Ambray vs. Tsourous

Forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive, and convincing evidence; a notarized deed of sale enjoys the prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution, and the direct testimony of a witness with personal knowledge of the signing prevails over an expert questioned-documents report. The Deed of Sale dated January 16, 1978 and TCT No. T-41382 in petitioners’ names were accordingly upheld.

Petitioners Damaso T. Ambray and Ceferino T. Ambray, Jr. are siblings of respondents, all children of the late Ceferino Ambray, Sr. and Estela Trias, except Sylvia A. Tsourous. The controversy concerns Lot 2-C, a subdivision lot originally part of Lot 2 owned by the parents in San Pablo City, Laguna. Before the civil complaint, respondents had filed a criminal falsification case against petitioners over the same deed; petitioners were acquitted. The present case is a civil action for annulment of title, reconveyance, and damages.

Petitioners Damaso T. Ambray and Ceferino T. Ambray, Jr. and respondents Sylvia A. Tsourous, Carmencita Ambray-Laurel, Hedy Ambray-Azores, Vivien Ambray-Yatco, Nancy Ambray-Escudero, Maristela Ambray-Ilagan, Elizabeth Ambray-Soriano, Ma. Fe Luisa Ambray-Arcilla, and Cristina Ambray-Labit are siblings, except Sylvia, being the children of the late Ceferino Ambray, Sr. and Estela Trias. Ceferino, Sr. and Estela owned several properties, including Lot 2 of subdivision plan Pcs-12441 in San Pablo City, Laguna, with an area of 4,147 square meters, covered by TCT No. T-11259. On December 28, 1977, Ceferino, Sr. mortgaged Lot 2 to Manila Bank for P180,000.00; the mortgage was discharged on September 16, 1984. Sometime in August 1984, Lot 2 was subdivided into Lot 2-A, Lot 2-B, and Lot 2-C, resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. T-11259. Lot 2-C was registered in Ceferino, Sr.’s name pursuant to his letter dated August 29, 1984, and TCT No. T-22749 was issued in his name, married to Estela.

By virtue of a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 16, 1978, Ceferino, Sr., with Estela’s consent, allegedly sold “a portion of lot 2 of the consolidation subd. plan (LRC) Pcs-12441” to petitioners for P150,000.00. The Deed of Sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of San Pablo City only on February 5, 1996. In June 1996, Maristela discovered that TCT No. T-22749 covering Lot 2-C had been cancelled and that TCT No. T-41382 had been issued in petitioners’ names. Respondents then filed a criminal case for falsification of public document against petitioners before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of San Pablo City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 39153. In a Decision dated October 30, 2000, the MTCC acquitted petitioners for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. During that case, Estela testified and identified the signatures on the Deed of Sale as hers and Ceferino, Sr.’s, and Atty. Zosimo Tanalega, the notary public who notarized the Deed of Sale, corroborated her testimony and stated that he was present when the Ambray spouses affixed their signatures.

Respondents thereafter filed a complaint for annulment of title, reconveyance, and damages against petitioners and Estela, docketed as Civil Case No. SP-5831(01), alleging that TCT No. T-41382 and the Deed of Sale were null and void because the signatures of Ceferino, Sr. and Estela thereon were forgeries. Defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that the issue on the authenticity of the signatures had already been passed upon in the falsification case where petitioners were acquitted, and that the matter was res judicata. The RTC granted the motion and dismissed the case on June 6, 2002, but on appeal the CA reversed the dismissal on September 29, 2005, found that res judicata did not apply, and remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings.

Before the RTC, petitioners filed their answer and disclosed that Estela had died on August 15, 2002. They averred that respondents were aware of the conveyance of Lot 2-C to them, that respondents’ action had prescribed, and that it was barred by prior judgment and res judicata. Subsequently, citing an Affidavit dated February 18, 2008 executed by Ma. Fe Luisa, the rest of the respondents moved that she be dropped as a plaintiff, which the RTC granted; she was later impleaded as a party-defendant in respondents’ supplemental complaint and adopted petitioners’ answer with counterclaim.

The RTC found that respondents proved by a preponderance of evidence that the Deed of Sale was spurious and of dubious origin. It held that at the time of its execution in 1978, Ceferino, Sr. could not have sold a specific portion of Lot 2 to petitioners because Lot 2 was subdivided only in 1984. It also noted that after the subdivision, Ceferino, Sr. requested the Register of Deeds to register Lot 2-C in his name, which he would not have done had he already sold it; that he leased Lot 2-C to MB Finance Corporation from 1986 to 1989 as owner; that after his death, Damaso, as administrator, renewed the lease; and that the Deed of Sale was registered only in 1996. The RTC found petitioners’ explanation that Estela kept the Deed of Sale until she became sickly and gave it to Damaso to be a mere afterthought. On the forgery issue, the RTC noted the CA’s opinion in CA-G.R. CV No. 75507 that the MTCC made no categorical finding as to falsification and merely concluded that the prosecution failed to establish petitioners’ participation.

• Forgery and Due Execution: Petitioners maintained that the Deed of Sale was genuine and duly executed, pointing to Estela’s testimony in the falsification case identifying the signatures as hers and Ceferino, Sr.’s, corroborated by Atty. Tanalega, the notary public present at the signing.
• Res Judicata / Conclusiveness of Judgment: Petitioners argued that the issue on the authenticity of the signatures of Ceferino, Sr. and Estela on the Deed of Sale had already been passed upon in the falsification case where they were acquitted, hence the matter was res judicata.
• Prescription and Awareness: In their answer, petitioners averred that respondents were aware of the conveyance of Lot 2-C to them and that respondents’ action had prescribed.
• Error of the RTC and CA: Petitioners imputed error upon the RTC in declaring null and void the Deed of Sale and TCT No. T-41382, and later sought reversal of the CA’s affirmance of that ruling.

• Forgery: Respondents alleged that TCT No. T-41382 and the Deed of Sale were null and void because the signatures of Ceferino, Sr. and Estela thereon were forgeries.
• Questioned Documents Report: Respondents relied on Questioned Documents Report No. 266-397 dated March 24, 1997 issued by NBI Document Examiner II Antonio R. Magbojos, stating that the signatures of Ceferino, Sr. and Estela on the Deed of Sale, when compared to standard sample signatures, were not written by one and the same person.
• Damages and Attorney’s Fees: Respondents questioned the RTC’s refusal to grant damages and attorney’s fees in their favor, although the CA later denied moral damages for lack of factual basis, and consequently exemplary damages, and held attorney’s fees not warranted.

• Nullification of Deed and Title: Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s nullification of the January 16, 1978 Deed of Sale and TCT No. T-41382 covering Lot 2-C in petitioners’ names.
• Forgery: Whether respondents proved by clear, positive, and convincing evidence that the signatures of Ceferino, Sr. and Estela on the Deed of Sale were forged.
• Former Testimony: Whether Estela’s testimony in the falsification case is admissible under Section 47, Rule 130 and sufficient to establish the genuineness and due execution of the Deed of Sale.
• Res Judicata: Whether the falsification case and petitioners’ acquittal bar the civil complaint under res judicata or conclusiveness of judgment.
• Validity of Sale of Unspecified Portion: Whether the sale of “a portion of Lot 2” before its subdivision in 1984 is valid under Article 1463 of the Civil Code.

• Nullification of Deed and Title: Yes. The CA erred; the petition is meritorious, the Deed of Sale and TCT No. T-41382 are valid, and the complaint is dismissed.
• Forgery: No. Forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive, and convincing evidence; the NBI report was expert or circumstantial evidence and did not overcome the direct testimony and the notarized deed.
• Former Testimony: Yes. Estela’s former testimony is admissible under Section 47, Rule 130, all requisites being present, and directly established the genuineness of the signatures.
• Res Judicata: Not applicable. Res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment is of doubtful application because the MTCC did not categorically pronounce that the Deed of Sale was not falsified; it merely found no participation by petitioners.
• Validity of Sale of Unspecified Portion: Yes. Under Article 1463 of the Civil Code, the sole owner of a thing may sell an undivided interest therein; Ceferino, Sr. could validly convey an unspecified portion of Lot 2 before subdivision.

• Nullification of Deed and Title: The Court acknowledged the general rule that factual findings are not reviewed under Rule 45, but found a confluence of exceptions, allowing it to pass upon the evidence. The core issue was the validity of the Deed of Sale and the genuineness of the signatures. The RTC and CA both erred in finding the Deed spurious. The authenticity and due execution of the Deed must be upheld, and TCT No. T-41382 remains valid. The complaint should be dismissed.
• Forgery: Forgery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear, positive, and convincing evidence, with the burden on the party alleging it. It can only be established by comparing the alleged forged signature with the authentic genuine signature. Under Rule 132, Section 22, genuineness of handwriting may be proved by a witness who saw the person write or by comparison. The presumption of validity and regularity prevails over allegations of forgery and fraud. Direct testimony of a witness physically present at the signing and with personal knowledge prevails over expert testimony, which is indirect or circumstantial. Respondents’ only direct evidence was NBI Questioned Documents Report No. 266-397 dated March 24, 1997 by Magbojos, stating the signatures were not written by one and the same person. Petitioners offered Estela’s testimony in the falsification case identifying the signatures as hers and Ceferino, Sr.’s, corroborated by Atty. Tanalega, the notary public present at the signing. The Court gave greater evidentiary weight to Estela’s testimony and the notary’s corroboration. Thus, forgery was not established.
• Former Testimony: Section 47, Rule 130 allows the testimony of a deceased or unable witness, given in a former case involving the same parties and subject matter, to be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine. The requisites are: (a) the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) the testimony was given in a former case between the same parties or their representatives; (c) the former case involved the same subject although on different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to is the same; and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine. The reasons are necessity and trustworthiness, and a proper predicate must be laid. Estela died on August 15, 2002 during the pendency of the proceedings before the RTC, before the presentation of evidence. She had testified on direct and cross-examination in the falsification case and affirmed that the signatures on the Deed of Sale were hers and her deceased husband’s. The parties in the falsification case were respondents and petitioners, and the subject matter was the same: the genuineness and authenticity of the signatures. Her former testimony was therefore admissible and deserved significant consideration. She confirmed the genuineness and authenticity of the questioned signatures, making the Deed valid and duly executed.
• Res Judicata: Petitioners invoked res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment. The Court found its application doubtful because the MTCC in the falsification case did not categorically pronounce that the Deed of Sale was not falsified; it merely concluded that petitioners had no participation in any alleged falsification. Nevertheless, Estela’s testimony established the genuineness and due execution of the Deed, which effectively conveyed title over Lot 2-C to petitioners.
• Validity of Sale of Unspecified Portion: The RTC found it puzzling that the Deed of Sale did not specifically mention the exact area sold, disposing only of “a portion of lot 2” without metes and bounds, and concluded that Ceferino, Sr. could not have sold a specific portion because Lot 2 was subdivided only in 1984. Article 1463 of the Civil Code provides that the sole owner of a thing may sell an undivided interest therein. As Ceferino, Sr. was the sole owner of the original Lot 2 from which Lot 2-C came, he could validly convey an unspecified portion thereof. The disposition of Lot 2-C to petitioners, a portion of Lot 2 yet to be subdivided in 1978, was therefore valid. The registration of Lot 2-C in Ceferino, Sr.’s name in 1984 was explained by the parents’ apprehension that their sons might mortgage or squander the property while they were alive; petitioners did not demand immediate registration because they never questioned their father’s decisions during his lifetime. This also explained why Ceferino, Sr. leased Lot 2-C to third parties and why Damaso renewed the lease in his father’s name after his death. The delay in transferring title was due to Estela keeping the Deed of Sale until her poor health prompted her to give it to petitioners. The delay in registration neither affected nor invalidated the sale in light of the authenticity of the Deed. Thus, the RTC’s inferences were inconsequential.

• Forgery — burden and quantum of proof — Forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive, and convincing evidence; the burden lies on the party alleging forgery. Applied: respondents’ NBI Questioned Documents Report did not meet this standard against the direct testimony and notarized deed.
• Genuineness of handwriting — Rule 132, Section 22 — Genuineness of handwriting may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of a person because he has seen the person write, or by comparison with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. Applied: Estela and the notary provided direct proof of the signatures.
• Presumption of authenticity and due execution of a notarized contract — A duly notarized contract enjoys the prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution and the full faith and credence attached to a public instrument; to overturn this, evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant. Applied: the notarized Deed of Sale was presumed valid, and respondents failed to overcome the presumption.
• Direct testimony prevails over expert evidence — The testimony of a witness who was physically present at the signing and had personal knowledge prevails over the testimony of an expert witness, which is indirect or circumstantial at best. Applied: Estela’s and the notary’s testimony outweighed the NBI expert report.
• Former testimony rule — Section 47, Rule 130 — The testimony or deposition of a deceased or unable witness, given in a former case involving the same parties and subject matter, may be admitted against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine. Requisites:
  • (a) the witness is dead or unable to testify;
  • (b) the testimony was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties or those representing the same interests;
  • (c) the former case involved the same subject as the present case, although on different causes of action;
  • (d) the issue testified to in the former trial is the same issue in the present case; and
  • (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case. Applied: Estela’s testimony in the falsification case was admissible because she died during the pendency of the civil case, the parties and subject matter were the same, and respondents had cross-examined her.
• Res judicata / conclusiveness of judgment — The principle is of doubtful application where the prior criminal case did not categorically pronounce that the deed was not falsified and merely concluded that the accused had no participation in the alleged falsification. Applied: the Court did not rely on res judicata but instead upheld the Deed through Estela’s former testimony.
• Article 1463, Civil Code — sale of undivided interest — The sole owner of a thing may sell an undivided interest therein. Applied: Ceferino, Sr., as sole owner of Lot 2, could validly sell an unspecified portion later identified as Lot 2-C even before subdivision.
• Delay in registration does not invalidate the sale — The delay in registering a deed of sale neither affects nor invalidates the sale, especially where the deed’s authenticity is established. Applied: the 1978 Deed of Sale registered only in 1996 remained valid.

• "As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence, and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery." — States the quantum and burden of proof for forgery, the ratio for rejecting respondents’ claim.
• "Corollary thereto, jurisprudence states that the presumption of validity and regularity prevails over allegations of forgery and fraud. As against direct evidence consisting of the testimony of a witness who was physically present at the signing of the contract and who had personal knowledge thereof, the testimony of an expert witness constitutes indirect or circumstantial evidence at best." — Articulates the evidentiary hierarchy applied to prefer Estela’s and the notary’s testimony over the NBI report.
• "The reasons for the admissibility of testimony taken at a former trial or proceeding are the necessity for the testimony and its trustworthiness." — States the rationale for the former-testimony rule under Section 47, Rule 130, which the Court applied to admit Estela’s testimony.
• "As Ceferino, Sr. was the sole owner of the original Lot 2 from whence came Lot 2-C, he is therefore allowed by law to convey or sell an unspecified portion thereof." — Applies Article 1463 of the Civil Code to validate the sale of an unspecified portion before subdivision.

• Maersk-Filipinas Crewing Inc. vs. Avestruz, G.R. No. 207010, February 18, 2015, 751 SCRA 161 — Cited for the general rule that factual findings are not reviewed in a Rule 45 petition and for the exceptions allowing review.
• New City Builders, Inc. vs. NLRC, 499 Phil. 207 (2005) — Cited for the enumeration of exceptions to the rule against factual review.
• Gepulle-Garbo vs. Garabato, G.R. No. 200013, January 14, 2015, 746 SCRA 189 — Cited for the rule that forgery must be proved by clear, positive, and convincing evidence and by comparison with genuine signatures.
• Bautista vs. CA, 479 Phil. 787 (2004) — Cited for the presumption of validity and regularity of a notarized contract and for the rule that direct testimony prevails over expert evidence.
• Samalio vs. CA, 494 Phil. 456 (2005) — Cited for the requisites of the former-testimony rule under Section 47, Rule 130.
• Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 678 Phil. 358 (2011) — Cited for the requirement that a proper predicate be laid before former testimony may be admitted.

• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Governs petitions for review on certiorari; although factual findings are generally not reviewed, the Court applied the recognized exceptions to examine the evidence.
• Rule 132, Section 22, Rules of Court — Provides the manner of proving genuineness of handwriting; applied in weighing the NBI report against Estela’s and the notary’s testimony.
• Section 47, Rule 130, Rules on Evidence — The former-testimony rule; applied to admit Estela’s testimony from the falsification case because she had died, the parties and subject matter were the same, and respondents had the opportunity to cross-examine her.
• Article 1463, Civil Code — The sole owner of a thing may sell an undivided interest therein; applied to uphold the sale of an unspecified portion of Lot 2 before subdivision.

Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Lucas P. Bersamin, and Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa concurred. Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno was on official leave.