Ampatuan Jr. vs. De Lima

Mandamus does not lie to compel the Secretary of Justice to charge a specific individual as an accused in a criminal information, as this would constitute directing the manner of exercising prosecutorial discretion; furthermore, admission into the Witness Protection Program under Republic Act No. 6981 operates as an acquittal of the state witness for the offense covered by his testimony, provided he complies with the program requirements.

On November 23, 2009, 57 civilians were massacred in Sitio Masalay, Municipality of Ampatuan, Maguindanao Province, in what became known as the Maguindanao massacre. Petitioner Datu Andal Ampatuan Jr., then Mayor of Datu Unsay, was among the principal suspects charged with multiple murder. The prosecution relied partly on the affidavits of Kenny Dalandag, who admitted his participation in the massacre and was subsequently admitted into the Department of Justice Witness Protection Program on August 13, 2010.

• On November 23, 2009, 57 civilians were massacred in Sitio Masalay, Municipality of Ampatuan, Maguindanao Province.
• Petitioner Datu Andal Ampatuan Jr., then Mayor of Datu Unsay, was among the principal suspects.
• Inquest proceedings were conducted against petitioner on November 26, 2009 at the General Santos (Tambler) Airport Lounge before he was flown to Manila and detained at the National Bureau of Investigation.
• The Department of Justice (DOJ) resolved to file informations for murder against petitioner on November 27, 2009, and additional informations were filed subsequently, totaling 41 informations to which petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignments on January 5, 2010, February 3, 2010, and July 28, 2010.
• The venue of trial was transferred from Cotabato City to Quezon City pursuant to a resolution by the Supreme Court dated December 8, 2009.
• In the joint resolution dated February 5, 2010, the Panel of Prosecutors charged 196 individuals with multiple murder, partly relying on the twin affidavits of Kenny Dalandag dated December 7, 2009.
• On August 13, 2010, Dalandag was admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ.
• On September 7, 2010, the Quezon City RTC issued its amended pre-trial order listing Dalandag as one of the Prosecution witnesses.
• On October 14, 2010, petitioner wrote to Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima requesting the inclusion of Dalandag in the informations for murder, which was reiterated on October 22 and November 2, 2010.
• By letter dated November 2, 2010, Secretary De Lima denied the request.
• On December 7, 2010, petitioner filed a petition for mandamus in the RTC in Manila seeking to compel respondents to charge Dalandag as an accused.

• The Secretary of Justice and the Panel of Prosecutors may be compelled by mandamus to investigate and prosecute Kenny Dalandag as an accused in the informations for multiple murder in light of his admitted participation in the massacre as evidenced by his sworn affidavits and official records filed with the prosecutor and the Quezon City RTC.
• The subsequent inclusion of Dalandag in the Witness Protection Program does not justify his exclusion as an accused and his non-indictment for complicity in the massacre, notwithstanding his admissions that he took part in its planning and execution.
• Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court mandates that the complaint or information shall be filed against all persons who appear to be responsible for the offense involved.

• Mandamus cannot be used to compel the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in a specific manner; it may only compel action but not the manner or particular way discretion is to be exercised.
• The Secretary of Justice has the discretion to determine whom to charge based on sufficient evidence establishing probable cause, and judicial review is only allowed upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion.
• Kenny Dalandag was validly admitted into the Witness Protection Program under Republic Act No. 6981, which operates as an acquittal and bars his subsequent inclusion in the criminal information unless he fails or refuses to testify.
• There are two distinct modes of becoming a state witness: discharge under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court (requiring prior charging as an accused) and admission under RA 6981 (not requiring prior charging), and Dalandag was admitted under the latter mode.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether mandamus lies to compel the Secretary of Justice to charge a specific individual as an accused in a criminal information.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the admission of Kenny Dalandag into the Witness Protection Program under Republic Act No. 6981 bars his subsequent prosecution for the Maguindanao massacre despite his admissions of participation.
  • Whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in excluding Dalandag from the informations.

• Procedural:
  • Mandamus shall issue only to compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, but it cannot be used to direct the manner or particular way discretion is to be exercised, nor to compel the retraction or reversal of an action already taken.
  • While the Secretary of Justice may be compelled by mandamus to act on a letter-request or motion to include a person in the information, she may not be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such request.
  • Considering that the Secretary of Justice already denied the letter-request, mandamus was no longer available as a recourse.
• Substantive:
  • The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department, and public prosecutors have a wide range of discretion on what and whom to charge; judicial interference is allowed only upon a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion defined as the arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic exercise of discretion.
  • There are two distinct modes by which a participant in a crime may become a state witness: (a) discharge from the criminal case pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court (requiring prior charging as an accused and court approval), and (b) approval of application for admission into the Witness Protection Program under Republic Act No. 6981 (not requiring prior charging).
  • Admission into the Witness Protection Program under RA 6981 operates as an acquittal, and the witness cannot subsequently be included in the criminal information except when he fails or refuses to testify; the immunity is granted by the DOJ, not by the trial court.
  • The records show no grave abuse of discretion in excluding Dalandag, as his admission into the Program was warranted by the absolute necessity of his testimony and compliance with all requisites under RA 6981.

• Prosecutorial Discretion — The Executive Department, through the Department of Justice, has the exclusive power to determine what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of offenders, and the courts will not interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion.
• State Witness Doctrine (Dual Modes) — A participant in the commission of a crime may become a state witness either by: (a) discharge under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, which requires prior charging as an accused and operates as an acquittal upon court approval; or (b) admission into the Witness Protection Program under Republic Act No. 6981, which does not require prior charging and also operates as an acquittal upon DOJ approval, provided the witness testifies as required.
• Nature of Mandamus — Mandamus is available to compel a public officer to perform a ministerial duty or to take action when required by law, but it cannot be used to control the exercise of discretion or to dictate the manner in which that discretion should be exercised, nor to reverse an action already taken in the exercise of such discretion.

• "In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way the judgment and discretion are to be exercised."
• "The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department of the Government whose principal power and responsibility are to see to it that our laws are faithfully executed."
• "Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the Court deems it a sound judicial policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to allow the Executive Department, through the Department of Justice, exclusively to determine what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders."

• Soberano v. People — Cited for the principle that public prosecutors have a wide range of discretion on what and whom to charge.
• Leviste v. Alameda — Cited for the scope of prosecutorial discretion.
• Crespo v. Mogul — Cited for the quasi-judicial discretion of public prosecutors to determine whether criminal cases should be filed.
• Glaxosmithkline Philippines, Inc. v. Khalid Mehmood Malik — Cited for the definition of grave abuse of discretion as the arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic exercise of discretion.
• People v. Tabayoyong — Cited for the principle that the discharge of an accused to become a state witness is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.
• Chua v. Court of Appeals — Cited for the discretion to discharge a co-accused from the information to be a state witness.
• Quarto v. Marcelo — Cited for the principle that mandamus cannot direct the manner of exercising discretion.
• Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman — Cited for the principle that mandamus cannot compel the reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of discretion.

• Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court — Mandates that the complaint or information shall be filed against all persons responsible for the offense, subject to exceptions such as when a participant becomes a state witness.
• Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court — Governs the discharge of an accused to be a state witness, requiring prior charging and court approval upon motion by the prosecution before resting its case.
• Republic Act No. 6981 (The Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act), Section 10 — Prescribes the requisites for admission of a participant in a crime as a state witness into the Witness Protection Program.
• Republic Act No. 6981, Section 12 — Provides that if a state witness is charged in court, the prosecutor shall petition for his discharge upon presentation of the certification of admission into the Program.