Amores vs. Civil Service Commission

A permanent appointment in the civil service requires that the appointee meet all the requirements of the position, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed by law. An appointment to a Career Executive Service position without the requisite CES eligibility is at best temporary, conditioned on the subsequent obtention of such eligibility, and does not confer security of tenure on the occupant.

The petitioner was a physician who began his civil service career at the Lung Center of the Philippines (LCP) in 1982 as a resident physician and was subsequently promoted to Medical Specialist, then Department Manager, and finally Deputy Director for Hospital Support Services. The position of Deputy Director belongs to the Career Executive Service (CES), the third level of the career service under the Civil Service Law, which requires appointees to possess the corresponding CES eligibility conferred by the Career Executive Service Board upon passing the CES examinations. The dispute arose in the context of a leadership change at the LCP, where the petitioner was designated officer-in-charge after the retirement of the Executive Director, but a different candidate was appointed to the position.

Jose Pepito M. Amores was the Deputy Director for Hospital Support Services at the Lung Center of the Philippines (LCP). His civil service career began in 1982 when he was initially engaged at the LCP as a resident physician. In the course of his service, he was promoted to Medical Specialist, then to Department Manager, and finally to Deputy Director. When Executive Director Dr. Calixto Zaldivar retired in 1999, petitioner was designated officer-in-charge of the LCP by Department of Health (DOH) Secretary Alberto Romualdez, Jr., while the DOH selection board was in the process of selecting a new executive director. In the meantime, Dr. Fernando Melendres was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada as Executive Director of the LCP. Although petitioner claimed he was not challenging Melendres' right to the office, he believed he himself was the rightful person to be appointed inasmuch as he had top-billed the evaluation results of the DOH Selection Board, with Melendres in second place.

The controversy started when petitioner and other doctors and rank-and-file employees at the LCP drafted a manifesto which ventilated their collective dismay at Melendres' appointment and leadership, exposing alleged anomalous circumstances surrounding his appointment, the reassignment of some LCP personnel amounting to demotion, anomalies in the procurement of property and supplies, his abusive conduct in publicly accusing some doctors of having caused a fire that gutted the center in May 1998, and his practice of favoritism and nepotism. The tenor of the manifesto even questioned Melendres' fitness to act as executive director on the ground of his previous brush with substance abuse and the failure of his marriage. These allegations led the DOH to create a Fact-finding Committee to conduct an investigation. At the proceedings before the Committee, Melendres filed charges of dishonesty and double compensation against petitioner, alleging that the latter had been engaging in the private practice of medicine within the LCP's premises during official hours.

At the close of the investigation, the Fact-finding Committee issued a report declaring Melendres guilty of the charges against him. As for petitioner, the Committee absolved him of the charge of receiving double compensation but nevertheless found him guilty of having committed dishonesty by engaging in the private practice of his profession during the hours that he should be engaging in public service in violation of the Civil Service Law. On August 27, 2002, petitioner received a letter from the LCP Board of Trustees informing him of his separation from service as Deputy Director effective September 30, 2002, to which was attached a copy of the Board's Resolution dated August 23, 2002, principally directing petitioner's termination from service after consultation with the Career Executive Service Board.

Petitioner brought an appeal to the Civil Service Commission. Resolving the appeal, the CSC declared that the LCP Board of Trustees had properly and validly separated petitioner from his post as Deputy Director. The CSC declined to pass upon the charge of dishonesty on the ground of pre-maturity, as the issue had not yet been finally determined in a proper proceeding. However, it pointed out that petitioner's separation from service was anchored on his lack of a CES eligibility which is required for the position of deputy director and, as such, he enjoyed no security in his tenure. Petitioner lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeals, but it was dismissed and the CSC Resolution was affirmed. The petitioner then filed the present petition for review with the Supreme Court.

• Due Process: Petitioner argued that he had been denied due process when his separation from office was ordered on a ground not raised before the DOH Fact-finding Committee.
• Equal Protection: Petitioner argued that his rights to equal protection had been violated inasmuch as he was similarly situated with other department managers in the LCP who had no CES eligibility but who had not been separated from service.
• Security of Tenure: Petitioner theorized that his right to security of tenure had been breached and that he was entitled to remain as deputy director because his promotion to the said position, which was a recognition of his competence, was permanent in character.

• Lack of Eligibility: The LCP, the CSC, and the DOH, all represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, asserted that there can be no question as to the validity of petitioner's removal from office for the basic fact that he enjoyed no security of tenure on account of his lack of eligibility.
• Nature of Separation: The LCP posited that petitioner's separation from office did not result from an administrative disciplinary action, but rather from his failure to qualify for the office of Deputy Director on account of lack of eligibility.
• Third-Level Appointment: The CSC and the DOH characterized petitioner as a third-level appointee who must be in possession of the corresponding third-level eligibility; since petitioner had none, he enjoyed no security of tenure and may thus be removed at a moment's notice even without cause.
• Consultation with CES Board: Melendres capitalized on the fact that the LCP Board of Trustees arrived at the resolution to separate petitioner from service upon consultation with the CES Board and the CSC, concluding that the cause for the removal was actually his lack of eligibility and not his commission of dishonesty.

• Due Process: Whether petitioner was denied due process when his separation from office was ordered on a ground not raised before the DOH Fact-finding Committee.
• Equal Protection: Whether petitioner's rights to equal protection were violated when he was separated from service while other department managers in the LCP who also lacked CES eligibility were not.
• Security of Tenure: Whether petitioner's separation from service violated his right to security of tenure.

• Due Process: No. The Court found the due process and equal protection issues to be merely petitioner's last-ditch attempts to remain in office, and declined to expound on them, finding no merit therein.
• Equal Protection: No. The Court similarly dismissed this issue as a futile last-ditch attempt to remain in office, without further elaboration.
• Security of Tenure: No. Because petitioner lacked the proper CES eligibility and therefore had not held the subject office in a permanent capacity, there could not have been any violation of his supposed right to security of tenure inasmuch as he had never been in possession of the said right at least during his tenure as Deputy Director for Hospital Support Services.

• Security of Tenure: The Court began with the precept that a permanent appointment in the civil service is issued to a person who has met the requirements of the position to which the appointment is made in accordance with law and the rules issued pursuant thereto. Under Section 8 of the Civil Service Law, positions in the career service are grouped into three levels, with the third level covering positions in the Career Executive Service. With particular reference to CES positions, the requisite civil service eligibility is acquired upon passing the CES examinations administered by the CES Board and the subsequent conferment of such eligibility upon passing the examinations. The Court noted that petitioner did not profess that at any time he was holding the position he was able to acquire the required eligibility by taking the CES examinations. The law permits, on many occasions, the appointment of non-CES eligibles to CES positions in the absence of appropriate eligibles and when there is necessity in the interest of public service, but in all such cases, the appointment is at best merely temporary, conditioned on the subsequent obtention of the required CES eligibility. This rule is invariable even though the given appointment may have been designated as permanent by the appointing authority, citing De Leon vs. Court of Appeals, Dimayuga vs. Benedicto, Caringal vs. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, and Achacoso vs. Macaraig.

• Security of Tenure in the CES: The Court explained that security of tenure in the career executive service, which presupposes a permanent appointment, takes place upon passing the CES examinations administered by the CES Board. It is that which entitles the examinee to conferment of CES eligibility and the inclusion of his name in the roster of CES eligibles. Under the rules and regulations promulgated by the CES Board, conferment of the CES eligibility is done by the CES Board through a formal board resolution after an evaluation of the examinee's performance in the four stages of the CES eligibility examinations. Upon conferment of CES eligibility and compliance with the other requirements prescribed by the Board, an incumbent of a CES position may qualify for appointment to a CES rank, which is made by the President upon the Board's recommendation. It is this process which completes the official's membership in the CES and confers on him security of tenure in the CES. Petitioner did not seem to have gone through this definitive process.

• Nature of Appointment: The Court emphasized that the mere fact that a particular position belongs to the career service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. The Court also noted that even the mere fact that an employee is a CES eligible does not automatically operate to vest security of tenure on the appointee inasmuch as the security of tenure of employees in the career executive service, except first and second-level employees, pertains only to rank and not to the office or position to which they may be appointed.

• Permanent Appointment Requires Eligibility — A permanent appointment in the civil service is issued to a person who has met all the requirements of the position, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed. An appointment is permanent where the appointee meets all the requirements for the position, and temporary where the appointee meets all the requirements except only the appropriate civil service eligibility. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that petitioner's appointment as Deputy Director, lacking CES eligibility, was at best temporary.

• Temporary Appointment to CES Positions — The law permits the appointment of non-CES eligibles to CES positions in the absence of appropriate eligibles and when there is necessity in the interest of public service, but in all such cases, the appointment is at best merely temporary, conditioned on the subsequent obtention of the required CES eligibility. This rule is invariable even though the given appointment may have been designated as permanent by the appointing authority. The Court applied this doctrine to reject petitioner's claim that his promotion was permanent in character.

• Security of Tenure in the Career Executive Service — Security of tenure in the career executive service, which presupposes a permanent appointment, takes place upon passing the CES examinations administered by the CES Board, which entitles the examinee to conferment of CES eligibility and the inclusion of his name in the roster of CES eligibles. The Court applied this doctrine to find that petitioner, who never acquired CES eligibility, never possessed security of tenure during his tenure as Deputy Director.

• Security of Tenure Pertains to Rank, Not Position — The security of tenure of employees in the career executive service, except first and second-level employees, pertains only to rank and not to the office or position to which they may be appointed. The Court cited this principle to further support its conclusion that petitioner had no security of tenure in the specific office of Deputy Director.

• "What at the outset weighs heavily on petitioner's case is the fact that the position of Deputy Director for Hospital Support Services at the LCP belongs to the career executive service appointments to which by law require that the appointees possess the corresponding CES eligibility." — This passage establishes the foundational premise of the decision: that the position at issue belongs to the CES and therefore requires CES eligibility.

• "Verily, it is clear that the possession of the required CES eligibility is that which will make an appointment in the career executive service a permanent one. Petitioner does not possess such eligibility, however, it cannot be said that his appointment to the position was permanent." — This passage articulates the core ratio decidendi: CES eligibility is the determining factor for permanence of appointment in the career executive service.

• "At this juncture, what comes unmistakably clear is the fact that because petitioner lacked the proper CES eligibility and therefore had not held the subject office in a permanent capacity, there could not have been any violation of petitioner's supposed right to security of tenure inasmuch as he had never been in possession of the said right at least during his tenure as Deputy Director for Hospital Support Services." — This passage states the Court's conclusion on the security of tenure issue, directly resolving the central question of the case.

• "All told, we reiterate the long-standing rule that the mere fact that a particular position belongs to the career service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it." — This passage summarizes the Court's final holding and the general principle that career service membership alone does not confer security of tenure.

• Caringal vs. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, G.R. No. 161942, October 13, 2005, 472 SCRA 577 — Cited as controlling precedent for the precept that a permanent appointment requires meeting all the requirements of the position, and for the rule that CES eligibility is acquired upon passing the CES examinations and subsequent conferment.

• Achacoso vs. Macaraig, 195 SCRA 235 (1991) — Cited as controlling precedent for the rule that an appointment of a non-eligible to a CES position is at best temporary, and that a person who does not have the requisite qualifications may only be appointed in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles.

• De Leon vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127182, January 22, 2001, 350 SCRA 1 — Cited as one of the cases establishing the invariable rule that an appointment of a non-CES eligible is temporary even though designated as permanent by the appointing authority.

• Dimayuga vs. Benedicto, G.R. No. 144153, January 16, 2002, 373 SCRA 652 — Cited alongside other cases for the same invariable rule regarding temporary appointments of non-CES eligibles.

• Cuevas vs. Bacal, G.R. No. 139382, December 6, 2000, 347 SCRA 338 — Cited for the proposition that once a person acquires CES eligibility, he either earns the status of a permanent appointee or becomes qualified for a permanent appointment, and for the rule that a non-eligible may be removed even without cause.

• General vs. Roco, G.R. No. 143366 & 143524, January 29, 2001, 350 SCRA 528 — Cited for the proposition that the law permits the appointment of non-CES eligibles to CES positions in the absence of appropriate eligibles, conditioned on subsequent obtention of eligibility.

• Ignacio vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 163573, July 27, 2005, 464 SCRA 220 — Cited for the principle that security of tenure of employees in the career executive service pertains only to rank and not to the office or position to which they may be appointed.

• Section 7, Civil Service Law (Executive Order No. 292, Revised Administrative Code of 1987) — Classifies positions in the career service, including positions in the Career Executive Service, namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Regional Director, Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the President.

• Section 8, Civil Service Law (Executive Order No. 292, Revised Administrative Code of 1987) — Groups classes of positions in the career service into three levels, with the third level covering positions in the Career Executive Service. The Court applied this provision to determine that the position of Deputy Director for Hospital Support Services belongs to the third level, requiring CES eligibility.

• Section 27, Civil Service Law (Executive Order No. 292, Revised Administrative Code of 1987) — Defines permanent and temporary appointments, providing that an appointment is permanent where the appointee meets all the requirements for the position including the appropriate eligibility, and temporary where the appointee meets all requirements except the appropriate civil service eligibility. The Court applied this provision to characterize petitioner's appointment as temporary.

Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, and Bersamin, JJ., concurred.