Amor vs. Constant Packaging Corporation/William Chan and Virginia Chan

Preventing an employee from reporting to work constitutes dismissal, and the lack of just or authorized cause and procedural due process makes it illegal. When an employee is able and willing to work, evidenced by their proceeding to the company premises, and the employer arbitrarily prevents them from working for no known and valid reason, there is illegal dismissal.

Constant Packaging Corporation is engaged in printing packaging materials, with William Chan as its chairperson and Virginia Chan as a stockholder. The petitioners were hired as sorters, revisers, and packers on a pakyaw (task) basis. The petitioners aired their grievances via petition to management, and tensions escalated when some were prevented from entering the company premises after failing to attend the company Christmas Party and after raising concerns about their working conditions to the Department of Labor and Employment.

Constant Packaging Corporation hired Rhoda P. Amor, Lourdes R. Balanquit, Gloria G. Narag, Jovelyn G. Bueno, Agnes B. Ricerra, Valentina H. Adalid, Elynor R. Romero, Maria Fe J. Claro, Elizabeth C. Catulay, Celestina V. Magtolis, Jonalyn R. Romero, Jasmin B. Borlagdatan-Arambulo, Marissa C. Busel, and Glenda M. Tordillo as sorters, revisers, and packers on a pakyaw basis. The petitioners aired their grievances via petition to Constant Packaging's management, but they were told to leave their jobs if they were dissatisfied with the working conditions. Tensions escalated when Narag and Balanquit were prevented from entering the company premises after failing to attend the company Christmas Party.

Amor and Arambulo were also barred from entering work premises because management did not like it when the two raised concerns about their below minimum wage, 12-hour work day, 7-day work week, non-remittance of their SSS, PhilHealth, and Pag-IBIG contributions, as well as delays in the release of their salaries. They reported these concerns to the Department of Labor and Employment. When Constant Packaging's management received summons from the Department of Labor and Employment, Bueno, Ricerra, Adalid, Elynor, Jonalyn, Claro, Catulay, and Magtolis were also prevented from entering the plant. As to Busel and Tordillo, the two resigned from their posts because of health reasons and the pressure from their supervisor, Imelda Vea.

For its part, Constant Packaging claimed that the company never dismissed the petitioners since they were allowed to work anytime on a pakyaw basis. The company also claimed that it did not control their hours of work, that time-in and time-out were not required, and that they were not disciplined for producing little to no output. Thus, Constant Packaging asserted that no employer-employee relationship existed. They also rejected the claim that the workers were made to work 12 hours a day and that their daily wage was below the minimum wage.

The labor arbiter ruled in favor of the workers, declaring them regular employees and finding the workers, except for Busel and Tordillo, illegally dismissed. On appeal by both parties, the National Labor Relations Commission agreed with the labor arbiter that the workers were regular employees but reversed the finding of illegal dismissal, finding that the fact of dismissal was not proven, as the act of barring the workers from entering the workplace "cannot be construed as an overt act of termination" of employment. The Commission ordered the workers to return to work and for the company to accept them back, and removed the award of 13th month pay, saying that workers paid on pakyaw basis were excluded from receiving this.

The petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed. The Court of Appeals ruled that the security guard's alleged act of preventing petitioners from reporting for work on separate occasions is not tantamount to a dismissal, and that the links between the acts of the guard and the supposed instructions of the Plant Manager, and the latter with the purported marching orders of private respondents, have not been shown by the requisite clear, positive, and convincing evidence.

• Fact of Dismissal: Petitioners argued that the fact of their dismissal from service is supported by substantial evidence, pointing to the findings of the labor arbiter that the security guards stationed at the gates, who control the entry and exit of people, prevented petitioners from entering the company premises, which meant that they were not allowed to work.
• Management Order: Petitioners argued that a total of 12 workers were prevented by the security guard from entering the company premises on various dates, demonstrating that it was a management order to bar them from going inside and work, and that they were told by the plant manager, "Kung ayaw mo ng patakaran ng kumpanya, maluwag ang pinto. Isa ang aalis, 10 ang papalit" after they filed a complaint with the Department of Labor and Employment.
• Constructive Dismissal: Busel and Tordillo maintained that they were constructively dismissed due to harassment, pressure, and tension from their supervisor, which led to health problems and their eventual resignation, and prayed for separation pay in lieu of reinstatement and 13th month pay.

• Questions of Fact: Respondents argued that the Petition raises questions of fact which are outside the scope of a petition for review under Rule 45.
• No Proof of Dismissal: Respondents claimed that the fact of petitioners' dismissal is not supported by evidence, and that the fact that petitioners went to the Department of Labor and Employment to complain "cannot be equated as proof that they were indeed dismissed from their jobs," as this will not clearly, positively, and convincingly prove the factual basis of their dismissal.
• Burden of Proof: Respondents maintained that the "best evidence of dismissal is the written notice," and if there is none, the burden is on the employee to prove the fact of dismissal; they asserted that there could be no illegal dismissal because petitioners were not notified of their dismissal, nor were they prevented from coming to work.
• Human Experience: Respondents claimed that if petitioners had indeed been prevented from entering the premises, the prudent thing to do would have been to confer with management or resort to other means of communication like writing a letter, making telephone calls, or sending text messages, and that petitioners' failure to do so is against human experience.
• Constructive Dismissal Unsubstantiated: Respondents reiterated the uniform findings of the labor arbiter, the National Labor Relations Commission, and the Court of Appeals that the allegation of oppressive conduct resulting in constructive dismissal is unsubstantiated, and that the complaint was for actual dismissal and not constructive dismissal.
• 13th Month Pay: Respondents argued that petitioners are not entitled to 13th month pay as the implementing rules of Presidential Decree No. 851 exclude those who are paid on a task basis from receiving this benefit.

• Illegal Dismissal: Whether the act of preventing the 12 petitioners from entering the company premises constitutes illegal dismissal.
• Constructive Dismissal: Whether petitioners Busel and Tordillo were constructively dismissed due to harassment and pressure from their supervisor.
• 13th Month Pay: Whether petitioners, as pakyaw workers, are entitled to 13th month pay.

• Illegal Dismissal: Yes. The act of preventing the 12 petitioners from entering the company premises constitutes illegal dismissal. When an employee is able and willing to work, evidenced by their proceeding to the company premises, and the employer arbitrarily prevents them from working for no known and valid reason, then there is illegal dismissal.
• Constructive Dismissal: No. Petitioners Busel and Tordillo were unable to substantiate their claim of oppressive conduct resulting in their constructive dismissal, and the uniform findings of the labor tribunal and the Court of Appeals were affirmed.
• 13th Month Pay: No. Petitioners, as pakyaw workers, are excluded from receiving 13th month pay under the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 851, which excludes employers of those who are paid on purely commission, boundary, or task basis.

• Illegal Dismissal: The Court agreed with petitioners that the act of preventing them from entering company premises is tantamount to dismissal. When an employee is able and willing to work, evidenced by their proceeding to the company premises, and the employer arbitrarily prevents them from working for no known and valid reason, then there is illegal dismissal. The Court rejected respondents' insistence that the absence of a written notice proves that there was no dismissal, noting that the 12 petitioners' services were abruptly terminated without undergoing the necessary processes and without just cause. The Court also addressed respondents' theory that petitioners abandoned their employment, citing Hubilla vs. HSY Marketing Ltd., Co. for the twin requirements to prove abandonment: (1) the employee must have failed to report to work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) there must have been an overt act demonstrating clear intention on the part of the employee to sever the employer-employee relationship. The Court found that the second element was glaringly lacking, as respondents only pointed to how the 12 petitioners reacted to being prevented from entering company premises, which fails to show any intention to sever the employer-employee relationship. Following Hubilla, where both parties have not presented substantial evidence to prove their allegations, the evidence is considered to be in equipoise, and the scales of justice are tilted in favor of labor. The Court affirmed the labor arbiter's finding of fact that petitioners were indeed prevented by respondents' security guard from entering the company premises and rendering work, which constitutes an overt act of dismissal.
• Constructive Dismissal: The Court affirmed the uniform findings of the labor tribunal and the Court of Appeals that Busel and Tordillo were unable to substantiate their claim of oppressive conduct resulting in their constructive dismissal. Citing Ascent Skills Human Resources Services, Inc. vs. Manuel, the Court stated that while voluntary resignation of the employee should be proven by the employer, the burden to prove the circumstances that led to the constructive dismissal is on the employee. These circumstances that constitute discriminatory acts, insensibility, or disdain towards the employee should be clearly shown in evidence, such that the working environment created by the employer leaves the employee no other choice but to resign. Busel and Tordillo were unable to discharge this burden, and respondents correctly pointed out that the original complaint was for illegal dismissal, which raises an issue different from a claim of constructive dismissal.
• 13th Month Pay: The Court agreed with respondents and the Court of Appeals that being pakyaw workers, petitioners are excluded from receiving 13th month pay. The Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 851 excludes employers of those who are paid on purely commission, boundary, or task basis, and those who are paid a fixed amount for performing a specific work, irrespective of the time consumed in the performance thereof. Because petitioners work on pakyaw basis as sorters, revisers, and packers, their jobs are task based, and they are excluded from the coverage of those who can claim 13th month pay.

• Prevention from reporting to work constitutes dismissal — When an employee is able and willing to work, evidenced by their proceeding to the company premises, and the employer arbitrarily prevents them from working for no known and valid reason, then there is illegal dismissal. The Court applied this doctrine to find that the 12 petitioners were illegally dismissed when security guards prevented them from entering the company premises.
• Abandonment of employment — To constitute abandonment, the employer must prove that: (1) the employee must have failed to report to work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) there must have been a clear intention on the part of the employee to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by some overt act. Abandonment is essentially a matter of intent and cannot be presumed from the occurrence of certain equivocal acts; there must be a concurrence of the two elements. The Court applied this doctrine to reject respondents' theory that petitioners abandoned their jobs, finding that the second element was lacking.
• Equipoise doctrine in labor cases — Where both parties in a labor case have not presented substantial evidence to prove their allegations, the evidence is considered to be in equipoise, and the scales of justice are tilted in favor of labor. The Court applied this doctrine following Hubilla vs. HSY Marketing Ltd., Co. to consider the 12 petitioners as having been illegally dismissed.
• Constructive dismissal — Constructive dismissal does not always entail a forthright dismissal or diminution in rank, compensation, benefit, and privileges; there can also be constructive dismissal where an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by employers becomes so unbearable for the employees that it could foreclose any choice by the latter except to forego their continued employment. The burden to prove the circumstances that led to the constructive dismissal is on the employee. The Court applied this doctrine to find that Busel and Tordillo failed to discharge this burden.

• "The act of preventing an employee from reporting to work is considered dismissal, and the lack of just or authorized cause and procedural due process makes it illegal." — This is the opening statement of the decision and articulates the core ratio decidendi of the case.
• "When an employee is able and willing to work, evidenced by their proceeding to the company premises, and the employer arbitrarily prevents them from working for no known and valid reason, then there is illegal dismissal." — This passage defines the standard for determining illegal dismissal through prevention from reporting to work.
• "Where both parties in a labor case have not presented substantial evidence to prove their allegations, the evidence is considered to be in equipoise. In such a case, the scales of justice are tilted in favor of labor. Thus, petitioners are hereby considered to have been illegally dismissed." — This quotation from Hubilla v. HSY Marketing Ltd., Co. states the equipoise doctrine applied by the Court to resolve the case in favor of the 12 petitioners.
• "To constitute abandonment, the employer must prove that 'first, the employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and second, [that] there must have been a clear intention on the part of the employee to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by some overt act.' Abandonment is essentially a matter of intent. It cannot be presumed from the occurrence of certain equivocal acts." — This quotation from Hubilla states the twin requirements for abandonment of employment, which the Court applied to reject respondents' theory.

• Hubilla vs. HSY Marketing Ltd., Co., 823 Phil. 358 (2018) — Controlling precedent followed by the Court. The case involved employees who were likewise prevented from entering their employer's stores, and the Court cited it for the doctrines on abandonment of employment and the equipoise doctrine in labor cases.
• Ascent Skills Human Resources Services, Inc. vs. Manuel, 912 Phil. 971 (2021) — Followed by the Court for the doctrine on constructive dismissal, particularly the burden on the employee to prove the circumstances that led to the constructive dismissal.

• Section 3, Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 851 — This provision excludes employers of those who are paid on purely commission, boundary, or task basis, and those who are paid a fixed amount for performing a specific work, irrespective of the time consumed in the performance thereof, from the coverage of the 13th month pay decree. The Court applied this provision to deny the petitioners' claim for 13th month pay, as they were pakyaw workers.

Lazaro-Javier, M. Lopez, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concurred. J. Lopez, J., was on official business.