Ambil, Jr. vs. COMELEC

The Court held that a motion for reconsideration before the Comelec en banc is a mandatory prerequisite before a decision, resolution, or final order of a Comelec Division may be elevated to the Supreme Court via certiorari, and absent such exhaustion of administrative remedies, the petition must be dismissed for prematurity.

Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. and Jose T. Ramirez contested the position of Governor of Eastern Samar in the May 11, 1998 elections. Ambil was proclaimed the winner. Ramirez filed an election protest with the Comelec First Division. Commissioner Japal M. Guiani prepared a proposed resolution favoring Ramirez but retired before it could be promulgated. Commissioner Rufino S. Javier replaced him. The parties received a purported resolution signed by Guiani, but the Comelec First Division declared it a "useless scrap of paper" due to lack of valid promulgation. Later, Commissioners Tancangco and Javier recommended proceeding with the promulgation of the Guiani resolution, prompting the First Division to set a new promulgation date.

• Election and Protest: During the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Ambil and respondent Ramirez were candidates for Governor of Eastern Samar. The Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed Ambil the winner with 46,547 votes against Ramirez's 45,934 votes. On June 4, 1998, Ramirez filed an election protest (EPC Case No. 98-29) with the Comelec, challenging the results in 201 precincts. The case was assigned to the First Division, composed of Commissioner Julio F. Desamito (presiding), Commissioner Japal M. Guiani, and Commissioner Luzviminda G. Tancangco.
• The Guiani Resolution: On January 27, 2000, Commissioner Guiani prepared and signed a proposed resolution favoring Ramirez. Commissioner Desamito dissented, while Commissioner Tancangco reserved her vote, stating she wished to see both positions before making a final decision. On February 15, 2000, Commissioner Guiani retired from the service. On March 3, 2000, the President appointed Commissioner Rufino S. Javier to the vacated seat; Javier assumed office on April 4, 2000.
• Premature Release and Rejection: On or about February 24, 2000, the parties received a purported thirteen-page resolution promulgated on February 14, 2000, signed by Commissioners Guiani and Tancangco, with Commissioner Desamito dissenting, declaring Ramirez the victor. On February 28, 2000, the Comelec First Division declared the resolution a "useless scrap of paper which should be ignored by the parties" because there was no valid promulgation. The Clerk of the First Division denied releasing the resolution, disowned the initials indicating promulgation as a forgery, and stated there was no record of promulgation in the Electoral Contests and Adjudication Department.
• Attempted Promulgation: On March 31, 2000, the Comelec First Division set the promulgation for April 6, 2000. Ambil filed a motion to cancel, and the Division postponed the promulgation. On June 14, 2000, Commissioners Tancangco and Javier sent a joint memorandum to Commissioner Desamito recommending the promulgation of the Guiani resolution notwithstanding jurisprudence to the contrary, arguing that the Commission's policy is that the date the ponente signed controls. On June 15, 2000, the Comelec First Division issued an order setting the promulgation on June 20, 2000.
• Petition to Supreme Court: Without waiting for the June 20, 2000 promulgation, Ambil filed the instant petition on June 19, 2000, seeking to annul the June 15 order and prohibit the Comelec from promulgating the Guiani resolution.

• Petitioner maintained that the Comelec First Division acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in scheduling the promulgation.
• Petitioner argued that the "Guiani resolution" is void because the ponente, Commissioner Guiani, had retired before promulgation; thus, his vote was automatically invalidated and the incoming commissioner could not adopt the retired commissioner's written opinion.
• Petitioner contended that the Division must deliberate anew on the case and promulgate a resolution reached after such deliberation.

• Respondent Ramirez admitted that the proposed resolution of Commissioner Guiani was no longer valid after his retirement.
• Respondent Ramirez argued, however, that the Comelec First Division, its membership still constituting a majority, must elevate the protest case to the Comelec en banc until resolved with finality.
• The Solicitor General interposed no objection to the petition, submitting that the Guiani resolution is deemed vacated by the retirement of Commissioner Guiani.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the petition for certiorari is premature for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, specifically the filing of a motion for reconsideration before the Comelec en banc.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the Comelec First Division acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in scheduling the promulgation of the resolution.
  • Whether the "Guiani resolution" is valid and may be promulgated despite the ponente's retirement prior to promulgation.

• Procedural: The Court ruled the petition premature for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Under the Constitution and the Comelec Rules of Procedure, a motion for reconsideration before the Comelec en banc is a mandatory prerequisite before a decision, resolution, or final order of a Comelec Division may be elevated to the Supreme Court via certiorari. The Court emphasized that the recognized exceptions to the exhaustion of administrative remedies do not apply to election cases within the jurisdiction of the Comelec in Division, where a motion for reconsideration is mandatory by constitutional fiat. Because the petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration and because the assailed order was merely a notice of promulgation rather than a final resolution, the petition was dismissible for prematurity.
• Substantive: The Court ruled that the Comelec First Division did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the notice of promulgation. The Court refused to speculate that the Comelec would promulgate a void resolution, presuming instead that the Commission would obey the Constitution and the law. However, the Court explicitly declared the "Guiani resolution" void. A final decision or resolution becomes binding only after promulgation; one who is no longer a member of the Commission at the time of promulgation cannot validly take part in that decision. Because Commissioner Guiani vacated his office before the resolution was signed by a majority and duly promulgated, his vote was automatically invalidated. Before a decision is signed and promulgated, there is no valid decision to speak of, as a ponente may change their mind at any time before promulgation.

• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies in Comelec Cases — A motion for reconsideration before the Comelec en banc is a mandatory prerequisite before a decision, resolution, or final order of a Comelec Division may be elevated to the Supreme Court via certiorari. The recognized exceptions to the exhaustion of administrative remedies do not apply to election cases within the jurisdiction of the Comelec in Division, where elevation to the en banc is constitutionally mandated.
• Validity of Decisions Promulgated After a Member's Retirement — A final decision or resolution becomes binding only after it is promulgated. A member who is no longer part of the Commission at the time of promulgation cannot validly take part in that resolution. The vote cast by a member after deliberation is understood to be subject to confirmation at the time of signing and promulgation; if the member vacates office before promulgation, the vote is automatically invalidated. Before a decision is signed and promulgated, there is no valid decision, as members retain the privilege of changing their opinion until the last moment.

• "A final decision or resolution becomes binding only after it is promulgated and not before. Accordingly, one who is no longer a member of the Commission at the time the final decision or resolution is promulgated cannot validly take part in that resolution or decision."
• "The sea of suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks upon it is without rudder or compass."

• Kho v. Commission on Elections, 344 Phil. 878 [1997] — Distinguished. The Court noted that in Kho, the Comelec Division denied the prayer to elevate the case to the en banc because the orders were interlocutory, leaving the aggrieved party no choice but to seek recourse in the Supreme Court. This factual circumstance was absent in the present case, where no motion for reconsideration was filed.
• Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 [1949] — Followed. Established the doctrine that a decision is the one signed by the Justices and duly promulgated; a vote cast is subject to confirmation at the time of signing, and a member who vacates office before promulgation cannot validly take part in the decision.
• Jamil v. Commission on Elections, 283 SCRA 349 [1997] — Followed. Cited for the proposition that at any time before promulgation, the ponente may change his mind, and a retired member's vote is automatically invalidated.
• Reyes v. Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro, 244 SCRA 41 [1995] — Followed. Held that the Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari an interlocutory order or a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections; review must be by the Comelec en banc via motion for reconsideration.

• Article IX, Section 7, 1987 Constitution — Requires that each constitutional commission decide by a majority vote of all its members, and any decision, order, or ruling may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt. The Court interpreted this to mean final decisions of the Comelec en banc, not interlocutory orders or division decisions.
• Article IX-C, Section 3, 1987 Constitution — Provides that motions for reconsideration of decisions of a Comelec Division shall be decided by the Commission en banc. The Court applied this as a mandatory prerequisite before judicial review.
• Rule 3, Section 5(c), Comelec Rules of Procedure — Stipulates that any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a Division shall be resolved by the Commission en banc. Applied to show that the petitioner had an available administrative remedy.
• Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Requires that there be no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for certiorari to lie. The Court held a motion for reconsideration before the Comelec en banc constitutes such a plain and adequate remedy.

Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Purisima, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur. Kapunan, J., voted for this ponencia during the deliberations on 17 October 2000.

• De Leon, Jr., J. — Dissented, arguing that the petition falls under exceptions to the exhaustion of administrative remedies because the challenged order is a patent nullity and there is great necessity to resolve the election protest with dispatch. The dissent emphasized that the Joint Memorandum of Commissioners Tancangco and Javier explicitly showed that the Comelec intended to promulgate the void Guiani resolution, thereby committing grave abuse of discretion. Citing Araneta v. Dinglasan and Consolidated Bank v. IAC, the dissent maintained that the ponencia "died" with the ponente's retirement and could not be promulgated thereafter. Joined by Davide, Jr., C.J., Mendoza, and Quisumbing, JJ.