Alvero vs. De la Rosa

A motion for reconsideration that fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 37, Section 2, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court—specifically, the duty to point out the findings or conclusions in the judgment not supported by the evidence or contrary to law, with express reference to the pertinent evidence or legal provisions—is pro forma, does not interrupt or suspend the reglementary period for perfecting an appeal, and strict compliance with procedural rules on appeal is mandatory and imperative.

The dispute involved two parcels of land in the Manotoc subdivision, Balintawak, with a combined area of 480 square meters. Margarita Villarica was the original owner who sold the property to Jose R. Victoriano on October 1, 1940, under an installment plan, and subsequently sold the same property to Fredesvindo S. Alvero on December 31, 1944, for P100,000 in Japanese military notes, having allegedly forgotten the first sale. The case was litigated in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila before Judge Mariano L. de la Rosa, who rendered judgment in favor of Victoriano on the basis of the older document and prior possession. Alvero sought to challenge that judgment through the appellate process, giving rise to the present certiorari proceeding.

On October 1, 1940, Margarita Villarica sold two parcels of land in the Manotoc subdivision, Balintawak, with a combined area of 480 square meters, to Jose R. Victoriano for P6,000, under terms requiring a down payment of P1,700 and monthly installments of P76.86 over 120 months. The contract stipulated that upon failure of the purchaser to pay three successive monthly installments, the vendor would be free to resell the property, forfeiting payments made, except in case of force majeure. Victoriano took possession immediately after the sale and made improvements amounting to P800. He continued making monthly payments until December 1941, when, owing to wartime conditions, Villarica verbally agreed to suspend payments until the restoration of peace. Victoriano occupied the property until December 1944, when he evacuated, returning in February 1945.

On December 31, 1944, Villarica, having forgotten the earlier sale to Victoriano, sold the same property to Fredesvindo S. Alvero for P100,000 in Japanese military notes. Alvero presented the deed of sale to the Register of Deeds of Manila on January 3, 1945, and took possession in December 1944, but found Victoriano on the premises upon returning in February 1945. After liberation, Villarica offered to repurchase the property from Alvero for P8,000 in genuine Philippine currency, but Alvero refused. Neither party had secured transfer of title to his name, though both had presented their respective deeds to the Register of Deeds.

On June 25, 1945, Victoriano filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Alvero and Villarica, seeking to declare the first sale in force and the subsequent sale null and void. Villarica admitted the second sale in her answer, attributing it to the imperative necessity of raising funds, and offered to repurchase from Alvero for P5,000. Alvero denied the allegations, claimed exclusive ownership, and filed a counterclaim and crossclaim demanding P200 monthly rent from February 1945 plus P2,000 in damages. After trial, Judge de la Rosa rendered judgment on November 16, 1945, in favor of Victoriano, adjudging title to him on the basis of the older document and prior possession since October 1, 1940, and dismissing Alvero's counterclaim.

Alvero was notified of the decision on November 28, 1945. On December 27, 1945, he filed a motion for reconsideration and new trial, which was denied on January 3, 1946; he was notified of the denial on January 7, 1946. The following day, January 8, 1946, Alvero filed his notice of appeal and record on appeal, but did not file the required P60 appeal bond. On January 14, 1946, Victoriano moved to dismiss the appeal and sought execution of judgment. On January 15, 1946, Alvero opposed the motion, stating that the appeal bond had been filed that same day, and offered as excuse the illness of his counsel's wife, who had died on January 10, 1946, and was buried the following day. On January 17, 1946, the respondent judge dismissed the appeal, holding that while the notice of appeal and record on appeal had been filed in due time, the appeal bond was filed too late. A petition for reconsideration of that order was denied on January 29, 1946, prompting the present certiorari petition.

• Excusable Negligence: Petitioner maintained that the failure to file the appeal bond on time was due to the illness and subsequent death of counsel's wife on January 10, 1946, which greatly affected counsel's state of mind and prevented timely compliance.
• Timeliness of Appeal: Petitioner argued that the notice of appeal and record on appeal were filed on January 8, 1946, which he contended was within the reglementary period as computed from the denial of his motion for reconsideration.
• Opposition to Dismissal: Petitioner opposed the motion to dismiss the appeal, asserting that the appeal bond was actually filed on January 15, 1946, and that the circumstances warranted leniency.

• Defective Petition: Respondents argued that the petition for certiorari was defective both in form and in substance.
• No Excusable Negligence or Grave Abuse of Discretion: Respondents maintained that there was no excusable negligence on the part of the petitioner, and no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge in dismissing the appeal.

• Pro Forma Motion: Whether the motion for reconsideration and new trial filed by petitioner's counsel was pro forma and thus did not toll the reglementary period for perfecting the appeal.
• Timeliness of Appeal: Whether the notice of appeal, record on appeal, and appeal bond were filed within the reglementary period.
• Excusable Negligence: Whether the illness and death of counsel's wife constituted excusable negligence justifying the late filing of the appeal bond.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal.

• Pro Forma Motion: Yes. The motion for reconsideration was pro forma because it failed to comply with Rule 37, Section 2, paragraph (c), which requires specific reference to findings or conclusions not supported by evidence or contrary to law, with express reference to pertinent evidence or legal provisions.
• Timeliness of Appeal: No. Because the motion was pro forma and did not toll the appeal period, the period commenced from November 28, 1945, and expired on December 28, 1945; all appeal documents filed on January 8 and January 15, 1946, were filed out of time.
• Excusable Negligence: No. Counsel's personal circumstances, while understandable, did not constitute excusable negligence, as he could have sought an extension of time from the lower court but failed to do so.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. The respondent judge correctly dismissed the appeal, the rules of court being mandatory and indispensable to the prevention of needless delays.

• Pro Forma Motion: Rule 37, Section 2, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court requires that a motion for new trial specifically point out the findings or conclusions in the judgment that are not supported by the evidence or contrary to law, making express reference to the pertinent evidence or legal provisions. Counsel's motion for reconsideration and new trial, dated December 27, 1945, failed to meet this requirement. Citing Valdez vs. Jugo and Reyes vs. Court of Appeals and Bautista, the Court held that such motions are considered pro forma, intended merely to delay proceedings, and cannot interrupt or suspend the period for perfecting an appeal. Consequently, the reglementary period for appeal commenced from November 28, 1945, when counsel was notified of the judgment, and expired on December 28, 1945.

• Timeliness of Appeal: Because the motion for reconsideration was pro forma and did not toll the appeal period, the notice of appeal and record on appeal filed on January 8, 1946, were already filed out of time, and the appeal bond filed on January 15, 1946, was even more late. The Court reiterated that failure to perfect an appeal within the period prescribed by the rules causes the judgment to become final, and certification of the record on appeal thereafter cannot restore jurisdiction that has been lost, citing Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao vs. Director of Lands, Estate of Cordoba and Zarate vs. Alabado, and Bermudez vs. Director of Lands.

• Excusable Negligence: While the Court acknowledged the emotional toll of counsel's wife's illness and death, it held that human laws are inflexible and no personal consideration should stand in the way of performing a legal duty. Counsel could have asked for an extension of time within which to file and perfect the appeal, as permitted under Layda vs. Legaspi, but failed to do so. The Court emphasized that strict observance of the rules of court, indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy dispatch of judicial business, is an imperative necessity. No excusable negligence was shown.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The respondent judge's dismissal of the appeal was a proper application of mandatory procedural rules. Rules of court promulgated by authority of law have the force and effect of law, and those prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are considered absolutely indispensable, citing Shioji vs. Harvey and Salaveria vs. Albindo. No grave abuse of sound judicial discretion was demonstrated. The Court further noted that no irreparable damage was caused to the petitioner, as Villarica had shown readiness to repair the damage done.

• Pro Forma Motion for New Trial — A motion for reconsideration or new trial that fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 37, Section 2, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court—specifically, the duty to point out with particularity the findings or conclusions in the judgment not supported by the evidence or contrary to law, with express reference to the pertinent evidence or legal provisions—is considered pro forma, intended merely to delay proceedings, and does not interrupt or suspend the reglementary period for perfecting an appeal. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that petitioner's motion was pro forma, rendering his subsequent appeal documents filed out of time.

• Mandatory Nature of Rules of Court — Rules of court promulgated by authority of law have the force and effect of law, and rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. Strict compliance is mandatory and imperative; failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribed period causes the judgment to become final, and jurisdiction once lost cannot be restored by subsequent certification of the record on appeal.

• Extension of Time for Appeal — The period within which the record on appeal and appeal bond should be perfected and filed may be extended by order of the court, upon application made prior to the expiration of the original period. Counsel's failure to seek such an extension before the deadline was fatal to the petition.

• "Motions of that kind have been considered as motions pro forma intended merely to delay the proceeding, and, as such, they cannot and will not interrupt or suspend the period of time for the perfection of the appeal." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the effect of pro forma motions on the appeal period, establishing that non-compliant motions for reconsideration do not toll the reglementary period.

• "But human laws are inflexible and no personal consideration should stand in the way of performing a legal duty." — This passage articulates the Court's refusal to excuse procedural non-compliance on grounds of counsel's personal circumstances, reinforcing the mandatory character of rules of court.

• "A strict observance of the rules of court, which have been considered indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy dispatch of judicial business, is an imperative necessity." — This formulation of the mandatory nature of procedural rules is the doctrinal anchor for the dismissal, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on strict compliance with appeal rules.

• Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao vs. Director of Lands, 34 Phil. 623 — Followed. Established that failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribed period causes the judgment to become final, and subsequent certification of the record on appeal cannot restore lost jurisdiction.
• Estate of Cordoba and Zarate vs. Alabado, 34 Phil. 920 — Followed. Reinforced the principle that jurisdiction once lost through failure to perfect an appeal cannot be restored.
• Bermudez vs. Director of Lands, 36 Phil. 774 — Followed. Further supported the rule on the finality of judgments upon failure to perfect appeal within the prescribed period.
• Layda vs. Legaspi, 39 Phil. 83 — Followed. Established that the period for perfecting an appeal may be extended by court order upon application made prior to the expiration of the original period, underscoring counsel's available remedy.
• Shioji vs. Harvey, 43 Phil. 333 — Followed. Held that rules of court have the force and effect of law and that rules prescribing time periods are indispensable to the orderly and speedy dispatch of judicial business.
• Salaveria vs. Albindo, 39 Phil. 922 — Followed. Held that failure to pay the docket fee within the prescribed period causes dismissal of the appeal, illustrating strict compliance with procedural rules.
• Valdez vs. Jugo, 74 Phil. 49 — Followed. Established that pro forma motions for reconsideration do not interrupt the period for perfecting an appeal.
• Reyes vs. Court of Appeals and Bautista, 74 Phil. 235 — Followed. Reinforced the doctrine on pro forma motions and their effect on the appeal period.

• Rule 37, Section 2, paragraph (c), Rules of Court — Requires that a motion for new trial specifically point out the findings or conclusions in the judgment not supported by the evidence or contrary to law, making express reference to the pertinent evidence or legal provisions. The Court held that petitioner's motion for reconsideration and new trial failed to comply with this provision, rendering it pro forma and ineffective to toll the appeal period.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Jaranilla, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon, and Briones, JJ., concurred.