Amora, Jr. vs. COMELEC

A defective notarization of a certificate of candidacy is not a ground for disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of the Local Government Code, and the COMELEC cannot treat an improperly sworn COC as equivalent to possession of a disqualification ground. Under Section 2 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, competent evidence of identity is not required when the affiant is personally known to the notary public.

Sergio G. Amora, Jr. was the incumbent Mayor of Candijay, Bohol, having been elected to that post in 2004 and 2007. For the 2010 mayoralty race, the Nationalist People’s Coalition fielded Trygve L. Olaivar against him, while Arnielo S. Olandria ran for councilor under the same party. The legal backdrop includes Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code, which requires a sworn certificate of candidacy, and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, which define an oath and competent evidence of identity.

On December 1, 2009, Amora filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Candijay, Bohol. On March 5, 2010, Olandria filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification against Amora in SPA No. 10-046 (DC). Olandria alleged that Amora’s COC was not properly sworn contrary to the Omnibus Election Code and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice because, in executing his COC, Amora merely presented his Community Tax Certificate to the notary public, Atty. Oriculo Granada, instead of presenting competent evidence of his identity. Consequently, according to Olandria, Amora’s COC had no force and effect and should be considered as not filed.

Amora traversed Olandria’s allegations in his Answer cum Position Paper. He countered that the Petition for Disqualification was actually a Petition to Deny Due Course or cancel a certificate of candidacy and was effectively filed out of time; that Olandria’s claim did not constitute a proper ground for cancellation of the COC; that the COC was valid and effective because he was personally known to Atty. Granada before whom he took his oath; that Atty. Granada was a close acquaintance since they had been members of the League of Municipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter, for several years; and that he sufficiently complied with the requirement that the COC be under oath.

The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified Amora from running for Mayor of Candijay, Bohol. Amora filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc, reiterating his previous arguments and emphasizing the asseverations of Atty. Granada in the latter’s affidavit. According to that affidavit, while Atty. Granada normally required the affiant to show competent evidence of identity, he accepted Amora’s CTC because he personally knew Amora; apart from being both members of the League of Municipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter, the two considered each other as distant relatives because Amora’s mother is a Granada; it was a matter of judicial notice that practically everybody knows the Mayor, most especially lawyers and notaries public; and the COC filed by Amora did not lack the required formality of an oath.

Meanwhile, on May 10, 2010, national and local elections were held. Amora obtained 8,688 votes, equivalent to 58.94% of the total votes cast, compared to Olaivar’s 6,053 votes, equivalent to only 41.06% thereof. The Municipal Board of Canvassers of Candijay, Bohol, proclaimed Amora as the winner for the position of Municipal Mayor. A week thereafter, or on May 17, 2010, the COMELEC en banc denied Amora’s motion for reconsideration and affirmed the resolution of the COMELEC Second Division. Three of the seven commissioners dissented; Commissioner Gregorio Larrazabal wrote a dissenting opinion, concurred in by then Chairman Jose A.R. Melo and Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento.

In denying the motion and upholding Olandria’s petition, the COMELEC ruled that Amora himself admitted that the CTC is no longer competent evidence of identity for purposes of notarization; that the COC was rendered invalid when Amora presented only his CTC to the notary public; that his defense of personal knowledge could not be recognized because the best proof of his contention could have been the COC itself, and the jurat portion of the COC revealed no assertion by the notary public that he personally knew the affiant; and that the belated production of an affidavit by the notary public could not be given weight because such evidence could and should have been produced at the earliest possible opportunity. The COMELEC invoked Section 73 of the Election Code, Sections 2 and 12 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, and Baylon vs. Almo. It also held that the petition was governed by COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 as a petition to disqualify for lack of qualifications or possessing some grounds for disqualification, not by Section 78 of the Election Code.

Amora then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, imputing grave abuse of discretion to the COMELEC. He insisted that the Petition for Disqualification was actually a Petition to Deny Due Course since the purported ground referred to the defective notarization of the COC; that Section 73 of the OEC pertained to substantive qualifications or the lack thereof under the Local Government Code and the OEC; and that Olandria’s petition was filed beyond the 25-day period from the filing of the disputed COC. He maintained that his COC was properly notarized and not defective, and that presenting his CTC to the notary public to whom he was personally known sufficiently complied with the requirement that the COC be under oath. He further alleged that Olaivar, his opponent in the mayoralty post and likewise a member of the NPC, was purportedly a fraternity brother and close associate of Commissioner Nicodemo T. Ferrer, one of the commissioners who disqualified him, and that Olaivar served as Consultant for the COMELEC, assigned to the Office of Commissioner Ferrer. Olandria and the COMELEC opposed the petition and reiterated the arguments contained in the COMELEC en banc resolution of May 17, 2010.

• Nature of Olandria’s Petition and Timeliness: Petitioner argued that the Petition for Disqualification was actually a Petition to Deny Due Course or cancel a certificate of candidacy, and was effectively filed out of time because Section 78 of the OEC requires filing within 25 days from the filing of the COC. He maintained that Section 73 of the OEC pertains to substantive qualifications or lack thereof under the LGC and the OEC, not to a disqualification ground.
• Validity of the COC and Oath: Petitioner argued that his COC was valid and effective because he was personally known to the notary public, Atty. Granada, before whom he took his oath; they had been close acquaintances and members of the League of Municipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter, for several years; and he sufficiently complied with the requirement that the COC be under oath. He also invoked Atty. Granada’s affidavit that he accepted the CTC because he personally knew Amora, that they considered each other distant relatives because Amora’s mother is a Granada, and that the COC did not lack the required formality of an oath.
• No Proper Ground for Cancellation/Disqualification: Petitioner argued that Olandria’s claim did not constitute a proper ground for cancellation of the COC, and that the COMELEC’s ruling practically supplanted Congress by adding another ground for disqualification not provided in the OEC or the LGC.
• Impartiality: Petitioner alleged that Olaivar, his opponent in the mayoralty post and a member of the NPC, was purportedly a fraternity brother and close associate of Commissioner Ferrer, one of the commissioners who disqualified him, and that Olaivar served as Consultant for the COMELEC assigned to the Office of Commissioner Ferrer.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner imputed grave abuse of discretion to the COMELEC for disqualifying him despite his victory and proclamation.

• Nature of the Petition: Respondent Olandria and the COMELEC argued that the Petition for Disqualification was a petition to disqualify for possessing some grounds for disqualification governed by COMELEC Resolution No. 8696, which may be filed after the last day for filing COCs but not later than the date of proclamation. They argued it invoked Section 73 of the OEC requiring a sworn COC, not Section 78.
• Defective Notarization: They argued that Amora’s COC was invalid because he presented only a CTC, which is not competent evidence of identity under Section 12 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice; a CTC bears no photograph, and Baylon vs. Almo recognized its unreliability for notarization.
• Personal Knowledge Not Shown: They argued that Amora’s defense that he was personally known to the notary could not be recognized because the best proof of his contention could have been the COC itself, and the jurat portion of the COC contained no assertion by the notary public that he personally knew the affiant. The belated affidavit of the notary public could not be given weight because it could and should have been produced at the earliest possible opportunity.
• Statutory Grounds: They argued that the grounds for disqualification were laid down in the OEC, the LGC, and COMELEC Resolution No. 8696, so the COMELEC did not add a new disqualification ground.

• Characterization of Olandria’s Petition: Whether Olandria’s Petition for Disqualification was a proper petition to disqualify Amora for lack of qualifications or possessing grounds for disqualification under Section 68 of the OEC and Section 40 of the LGC.
• Defective Notarization as Disqualification Ground: Whether an improperly sworn COC or defective notarization is a ground for disqualification under the OEC and the LGC.
• Validity of Amora’s COC: Whether Amora’s COC was validly sworn when he presented a CTC to a notary public who personally knew him.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting Olandria’s petition and disqualifying Amora despite his victory and proclamation.

• Characterization of Olandria’s Petition: No. The petition was not based on any ground for disqualification under Section 68 of the OEC or Section 40 of the LGC; its proper characterization cannot depend on Olandria’s designation, and the COMELEC should have dismissed it outright.
• Defective Notarization as Disqualification Ground: No. A defective notarization is not among the statutory grounds for disqualification, and the COMELEC cannot treat an improperly sworn COC as equivalent to possession of a disqualification ground.
• Validity of Amora’s COC: Yes. Under Section 2 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, competent evidence of identity is not required when the affiant is personally known to the notary public; Amora and Atty. Granada personally knew each other, so the CTC presentation was sufficient in this instance.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Yes. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in upholding Olandria’s claim and disqualifying Amora despite his victory and proclamation; where a candidate has received popular mandate, doubts should be resolved in favor of eligibility.

• Characterization of Olandria’s Petition: The SC held that the COMELEC’s treatment of Olandria’s petition as a disqualification petition under COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 was a grave abuse of discretion. The proper characterization of a petition cannot depend on the petitioner’s designation; Olandria’s petition invoked the formal requirement in Section 73 that a COC be sworn, not a statutory disqualification. The SC distinguished a petition for disqualification, which may be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the OEC or Section 40 of the LGC, from a petition to deny due course or cancel a COC under Section 78, which must be grounded on a false material representation. The effects differ: a candidate disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited from continuing as a candidate and may be substituted, while a person whose COC is denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all and cannot be substituted. Because Olandria’s petition did not allege any statutory disqualification, the COMELEC should have dismissed it outright.
• Defective Notarization as Disqualification Ground: The SC examined Section 68 of the OEC and Section 40 of the LGC and found that neither enumerates defective notarization or an improperly sworn COC as a disqualification ground. It held that it could not infer such an additional ground from the specific wording of Section 68. The power to prescribe additional qualifications for elective office and grounds for disqualification is vested in Congress, and laws prescribing qualifications and disqualifications are liberally construed in favor of eligibility. The SC thus rejected the COMELEC’s position that an improperly sworn COC is equivalent to possession of a ground for disqualification.
• Validity of Amora’s COC: The SC held that Amora complied with the requirement of a sworn COC. Section 2 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice defines an oath as an act in which an individual on a single occasion (a) appears in person before the notary public, (b) is personally known to the notary public or identified through competent evidence of identity, and (c) avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of the contents of the instrument. Competent evidence of identity is not required when the affiant is personally known to the notary public. Amora and Atty. Granada personally knew each other; they were not just colleagues at the League of Municipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter, but considered each other distant relatives. Olandria presented no evidence to counter Atty. Granada’s affidavit. Thus, the alleged defect in the oath was not proven, and the presentation of a CTC was sufficient in this instance.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The SC found that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion, a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Certiorari lies where a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The COMELEC upheld Olandria’s claim despite the absence of a statutory disqualification ground and confirmed Amora’s disqualification although he had won and was proclaimed as Mayor. The SC emphasized that where a candidate has received popular mandate, all possible doubts should be resolved in favor of the candidate’s eligibility, for to rule otherwise is to defeat the will of the people.

• Proper characterization of election petitions — The nature of a petition is determined by its allegations and grounds, not by the petitioner’s designation. A petition for disqualification under Section 12 or 68 of the OEC or Section 40 of the LGC is distinct from a petition to deny due course or cancel a COC under Section 78, which requires a false material representation. A candidate disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited from continuing and may be substituted; a person whose COC is denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all and cannot be substituted. Applied: Olandria’s petition invoked defective notarization, not a statutory disqualification ground, so the COMELEC should have dismissed it.
• Statutory grounds for disqualification cannot be expanded by the COMELEC — Disqualification grounds are those enumerated in Section 68 of the OEC and Section 40 of the LGC; the power to prescribe additional qualifications and disqualifications is vested in Congress. Applied: defective notarization is not among the enumerated grounds, and the COMELEC cannot treat an improperly sworn COC as equivalent to possession of a disqualification ground.
• Personal knowledge exception in notarization — Under Section 2 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, an oath requires (a) personal appearance before the notary public, (b) personal knowledge of the notary public or identification through competent evidence of identity, and (c) avowal under penalty of law. Competent evidence of identity under Section 12 is not required when the affiant is personally known to the notary public. Applied: Amora was personally known to Atty. Granada, so his presentation of a CTC was sufficient in this instance.
• Popular mandate and liberal construction of eligibility laws — Where a candidate has received popular mandate, all possible doubts should be resolved in favor of the candidate’s eligibility; laws prescribing qualifications and disqualifications are liberally construed in favor of eligibility; election laws are construed to give effect to the will of the voters. Applied: Amora won and was proclaimed, so the COMELEC’s disqualification based on a non-statutory ground defeated the will of the people.
• Grave abuse of discretion — Grave abuse of discretion is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; certiorari lies where a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Applied: the COMELEC upheld a disqualification on a non-existent ground and disregarded Amora’s victory and proclamation.

• "The proper characterization of a petition as one for disqualification under the pertinent provisions of laws cannot be made dependent on the designation, correctly or incorrectly, of a petitioner. The absurd interpretation of Olandria, respondent herein, is not controlling; the COMELEC should have dismissed his petition outright." — This establishes that designation does not control and the petition should have been dismissed.
• "In this case, it was grave abuse of discretion to uphold Olandria’s claim that an improperly sworn COC is equivalent to possession of a ground for disqualification." — This rejects defective notarization as a disqualification ground.
• "In this case, however, contrary to the declarations of the COMELEC, Amora complied with the requirement of a sworn COC. He readily explained that he and Atty. Granada personally knew each other; they were not just colleagues at the League of Municipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter, but they consider each other as distant relatives. Thus, the alleged defect in the oath was not proven by Olandria since the presentation of a CTC turned out to be sufficient in this instance." — This is the majority’s holding on the oath and personal knowledge.
• "We cannot overemphasize the principle that where a candidate has received popular mandate, all possible doubts should be resolved in favor of the candidate’s eligibility, for to rule otherwise is to defeat the will of the people." — This states the popular mandate principle applied to Amora’s victory.

• Fermin vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 179695 and 182369, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 782, 796 — Controlling precedent followed by the SC to distinguish a petition for disqualification under Sections 12 or 68 of the OEC or Section 40 of the LGC from a petition to deny due course or cancel a COC under Section 78.
• Miranda vs. Abaya — Cited in the Fermin discussion and followed for the rule that a candidate disqualified under Section 68 may be substituted, while a person whose COC is denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted.
• Dumlao vs. COMELEC, 184 Phil. 369 (1980) — Relied on for the rule that, apart from constitutional qualifications, the power to prescribe additional qualifications for elective office and grounds for disqualification is vested in Congress.
• O’Hara vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 148941-42, March 12, 2002, 379 SCRA 247 — Relied on for the principle that where a candidate has received popular mandate, all possible doubts should be resolved in favor of the candidate’s eligibility.

• Section 73, Omnibus Election Code — Requires that no person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed. The SC emphasized the COC must be sworn but held that defective notarization is not a disqualification ground; Amora complied because he was personally known to the notary public.
• Section 68, Omnibus Election Code — Enumerates the grounds for disqualification, including giving money or material consideration, acts of terrorism, excess campaign spending, prohibited contributions, violations of specified sections, and permanent resident or immigrant status unless waived. The SC held that defective notarization is not among these grounds and cannot be inferred as an additional ground.
• Section 40, Local Government Code — Enumerates disqualifications for elective local positions, including final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or punishable by one year or more, removal from office, conviction for violating the oath of allegiance, dual citizenship, fugitive status, permanent residence abroad, and insanity or feeble-mindedness. The SC held that Olandria’s petition was not based on any of these grounds.
• Section 78, Omnibus Election Code — Allows a verified petition to deny due course or cancel a COC exclusively on the ground that a material representation in the COC is false, filed not later than 25 days from the filing of the COC and decided not later than 15 days before the election. The SC distinguished this from a disqualification petition and noted the different effects of each.
• Section 2, 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice — Defines an oath or affirmation as an act in which an individual on a single occasion (a) appears in person before the notary public, (b) is personally known to the notary public or identified through competent evidence of identity, and (c) avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of the contents of the instrument. The SC applied the personal knowledge exception in Amora’s favor.
• Section 12, 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice — Defines competent evidence of identity as identification based on at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the individual. The SC held that such competent evidence was not required because Amora was personally known to the notary public.
• COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 — Governs a verified petition to disqualify a candidate for lack of qualifications or possessing some grounds for disqualification, which may be filed after the last day for filing COCs but not later than the date of proclamation. The SC held that the resolution could not supply a disqualification ground not found in the OEC or LGC.
• Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65, Rules of Court — Governs the petition for certiorari filed by Amora. The SC applied the grave abuse of discretion standard and found that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion.