argued that the judgment in Civil Case No. 4820 was null and void because the court never acquired jurisdiction over the person of Eugenia Peregrina, who had died on April 1, 1945, several years before the action was commenced. Publication of summons against a deceased person was, according to petitioner, absolutely vain and without validity.

• Action In Rem: Respondent judge maintained that Rosillosa's action was by its nature one in rem, so that service of summons by publication was binding upon the petitioner as surviving husband and administrator of the property in litigation.
• Status of Petitioner: Respondent argued that Ang Lam, as the surviving husband of the defendant and administrator of the land in question, was bound by the judgment.
• Barred by Rule 38: Respondent contended that the petition to set aside the judgment was filed beyond the periods provided in Section 3 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, the decision having been rendered on April 2, 1949, while the petition was presented only on September 26, 1949.

• Nature of the Action: Whether an action to redeem real property under the Public Land Act is an action in rem or in personam.
• Jurisdiction over a Deceased Defendant: Whether a court acquires jurisdiction over the person of a defendant who had died before the action was commenced, such that summons by publication is valid.
• Applicability of Rule 38: Whether Rule 38 of the Rules of Court bars a petition to annul a void judgment filed by a non-party to the original case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

• Nature of the Action: In personam. An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real property is not an action in rem; it is an action in personam, binding only upon parties properly impleaded and duly heard.

• Jurisdiction over a Deceased Defendant: No. The defendant having died years before the action was commenced, publication of summons against her was absolutely vain and without validity, and the court never acquired jurisdiction over her person.

• Applicability of Rule 38: No. Rule 38 is inapplicable because the petitioner was not a party to the original case and did not seek relief on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, but sought annulment for lack of jurisdiction. A void judgment may be assailed at any time.

• Nature of the Action: The Court distinguished actions in personam from actions in rem: the former are directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments, while the latter are directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world. An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action but remains in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing. An action for resolution of a contract of sale of real property is likewise in personam. In contrast, land registration proceedings and probate of wills are proceedings in rem, because the judgments rendered therein are binding upon the whole world. Since Rosillosa's action sought redemption from a specific defendant, it was in personam and could bind only parties properly impleaded and heard.

• Jurisdiction over a Deceased Defendant: Because Eugenia Peregrina had died on April 1, 1945, years before Civil Case No. 4820 was commenced on October 22, 1947, she had no legal personality to be sued. Publication of summons against a deceased person was absolutely vain and without validity whatsoever. The respondent judge's theory that the summons by publication bound Ang Lam as surviving husband and administrator was untenable, because the action was in personam and not in rem, and a judgment therein binds only parties properly impleaded and duly heard.

• Applicability of Rule 38: Rule 38 provides for relief from a judgment, order, or other proceeding taken against a party to the case who, by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, has been unjustly deprived of a hearing or prevented from taking an appeal. The petitioner was not a party to the original case and did not seek relief on any of the grounds enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 38; instead, he sought annulment of the judgment for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, who had long been deceased before the action was commenced. A judgment rendered by a court which had not acquired jurisdiction either over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant is void, and a void judgment may be assailed or impugned at any time, either directly or collaterally, by means of a petition filed in the same case or by means of a separate action, or by resisting such judgment in any action or proceeding wherein it is invoked.

• Void Judgment for Lack of Jurisdiction over the Person — A judgment rendered by a court which has not acquired jurisdiction either over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant is void. A void judgment may be assailed or impugned at any time, either directly or collaterally, by means of a petition filed in the same case or by means of a separate action, or by resisting such judgment in any action or proceeding wherein it is invoked. The Court applied this doctrine to annul the judgment against Peregrina, who had died before the action was commenced, rendering service of summons by publication absolutely vain.

• Distinction Between In Rem and In Personam Actions — Actions in personam are directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments, binding only upon parties properly impleaded and duly heard. Actions in rem are directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world. An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real property is a real action but is in personam, not in rem. Land registration proceedings and probate of wills are examples of proceedings in rem. The Court applied this distinction to reject the respondent judge's characterization of the redemption action as in rem.

• Inapplicability of Rule 38 to Annulment of Void Judgments by Non-Parties — Rule 38 provides relief from judgments taken against a party who, by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, has been unjustly deprived of a hearing or prevented from taking an appeal. It does not apply to a non-party seeking annulment of a void judgment for lack of jurisdiction, because a void judgment may be attacked at any time and is not subject to the time limitations of Rule 38.

• "At the time the action was commenced said defendant had long passed to another world. Hence the publication of the summons against her was absolutely vain and no validity whatsoever." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the futility of summons by publication against a deceased defendant, establishing that jurisdiction over the person cannot be acquired when the defendant is already dead.

• "An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action, but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing." — This passage provides the canonical formulation distinguishing real actions that are in personam from proceedings that are truly in rem, a distinction frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.

• "A judgment rendered by a court which had not acquired jurisdiction either over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant, is void. A void judgment may be assailed or impugned at any time either directly or collaterally, by means of a petition filed in the same case or by means of a separate action, or by resisting such judgment in any action or proceeding wherein it is invoked." — This passage articulates the doctrine on void judgments and the modes by which they may be attacked, a foundational principle in Philippine civil procedure.

• Patriarca vs. Orate, 7 Phil. 390 — Cited as authority for the proposition that an action to redeem or recover title to or possession of real property is in personam, binding only upon parties properly impleaded and heard.

• Sandejas vs. Robles, 46 Off. Gaz. (Supp. to No. 1) 203 — Cited for the proposition that an action for resolution of a contract of sale of real property is an action in personam.

• Grey Alba vs. Cruz, 17 Phil. 49 — Cited to illustrate the nature of in rem proceedings, where the object is to bar indifferently all who might make an objection against the right sought to be established.

• Reyes vs. Razon, 38 Phil. 480 — Cited as an example of an in rem application, where the judgment rendered is binding upon the whole world.

• In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156 — Cited as authority that the probate of a will is a proceeding in rem, because the order of probate is effective against all persons wherever residing.

• Section 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court — Provides the periods within which a petition for relief from judgment must be filed. The Court held this rule inapplicable to the petitioner, who was not a party to the original case and sought annulment of a void judgment for lack of jurisdiction rather than relief under the grounds enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 38.

• Section 1, Rule 38, Rules of Court — Enumerates the grounds for relief from judgment: fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence that unjustly deprived a party of a hearing or prevented an appeal. The Court found these grounds inapplicable to the petitioner's situation.

• Public Land Act — The statute under which Rosillosa sought to redeem the homestead property. The action's statutory basis did not alter its character as in personam.

Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concurred.