Anastacio vs. Heirs of Coloma

Property acquired during the marriage, even if registered in the name of only one spouse, is presumed conjugal under Article 116 of the Family Code, and its disposition without the written consent of the other spouse or court authority is void under Article 124. The presumption was not overcome by title registration in Juan's name alone or by an uncorroborated claim of exclusive ownership by succession, especially where the title history showed acquisition by sale during the marriage.

Juan F. Coloma and Juliana Parazo were spouses whose marriage subsisted when Transfer Certificate of Title No. 56899 was issued in the name of Juan married to Juliana on January 14, 1965. In 1965 the prevailing property regime between husband and wife was the conjugal partnership of gains, made applicable by Article 105 of the Family Code to partnerships already established before its effectivity. Both spouses are now deceased, leaving Rudy P. Coloma and Marcela C. Reyes as legitimate heirs.

Juan F. Coloma was the registered owner since January 14, 1965 of a 19,247-square-meter parcel in San Jose, Tarlac covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 56899, which carried the inscription of his marriage to Juliana Parazo. Both spouses died in August 2006, Juliana on August 17 and Juan on August 26, leaving Rudy P. Coloma and Marcela C. Reyes as legitimate heirs. The subject property was in the possession of Spouses Romeo Anastacio, Sr. and Norma T. Anastacio.

According to respondents, petitioners held possession by mere tolerance of their parents, and after the parents' demise respondents demanded surrender of possession. When petitioners refused, respondents filed a case for recovery of possession and title before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Ignacia, Tarlac, docketed as Civil Case No. 645-SJ (07). In their Answer, petitioners claimed ownership by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 7, 2004 allegedly executed by Juan during his lifetime, and on account of that ownership claim the MCTC dismissed the case without prejudice to filing with the proper court.

Thereafter respondents filed before the Regional Trial Court the Complaint for Annulment of Document, Recovery of Ownership and Possession with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction, alleging the deed was void because Juan's signature thereon was forged and because Juliana gave no conformity or consent to the sale. Petitioners maintained ownership under the same deed, alleging they paid Juan P100,000.00 as first payment in 2003 and P260,000.00 upon execution of the deed, apart from P100,000.00 spent for Juan's wake and burial, and that Juliana's consent was unnecessary because the property was Juan's sole property inherited from paternal ancestors and the spouses had long been separated from bed and board. The Pre-Trial Order dated March 6, 2009 recorded stipulations that Juan died on August 26, 2006, Juliana died on August 17, 2006, the property was registered by Juan married to Juliana in 1965, and it was registered during the spouses' lifetime.

At trial respondents presented handwriting expert PO3 Leslie Ramales, who testified that the questioned signature of Juan on the Deed of Absolute Sale and Juan's standard signatures were not written by one and the same person. Petitioners presented Carmelita Palma, who testified she had been Juan's paramour since 1978 and that Juan mortgaged and subsequently sold the property to petitioners, corroborated by petitioner Romeo Anastacio who testified the property was mortgaged to him by Juan in 2003 for P100,000.00 and sold in 2004 for P260,000.00. The RTC found the evidence failed to establish falsification and held the property was Juan's exclusive property not requiring Juliana's consent, dismissing the complaint; on appeal the CA found the questioned signature utterly dissimilar from Juan's customary signatures on the Catulagan Panggep Ti Salda and Voter Registration Record, held the property presumptively conjugal and acquired by sale from Laurelio Valete during the marriage, rejected the undated unsigned handwritten breakdown of payments as not credible, and found petitioners not in good faith.

• Burden of Proof: Petitioner argued that respondents, having alleged conjugal ownership in the Complaint, bore the burden to prove the property was owned by both Juan and Juliana.
• Conclusive Title Presumption: Petitioner maintained that TCT No. 56899 presents a conclusive presumption that the land was the capital of and owned exclusively by Juan, and that the phrase married to Juliana was merely descriptive of civil status.
• Validity of Sale Without Spousal Consent: Petitioner argued that the Deed of Absolute Sale was valid and Juliana's consent was not required because the property was Juan's exclusive property inherited from paternal ancestors and the spouses had long been separated from bed and board.
• Forgery and Notarial Regularity: Petitioner contended that the CA erred in declaring Juan's signature a forgery and in denying the deed the presumption of regularity in notarization and execution.
• Good Faith Acquisition: Petitioner raised as an issue that the CA erred in declaring petitioners were not in good faith, but no elaboration of that argument appeared in the Discussion portion of the Petition.

• Possession by Tolerance: Respondent countered that the subject property was under petitioners' possession by mere tolerance of their parents, and surrender was demanded upon the parents' demise.
• Forgery: Respondent argued that the signature of Juan appearing on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 7, 2004 was a forgery, supported by handwriting expert testimony that it and Juan's standard signatures were not written by one and the same person.
• Absence of Spousal Consent: Respondent maintained that the alleged sale was void for lack of conformity or consent of Juliana, the property having been registered in 1965 during the marriage in the name of Juan married to Juliana.

• Forgery: Whether the CA erred when it declared Juan's signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 7, 2004 a forgery.
• Presumption of Regularity: Whether the CA erred in declaring that the Deed of Absolute Sale does not carry the presumption of regularity in its notarization and execution.
• Conjugal Character: Whether the CA erred in declaring that the subject property is the conjugal property of the late spouses Juan and Juliana.
• Good Faith: Whether the CA erred in declaring that petitioners were not in good faith in acquiring the subject property from Juan.

• Forgery: Not ruled upon as inconsequential; even if genuine, the sale would remain void for lack of spousal consent.
• Presumption of Regularity: Not ruled upon as inconsequential; even if notarization were regular, regularity could not validate a void disposition.
• Conjugal Character: No. The property was conjugal, acquisition during the marriage having been stipulated and the Article 116 presumption not rebutted by strong, clear and convincing evidence.
• Good Faith: Affirmed as decided against petitioners. No direct refutation was offered, no alternative prayer for refund was made, and the payment list was self-serving.

• Forgery: Resolution of forgery was deemed unnecessary because nullity was already established on the conjugal ground. The sale's invalidity did not depend on genuineness of Juan's signature, since a genuine signature without Juliana's consent would still yield a void disposition.
• Presumption of Regularity: The same necessity rationale applied to notarization. Overturning the CA on regularity would not validate the transaction, the defect being substantive absence of authority or consent rather than formal irregularity.
• Conjugal Character: Proof of acquisition during the marriage is the condition sine qua non for the Article 116 presumption, and respondents laid that predicate through pre-trial stipulations and TCT No. 56899 showing registration in 1965 during the spouses' marriage. Once invoked, the presumption that property acquired during marriage, whether registered in one or both spouses, is conjugal stands until overcome, without need to prove acquisition with conjugal funds. Petitioners' reliance on registration in Juan's name alone bolstered rather than defeated the presumption, and their succession claim was belied by inscriptions on TCT No. 56899 and TCT No. 53369 showing cancellation by virtue of sale by Laurelio Valete in favor of Juan. No proof under Article 109 was made, the first three exclusive-property instances being inapplicable and the fourth — purchase with exclusive money — being unprovable through Palma, who became Juan's partner only in 1978 after the 1965 acquisition. Absent strong, clear and convincing evidence of exclusivity, Article 124 required Juliana's written consent or court authority, and separation from bed and board did not exempt the disposition, Juan's recourse being court authority. Without such consent, the disposition was void, construable only as a continuing offer that became ineffective upon the deaths of Juliana on August 17, 2006 and Juan on August 26, 2006 before acceptance, pursuant to Article 1323 of the Civil Code.
• Good Faith: Upholding was required in the absence of direct refutation in the Petition's Discussion, petitioners apparently treating the issue as redundant if conjugal character were overturned. In any event, no alternative recovery was prayed, only dismissal and damages, and the handwritten breakdown totaling P525,000.00 was undated, unsigned by Juan, self-serving, and included P40,000.00 for jeep overhauling and P125,000.00 given during Juan's wake in 2005 and 2006 after the alleged 2004 sale. Consistent with the CA's application of Fuentes vs. Roca, only buyers in good faith may recover payments chargeable against the estate, and awareness of the spouses' separation imposed a duty to inquire into Juan's authority, negating good faith.

• Conjugal presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code — All property acquired during the marriage, whether acquisition appears made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed conjugal unless the contrary is proved. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is the condition sine qua non for the presumption; it is unnecessary to prove acquisition with conjugal funds, and the presumption applies even when the manner of acquisition does not appear. Here stipulations and title established 1965 acquisition during marriage, triggering the presumption.
• Rebuttal requires strong, clear and convincing evidence of exclusive property under Article 109 — To overcome the presumption, the claimant must prove the property falls under Article 109: (1) brought to the marriage as his or her own; (2) acquired during marriage by gratuitous title; (3) acquired by right of redemption, barter or exchange with property of only one spouse; or (4) purchased with exclusive money of the wife or husband. Registration in one spouse's name alone does not suffice, and in this case succession was disproved by sale inscriptions and exclusive-money purchase was chronologically impossible on Palma's testimony.
• Void disposition of conjugal property without consent under Article 124 of the Family Code — Powers of administration do not include disposition or encumbrance without court authority or written consent of the other spouse; absent such authority or consent the disposition is void, though construed as a continuing offer by the consenting spouse and third person perfectible upon acceptance by the other spouse or court authorization before withdrawal. Separation from bed and board does not dispense with consent, the proper recourse being court authority.
• Termination of continuing offer upon death under Article 1323 of the Civil Code — An offer becomes ineffective upon death, civil interdiction, insanity or insolvency of either party before acceptance is conveyed. Thus the Article 124 continuing offer became ineffective upon Juliana's death on August 17, 2006 and Juan's death on August 26, 2006 without consent having been given.
• Review of factual findings in Rule 45 when RTC and CA conflict — Only questions of law may generally be raised in a Rule 45 petition, but conflict in factual findings of the RTC and CA is an admitted exception permitting review. The four issues, though factual, were therefore considered.
• Good-faith buyer recovery for void spousal sale — Only buyers in good faith are allowed recovery of payments for land sold without the deceased seller's spouse's consent, chargeable against the latter's estate. Awareness that spouses were separated from bed and board negates good faith for failure to inquire into authority to sell, as applied through Fuentes vs. Roca.

• "ART. 116. All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.(160a)" — States the controlling statutory presumption that determined the conjugal character of the 1965 acquisition.
• "These powers [of administration] do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerers. (165a)" — Provides the basis for voiding Juan's unilateral sale and for treating it only as an unperfected continuing offer.
• "Under Article 1323 of the Civil Code, an offer becomes ineffective upon the death, civil interdiction, insanity, or insolvency of either party before acceptance is conveyed." — Explains why the continuing offer could no longer materialize after the deaths of Juliana and Juan in August 2006.

• Fuentes vs. Roca, G.R. No. 178902, April 21, 2010, 618 SCRA 702 — Followed by the CA and sustained in effect to hold that only buyers in good faith may recover payments for land sold without spousal consent; petitioners' awareness of separation negated good faith.
• Wong vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70082, August 19, 1991, 200 SCRA 792 — Cited to support that separation from bed and board at the time of disposition did not exempt the sale from the spousal-consent requirement.

• Article 105, Family Code — Makes Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains applicable to partnerships established before the Family Code's effectivity, without prejudice to vested rights; applied to sustain CPG as the regime for the 1965 acquisition.
• Article 116, Family Code — Creates the rebuttable presumption of conjugal ownership for property acquired during marriage; applied because stipulations and TCT No. 56899 proved acquisition during Juan and Juliana's marriage.
• Article 109, Family Code — Enumerates exclusive property of each spouse; applied to test and reject petitioners' claim of Juan's exclusive ownership.
• Article 124, Family Code — Voids disposition or encumbrance of conjugal property without court authority or written spousal consent, saving it only as a continuing offer; applied to void the Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 7, 2004.
• Article 1323, Civil Code — Renders an offer ineffective upon death of either party before acceptance; applied to extinguish the continuing offer upon the August 2006 deaths.

Peralta, C.J. (Chairperson), Reyes, Jr., J., Lazaro-Javier, J., and Lopez, J. concur.