Ang Kek Chen vs. Spouses Calasan

For purposes of venue under the third paragraph of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, the phrase “where any of the offended parties actually resides” means personal, actual, or physical residence—the place of bodily presence as an inhabitant—not legal residence or domicile. A person may have a domicile in one locality and an actual residence in another, and it is the latter that controls venue in libel actions when the offended party opts to sue in the place of residence rather than where the libelous article was printed and first published.

Respondent Atty. Eleazar S. Calasan was born in Aparri, Cagayan, had been a registered voter there since 1969, and owned an ancestral home on Quirino Street. He also owned a house in Las Piñas, Metro Manila, where he and his family actually lived; his law office address was in Manila, and he secured a community tax certificate in Las Piñas. Petitioner Ang Kek Chen resided in Tondo, Manila, and was not a lawyer. Atty. Calasan served as counsel for Jaime U. Lim, an opponent of petitioner. In the course of that dispute, petitioner wrote a letter and a counter-affidavit dated June 9 and June 19, 2000, which Atty. Calasan believed maligned him. Copies were furnished to various persons, including high government officials. Atty. Calasan subsequently filed criminal libel complaints in Aparri, Cagayan against petitioner—some of which were dismissed—and petitioner retaliated with administrative disbarment complaints against Atty. Calasan.

• The Parties’ Residences: Petitioner Ang Kek Chen resided in Tondo, Manila. Respondent Atty. Eleazar S. Calasan was born in Aparri, Cagayan, had been a registered voter there since 1969, and owned an ancestral home donated by his mother. He also owned a house and lot in Las Piñas, Metro Manila, where he and his family actually lived. Atty. Calasan maintained a business address in Manila, was commissioned as a notary public by the Manila RTC, and obtained a Community Tax Certificate in Las Piñas. Respondent Leticia B. Calasan is his spouse.
• The Alleged Defamatory Imputations and Prior Criminal Cases: Petitioner wrote a counter-affidavit dated June 9, 2000, and a letter dated June 19, 2000, which Atty. Calasan perceived as maligning him; copies were disseminated to various persons, including Philippine government officials. Atty. Calasan filed multiple criminal libel cases against petitioner in Aparri, Cagayan. Criminal Case Nos. 07-1168 (RTC, Branch 7) and VI-1094 (RTC, Branch 6) were dismissed. In dismissing, those branches found that Atty. Calasan’s actual residence was in Las Piñas, not Aparri, and that his presence in Aparri was only occasional or intermittent. Petitioner also instituted administrative disbarment cases against Atty. Calasan.
• Filing of the Civil Action and Motion to Dismiss: On December 4, 2001, respondents filed a civil complaint for damages based on the same alleged libelous imputations in the Aparri, Cagayan RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 08-418. Petitioner moved to dismiss on several grounds, chief among them improper venue.
• Trial Court’s Findings on Residence: The RTC, Branch 8, found that respondents were “residents and domiciled in Aparri, Cagayan” and that they were registered voters there. However, it also found that respondents admitted having a residential house in Las Piñas where they stayed most of the time because of their profession and occupation. The trial court concluded that Aparri was respondents’ legal residence and place of domicile, but their “actual residence” was in Las Piñas, Metro Manila. The complaint was dismissed for improper venue, and reconsideration was denied.

• Improper Venue: Petitioner argued that under the third paragraph of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, venue is proper only where the libelous article was printed and first published or where any of the offended parties “actually resides.” He maintained that respondents’ actual residence at the time the alleged libelous statements were made was in Las Piñas, not Aparri, Cagayan.
• Distinction between Residence and Domicile: Petitioner contended that “residence” for venue purposes means personal, actual, or physical habitation, not legal residence or domicile. He asserted that the trial court correctly applied this distinction.
• Erroneous Reversal by the Court of Appeals: Petitioner claimed that the CA’s November 21, 2002 Resolution erred by equating “residence” with “domicile” and reversing the trial court’s well-founded dismissal. The initial CA Decision of August 12, 2002, which affirmed the dismissal, was correct.
• Certiorari as Substitute for Lost Appeal: Petitioner posited that the respondents’ Rule 65 petition could not substitute for the appeal they had lost, and the CA should not have entertained it.

• Residence as Domicile: Respondents contended that their actual residence was in Aparri, Cagayan, because that was their domicile. They asserted that an individual does not lose domicile merely by living and maintaining residences in different places, and that temporary absence to pursue a profession does not constitute loss of residence.
• Proper Venue: Having been born and registered as voters in Aparri and owning ancestral property there, respondents maintained that venue for the civil action was properly laid in Aparri under Article 360, as that was the place where the offended parties “actually resided.”
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: In their certiorari petition before the CA, respondents argued that the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the complaint for alleged improper venue, warranting the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.

• Venue under Article 360: Whether the term “actually resides” in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code refers to actual physical residence or to legal residence/domicile for purposes of determining venue in a civil action for damages arising from libel.
• Correctness of CA Reconsideration: Whether the CA erred in granting respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration and ordering the trial court to proceed, based on its finding that respondents’ residence was in Aparri, Cagayan.
• Propriety of Certiorari: Whether the petition for certiorari filed by respondents could substitute for a lost appeal and whether the CA properly entertained it.

• Venue under Article 360: The phrase “actually resides” in Article 360 refers to personal, actual, or physical habitation—actual residence—not legal residence or domicile. The distinction was settled in Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-40502, November 29, 1976), which laid down the doctrinal rule that “resides” connotes ex vi termini “actual residence” as distinguished from “legal residence or domicile.” For venue purposes, residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place; domicile requires both bodily presence and an intention to make it one’s domicile. A stay must be more than temporary to qualify as residence under the statute. Applying this, respondents had a residential house in Las Piñas where they habitually stayed due to profession and occupation, as evidenced by Community Tax Certificates for 2000 and 2001 bearing a Las Piñas address and the absence of any denial that the family lived there at the time of the publications. Their domicile in Aparri was not thereby extinguished, but their actual residence for venue was Las Piñas. Therefore, venue was improperly laid in Aparri. Article 360 uses the word “actually resides” and not “domicile”; thus, the less technical, popular meaning of residence governs.
• Correctness of CA Reconsideration: The CA’s November 21, 2002 Resolution was erroneous because it equated “residence” with “domicile” and disregarded the crucial distinction. The trial court did not deny that respondents had a domicile in Aparri; it correctly determined that their actual residence was elsewhere. The CA’s initial August 12, 2002 Decision correctly upheld the trial court’s finding and dismissal for improper venue. Consequently, that earlier decision was reinstated.
• Propriety of Certiorari: The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to rule on this procedural question, resolving the case solely on the core substantive issue of venue. The reinstatement of the CA’s initial decision, which dismissed the certiorari petition for lack of merit, effectively affirmed that the trial court committed no grave abuse of discretion.

• Doctrine of Actual Residence for Venue Purposes — Under venue statutes, including the third paragraph of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, the term “resides” or “actually resides” means personal, actual, or physical habitation—actual residence—as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. Residence requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place and actual stay thereat; domicile requires bodily presence plus an intention to make the place one’s fixed permanent home. A person may have only one domicile at a time but may maintain multiple residences. For venue in libel cases, the offended party’s actual residence at the time of the offense controls, even if different from the legal domicile, provided the stay is more than temporary and characterized by continuity.
• Application: The Court applied this doctrine by affirming that respondents’ habitual physical presence in Las Piñas, demonstrated by their house, family life, and Community Tax Certificates, constituted their actual residence in 2000, notwithstanding their continuing voter registration and ancestral ties to Aparri. Venue was thus improperly laid in Aparri.

• “We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term ‘resides’ connotes ex vi termini ‘actual residence’ as distinguished from ‘legal residence or domicile.’ This term ‘resides,’ like the terms ‘residing’ and ‘residence,’ is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules—x x x residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.” — Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, quoted in the decision.
• “There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time.” — Koh v. Court of Appeals, quoted in the decision.
• “Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code does not use the term ‘domicile’ in providing for venue … It is thus essential to determine where the offended parties … actually resided during the year 2000, the time of the commission of the offense.” — Supreme Court’s ratio.
• “To reiterate, for purposes of determining venue, ‘residence’ is not synonymous with ‘domicile.’ One may reside in a place apart from one’s legal residence, without changing domicile, and that residence would constitute ‘actual residence’ for purposes of determining venue.”

• Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-40502, November 29, 1976, 74 SCRA 189 — Controlling precedent; established the doctrinal rule that “resides” in venue statutes means actual residence, not legal residence or domicile. Followed and applied.
• Koh v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-40428, December 17, 1975, 70 SCRA 298 — Applied; clarified the distinction between domicile and residence, affirming that a person may have a domicile in one place and a residence in another.
• Saludo, Jr. v. American Express International, Inc., G.R. No. 159507, April 19, 2006, 487 SCRA 462 — Cited; recognized that while “residence” may be equated with “domicile” for election law purposes, the less technical definition of actual physical habitation is adopted for venue.

• Article 360, third paragraph, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the criminal and civil action for damages in written defamations “shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.” The Court interpreted “actually resides” to mean actual, physical residence rather than domicile, and ruled that venue was improperly laid in Aparri because respondents’ actual residence at the material time was in Las Piñas.

Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing (Chairperson), Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga.