Ang-Angco vs. Castillo

The President's constitutional power of control over executive officers does not authorize direct removal of a classified civil service employee in disregard of the Civil Service Act of 1959, which vests original and exclusive jurisdiction over administrative cases against classified employees in the Commissioner of Civil Service and finality in the Civil Service Board of Appeals. Where Congress has by law vested the appointment of inferior officers in heads of departments, it may likewise limit and regulate the removal of such officers, and the President must conform to such statutory procedures.

Isidro C. Ang-Angco served as Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila, a position to which he was appointed by the Secretary of Finance under the Revised Administrative Code, making him an officer in the classified civil service rather than a presidential appointee. The Civil Service Act of 1959 (Republic Act No. 2260) had restructured the disciplinary framework for classified employees, vesting original and exclusive jurisdiction over administrative cases in the Commissioner of Civil Service, with appeals to the Civil Service Board of Appeals whose decisions were made final, and eliminating the prior presidential power of review that existed under Commonwealth Act No. 598. The constitutional backdrop involved two apparently conflicting provisions: Section 10(1), Article VII, granting the President power of control over executive departments, and Section 4, Article XII, guaranteeing that no officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed except for cause as provided by law.

On October 8, 1956, the Pepsi-Cola Far East Trade Development Co., Inc. wrote to the Secretary of Commerce and Industry and the Secretary of Finance requesting a special permit to withdraw 1,188 units of pepsi-cola concentrates from the customs house. The concentrates had been imported without any dollar allocation or remittance of foreign exchange and were not covered by any Central Bank release certificate. Senator Pedro Sabido, acting on behalf of the company, likewise wrote to the officials urging that authority be granted, and Secretary Hernandez wrote to Dr. Andres Castillo, Acting Governor of the Central Bank, stating that unless there was legal objection, he wished to authorize the withdrawal upon payment of all charges in pesos. The Import-Export Committee of the Central Bank, through Mr. Gregorio Licaros, submitted a memorandum to the Monetary Board stating it saw no objection to the proposal, but the Monetary Board did not take up the matter in its meeting of October 12, 1956, for the reason that the transaction did not involve any dollar allocation or foreign exchange.

Having failed to secure the necessary authority from the Central Bank, the counsel for Pepsi-Cola approached Collector of Customs Isidro Ang-Angco on October 13, 1956, seeking immediate release of the concentrates. Ang-Angco, observing that the importation lacked a Central Bank release certificate, advised the counsel to secure one from the No-Dollar Import Office. That same morning, Mr. Aquiles J. Lopez of the No-Dollar Import Office wrote to Ang-Angco stating that his office had no objection to the release but could not take action because the matter was not within its jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 1410. The counsel showed the letter to Ang-Angco, who still hesitated and suggested the letter be amended to remove ambiguity, but Lopez refused, stating the letter was neither a permit nor a release. Secretary Hernandez was contacted by telephone, and Ang-Angco read the letter to him, whereupon the Secretary verbally expressed approval of the release. Ang-Angco, while still in doubt, authorized the release upon payment of the corresponding duties, customs charges, fees, and taxes.

When Commissioner of Customs Manuel P. Manahan learned of the release, he immediately ordered seizure of the concentrates, but only a negligible portion remained in the warehouse. He filed an administrative complaint against Ang-Angco charging him with grave neglect of duty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the customs service. President Ramon Magsaysay constituted an investigating committee composed of former Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla as Chairman, with Atty. Arturo A. Alafriz and Lt. Col. Angel A. Salcedo as members. Ang-Angco was suspended from office in late December 1956. The committee submitted its report recommending a suspension of 15 days without pay, chargeable against the period of his suspension. Ang-Angco was reinstated on April 1, 1957, but the decision on the administrative case remained pending until President Magsaysay's death.

After approximately three years during which Ang-Angco continued discharging his duties, Executive Secretary Natalio P. Castillo, by authority of the President, rendered a decision on February 12, 1960 finding Ang-Angco guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and considering him resigned effective from the date of notice, with prejudice to reinstatement in the Bureau of Customs. Ang-Angco wrote to President Carlos P. Garcia pointing out that the action deprived him of his statutory right to have his case originally decided by the Commissioner of Civil Service and his right of appeal to the Civil Service Board of Appeals, and that the removal violated the constitutional guaranty against removal except for cause as provided by law. Secretary Castillo denied the request for reconsideration on February 16, 1960, and again on July 1, 1960, asserting that the President's power of control over executive departments could not be divested or diminished by Congress.

• Jurisdiction and Due Process: Petitioner maintained that respondent Executive Secretary, in acting directly on his case by authority of the President, violated the constitutional guaranty to officers and employees in the classified service, specifically Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959, which vests in the Commissioner of Civil Service original and exclusive jurisdiction over administrative cases against classified employees.
• Right of Appeal: Petitioner argued that he was deprived of his right of appeal under Section 18(b) of the Civil Service Act of 1959 to the Civil Service Board of Appeals, whose decision on the matter is final.
• Removal Without Due Process: Petitioner contended that his removal violated Section 32 of the same Act, which requires due process before removal or suspension, and Section 4, Article XII of the Constitution, which provides that no officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed except for cause as provided by law.
• Status as Classified Employee: Petitioner asserted that as an officer belonging to the classified civil service, appointed by the Secretary of Finance under the Revised Administrative Code rather than by the President, he could not be removed by the President in disregard of the Civil Service Act of 1959.

• Presidential Power of Control: Respondents contended that the pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law applicable to classified employees do not apply to petitioner's case, because to hold otherwise would deprive the President of his constitutional power of control over officers and employees of the executive branch.
• No Distinction Between Presidential Appointees and Classified Employees: Respondents argued that whether officers or employees are presidential appointees or belong to the classified service, if they are in the executive department, they all come under the President's control, and his power of removal may be exercised over them directly without distinction.
• Practical Equivalence of Direct and Ultimate Action: Respondents relied on Negado vs. Castro for the proposition that the President may modify or set aside a decision of the Civil Service Board of Appeals at the instance of the office concerned, the respondent employee, or even motu proprio, and therefore there would be no logical difference between removing petitioner by direct presidential action and separating him through ultimate presidential action on appeal.
• Congress Cannot Diminish Presidential Power: Respondents contended that the power of control given by the Constitution to the President can only be limited by the Constitution and not by Congress, citing Hebron vs. Reyes, because to permit Congress to do so would diminish the authority conferred on the President by the Constitution, which is tantamount to amending the Constitution itself.

• Presidential Power of Control vs. Civil Service Security of Tenure: Whether the President has the power to take direct action on the administrative case of a classified civil service employee, removing him from office, notwithstanding the provisions of the Civil Service Act of 1959 vesting original and exclusive jurisdiction in the Commissioner of Civil Service and finality in the Civil Service Board of Appeals.

• Presidential Power of Control vs. Civil Service Security of Tenure: No. The President's power of control over executive departments does not extend to the power to directly remove a classified civil service employee in contravention of the Civil Service Act of 1959, which vests original and exclusive jurisdiction in the Commissioner of Civil Service and finality in the Civil Service Board of Appeals.

• Presidential Power of Control vs. Civil Service Security of Tenure: Under Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959, the Commissioner of Civil Service has original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide administrative cases against officers and employees in the classified service, with the only limitation being appeal to the Civil Service Board of Appeals, whose decision is final under Section 18 of Republic Act No. 2260. The law as it stands does not provide for any appeal to the President, nor does it grant the President power to review decisions motu proprio, unlike the previous law, Commonwealth Act No. 598, which was expressly repealed by the Civil Service Act of 1959. Petitioner, as a classified civil service employee, therefore comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service, and deprivation of the statutory procedure constituted a denial of due process. The saving clause "Except as otherwise provided by law" in Section 16(i) was examined in light of Section 64(b) of the Revised Administrative Code, which authorizes the President to remove officials "conformably to law," and Section (D) of the same Code, which provides that department heads may remove subordinate officers "in accordance with the Civil Service Law." Both provisions subordinate presidential removal power to the Civil Service Act. Regarding the constitutional power of control under Section 10(1), Article VII, the Court interpreted this to mean, per Hebron vs. Reyes, "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter" — a power over acts of subordinates, not over the actors themselves. The power of control does not include the power to remove a classified employee, because removal is not a matter of general policy. The Court reconciled the two apparently conflicting constitutional provisions — the President's power of control and the civil service security of tenure — by holding that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint only as to presidential appointees, not as to classified employees. Congress, having constitutional authority to vest appointment of inferior officers in heads of departments under Article VII, Section 10(3), may likewise limit and regulate removal of such officers, citing U.S. vs. Perkins. To hold otherwise would destroy the civil service system and revive the spoils system, as warned in Lacson vs. Romero.

• Power of Control vs. Power of Removal — The President's constitutional power of control over executive departments, as defined in Hebron vs. Reyes and Mondano vs. Silvosa, means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." This power extends to the acts of subordinates, not to the actors themselves; it does not include the power to remove classified civil service employees contrary to statutory procedures.
• Power to Appoint Includes Power to Remove — Limited Application — The principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint applies only to presidential appointees or officers not belonging to the classified service. It does not extend to classified civil service employees, whose appointments are vested in heads of departments by Congress, and whose removal is governed by the Civil Service Act.
• Congressional Authority to Regulate Removal of Inferior Officers — Where Congress, by law, vests the appointment of inferior officers in heads of departments, it may likewise limit, restrict, and regulate the removal of such officers. The constitutional authority to vest appointments implies authority to prescribe the conditions of removal, and the department head must be governed by such legislation not only in making appointments but in all that is incident thereto.
• Security of Tenure in the Classified Service — The constitutional guaranty that no officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed except for cause as provided by law (Section 4, Article XII) must be harmonized with the President's power of control (Section 10(1), Article VII). The rational reconciliation is that the President's control does not override specific statutory procedures for removal of classified employees, as holding otherwise would undermine the entire civil service system and revive the spoils system.

• "To hold that civil service officials hold their office at the will of the appointing power subject to removal or forced transfer at any time, would demoralize and undermine and eventually destroy the whole Civil Service System and structure. The country would then go back to the days of the old Jacksonian Spoils System under which a victorious Chief Executive, after the elections could if so minded, sweep out of office, civil service employees differing in Political color or affiliation from him, and sweep in his Political followers and adherents, especially those who have given him help, political or otherwise." — This passage, quoted from Lacson vs. Romero, articulates the fundamental rationale for security of tenure in the civil service and the danger of allowing the President to remove classified employees at will, serving as the Court's guiding principle in harmonizing the President's power of control with civil service protections.
• "The phrase 'conformably to law' is significant. It shows that the President does not have blanket authority [to] move any officer or employee of the government but his power must still be subject to the law that [was] passed by the legislative body particularly with regard the procedure, cause and finality of the removal of persons who may be the subject of disciplinary action." — This passage interprets Section 64(b) of the Revised Administrative Code as subordinating presidential removal power to statutory procedures, directly refuting the respondents' contention that the President's constitutional power of control cannot be limited by Congress.
• "We have no doubt that when Congress, by law, vests the appointment of inferior officers in the heads of departments it may limit and restrict [the] power of removal as it seem best for the public interest. The constitutional authority in Congress to thus vest the appointment implies authority to limit, restrict, and regulate the removal by such laws as Congress may enact in relation to the officers so appointed." — This passage establishes the doctrine that congressional authority to vest appointments in department heads carries with it the authority to regulate removal, drawing on U.S. vs. Perkins.

• Hebron vs. Reyes, L-9124, July 28, 1958 — Cited by respondents for the proposition that Congress cannot diminish the President's constitutional power of control; the Court cited it for the definition of "control" as the power to alter, modify, nullify, or set aside subordinate officers' acts, distinguishing control over acts from power over the actors.
• Lacson vs. Romero, 84 Phil. 740 — Cited for the doctrine that civil service officials do not hold office at the will of the appointing power, and that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint only as to presidential appointees, not classified employees; also cited for the warning against reviving the spoils system.
• Negado vs. Castro, 55 O.G. 10534 — Cited by respondents for the proposition that the President may modify or set aside decisions of the Civil Service Board of Appeals motu proprio; the Court distinguished this as having been based on the previous law (Commonwealth Act No. 598), which was expressly repealed by the Civil Service Act of 1959.
• Mondano vs. Silvosa, L-7708, May 30, 1955 — Cited in footnote as the source of the definition of the power of control adopted in Hebron vs. Reyes.
• U.S. vs. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 — Cited for the principle that Congress, having constitutional authority to vest appointment of inferior officers in heads of departments, may likewise limit and regulate their removal.

• Section 16(i), Republic Act No. 2260 (Civil Service Act of 1959) — Vests in the Commissioner of Civil Service original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide administrative cases against officers and employees in the classified service, subject to the saving clause "Except as otherwise provided by law." Applied as the primary statutory basis for ruling that petitioner's case fell under the Commissioner's exclusive jurisdiction.
• Section 18(b), Republic Act No. 2260 — Provides that decisions of the Commissioner of Civil Service may be appealed to the Civil Service Board of Appeals, whose decision shall be final, with no further appeal to the President. Applied to show that the law eliminated the President's power of review.
• Section 32, Republic Act No. 2260 — Provides that removal or suspension of any officer or employee in the civil service shall be accomplished only after due process. Applied to establish that petitioner was deprived of due process.
• Section 4, Article XII, 1935 Constitution — Provides that "No officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law." Applied as the constitutional guaranty of security of tenure that the President's direct removal action violated.
• Section 10(1), Article VII, 1935 Constitution — Grants the President power of control over all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. Interpreted as limited to control over acts of subordinates, not over the persons of classified employees.
• Section 10(3), Article VII, 1935 Constitution — Authorizes Congress to vest appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of departments. Applied as the constitutional basis for Congress's authority to regulate removal of officers whose appointments it vests in department heads.
• Section 64(b), Revised Administrative Code — Authorizes the President to remove officials "conformably to law." Interpreted as subordinating presidential removal power to statutory procedures.
• Section (D), Revised Administrative Code — Provides that department heads may remove subordinate officers "in accordance with the Civil Service Law." Interpreted as further confirming that removal power is subject to the Civil Service Act.
• Commonwealth Act No. 598 — The previous civil service law that allowed the President to reverse or modify decisions of the Civil Service Board of Appeals motu proprio; expressly repealed by Republic Act No. 2260, thereby eliminating the President's power of review.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concurred. No separate concurring opinions were noted.