Andrada vs. People

A claim of self-defense fails when unlawful aggression by the victim is not proven, and treachery attends an unexpected attack on a seated victim from behind, ensuring the execution of the crime without risk to the aggressor.

On September 24, 1986, in Baguio City, Philippine Constabulary soldiers dropped by Morlow's Restaurant for a snack after responding to a police assistance call. While Cpl. Arsenio Ugerio was seated and talking to a woman, petitioner Peter Andrada, who had earlier been advised by a PC officer to leave the restaurant due to apparent drunkenness, approached Ugerio from behind and hacked him twice on the head with a bolo. Ugerio sustained fatal scalp and skull injuries but survived due to timely medical intervention. Andrada fled but was apprehended by police shortly thereafter.

• The Incident: On September 23, 1986, at around 11:30 PM, PC soldiers responded to a police assistance call. Finding nothing amiss, they stopped at Morlow's Restaurant past midnight for coffee and sandwiches. While Cpl. Ugerio was talking to a woman at their table, petitioner approached and scolded him. Sgt. Sumabong advised petitioner, who appeared drunk, to pay his bill and go home. Petitioner left, but moments later, while Sgt. Sumabong was paying the bill, he heard Cpl. Ugerio moaning in pain. Turning around, Sgt. Sumabong saw Cpl. Ugerio sprawled on the floor, with petitioner hacking him on the head with a bolo. Petitioner fled and eluded immediate pursuit.
• Arrest and Medical Findings: Petitioner was arrested in a waiting shed at the corner of Camdas Road and Magsaysay Avenue. The bolo was recovered at the restaurant. Dr. Francisco Fernandez testified that the victim suffered two major injuries: a 5-cm scalping avulsion and a 6-cm depressed comminuted skull fracture with brain laceration. Either wound would have been fatal without timely medical treatment. The victim remained incapable of remembering or recalling visual stimuli.
• Petitioner's Version: Petitioner claimed that two of the military men slapped him, poked a gun at his head, threatened to "salvage" him, collared, and dragged him outside. Fearful for his life, he swung his bolo at the men without seeing if he hit them, then ran home. He alleged he was looking for his mother or grandmother to assist him in surrendering and eventually surrendered to the police sub-station at Magsaysay Avenue accompanied by his mother and a policeman.

• Due Process: Petitioner argued that his right to due process was violated by the gross incompetence of his counsel de parte, who failed to present all defense witnesses, failed to present a medical certificate of his injuries, failed to notify him of Sgt. Sumabong's cross-examination, and failed to submit a memorandum.
• Self-Defense: Petitioner maintained that he acted in self-defense and self-preservation when the military men attacked, threatened, and dragged him.
• Qualifying Circumstance: Petitioner insisted that treachery was absent because the hacking was a "spur-of-the-moment" act, warranting a conviction only for frustrated homicide rather than frustrated murder.
• Mitigating Circumstance: Petitioner argued that he was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, having surrendered to the authorities after the incident.

• Due Process: The Office of the Solicitor General countered that no due process violation occurred, as petitioner was represented by counsel of his choice; mere dissatisfaction with counsel's performance does not amount to a constitutional violation.

• Due Process: Whether petitioner's right to due process was violated due to the alleged gross incompetence of his counsel de parte.
• Self-Defense: Whether petitioner's claim of self-defense is valid.
• Nature of the Crime: Whether the crime committed is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide.
• Mitigating Circumstance: Whether petitioner is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

• Due Process: No due process violation was found. Negligence or incompetence of counsel is deemed gross only when it prejudices the constitutional right of an accused to be heard. Counsel actively participated in cross-examining prosecution witnesses, and the failure to present other witnesses or a medical certificate did not prejudice substantial rights. A client is bound by the mistakes of counsel regarding the competency of witnesses, sufficiency of evidence, or failure to introduce evidence, unless such mistakes prevent the proper presentation of the case. Having retained his counsel throughout the proceedings without seeking substitution, petitioner is bound by counsel's decisions.
• Self-Defense: The defense of self-defense is untenable. Unlawful aggression, the primary element of self-defense, was absent. The trial and appellate courts found that the victim was seated with his back turned when hacked by petitioner, negating any ongoing unlawful aggression from the victim. Petitioner was the unlawful aggressor.
• Nature of the Crime: The crime is frustrated murder. Treachery (alevosia) attended the killing because petitioner employed means that directly and especially ensured the execution of the crime without risk to himself from any defense the victim might make. The sudden and unexpected attack on a seated victim from behind, without warning, satisfied the element of treachery. All acts of execution were performed, and death was averted solely by timely medical assistance, a cause independent of petitioner's will.
• Mitigating Circumstance: Voluntary surrender was not appreciated. The surrender was not spontaneous, as petitioner fled after the attack and was apprehended by responding police officers in a waiting shed before any surrender could take place.

• Gross Negligence or Incompetence of Counsel — Negligence or incompetence of counsel is deemed gross and warrants relief only when it prejudices the constitutional right of an accused to be heard. Mistakes of attorneys regarding the competency of witnesses, sufficiency of evidence, the proper defense, failure to introduce evidence, summon witnesses, or argue the case do not constitute gross negligence unless they prejudice the client and prevent the proper presentation of the case. A client who retains counsel despite perceived ineptitude is bound by counsel's mistakes.
• Self-Defense — The requisites of self-defense are: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel or prevent it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non. The burden of proof shifts to the accused upon a plea of self-defense, requiring clear and convincing evidence to justify the act.
• Treachery (Alevosia) — Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to ensure the execution of the crime without risk to himself from any defense which the offended party might make. A sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim from behind constitutes treachery.
• Voluntary Surrender — For voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the surrender must be spontaneous, demonstrating the accused's interest in surrendering unconditionally to the authorities, either because of an acknowledgment of guilt or a wish to save the authorities the trouble and expenses of search and capture. Apprehension negates spontaneity.

• "In criminal cases, the negligence or incompetence of counsel to be deemed gross must have prejudiced the constitutional right of an accused to be heard."
• "For if an accused feels that his counsel is inept, he should take action by discharging him earlier, instead of waiting until an adverse decision is rendered and thereupon blame his counsel for incompetence."
• "Indeed, how could there be an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim at that instance? Petitioner’s bare assertions that the victim slapped him, poked a handgun at him, and threatened to 'salvage' him were not duly proved by the evidence for the defense."

• US v. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74 (1916) — Cited as an example of gross negligence where counsel inadvertently substituted a plea of guilty for an earlier plea of not guilty, warranting a new trial.
• Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, 320 Phil. 456 (1995) — Cited as an example of gross negligence where the failure to file an appellant's brief was due to sheer irresponsibility of counsel, warranting reinstatement of the appeal.
• De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, 256 SCRA 171 (1996) — Cited as an example of gross negligence where counsel filed a demurrer despite denied leave, precluding the presentation of evidence, warranting remand.
• Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 543 (1997) — Cited as an example of gross negligence where counsel abandoned the accused without explanation, warranting a new trial.
• People v. Bascuiguin, 418 Phil. 209 (2001) — Cited as an example of invalid arraignment due to incompetent counsel de officio who merely conferred with the accused for a few minutes.

• Article 14, Paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code — Defines treachery (alevosia). Applied to qualify the crime to murder because the sudden attack from behind on a seated victim ensured the execution of the crime without risk to the aggressor.
• Article 13, Paragraph 2, Revised Penal Code — Defines voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance. Not applied because petitioner's surrender was not spontaneous, he having been apprehended after fleeing.
• Article 68, Revised Penal Code — Provides for the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. Applied by the Court of Appeals and affirmed, as petitioner was 17 years, 9 months, and 20 days old at the time of the incident, thereby modifying the imposable penalty.

Panganiban (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ.