Amion vs. Chiongson

The right of an accused to counsel of his own choice is not absolute and must yield to the court's duty to expedite the trial and prevent dilatory tactics. The Court held that appointing a counsel de oficio during the absence of the accused's retained counsel, pursuant to the continuous trial system, does not violate the right to due process or counsel, especially when the accused's own actions cause the delay.

Baltazar D. Amion, a police officer, was charged with murder in Criminal Case No. 94-15772 before Judge Roberto S. Chiongson. From the time Judge Chiongson assumed office, the case had not moved due to the repeated absences of Amion's retained counsel, Atty. Reynaldo C. Depasucat. To avoid further delay, and noting the inconvenience to prosecution witnesses who traveled from afar, Judge Chiongson appointed Atty. Manuel Lao-Ong of the Free Legal Aid Office as counsel de oficio for the scheduled hearings on March 28 and 29, 1996. Amion vehemently objected to the appointment, insisting on his right to be defended by his retained counsel, and subsequently filed an administrative case against the judge.

• The Murder Charge: Complainant Baltazar D. Amion, a police officer, was the accused in Criminal Case No. 94-15772 for murder, pending before Judge Roberto S. Chiongson.
• Repeated Absences of Retained Counsel: Upon assuming office, Judge Chiongson set hearings, but Amion's retained counsel, Atty. Depasucat, repeatedly failed to appear. On January 19, 1996, after another absence, the court appointed a PAO lawyer who declined representation due to office policy regarding accused with retained counsel. Atty. Depasucat again failed to appear on February 21, 1996.
• Appointment of Counsel De Oficio: Due to the continued absence of retained counsel and the inconvenience to prosecution witnesses traveling from afar, Judge Chiongson appointed Atty. Manuel Lao-Ong from the Free Legal Aid Office as counsel de oficio for the March 28 and 29, 1996 hearings. The court explicitly stated that the appointment was without prejudice to the appearance of counsel de parte.
• Objection and Dilatory Tactics: Amion objected to the de oficio counsel, claiming violation of his right to counsel of choice. Over the subsequent months, Amion went through multiple counsels (Atty. Morana, Atty. Sabio) who filed repeated motions for inhibition and postponement, further delaying the proceedings. Atty. Sabio failed to appear at a scheduled hearing despite the denial of his motion for postponement.
• Prior Incidents: Amion also charged Judge Chiongson with oppression regarding a slander case where Amion was the offended party (which the judge dismissed via demurrer) and gross ignorance of the law regarding a B.P. 22 case tried in Amion's absence.

• Petitioner maintained that the appointment of a counsel de oficio despite his objection constituted a clear violation of his right to due process and a deprivation of his constitutional and statutory right to be defended by counsel of his own choice.
• Petitioner argued that the appointed counsel de oficio lacked sufficient knowledge of the case and that no prior conference was held.
• Petitioner argued that Judge Chiongson exhibited oppression and bias by acting with undue haste to terminate the murder case, whereas the judge took a year to dismiss a separate slander case where petitioner was the offended party.
• Petitioner charged the judge with gross ignorance of the law for trying a B.P. 22 case against petitioner in the absence of his counsel.

• Respondent countered that the administrative case was filed solely because he denied petitioner's plea for inhibition.
• Respondent argued that the appointment of a counsel de oficio was justified due to the vexatious and oppressive delay caused by petitioner and his retained counsel, who repeatedly failed to appear.
• Respondent asserted that petitioner and his lawyers employed dilatory tactics to frustrate the ends of justice, including filing multiple motions for inhibition and a Petition for Certiorari to delay the case.
• Respondent explained that the slander case was dismissed via demurrer because the utterance in question was an expression of exasperation, not slander, and that the B.P. 22 charge had no connection to petitioner based on the records.

• Procedural Issues: N/A
• Substantive Issues: Whether respondent judge committed ignorance of the law or oppression by appointing a counsel de oficio over the accused's objection, thereby allegedly violating the accused's right to counsel of choice and due process. Whether respondent judge committed oppression and gross ignorance of the law in handling prior cases (slander and B.P. 22 cases).

• Procedural: N/A
• Substantive: The Court held that the right of an accused to counsel of his own choice is not absolute and must yield to the prompt administration of justice. The preference in the choice of counsel under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution pertains more aptly to a person under custodial investigation; even if extended to an accused in a criminal prosecution, such preferential discretion cannot be so absolute as to preclude other competent counsels from representing the accused. Because the accused-complainant and his retained counsel employed dilatory tactics, the judge's appointment of a counsel de oficio to prevent further delay under the continuous trial system did not constitute ignorance of the law or a violation of due process. A party cannot feign denial of due process when he had the opportunity to be heard but forfeited it through his own machinations. Regarding the charges of oppression and gross ignorance of the law relative to the slander and B.P. 22 cases, the Court found that respondent judge's explanations demonstrated that the allegations had neither legal nor factual basis and were merely conjectural. The judge's actuations in the murder case merited acknowledgment for demonstrating zeal to expedite the case and render justice as mandated by the Code of Judicial Conduct.

• Right to Counsel of Choice is Not Absolute — While an accused has the right to counsel, the preference in the choice of counsel is not an absolute and arbitrary discretion that precludes other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling the defense. The accused's choice must yield to the prompt administration of justice; the pace of a criminal prosecution cannot be entirely dictated by the accused to the detriment of the case's resolution.
• Appointment of Counsel De Oficio to Prevent Delay — There is no denial of the right to counsel where a counsel de oficio is appointed during the absence of the accused's counsel de parte pursuant to the court's desire to finish the case as early as practicable under the continuous trial system, especially when the absence is part of dilatory machinations.

• "Even if we were to extend the application of the concept of 'preference in the choice of counsel' to an accused in a criminal prosecution, such preferential discretion cannot partake of a discretion so absolute and arbitrary as to make the choice of counsel refer exclusively to the predilection of the accused."
• "Moreover, there is no denial of the right to counsel where a counsel de oficio was appointed during the absence of the accused's counsel de parte pursuant to the court's desire to finish the case as early as practicable under the continuous trial system."

• People v. Barasina, 229 SCRA 450 — Followed. Held that the word "preferably" under Section 12(1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does not convey that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive to preclude other equally competent attorneys, as this would allow the accused to obstruct the proceedings. The Court extended this principle to an accused in a criminal prosecution.
• Lacambra v. Ramos, 232 SCRA 435 — Followed. Noted the series of legal maneuvers and repeated importunings of the accused or his counsel which resulted in the protracted trial of the case, making a mockery of the judicial process.
• People v. Mallari, 212 SCRA 777 — Followed. Held that an accused was not deprived of his substantive and constitutional right to due process as he was accorded all opportunities to be heard but forfeited this right by not appearing in court with his counsel.
• People v. Acol, 232 SCRA 406 — Followed. Stated that a party cannot feign denial of due process when he had the opportunity to present his side.
• People v. Macagaling, 237 SCRA 299 — Followed. Held that there is no denial of the right to counsel where a counsel de oficio is appointed during the absence of the accused's counsel de parte to finish the case under the continuous trial system.

• Article III, Section 12(1), 1987 Constitution — Provides that any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. The Court clarified that this preference pertains more aptly to custodial investigation rather than a criminal prosecution.
• Article III, Section 14(2), 1987 Constitution — Provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. The Court noted that this provision does not grant the accused an absolute right to choose counsel to the point of delaying the trial.
• Code of Judicial Conduct — Mandates that a judge should administer justice impartially and without delay. The Court relied on this to commend the judge's zeal in expediting the case.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ.