Ampatuan, Sr. vs. Secretary of Justice

A supplemental motion for reconsideration filed while the first motion for reconsideration is still pending is not a prohibited second motion for reconsideration under the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal, and the Secretary of Justice may accept additional evidence attached thereto without ordering a separate reinvestigation, provided the accused was afforded the opportunity to present counter-affidavits and evidence during the preliminary investigation.

Datu Akmad "Tato" Ampatuan, Sr. (Tato) was the Vice Governor of Maguindanao and a member of the Ampatuan political family. The case arose from the Maguindanao Massacre of November 23, 2009, in which 57 persons — including relatives and supporters of Esmael "Toto" Mangudadatu and numerous journalists — were killed after a convoy en route to file a certificate of candidacy was intercepted at a checkpoint in Ampatuan, Maguindanao. The National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation Detection Group conducted investigations and impleaded over 100 individuals, including Tato, as participants in the killings. The Secretary of Justice exercises power of supervision and control over prosecuting officers under the Revised Administrative Code and the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal, which governs appeals from resolutions of prosecutors in preliminary investigations.

On November 23, 2009, Esmael "Toto" Mangudadatu sent a convoy of about six vehicles to file on his behalf his certificate of candidacy for governor of Maguindanao for the 2010 National and Local Elections. The passengers included his wife, relatives, supporters, lawyers, and numerous journalists. At around 10:00 a.m., the convoy was stopped at a checkpoint in Sitio Malating, Barangay Salman, Ampatuan, Maguindanao, secured by members of the 1508th Provincial Mobile Group. While the inspection was ongoing, a group of heavily armed men, allegedly led by then Maguindanao Mayor Datu Andal "Unsay" Ampatuan, Jr., swooped in and ordered the passengers to step out of their vehicles and lie on the ground. Their personal belongings, laptops, mobile phones, and cameras were taken from them. The passengers were then ordered back into their vehicles, which the armed men drove to the Municipality of Ampatuan, Maguindanao. Gunfire was later heard in Barangay Saniag.

At about 2:30 p.m., military and police were sent to the area, where they spotted the six vehicles and recovered 57 mutilated and mangled corpses bearing multiple gunshot wounds. The bodies were later identified as the passengers of the Mangudadatu convoy. Andal was arrested on November 26, 2009, and inquest proceedings followed. On the same day, the National Bureau of Investigation filed a complaint against Andal for abduction, multiple counts of murder, robbery, and damage to property, which was endorsed to the Department of Justice Panel of Investigating Prosecutors. On November 27, 2009, the DOJ Panel issued a Resolution directing the filing of an information against Andal and the issuance of subpoenas to several others, including Tato.

Tato filed his counter-affidavit, alleging that the affidavit of a certain Kenny Dalandag failed to show his direct or indirect participation in the crime. He claimed that on November 22, 2009, he was at his residence preparing for a medical mission the next day in Mamasapano, Maguindanao, and that on November 23, 2009, he was present at the medical mission at the municipal gymnasium from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. He submitted a joint affidavit by three individuals who were allegedly with him at the gymnasium, as well as photographs of the medical mission. On February 5, 2010, the DOJ Panel issued a Joint Resolution finding probable cause for multiple murder against 103 respondents, including Tato.

Tato filed a Petition for Review with the Secretary of Justice, arguing that he was not impleaded as a respondent in the complaints or affidavits submitted by the NBI and PNP-CIDG, that his name was mentioned only in the sworn statements of Esmael Mangudadatu and Nasser Abdul which were insufficient to establish conspiracy, and that the Dalandag affidavit did not mention him as among those present at the November 22, 2009 planning meeting at Datu Andal Ampatuan, Sr.'s house. On April 16, 2010, Secretary of Justice Alberto C. Agra granted Tato's Petition, finding that he was not present at or near the crime scene and that the Dalandag affidavit did not mention him at the planning meeting, and directed the filing of amended informations excluding Tato.

Several motions for reconsideration were filed, including one by private prosecutors who submitted a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration attaching the affidavit of Abdul Talusan y Ogalingan, which alleged that Tato was present at the November 22, 2009 planning meeting. On May 5, 2010, Secretary Agra reconsidered his earlier resolution and found probable cause against Tato based on the Talusan affidavit, ordering the reinstatement of the criminal informations. Tato filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which denied the petition and affirmed the Secretary of Justice's resolution. The Court of Appeals held that the Secretary of Justice was not precluded from receiving additional evidence on a motion for reconsideration, that the Talusan affidavit was neither new nor additional evidence since it merely corroborated the earlier Dalandag affidavit, and that Tato's right to due process was not violated. Tato's motion for reconsideration was denied. The present petition followed.

During the pendency of the petition, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 221, rendered its decision acquitting Tato on the ground of reasonable doubt. The trial court found that while Tato may have attended meetings discussing the plot to kill, his mere presence and utterances at the meeting did not suffice to establish conspiracy without proof of an overt act in furtherance of the agreed plan, and his attendance at a medical mission on November 23, 2009 showed he did not cling to the agreed plot.

• Prohibited Pleading: Petitioner argued that the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration containing the Talusan affidavit was a prohibited second motion for reconsideration under Section 13 of the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal, and that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in accepting evidence attached to it without ordering a separate reinvestigation.
• Denial of Due Process: Petitioner maintained that he was denied due process because he was not given a copy of the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration or allowed to file a counter-affidavit to controvert the Talusan affidavit.
• No Probable Cause: Petitioner argued that there was no probable cause to charge him with multiple murder, asserting that he was not impleaded in the original complaints, that the Dalandag affidavit did not mention his presence at the November 22, 2009 planning meeting, and that the sworn statements of Esmael Mangudadatu and Nasser Abdul were insufficient to establish conspiracy.
• Alibi: Petitioner alleged that he was at a medical mission in Mamasapano, Maguindanao, on November 23, 2009, from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., supported by a joint affidavit of three witnesses and photographs.
• Questions of Fact in Rule 45 Petition: Respondent Secretary of Justice characterized petitioner's arguments as raising questions of fact, which are improper in a Rule 45 petition; petitioner countered that he also questioned the manner of presenting and weighing evidence, raising legal questions.

• Proper Exercise of Discretion: Respondent Secretary of Justice argued that no grave abuse of discretion attended the May 5, 2010 Resolution, as the Secretary exercised full control and supervision over all prosecutors during preliminary investigation and was not precluded by the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal from receiving further evidence on appeal or motion for reconsideration.
• Not a Prohibited Pleading: Respondent contended that the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration did not rehash issues prior to the resolution of the first Motion for Reconsideration and was not a prohibited second motion for reconsideration.
• No Denial of Due Process: Respondent asserted that petitioner was not denied due process since he was able to file several pleadings raising his defense of alibi, against which the evidence in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration was reviewed, and that the Secretary of Justice can order the filing of an information without another preliminary investigation on the Talusan affidavit.
• Probable Cause Properly Found: Respondent argued that there was probable cause to indict petitioner, that the issue of witness credibility was best weighed at trial, and that state witness Lakmodin Saliao had testified before the RTC that petitioner participated in the planning of the murder and was present at the November 22, 2009 meeting, corroborating the finding of probable cause.
• Matters of Defense: Respondent maintained that petitioner's arguments were matters of defense best addressed during trial, not at the preliminary investigation stage.
• Private Respondents' Position: Respondent Heirs of Mangudadatu et al., Heirs of Betia, and Heirs of Lupogan et al. agreed with the Secretary of Justice, adding that petitioner had been denied bail as of January 9, 2015, and that several witnesses had testified on petitioner's involvement, and that a preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial and not a trial on the merits.

• Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration: Whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in accepting evidence on a supplemental motion for reconsideration without ordering a separate reinvestigation.
• Due Process: Whether petitioner was denied due process on the allegation that he was not allowed to controvert the additional evidence presented in the supplemental motion for reconsideration.
• Probable Cause: Whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion when he found probable cause to indict petitioner for multiple murder based on the supplemental motion for reconsideration.
• Procedural Question: Whether petitioner presents questions of fact in his Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

• Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration: No. The supplemental motion was not a prohibited second motion for reconsideration because it was filed while the first motion for reconsideration was still pending and unacted upon, and the Secretary of Justice had discretion to accept additional evidence without ordering a reinvestigation.
• Due Process: No. Due process was satisfied because petitioner was afforded the opportunity to file his counter-affidavit and submit evidence during the preliminary investigation, and the right to a reinvestigation on the Talusan affidavit is not a statutory or constitutional right but remains within the Secretary of Justice's discretion.
• Probable Cause: No. The Secretary of Justice did not gravely abuse discretion in finding probable cause, as the Talusan affidavit placed petitioner at the November 22, 2009 planning meeting and indicated his apparent agreement to the plan, sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that petitioner probably participated in the crime.
• Procedural Question: No. While petitioner's arguments appeared to raise questions of fact, a closer examination revealed that he also questioned the manner of presenting and weighing evidence and the exercise of the Secretary of Justice's discretion, presenting legal questions proper for review.

• Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration: Section 13 of the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal prohibits second or further motions for reconsideration, the rationale being that such motions are mere reiterations of issues already raised and fully passed upon. However, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration in this case was filed on April 30, 2010, while the first Motion for Reconsideration was still pending and unacted upon. There were no issues to reiterate, and the contents of the Supplemental Motion, if given due weight, would reverse the Secretary of Justice's prior resolution. The Court distinguished this from the situation in Lao vs. Co, where a subsequent motion would have been a mere reiteration of previously raised and resolved issues. Accordingly, the Supplemental Motion was not the prohibited pleading contemplated by Section 13. The Secretary of Justice, exercising supervision and control over prosecutors under the Revised Administrative Code, had the discretion to accept the evidence and determine whether reinvestigation was necessary; the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal requires reinvestigation only if the Secretary "finds it necessary to reinvestigate the case."

• Due Process: The right to a preliminary investigation is a substantive right and a component of due process in criminal justice, as articulated in Duterte vs. Sandiganbayan. However, in that case, the accused were not given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits, constituting a violation. Here, petitioner was able to file his counter-affidavit, the affidavits of his witnesses, and other documentary evidence to prove his defense of alibi. In all stages of the prosecution, including subsequent pleadings before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, petitioner submitted the same evidence. Due process is satisfied when parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their sides. The absence of a reinvestigation on the Talusan affidavit did not violate petitioner's right to preliminary investigation, because the Secretary of Justice has the authority under Rule 112, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to direct the filing of an information without conducting another preliminary investigation, and reinvestigation is necessary only if the Secretary finds it necessary. Petitioner has no statutory or other right to a reinvestigation; it remains solely within the Secretary of Justice's discretion.

• Probable Cause: Probable cause is defined as a sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. The conduct of preliminary investigation and any subsequent finding of probable cause is within the sole discretion of the prosecutor as a purely executive function; courts should not interfere absent grave abuse of discretion. The Talusan affidavit testified that petitioner was present during the planning meeting at Datu Andal Ampatuan, Sr.'s house on November 22, 2009, and that he expressed apparent agreement to the plan to kill Toto Mangudadatu and his companions. This was sufficient for the Secretary of Justice to conclude that it was probable petitioner participated in the massacre. The trial court's eventual acquittal of petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt — for absence of proof of an overt act — did not invalidate the prior finding of probable cause, because a preliminary investigation merely determines probability, not guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Jurisdiction over the case had already transferred to the trial court upon the filing of the information, and any determination of guilt or innocence rested with that court.

• Procedural Question: While petitioner's arguments appeared to raise questions of fact regarding the probative value of evidence, a closer examination revealed that he also questioned the manner of presenting and weighing evidence and the exercise of the Secretary of Justice's discretion in determining probable cause. These presented legal questions that the Court could properly resolve. The Court noted that the petition was rendered moot by petitioner's acquittal, but resolved the legal questions nonetheless because they would otherwise remain unanswered.

• Nature of Preliminary Investigation — A preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial and is not the venue for an exhaustive display of evidence. It seeks only to determine if there is reasonable ground to believe a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty and should be held for trial. It does not determine guilt beyond reasonable doubt. A subsequent acquittal by the trial court does not necessarily invalidate a prior finding of probable cause.

• Secretary of Justice's Power of Supervision and Control — Under the Revised Administrative Code, the Secretary of Justice exercises supervision and control over all prosecutors, including the authority to affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify their rulings. The Secretary may, motu proprio, reverse or modify resolutions of provincial or city prosecutors without a pending motion from either party, and may direct the filing of an information without conducting another preliminary investigation. Reinvestigation is necessary only if the Secretary "finds it necessary to reinvestigate the case."

• Prohibition on Second Motions for Reconsideration Under the 2000 NPS Rule — Section 13 of the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal prohibits second or further motions for reconsideration, the rationale being that such motions are mere reiterations of previously raised and resolved issues. However, a supplemental motion for reconsideration filed while the first motion is still pending and unacted upon is not a prohibited second motion, as there are no issues to reiterate.

• Due Process in Preliminary Investigation — The right to a preliminary investigation is a substantive right and a component of due process in criminal justice. Due process is satisfied when parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy. The accused has no statutory or constitutional right to a reinvestigation on additional evidence presented on a motion for reconsideration; this remains within the Secretary of Justice's discretion.

• Probable Cause Defined — Probable cause is a sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. Its determination is a purely executive function within the sole discretion of the prosecutor, and courts should not interfere absent grave abuse of discretion.

• "The finding of probable cause in a preliminary investigation is within the sole discretion of the prosecution. Courts should not interfere absent any grave abuse of discretion." — This opening passage frames the entire decision's analytical framework, establishing the standard of review for the Secretary of Justice's determination.

• "A preliminary investigation is not the venue to exhaust the parties' arguments, nor is it the tribunal that determines the guilt and innocence of the accused. It merely determines whether there was a probability that the accused committed the crime." — This passage articulates the fundamental distinction between preliminary investigation and trial, explaining why acquittal does not invalidate a prior finding of probable cause.

• "What private respondents submitted to the Secretary of Justice, however, was a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, not a second motion for reconsideration. At the time, the first Motion for Reconsideration was still pending and unacted upon. There were yet no issues to reiterate." — This is the ratio decidendi for the first issue, distinguishing a supplemental motion from a prohibited second motion for reconsideration.

• "Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy." — This formulation of the due process standard in preliminary investigation is the controlling principle applied to reject petitioner's claim of deprivation.

• Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership vs. Velasco, 324 Phil. 483 (1996) — Cited for the principle that second motions for reconsideration are disfavored and that piece-meal impugnation of a judgment by successive motions is anathema. The Court discussed this to explain the rationale behind the prohibition in Section 13 of the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal, but distinguished it on the ground that the Supplemental Motion was not a second motion.

• Lao vs. Co, 585 Phil. 134 (2008) — Cited for the principle that a second motion for reconsideration is prohibited for being a mere reiteration of issues previously raised. Distinguished because the Supplemental Motion was filed while the first motion was still pending, so there were no issues to reiterate.

• Duterte vs. Sandiganbayan, 352 Phil. 557 (1998) — Cited for the doctrine that the right to a preliminary investigation is a substantive right and a component of due process in criminal justice. Distinguished because in that case, the accused were not given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits, whereas petitioner here was able to file his counter-affidavit and evidence.

• Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals, 344 Phil. 207 (1997) — Cited for the principle that the Secretary of Justice exercises power of supervision and control over prosecutors and may affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify their rulings under the Revised Administrative Code.

• Crespo vs. Mogul, 235 Phil. 465 (1987) — Cited for the principle that once a complaint or information is filed in court, jurisdiction over the case is transferred to the trial court, and any disposition as to dismissal, conviction, or acquittal rests in the sound discretion of the court.

• Community Rural Bank of Guimba vs. Talavera, 495 Phil. 30 (2005) — Cited for the proposition that the Secretary of Justice is the ultimate authority who decides which of the conflicting theories of complainants and respondents should be believed.

• Section 13, 2000 National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal — Prohibits second or further motions for reconsideration. Applied to determine that the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration was not a prohibited pleading because it was filed while the first motion was still pending.

• Section 4, Rule 112, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Authorizes the Secretary of Justice to reverse or modify the resolution of a prosecutor motu proprio and to direct the filing of an information without conducting another preliminary investigation. Applied to uphold the Secretary of Justice's authority to accept the Talusan affidavit and direct the filing of informations without a separate reinvestigation.

• Section 11, 2000 National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal — Provides that reinvestigation is necessary only if the Secretary of Justice "finds it necessary to reinvestigate the case." Applied to establish that petitioner had no right to demand a reinvestigation on the Talusan affidavit.

• Section 4, Republic Act No. 10071 (Prosecution Service Act of 2010) — Gives the Secretary of Justice authority to act directly on matters involving national security or probable miscarriage of justice and to review, reverse, revise, modify, or affirm judgments and orders of prosecutors. Cited to reinforce the Secretary's supervisory authority.

• Section 38, Chapter 7, Book IV, Revised Administrative Code — Defines supervision and control as including authority to review, approve, reverse, or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials. Cited to establish the scope of the Secretary of Justice's power over prosecutors.

• Section 1, Rule 45, Rules of Court — Governs petitions for review on certiorari, limited to questions of law. Referenced to address the procedural issue of whether petitioner raised questions of fact.

• Section 7, Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Relates to the denial of bail where evidence of guilt is strong. Cited to note that petitioner's denial of bail by the trial court indicated the existence of strong evidence of guilt at the time of arrest.

Lazaro-Javier, M. Lopez, J. Lopez, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concurred.