Alvero vs. Reas

Ten years' actual, open, public, continuous possession under claim of exclusive ownership adverse to all other claimants vests full and complete title by acquisitive prescription under Section 41, Act 190, even without good faith and just title and however the occupancy commenced. An unexecuted land registration decision, without entry of final decree and issuance of certificate of title under Sections 41, 45 and 46 of Act 496, does not confer indefeasible registered title and does not toll prescription.

Petitioners Rufino Alvero, Pedro Alvero, Fortunata Alvero-Ramirez and Eustaquio Bayot and respondents Mariano Reas and Paula Vda. de Alvero are rival claimants deriving title from the late Cipriana Alvero through her heirs, including Alejandra Alvero, Rufino Alvero, Norberto Alvero and Mariano Reas. The governing statutory backdrop includes the Land Registration Act (Act 496) on when registered title becomes indefeasible, and the Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190) on acquisitive prescription for prescription already running before the New Civil Code.

On 21 June 1937, the Court of Land Registration in Tacloban, Leyte, in its Case No. 235 (G.L.R.O. Record No. 51534), rendered a decision adjudicating the disputed land in favor of Cipriana Alvero. No final decree was entered and no certificate of title was ever issued thereunder. According to petitioners, Alejandra Alvero acquired the land from Cipriana by succession and by purchase of the shares of her co-heirs, and petitioners succeeded to Alejandra's rights.

According to respondents, four heirs of Cipriana — Rufino Alvero, Alejandra Alvero, Mariano Reas and Norberto Alvero, deceased husband of Paula Vda. de Alvero — verbally partitioned the land in 1938, the other heirs having received other properties, and each partitioner thereafter possessed his respective share as exclusive owner. After Alejandra's death in 1940, the persons who appeared to have taken possession of the land left by her were Rufino Alvero, Norberto Alvero and Mariano Reas, while Eustaquio Bayot and Fortunata Alvero-Ramirez, who derived title from Alejandra, exercised no right of possession and ownership over their supposed shares. As early as 1948, Norberto Alvero leased his share in the partition to third persons where a sawmill and lumberyard were installed, with petitioner Rufino Alvero acting as instrumental witness to the lease contract.

On 12 October 1949, Mariano Reas, Norberto Alvero and Rufino Alvero ratified or confirmed in a public instrument their long-time possession by partitioning the land among themselves into four parts, with Rufino Alvero taking two shares, identified as Lots 2 and 7. These portions were subsequently declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declarations Nos. 11592, 11593, 11594 and 11595, a fact admitted in paragraph 6 of the complaint. When municipal roads later traversed the lands, compensation for the right-of-way was paid to these possessors among others as recognized owners.

On 12 February 1960, petitioners commenced suit in the Court of First Instance of Leyte to quiet title to the parcel in Nalibunan, Abuyog, Leyte covered by Tax Declaration No. 565, to recover the same from respondents and to collect damages. The trial court found for petitioners on the strength of the 1937 registration decision and the heirs' sales in favor of Alejandra Alvero. The Court of Appeals, by contrast, found preponderantly proven actual, open, public and continuous possession by respondents under claim of exclusive ownership for more than ten years before suit, including repudiation by Mariano Reas of any mere administrator status and exclusive possession without delivery of fruits or produce to anyone.

• Unexecuted Registration Decision vs. Prescription: Petitioners did not question in the Supreme Court the Court of Appeals' finding that the decision in favor of Cipriana Alvero acquired no greater force than an ordinary judgment and could be defeated by prescription for lack of entry of judgment, decree of registration and certificate of title.
• Absence of Adverse Possession: Petitioners vigorously challenged the holding that respondents acquired ownership by adverse possession, maintaining that the requisites of acquisitive prescription were not satisfied.
• Administrator Status: Petitioners contended that Mariano Reas could not acquire a portion covered by Tax Declaration No. 11592 (Exhibit "H") because he was merely an administrator thereof.
• Late Discovery: Petitioners contended that they discovered the 12 October 1949 partition and specifically the perfidy of administrator Mariano Reas only in February 1960, as a result of which the complaint was filed on 12 February 1960.
• Falsified Exhibits: Petitioners claimed that certain exhibits had been tampered with or falsified, in effect urging re-examination and weighing of the documentary evidence.

• Verbal and Written Partition: Respondents asserted that four heirs of Cipriana Alvero verbally partitioned the land in 1938, with other heirs receiving other properties, and ratified the oral partition in writing in 1949.
• Exclusive Ownership and Adverse Possession: Respondents maintained that each partitioner since 1938 possessed his respective share as exclusive owner, exercising acts of dominion, and pleaded title by adverse possession ripening into ownership.

• Effect of Unexecuted Registration Decision: Whether the 21 June 1937 land registration decision in favor of Cipriana Alvero, without entry of final decree or issuance of certificate of title, conferred indefeasible title or prevented prescription.
• Acquisitive Prescription: Whether respondents acquired ownership of the disputed land by acquisitive prescription through more than ten years' actual, open, public, continuous adverse possession as exclusive owners before the 1960 suit.
• Administrator's Adverse Possession: Whether Mariano Reas, alleged to be a mere administrator, could acquire title adversely against the heirs.
• Review of Factual Findings: Whether the Supreme Court could reweigh credibility and documentary evidence to overturn the Court of Appeals' findings of adverse possession.

• Effect of Unexecuted Registration Decision: No. Without entry or transcription under Section 41 of Act 496 and without decree or certificate of title, the land did not become registered land and the judgment remained an ordinary, unenforceable judgment that did not toll prescription.
• Acquisitive Prescription: Yes. Respondents' actual, open, public, continuous possession under exclusive claim of ownership since at least 1949 vested full and complete title under Section 41, Act 190, even without good faith and just title.
• Administrator's Adverse Possession: Yes. Repudiation of representative capacity, openly and notoriously asserting an independent, exclusive and hostile right with no fruits delivered and no disability on the heirs, rendered possession adverse.
• Review of Factual Findings: No. Findings of the Court of Appeals on possession, dominion and compliance with Section 41 are binding where supported by substantial evidence, credibility and weight of evidence being its exclusive province.

• Effect of Unexecuted Registration Decision: Under Sections 41, 45 and 46 of the Land Registration Law (Act 496), registration requires proper entry of judgment and decree of registration. Although final, the 1937 decision was never executed, no final decree was entered and no certificate issued; it was therefore nothing but a statement of facts and applicable law that lost vigor and enforceability, became not merely dormant but dead after expiration of the enforcement period, and never tolled or suspended the prescriptive period, the pendency of an abandoned or discontinued action being treated as if never instituted.
• Acquisitive Prescription: Under Article 1116 of the New Civil Code, prescription already running before its effectivity is governed by prior law, here Sections 40 and 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 41 vests full and complete title after ten years' actual adverse possession uninterruptedly continued by occupancy, descent, grants or otherwise, however occupancy commenced, provided possession is actual, open, public, continuous, under claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claimants, even absent good faith and just title. Applied to the facts found binding on review, respondents proved preponderant adverse possession for more than ten years before 1960, with petitioners' cause of action running from Alejandra's death in 1940, petitioners never in possession, the 1948 lease by Norberto witnessed by Rufino, the admitted 12 October 1949 extrajudicial partition and tax declarations, Rufino's occupancy of Lots 2 and 7, and payment of road right-of-way compensation to respondents as recognized owners; knowledge of the 1949 partition was imputable to petitioners since Rufino himself was party-signatory, negating the claimed February 1960 discovery, and a prior sale did not bar later adverse possession where Section 41 conditions were met.
• Administrator's Adverse Possession: Repudiation was found both factually and legally established. Mariano Reas was in exclusive possession in the concept of owner over only .1926 hectare, giving no fruit or moiety of produce to any alleged principal. Where an administrator repudiates representative capacity as to the disputed land and sets up an independent, exclusive and hostile right openly and notoriously, possession may become adverse to heirs or devisees provided they are under no disability, and Bayot and Ramirez were found under no disability, with Section 42, Act 190 saving only persons then minors, of unsound mind or in prison.
• Review of Factual Findings: Jurisdiction in this class of cases is limited to errors of law. Credibility of witnesses and weighing of conflicting oral and documentary evidence, including claims of tampering or falsification, belong exclusively to the Court of Appeals and are not to be recalibrated unless totally devoid of support or glaringly erroneous as serious abuse of discretion. The facts and law were clearly set forth, findings were supported by substantial evidence, and the admitted extrajudicial partition bound petitioners as to knowledge thereof.

• Acquisitive prescription under Section 41, Act 190 — Ten years' actual adverse possession by a person claiming to be owner, uninterruptedly continued for ten years by occupancy, descent, grants or otherwise, in whatever way occupancy commenced or continued, vests full and complete title, provided possession is actual, open, public, continuous, under claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claimants, even in the absence of good faith and just title. Applied to sustain respondents' ownership after possession as exclusive owners since at least 1949, more than ten years before the 1960 action.
• Registered land requires decree and certificate under Act 496 — A land registration judgment that is not entered or transcribed under Section 41 and not followed by final decree and certificate of title under Sections 45 and 46 does not make title indefeasible or imprescriptible but stands as an ordinary judgment that, once unenforceable by lapse of time, is dead and does not toll prescription. Applied to deny indefeasibility to the 1937 decision in favor of Cipriana Alvero.
• Administrator's repudiation converts possession to adverse possession — If an administrator repudiates representative capacity as to the disputed land and openly and notoriously asserts an independent, exclusive and hostile right in himself, delivering no fruits to the alleged principal, his possession may become adverse to heirs or devisees if they are under no disability. Applied to allow Mariano Reas to acquire despite the claim he was merely an administrator.
• Governing law for running prescription under Article 1116, New Civil Code — Prescription already running before the effectivity of the New Civil Code is governed by laws previously in force. Applied to govern this dispute by Sections 40 and 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure rather than the New Civil Code.
• Finality of Court of Appeals factual findings — Credibility of witnesses and weighing of conflicting evidence are within the exclusive authority of the Court of Appeals; the Supreme Court, confined to questions of law, will not re-examine transcripts and exhibits absent a showing that findings are totally devoid of support or glaringly erroneous as grave abuse of discretion. Applied to refuse reweighing of exhibits alleged to be tampered with.
• Judicial admission by allegation in complaint — Allegations in the complaint admit the existence of the facts alleged, binding the pleader as to knowledge thereof. Applied to bind petitioners by their allegation of the 12 October 1949 extrajudicial partition to establish knowledge defeating the claim of discovery only in February 1960.

• "Ten years actual adverse possession by any person claiming to be owner for that time of any land or interest in land, uninterruptedly continued for ten years by occupancy, descent, grants, or otherwise, in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced or continued, shall vest in every actual occupant or possessor of such land a full and complete title" — States the statutory text of Section 41, Act 190 applied as the controlling rule for vesting title by prescription.
• "Defendants-appellants have proven preponderantly that they have been in actual, open, public, continuous possession under claim of exclusive ownership over the land in question for more than 10 years before the instant suit was lodged in the court below. Such possession has ripened into ownership by and through prescription." — Articulates the core factual finding and ratio sustaining respondents' acquisitive ownership.
• "In order to constitute such title by prescription or adverse possession, the possession by the claimant or by the person under or through whom he claims must be actual, open, public, continuous, under a claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claimants." — Defines the canonical requisites of adverse possession relied upon to test respondents' possession.
• "The credibility of witnesses and the weighing of conflicting evidence are matters within the exclusive authority of the Court of Appeals, and it is not necessarily bound by the conclusions of the trial court." — States the appellate-deference doctrine invoked to decline re-examination of allegedly falsified exhibits.

• De los Reyes vs. De Villa, 48 Phil. 22 — Cited by the Court of Appeals for the proposition that the unexecuted 1937 land registration decision was unavailing as registered title.
• Arboso vs. Andrade, 87 Phil. 782, 785-786 — Cited for the rule that time of pendency of an abandoned or discontinued action is treated as if never instituted in computing adverse possession.
• Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227, citing McDaniel vs. Apacible, 44 Phil. 248 — Cited for the rule that allegations in the complaint, including the 1949 extrajudicial partition, constitute admissions binding petitioners as to knowledge.
• Santa Ana, Jr. vs. Hernandez, L-16394, 17 December 1966, 18 SCRA 973 — Followed as controlling on exclusive Court of Appeals authority over credibility and weight of evidence and limits on Supreme Court review absent total lack of support or grave abuse.
• Fortus vs. Novero — Followed for the rule that queries requiring calibration of the whole evidence on credibility, surrounding circumstances and probabilities present factual questions for the Court of Appeals.

• Sections 41, 45 and 46, Land Registration Act (Act 496) — Require proper entry/transcription of judgment and issuance of decree and certificate of title to make land registered and indefeasible; applied to hold the 1937 decision created no registered title for lack of decree and certificate.
• Sections 40 and 41, Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190) — Provide the ten-year period and requisites for title by prescription through actual adverse possession; applied under Article 1116 to vest title in respondents after possession since at least 1949.
• Section 42, Act 190 — Saves rights of persons under disability (minority, unsound mind, imprisonment) to sue within three years after disability removed; applied to confirm no disability protected Bayot and Ramirez against adverse possession.
• Article 1116, New Civil Code — Governs prescription already running before the Code by prior laws; applied to select Act 190 as applicable law.
• Article 1150, New Civil Code — Counts prescriptive period for actions from the day they may be brought; cited for running of plaintiffs' cause of action from Alejandra Alvero's death in 1940.

Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.