Ancheta vs. Ancheta

A Rule 47 petition to annul a final order on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person need not allege that ordinary remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner; such a void order may be assailed at any time unless barred by laches. Substituted service of summons, being extraordinary, must strictly comply with Rule 14, including a statement of the impossibility of prompt personal service and the efforts made to locate the defendant.

Marietta B. Ancheta and Rodolfo S. Ancheta were spouses married on March 5, 1959, and had eight children during their coverture. Their dispute implicated the State’s constitutional and statutory interest in marriage as an inviolable social institution, particularly Article 48 of the Family Code, which governs state participation in annulment and declaration of nullity cases. The procedural remedy at issue is Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows annulment of a final judgment or order of the RTC on grounds of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction.

Marietta B. Ancheta and Rodolfo S. Ancheta were married on March 5, 1959, and resided in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. They had eight children during their coverture, including Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III. On December 6, 1992, Rodolfo left the conjugal home and abandoned Marietta and their children. On January 25, 1994, Marietta filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 40, against Rodolfo for dissolution of their conjugal partnership and judicial separation of property, with a plea for support and support pendente lite; the case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-3735. At that time, Marietta was renting a house at No. 72 CRM Avenue corner CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila.

On April 20, 1994, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement under which some conjugal properties were adjudicated to Marietta and her eight children, including a parcel of land at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, registered in the name of the family Ancheta Biofood Corporation under TCT No. 310882, together with the resort Munting Paraiso, Training Center, four-storey building, pavilion, swimming pool, and all improvements. All shares of stock of Ancheta Biofoods Corporation were distributed one-third to Marietta and one-twelfth each to the eight children. The court rendered judgment based on the Compromise Agreement. On June 1, 1994, Rodolfo vacated the resort Munting Paraiso and all buildings and improvements thereon; thereafter, with Rodolfo’s knowledge, Marietta resided in the property.

Rodolfo intended to marry again. On June 5, 1995, he filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15, for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Marietta on the ground of psychological incapacity; the case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. NC-662. Although Rodolfo knew that Marietta was already residing at the resort Munting Paraiso in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, he alleged in his petition that she was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue corner CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, “where she may be served with summons.” The clerk of court issued summons to Marietta at the address stated in the petition. On June 6, 1995, the sheriff served the summons and a copy of the petition by substituted service on Marietta’s son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, at his residence in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite. On June 21, 1995, Sheriff Jose R. Salvadora, Jr. submitted a Return of Service stating that the summons and a copy of the petition were served on Marietta through her son Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III on June 6, 1995.

Marietta failed to file an answer. On June 22, 1995, Rodolfo filed an “Ex-Parte Motion to Declare Defendant as in Default,” setting it for hearing on June 27, 1995. At the hearing, no one appeared for Marietta; the public prosecutor appeared for the State and offered no objection to the motion, while Rodolfo appeared with counsel. The trial court granted the motion, declared Marietta in default, and allowed Rodolfo to adduce evidence ex-parte. Rodolfo testified and adduced documentary evidence. On July 7, 1995, the trial court issued an Order granting the petition and declaring the marriage of the parties void ab initio. The clerk of court issued a Certificate of Finality on July 16, 1996. On February 14, 1998, Rodolfo and Teresita H. Rodil were married in civil rites before the municipal mayor of Indang, Cavite.

On July 7, 2000, Marietta filed a verified petition with the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court for annulment of the RTC Order in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662; the case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59550. She alleged that Rodolfo committed gross misrepresentations by making it appear that she resided in Las Piñas when he knew she was residing at Munting Paraiso, Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, to deprive her of her right to be heard and to secure a favorable judgment without opposition. She also alleged that Rodolfo caused the service of the petition and summons on her by substituted service through their married son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, a resident of Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, and that Venancio failed to deliver to her the copy of the petition and summons. Marietta contended that the RTC Order was null and void for lack of jurisdiction over her person and extrinsic fraud, and that there was no factual basis for the finding of psychological incapacity. She averred that she learned of the RTC Order only on January 11, 2000. Appended to the petition were the affidavits of Marietta and Venancio. In his affidavit, Venancio stated that he had been residing on the adjoining land in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite since his father started staying at Munting Paraiso; on June 6, 1995, at his residence, his father asked him to sign papers that he was not allowed to read, apparently the summons to his mother, and he was not given any copy of the summons or complaint.

• Rule 47 — Lack of Jurisdiction: Petitioner argued that the RTC Order was null and void for lack of jurisdiction over her person because the summons and complaint were not served on her; substituted service on her son was improper and he did not deliver the papers to her.
• Extrinsic Fraud: Petitioner alleged that Rodolfo committed gross misrepresentations by stating she resided in Las Piñas despite knowing she resided at Munting Paraiso, Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, to deprive her of her right to be heard.
• No Factual Basis for Psychological Incapacity: Petitioner contended that there was no factual basis for the trial court’s finding that she suffered from psychological incapacity.
• Procedural Errors by the Court of Appeals: Petitioner alleged that the CA erred in failing to consider the kind of order sought to be annulled, in finding the petition procedurally flawed, in not finding substantial compliance with Rule 47, in failing to comply with Section 5, Rule 47, in not considering or admitting the amended petition, and in failing to apply the Rules liberally.
• State Participation in Annulment: In her amended petition, petitioner alleged that the order was null and void for failure to order the public prosecutor to investigate collusion and the Solicitor General to appear for the State.

• Rule 47 — Lack of Jurisdiction: Whether a Rule 47 petition grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant must allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, or petition for relief are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
• Substituted Service of Summons: Whether the substituted service of summons on petitioner’s son validly conferred jurisdiction over petitioner’s person.
• Dismissal and Amended Petition: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the original Rule 47 petition and in denying admission of the amended petition.
• State Participation in Annulment: Whether the trial court and public prosecutor complied with Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court in the annulment proceedings.

• Rule 47 — Lack of Jurisdiction: No. A Rule 47 petition based on lack of jurisdiction over the person need not allege that ordinary remedies are no longer available through no fault; a void judgment may be assailed anytime unless barred by laches.
• Substituted Service of Summons: No. The substituted service was invalid; the sheriff’s return did not state impossibility of prompt personal service or efforts to locate petitioner, and the son was not given copies, so the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her person.
• Dismissal and Amended Petition: Yes. The Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the original petition and denying admission of the amended petition; the petition stated a sufficient cause of action for nullification on lack of jurisdiction.
• State Participation in Annulment: No. The trial court and public prosecutor failed to comply with Article 48 and the no-default rule; the prosecutor offered no objection to default and the court received ex-parte evidence without requiring collusion investigation or Solicitor General participation.

• Rule 47 — Lack of Jurisdiction: Rule 47 permits annulment of an RTC judgment or final order in civil actions on two grounds: extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction. If based on extrinsic fraud, the remedy is subject to a condition precedent: the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. The petitioner must allege this and explain and justify the failure to avail of such remedies. If based on lack of jurisdiction over the person or over the nature or subject of the action, however, no such allegation is required, because a judgment rendered or final order issued without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed at any time, collaterally or directly, unless barred by laches. Here, the original and amended petitions did not state a cause of action for annulment on extrinsic fraud because they failed to explain why ordinary remedies were not availed of. They did, however, state a sufficient cause of action for annulment on lack of jurisdiction over Marietta’s person, since she alleged that the summons and complaint were not served on her. The CA therefore erred in dismissing the petition on the ground that the ordinary remedies were not alleged as unavailable.

• Substituted Service of Summons: Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired either by voluntary appearance and submission to the court’s authority or by service of summons. Service of summons and complaint informs the defendant that a case has been filed and enables the defendant to defend; without valid service, in the absence of a valid waiver, the judgment is null and void. Knowledge of the case does not confer jurisdiction. Personal service is the usual mode; substituted service is extraordinary and may be used only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time despite diligent efforts. The proof of service must state the efforts made to find and personally serve the defendant and the fact that such efforts failed. In this case, the summons was issued on June 6, 1995 and served on the same day on Marietta’s son Venancio at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite. The sheriff’s Return of Service filed on June 21, 1995 did not state any impossibility of locating Marietta within a reasonable time or any effort to locate her. It did not state that Venancio resided at the Las Piñas address where Marietta was allegedly residing. Venancio actually resided at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite; his father merely showed him the summons and complaint and had him sign the summons, and he was not furnished copies. The substituted service was therefore invalid, and the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over Marietta’s person.

• Dismissal and Amended Petition: The CA dismissed the original petition for failure to allege that ordinary remedies were no longer available through no fault of petitioner. That defect affected only the extrinsic fraud ground. Because the petition also alleged lack of jurisdiction over the person, the CA should not have dismissed it. The amended petition did not cure the extrinsic fraud defect, but it also did not remove the lack-of-jurisdiction ground. The original petition and its annexes were prima facie meritorious and stated a sufficient cause of action for nullification on lack of jurisdiction. The CA acted arbitrarily in dismissing the original petition and in denying admission of the amended petition. The Rule 47 action does not involve the merits of the final order of the trial court; the CA should have given the petition due course.

• State Participation in Annulment: Article 48 of the Family Code requires the court, in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, to order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to ensure that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. No judgment may be based on a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment. Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) prohibits defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or legal separation; if the defendant fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether collusion exists and, if none, to intervene for the State. Republic vs. Court of Appeals further requires the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State and the Solicitor General to issue a certification. Here, the trial court declared Marietta in default, allowed Rodolfo to present evidence ex-parte, and rendered judgment, while the public prosecutor offered no objection. This was in defiance of Article 48 and the no-default rule. Marriage is an inviolable social institution in which the State is vitally interested; its protection requires vigilant and zealous participation, not pro-forma compliance, and a default annulment is fraught with the danger of collusion.

• Rule 47 Annulment of Judgment — Grounds and Condition Precedent — An original action in the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 to annul a judgment, final order, or resolution of the RTC in civil actions may be based on two grounds: (a) extrinsic fraud; or (b) lack of jurisdiction. If based on extrinsic fraud, the remedy is subject to a condition precedent: the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. The petitioner must allege this and explain and justify the failure to avail of such remedies. If based on lack of jurisdiction over the person or over the nature or subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege that ordinary remedies are no longer available; a void judgment may be assailed at any time, collaterally or directly, unless barred by laches. The Court applied this by holding that the CA erred in dismissing the petition because it also alleged lack of jurisdiction over Marietta’s person.

• Substituted Service of Summons — Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired by voluntary appearance or by valid service of summons. Substituted service is extraordinary and must be strictly followed; it is allowed only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time despite diligent efforts. The proof of service must state the efforts made to find and personally serve the defendant and the fact that such efforts failed. Service may be effected by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with a person of suitable age and discretion residing therein, or at the defendant’s office or regular place of business with a competent person in charge. Knowledge of the case does not confer jurisdiction. The Court applied this by invalidating the substituted service on Marietta’s son because the return did not show impossibility or efforts, the son did not reside at the stated address, and he was not given copies.

• State Participation in Annulment and Nullity of Marriage — Article 48 of the Family Code requires the court to order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal to appear on behalf of the State in all annulment or declaration of absolute nullity cases to prevent collusion and to ensure that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed; no judgment may be based on stipulation of facts or confession of judgment. The no-default rule prohibits default in annulment or legal separation cases; if the defendant fails to answer, the court must order the prosecuting attorney to investigate collusion and intervene for the State. Republic vs. Court of Appeals requires the Solicitor General to appear and certify. The Court applied this by finding that the trial court and public prosecutor failed to comply when Marietta was declared in default and judgment was rendered ex-parte.

• Marriage as an Inviolable Social Institution — Marriage is not a mere contract but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested; the Constitution commits to strengthening the family as a basic social institution. The preservation of marriage is not the concern of the family members alone, and its break-up weakens the social and moral fabric. The Court applied this by stressing that protecting marriage requires vigilant and zealous participation, not mere pro-forma compliance, and that a default annulment is fraught with the danger of collusion.

• "In a case where a petition for the annulment of a judgment or final order of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available through no fault of her own." — This states the ratio decidendi distinguishing the lack-of-jurisdiction ground from the extrinsic-fraud ground under Rule 47.
• "This is so because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches." — This explains why no condition precedent applies to a Rule 47 petition grounded on lack of jurisdiction.
• "It has been held that substituted service of summons is a method extraordinary in character; hence, may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances categorized by statutes." — This is the Court’s canonical statement on the strictness required for substituted service of summons.
• "A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed." — This states the rationale for the State’s mandatory participation in annulment and nullity cases.

• Paramount Insurance Corporation vs. Japzon, 211 SCRA 879 (1992) — Cited for the rule that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired either by voluntary appearance and submission to the court’s authority or by service of summons; without valid service, the judgment is null and void.
• Umandap vs. Sabio, Jr., 339 SCRA 243 (2000) — Cited for the rule that jurisdiction cannot be acquired over the defendant’s person even if the defendant knows of the case unless the defendant is validly served with summons.
• United Coconut Planters Bank vs. Ongpin, 368 SCRA 464 (2001) — Cited to support the same principle that valid service of summons is required for jurisdiction over the person.
• Miranda vs. Court of Appeals, 326 SCRA 278 (2000) — Cited for the rule that the modes of service must be strictly followed and that substituted service is proper only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time, with the proof of service stating the efforts made and their failure.
• Keister vs. Navarro, 77 SCRA 209 (1977) — Cited for the principle that substituted service is extraordinary and may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances categorized by statutes.
• Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198 (1997) — Cited for the guidelines on Article 48 of the Family Code, including the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State and the Solicitor General’s certification.
• Malcampo-Sin vs. Sin, 355 SCRA 285 (2001) — Cited as reiterating the pronouncement in Republic vs. Court of Appeals regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General.
• Tuason vs. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 158 (1996) — Cited for the principle that marriage is an inviolable social institution and that the State has a vital interest in its preservation.
• Pacquing vs. Court of Appeals, 115 SCRA 117 (1982) — Cited for the rule that a judgment rendered without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed at any time.
• Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 635 (1989) — Cited for the qualification that a void judgment may be assailed at any time unless barred by laches.
• Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 352 SCRA 235 (2001) — Cited for the Rule 47 condition precedent that a petitioner who fails to avail of ordinary remedies through her own fault or negligence cannot resort to Rule 47.

• Rule 47, Sections 1 and 3, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Rule 47 allows annulment of a judgment, final order, or resolution of the RTC in civil actions on grounds of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction. Section 3 provides that if based on extrinsic fraud, the action must be filed within four years from discovery; if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel. The Court applied this by holding that the lack-of-jurisdiction ground does not require the allegation that ordinary remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner.
• Rule 14, Sections 6 and 7, Rules of Court — Section 6 governs personal service of summons; Section 7 governs substituted service, which is allowed if, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time, by leaving copies at the defendant’s residence with a person of suitable age and discretion residing therein or at the defendant’s office or regular place of business with a competent person in charge. The Court applied this by finding the substituted service invalid because the return did not show impossibility or diligent efforts and the son was not given copies.
• Article 48, Family Code — In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal to appear on behalf of the State to prevent collusion and to ensure that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed; no judgment shall be based on a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment. The Court applied this by finding that the trial court and public prosecutor failed to comply when the case proceeded by default and ex-parte evidence.
• Rule 18, Section 6, 1985 Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e], 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) — No defaults are allowed in actions for annulment of marriage or legal separation; if the defendant fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether collusion exists and, if none, to intervene for the State to see that the evidence is not fabricated. The Court applied this by holding that the trial court improperly declared Marietta in default.
• Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC (effective March 15, 2003) — This administrative matter modified the procedure for annulment and nullity cases; Sections 8 and 9 provide that if the respondent fails to file an answer, the court shall not declare the respondent in default but shall order the public prosecutor to investigate collusion, with the public prosecutor submitting a report. The Court cited it as the modified procedure, although the events in the case predated its effectivity.

Justice Quisumbing (Acting Chairman), Justice Austria-Martinez, and Justice Tinga concurred. Justice Puno (Chairman) was on leave.