Andal vs. People

Habeas corpus does not lie where there is no showing of a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in restraint, no lack of jurisdiction in the sentencing court, and no excessive penalty imposed, the writ being unavailable as a substitute for a second motion for reconsideration of a final judgment.

Petitioners Jurry Andal, Ricardo Andal, and Edwin Mendoza were convicted of rape with homicide in Criminal Case Nos. 148-94 and 149-94 before the Regional Trial Court, Batangas, Branch 05, Lemery. Their conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court en banc on September 25, 1997, with a resolution on February 17, 1998. They were scheduled for execution on June 16, 17, and 18, 1999. The death penalty was prescribed under Republic Act No. 7659 for rape with homicide, amending Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code.

Petitioners Jurry Andal, Ricardo Andal, and Edwin Mendoza were charged with and convicted of rape with homicide before the Regional Trial Court, Batangas, Branch 05, Lemery, in Criminal Case Nos. 148-94 and 149-94. The prosecution's principal witness, Olimpio Corales, a brother-in-law of accused Jurry and Ricardo Andal, identified all three accused. The trial court convicted them and imposed the death penalty.

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction en banc on September 25, 1997, and issued a resolution on February 17, 1998. In its affirmance, the Court ruled that the accused made no confessions or admissions regarding the crime charged, and that the earring recovered from Jurry Andal was obtained through a search incident to a lawful arrest, not during the course of investigation. The defense counsel's failure to present Rufino Andal as a witness did not invalidate the judgment, the case having been decided on the evidence actually presented.

With execution scheduled for June 16, 17, and 18, 1999, petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus, claiming mistrial and asserting that pre-trial identification was conducted without the assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver from the accused. They also sought DNA testing of semen samples to compare with those taken from the victim's vagina, arguing for an objective and scientific basis of identification. The Court found the petition to be, in substance, an attempt at a second motion for reconsideration of a final decision disguised as one for habeas corpus.

• Mistrial and Ouster of Jurisdiction: Petitioners argued that the trial court was "ousted" of jurisdiction to try the case because the pre-trial identification of the accused was made without the assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver, rendering the decision void and warranting habeas corpus.
• Habeas Corpus as Appropriate Remedy: Petitioners relied on Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34, citing Justice Claudio Teehankee's separate opinion that once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the rendering court is deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of detention.
• DNA Testing: Petitioners sought DNA testing of semen samples to compare with those taken from the vagina of the victim, claiming it would provide an objective and scientific basis for identification superior to eyewitness identification.

• Jurisdiction/Mistrial: Whether the trial court was ousted of jurisdiction due to pre-trial identification conducted without counsel, rendering the judgment void and warranting the issuance of habeas corpus.
• DNA Testing: Whether DNA testing should be ordered to compare semen samples with those taken from the victim as a more accurate means of identification.
• Validity of Conviction and Sentence: Whether the conviction and the death penalty were validly imposed.

• Jurisdiction/Mistrial: No. The trial court had jurisdiction; there was no violation of constitutional rights, as the accused made no confessions or admissions, and any illegality in the arrest was cured by their voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction by entering their plea.
• DNA Testing: No. DNA testing was unnecessary, the accused having been properly and duly identified by the prosecution's principal witness, rendering such testing "forgotten evidence too late to consider."
• Validity of Conviction and Sentence: Yes. The conviction and death penalty were valid, the death penalty being what the law prescribes for rape with homicide under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659.

• Jurisdiction/Mistrial: The Court found no constitutional infirmity affecting the conviction. The accused made no confessions or admissions regarding the crime charged. The earring recovered from Jurry Andal was obtained through a search incident to a lawful arrest, not during investigation. Any illegality attendant during the arrest is deemed cured when the accused voluntarily submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court by entering their plea. The absence of testimony from Rufino Andal, due to defense counsel's failure to present him as a witness, did not render the judgment void, as the case was decided on the evidence actually presented, which the Court found sufficient to support the conviction. The petition was viewed as an attempt at a second motion for reconsideration of a final decision disguised as one for habeas corpus.
• DNA Testing: The accused were all properly and duly identified by the prosecution's principal witness, Olimpio Corales. The DNA testing proposed by petitioners was thus unnecessary and constituted "forgotten evidence too late to consider."
• Validity of Conviction and Sentence: The trial court imposed and the Supreme Court affirmed the correct sentence. The death penalty is what the law prescribes in cases involving rape with homicide under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659. The Court stated categorically that every opportunity was provided the accused to prove their innocence, and that the case was conscientiously reviewed.

• Cure of Illegal Arrest by Voluntary Submission — Any illegality attendant during the arrest is deemed cured when the accused voluntarily submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court by entering their plea. The Court applied this doctrine to defeat the claim that the trial court was ousted of jurisdiction, the accused having voluntarily submitted to the court's jurisdiction.
• Scope of Habeas Corpus — The writ of habeas corpus extends to cases where (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess. The Court found none of these grounds present.
• Habeas Corpus Not a Substitute for Motion for Reconsideration — Habeas corpus may not be used as a disguised second motion for reconsideration of a final judgment. The Court characterized the petition as precisely such an attempt.

• "However, in this case, we find that there was no violation of the constitutional rights of the accused and a resultant deprivation of liberty or due process of law. In fact, the petition may be viewed as an attempt at a second motion for reconsideration of a final decision of the Court, disguised as one for habeas corpus." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: habeas corpus does not lie absent a violation of constitutional rights, and cannot serve as a substitute for a second motion for reconsideration of a final judgment.
• "any illegality attendant during the arrest is deemed cured when the accused voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court by entering their plea" — This is the canonical formulation of the doctrine curing illegal arrest through voluntary submission, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.

• Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144 (1987) — Cited by petitioners for the proposition that habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy when deprivation of a constitutional right is shown; the Court acknowledged the principle but found no such deprivation in this case.
• People vs. De Guzman, 224 SCRA 93 — Cited for the doctrine that illegality during arrest is cured by voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction; followed and applied.
• People vs. Lopez Jr., 245 SCRA 95 — Cited in support of the same doctrine on cure of illegal arrest.
• People vs. Rivera, 245 SCRA 421 — Cited in support of the same doctrine on cure of illegal arrest.
• Harden vs. Director of Prisons, 31 Phil. 741 — Cited for the scope of habeas corpus extending to deprivation of constitutional rights, lack of jurisdiction, or excessive penalty.
• Cruz vs. Director of Prisons, 17 Phil. 269 — Cited alongside Harden for the same proposition on the scope of habeas corpus.

• Article VIII, Sections 1 and 5(2), 1987 Constitution — Defines judicial power and the Court's expanded jurisdiction to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. Applied to confirm the Court's authority to entertain the habeas corpus petition.
• Rule 102, Section 1, Revised Rules of Court — Provides that the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of liberty. Applied to define the scope of the writ and the grounds for its issuance.
• Section 11, Republic Act No. 7659 — Prescribes the death penalty for rape with homicide, amending Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code. Applied to confirm the correctness of the sentence imposed.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concurred. Four Justices maintained their position as to the unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 insofar as it prescribes the death penalty for certain heinous crimes; nevertheless, they submitted to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty may be lawfully imposed in proper cases such as the one at bar.