Andal vs. Macaraig

A child born within three hundred days following the dissolution of the marriage is presumed legitimate, and this presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first one hundred twenty days of the three hundred days next preceding the birth of the child.

Mariano Andal is the surviving son of Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueñas. The land in question was given by Eduvigis Macaraig to her son Emiliano by virtue of a donation propter nuptias executed on the occasion of his marriage to Maria Dueñas. The dispute concerns whether Mariano, born after Emiliano's death, is legitimate and thus entitled to inherit the land, or whether the land should revert to Eduvigis as the next of kin entitled to succeed under the law.

Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueñas were married, and on the occasion of their marriage, Emiliano's mother, Eduvigis Macaraig, executed a donation propter nuptias in his favor over a parcel of land in barrio Talacop, Calabanga, Camarines Sur. Emiliano possessed the land from 1938 until 1942, when Eduvigis entered it. Emiliano became sick of tuberculosis in January 1941, and his brother Felix went to live in his house to help him work his farm. His condition worsened, and on or about September 10, 1942, he became so weak that he could hardly move and get up from his bed. On that same day, Maria Dueñas eloped with Felix, and both went to live in the house of Maria's father until the middle of 1943. Since May 1942, Felix and Maria had sexual intercourse and treated each other as husband and wife. On January 1, 1943, Emiliano died without the presence of his wife, who did not even attend his funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria Dueñas gave birth to a boy named Mariano Andal.

Mariano Andal, assisted by his mother as guardian ad litem, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur for the recovery of the ownership and possession of the land. The complaint alleged that Mariano is the surviving son of Emiliano and Maria; that Emiliano died on September 24, 1942; that Emiliano owned the land by virtue of the donation propter nuptias; and that Eduvigis entered the land in 1942, taking advantage of the abnormal situation then prevailing. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring Mariano the legitimate son of Emiliano and entitled to inherit the land, declaring Mariano owner of the land, and ordering the defendant to pay costs. The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court on the plea that only questions of law are involved.

• Legitimacy and Inheritance: The plaintiffs alleged that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueñas; that Emiliano owned the land by virtue of the donation propter nuptias executed by Eduvigis Macaraig in his favor; and that Eduvigis entered the land in 1942, taking advantage of the abnormal situation then prevailing. They sought recovery of the ownership and possession of the land.

• Reverter of the Land: The defendant's position, as framed by the Court, was that if the son born to the couple is not deemed legitimate, then the land should revert back to Eduvigis Macaraig as the next of kin entitled to succeed him under the law. The defendant appealed on the plea that only questions of law are involved.

• Legitimacy of the Child: Whether Mariano Andal, born on June 17, 1943, after the death of Emiliano Andal on January 1, 1943, can be considered the legitimate son of Emiliano Andal.

• Legitimacy of the Child: Yes. The child was born within three hundred days following the dissolution of the marriage, so the presumption of legitimacy under Article 108 of the Civil Code applies, and it was not rebutted by proof of physical impossibility of access during the first one hundred twenty days of the three hundred days next preceding the birth of the child.

• Legitimacy of the Child: Article 108 of the Civil Code presumes legitimate children born within three hundred days following the dissolution of the marriage, and this presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first one hundred twenty days of the three hundred days next preceding the birth of the child. Since the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano died on January 1, 1943, the child was born within three hundred days following the dissolution of the marriage. No evidence was presented that Emiliano was absent during the initial period of conception, particularly the period between August 21, 1942 and September 10, 1942, which falls within the first one hundred twenty days of the three hundred days preceding the birth. On the contrary, Emiliano and his wife were still living under the marital roof during that period. Even if Felix and Maria were indulging in illicit intercourse since May 1942, that does not preclude cohabitation between Emiliano and his wife. Tuberculosis and physical weakness do not prevent carnal intercourse, as experience shows that persons suffering from this sickness can perform the carnal act even in the most crucial stage. There was no evidence of impotency that is patent, continuing and incurable, nor of imprisonment. The presumption of legitimacy was therefore not overcome. The same result follows under Section 68, par. (c) of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, which presumes the issue of a wife cohabiting with a husband who is not impotent to be legitimate if born within three hundred days following the dissolution of the marriage. The fact that Maria Dueñas committed adultery cannot overcome the presumption of legitimacy.

• Presumption of Legitimacy — Under Article 108 of the Civil Code, children born after the one hundred eighty days next following the celebration of marriage, or within the three hundred days next following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses, are presumed legitimate. The presumption may be rebutted only by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first one hundred twenty days of the three hundred days next preceding the birth of the child. In this case, the child was born within three hundred days of the dissolution of the marriage by the husband's death, and no proof of physical impossibility of access was presented.

• Physical Impossibility of Access — Per Manresa, impossibility of access by the husband to the wife includes (1) absence during the initial period of conception, (2) impotence which is patent, continuing and incurable, and (3) imprisonment, unless it can be shown that cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison regulations. None of these circumstances was established in this case; tuberculosis and physical weakness, without more, do not constitute physical impossibility of access.

• Adultery Does Not Rebut the Presumption — The fact that the wife committed adultery does not overcome the presumption of legitimacy of the child born within the statutory period. The presumption can only be rebutted by clear proof of physical or natural impossibility of carnal intercourse between the spouses.

• "Children born after the one hundred and eighty days next following that of the celebration of marriage or within the three hundred days next following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. This presumption may be rebutted only by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred next preceding the birth of the child." — This is the controlling statutory presumption under Article 108 of the Civil Code, which the Court applied to the facts of the case.

• "Impossibility of access by husband to wife would include (1) absence during the initial period of conception, (2) impotence which is patent, continuing and incurable, and (3) imprisonment, unless it can be shown that cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison regulations." — This passage, quoting Manresa, defines the exclusive grounds for rebutting the presumption of legitimacy.

• "We admit that Emiliano was already suffering from tuberculosis and his condition then was so serious that he could hardly move and get up from bed, his feet were swollen and his voice hoarse. But experience shows that this does not prevent carnal intercourse." — This passage states the Court's application of the rule to the facts, holding that tuberculosis does not constitute physical impossibility of access.

• "The presumption of legitimacy under the Civil Code in favor of the child has not, therefore, been overcome." — This is the ratio decidendi: the presumption stood because none of the grounds for rebuttal was proven.

• Manresa, Commentaries on the Civil Code, Vol. I, pp. 492–500 — Cited as authority defining the scope of physical impossibility of access, enumerating absence, patent and incurable impotence, and imprisonment as the exclusive grounds.
• Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. I, p. 90 — Cited in support of the Manresa formulation of impossibility of access.
• Tolentino, Commentaries on the Civil Code, Vol. I, p. 92 — Cited for the proposition that the wife's adultery does not overcome the presumption of legitimacy.

• Article 108, Civil Code — Establishes the presumption of legitimacy for children born within three hundred days following the dissolution of the marriage, rebuttable only by proof of physical impossibility of access during the first one hundred twenty days of the three hundred days preceding birth. Applied to hold Mariano Andal legitimate.
• Section 68, par. (c), Rule 123, Rules of Court — Provides that the issue of a wife cohabiting with a husband who is not impotent is indisputably presumed legitimate if born within three hundred days following the dissolution of the marriage. Applied as an alternative basis for the same conclusion.

Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes and Jugo, JJ., concurred.