Altarejos vs. Bautista

City mayors may order demolition or eviction without court intervention, and summary eviction, only on the limited grounds expressly authorized by Republic Act No. 7279 and related ordinances; they have no unbridled discretion to do so when the facts fall outside those grounds. In particular, summary eviction under Section 27 requires new squatter families or identified professional squatters or squatting syndicates, while Section 28 requires danger areas, government infrastructure, or a court order; under Quezon City Ordinance No. SP-1800 and the National Building Code, the building official, not the mayor, must declare a structure dangerous or ruinous and order demolition.

The dispute concerns a property at 39-C North Diversion Road, Camachile, Balintawak, Quezon City, registered in the names of Spouses Edilberto and Dolores Palispis but actually occupied by Cesar A. Altarejos et al. for around 20 to 30 years. The respondents are Quezon City officials: then Mayor Herbert Bautista, Secretary to the Mayor Tadeo M. Palma, and Marlowe Y. Jacutin as Officer-in-Charge of Task Force COPRISS. Republic Act No. 7279, the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992, together with the Local Government Code and Quezon City Ordinance No. SP-1800, supplies the statutory framework for demolition and eviction, including summary eviction and demolition without court intervention.

Cesar A. Altarejos et al. had been the actual possessors of a property at 39-C North Diversion Road, Camachile, Balintawak, Quezon City for around 20 to 30 years. The property was registered in the names of Spouses Edilberto and Dolores Palispis. The respondents were Quezon City officials: then Mayor Herbert Bautista, Secretary to the Mayor Tadeo M. Palma, and Marlowe Y. Jacutin as Officer-in-Charge of Task Force COPRISS.

On October 1, 2013, Spouses Palispis wrote Palma, through Jacutin, requesting the immediate removal of illegal structures and squatters within the property registered in their names. Altarejos et al. opposed, stating that Spouses Palispis had previously filed an ejectment case over the property but it was dismissed with finality, making any attempt to oust them without court intervention illegal; they also claimed the Task Force had no authority because demolition authority lies with the building official under the National Building Code. The Task Force inspected the site and found several structures for residential and commercial use. It held dialogues on October 4, 21, and 29, 2013 with the occupants and registered owners for an amicable settlement, but no settlement was reached.

On November 5, 2013, Jacutin wrote Palma requesting removal of the structures under Section 3(m) and Section 27 of Republic Act No. 7279, emphasizing that Spouses Palispis had presented proof of ownership while the occupants, who had been leasing the space to others, were professional squatters. In the interim, the Office of the Secretary to the Mayor held more meetings with the occupants, together with the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor and the Commission on Human Rights. Spouses Palispis committed to extend financial assistance of PHP 30,000.00 to each structure owner, but the occupants continued to stay because no settlement was reached.

On March 17, 2014, Palma issued a Memorandum ordering Jacutin to demolish the structures. The Memorandum cited the October 1, 2013 request; the Task Force inspection showing structures used for commercial and residential purposes; the absence of conclusive proof of ownership by the occupants; the Torrens titles, tax declarations, tax map, lot plan, verification survey plan, masterlist, structural survey map, January 17, 2013 Inspection Report of the Quezon City Fire District finding the structures to be fire hazards, and the November 25, 2013 Transmittal of the Department of Building Official declaring all structures illegal; the January 15, 2014 census tagging showing nine of forty structures used for commercial or business purposes; and the financial assistance committed by Spouses Palispis. It invoked DILG Opinion No. 16, series of 2006, Quezon City Ordinance No. SP-1800, series of 2007, Section 455(b)(3)(vi) of Republic Act No. 7160, and Sections 27 and 28(a) of Republic Act No. 7279.

On April 11, 2014, Jacutin issued the corresponding Notice of Demolition for violations of Section 28(a) of Republic Act No. 7279, Section 455(b)(3)(vi) of the Local Government Code, and Quezon City Ordinance No. SP-1800, series of 2007. This prompted Altarejos et al. to file a Petition for Prohibition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, alleging that the Memorandum was issued in derogation of the power of the courts and separation of powers.

The records showed that the building official declared the structures illegal but never declared them dangerous or ruinous and never ordered their demolition; no written notice or advice was served on petitioners declaring their structures to be nuisance, ruinous, or dangerous. The Court of Appeals nevertheless treated the structures as dangerous under the Local Government Code and Quezon City Ordinance No. SP-1800.

• Lack of Authority and Separation of Powers: Petitioners argued that respondents have no legal authority to summarily evict them and demolish their structures; Spouses Palispis’s request for demolition is in effect an ejectment case, and if they are true owners, their recourse is accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. They maintained that the city mayor cannot exercise purely judicial functions and adjudicate ownership and possession, as this would violate separation of powers.
• National Building Code and Building Official: Petitioners claimed that under the National Building Code, it is the building official, not the mayor’s secretary, who has authority to order demolition; the building official did not declare their structures nuisance, dangerous, and illegally constructed. Even if they violated the National Building Code for lack of permit, the law only provides for an administrative fine or criminal case, not summary demolition.
• Local Government Code, Ordinance, and General Welfare: Petitioners argued that even if they violated the ordinance, the Local Government Code provides recourse through judicial proceedings; respondents cannot seek refuge under the general welfare clause, which authorizes abatement of nuisance without judicial proceedings only for nuisance per se. They said none of the grounds under Republic Act No. 7279 exist for eviction, and under its Implementing Rules and Regulations only new squatter families whose structures were built after the law’s effectivity and squatter families identified as professional squatters or members of squatting syndicates may be summarily evicted.
• Reliance on DILG Opinion and Ordinance: Petitioners said respondents erred in relying on DILG Opinion No. 16, series of 2006, and Quezon City Ordinance No. SP-1800, which cannot prevail over an act of Congress or the Constitution.
• Due Process: Petitioners argued that there was a violation of due process because the Task Force is not a court with jurisdiction and judicial power to adjudge the matter; they were not given the opportunity to be heard and there was no hearing to ascertain their respective positions. Even if the structures were illegally constructed, they submitted that they can simply be directed to comply with the law.

• Authority Under Ordinance and Local Government Code: Respondents maintained that they have legal authority to summarily evict petitioners and demolish their structures. They cited the Quezon City Fire District’s January 17, 2013 Inspection Report finding the structures as fire hazards, and the November 25, 2013 Transmittal Letter from the Department of the Building Official declaring the structures as illegal. These findings allegedly make the structures dangerous, which the city mayor, under Quezon City Ordinance No. SP-1800 and Section 455(b)(3)(vi) of the Local Government Code, has authority to demolish.
• DILG Opinion and Executive Order No. 708: Respondents contended that their authority is bolstered by DILG Opinion No. 16, which provides that a city mayor can order demolition without any court order when structures are constructed without the necessary mayor’s permit or in violation of any law or ordinance. They also pointed out that Executive Order No. 708, series of 2008, amended Executive Order No. 152, series of 2002, and devolved the power to demolish to local government units instead of the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor.
• Separation of Powers and Ejectment: On petitioners’ claim of violation of separation of powers, respondents contended that the argument is misplaced; a judicial action for ejectment is distinct from the administrative action against illegal structures and individuals illegally occupying land that does not belong to them.
• Alangdeo Not Applicable: Respondents claimed that Alangdeo vs. City Mayor of Baguio is not on all fours because Spouses Palispis have title to the property, and the building official has declared that the improvements made by petitioners are illegal structures.
• Police Power: Respondents insisted that the demolition order was issued pursuant to their police power enabling them to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.

• Propriety of Petition for Prohibition: Whether the Petition for Prohibition filed is the proper remedy.
• Authority to Order Demolition and Eviction Without Court Intervention: Whether city mayors have the legal authority to order demolitions and evictions without court intervention and summarily.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether respondents, in issuing the demolition order, acted with grave abuse of discretion.

• Propriety of Petition for Prohibition: Yes. A city mayor performs quasi-judicial functions when issuing demolition notices or orders, and prohibition under Rule 65, Section 2 lies to command desistance from implementing such orders when issued with grave abuse of discretion. Exhaustion of administrative remedies was not an absolute bar, and the exceptions applied.
• Authority to Order Demolition and Eviction Without Court Intervention: Yes, but only on limited grounds. City mayors may order demolition or eviction without court intervention under Section 28(a) and (b) of Republic Act No. 7279 and summarily under Section 27, but they have no unbridled discretion when the facts fall outside the law. The present facts did not fall within those grounds.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Yes. The March 17, 2014 Memorandum was issued in excess of the city mayor’s statutory authority and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; it is void.

• Propriety of Petition for Prohibition: Under Rule 65, Section 2, prohibition issues to command a person to desist from further proceeding in an action or matter; the requisites are that it be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board, or person exercising judicial or ministerial functions, that the entity acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and that there is no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. City Engineer of Baguio vs. Baniqued clarified that mayors, though mainly executive, perform quasi-judicial functions when issuing demolition notices or orders. Aquino vs. Municipality of Malay, Aklan held that the nature of the act determines whether it is judicial or quasi-judicial; quasi-judicial functions involve investigating facts, holding hearings, and drawing conclusions as a basis for official action. Assessing the legality of a structure and whether it warrants demolition entails specific factual inquiries requiring hearings. Thus, prohibition is proper. The RTC’s denial based on failure to exhaust was hasty: petitioners sought administrative relief as early as October 21, 2013, and attended meetings and dialogues before Palma’s office. Exhaustion is not an ironclad rule; exceptions include purely legal questions, patently illegal acts, urgent need for judicial intervention, irreparable damage, no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, strong public interest, private land, quo warranto, and violation of due process. Here, judicial intervention was urgent, further administrative relief would have been futile, and demolition would have caused irreparable damage.
• Authority to Order Demolition and Eviction Without Court Intervention: The power of demolition is distinct from ejectment. Ejectment concerns who has the better right of possession; Article 536 of the Civil Code, Eversley Childs Sanitarium vs. Spouses Barbarona, and Mediran vs. Villanueva support this distinction. Section 455(b)(3)(vi) of the Local Government Code authorizes city mayors to require owners of illegally constructed houses, buildings, or structures to obtain permits or make changes, or to order demolition or removal within the period prescribed by law or ordinance. Republic Act No. 7279, in relation to Executive Order No. 708, empowers local government units to conduct demolition and eviction; Section 27 allows summary eviction and demolition of professional squatters and squatting syndicates; Section 28 allows eviction or demolition in danger areas, for government infrastructure with available funding, or by court order. City mayors are not precluded from ordering demolition or eviction despite the filing, pendency, or finality of an ejectment case, provided it is within the period prescribed by the law or ordinance. However, the grounds are limited; there is no unbridled discretion. The facts did not fall within the law. Under Section 27, petitioners cannot be considered new squatter families whose structures were built after Republic Act No. 7279 took effect; as early as 2006, when Spouses Palispis filed the first ejectment case, petitioners had occupied the structures for more than 20 years, and Republic Act No. 7279 was passed in 1992, so the structures were built before its effectivity. Petitioners were never identified as professional squatters or members of squatting syndicates; using nine of forty structures for commercial purposes does not equate to engaging in the illegal business of squatter housing for profit or gain. Under Section 28(a), the structures were not shown to be in danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, or public areas such as a sidewalk, road, park, or playground. The fire-hazard finding pertains to the condition or defect rendering a building dangerous or ruinous, not the area where it is located. Under Quezon City Ordinance No. SP-1800, Section 8 provides that the Building Official shall declare a building or structure illegally constructed, dangerous, or ruinous; Section 9 provides that the Building Official shall serve a written order to vacate, repair, or demolish dangerous or ruinous buildings, and for illegally constructed buildings, the City Mayor, upon finding by the Building Official or the Quezon City Engineering Department that the structure is illegally constructed, shall order the owner to secure the appropriate building permit within 30 days; only if the owner fails or refuses can the City Mayor order eviction and demolition. This is consistent with the National Building Code; Section 215 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations require a finding or declaration by the Building Official that the building or structure is a nuisance, ruinous, or dangerous before abatement or demolition. Alangdeo vs. Yaranon and Gancayco vs. City Government of Quezon City hold that the Building Official, not the City Mayor, has authority to order demolition under the National Building Code. Here, the building official never declared the structures dangerous or ruinous and never ordered demolition; no written notice or advice was served. At most, the building official declared the structures illegal. Lack of a building permit does not result in summary demolition; Alangdeo holds it subjects the violator to an administrative fine under Section 212 or a criminal case under Section 213 of the National Building Code. Section 455(b)(3)(vi) only requires owners to obtain a permit; declaring a building illegal does not immediately result in demolition. Section 9 of the ordinance required the city mayor to first order petitioners to secure the appropriate building permit within 30 days; the records do not show this. On police power, it is delegated to the legislative bodies of local government units through Section 16 of the Local Government Code; respondents, not being members of the city council, cannot rely on this provision to validate the demolition order. As executive officials, they were tasked with executing and implementing the ordinance but failed.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Alafriz vs. Nable defines grave abuse of discretion as capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or exercise of power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. Any judgment, order, or resolution issued without jurisdiction is void; Denila vs. Republic. Here, the city mayor transgressed the bounds prescribed by law and the ordinance; the structures did not fall within the scope of Republic Act No. 7279 and Quezon City Ordinance No. SP-1800 allowing summary demolition and demolition without court intervention. Therefore, the March 17, 2014 Memorandum was issued in excess of statutory authority, amounting to grave abuse of discretion, and is void.

• Limited authority of city mayors to order demolition and eviction without court intervention — Republic Act No. 7279 and the Local Government Code allow city mayors to issue demolition and eviction orders without court intervention, and summary eviction, but only on limited grounds. They do not possess unbridled discretion when the facts fall outside the law. The Court applied this by finding that petitioners’ situation did not fall under Section 27 or Section 28(a) of Republic Act No. 7279 or the ordinance.
• Demolition distinguished from ejectment — Ejectment is a judicial action that resolves only who has the better right of possession; demolition is a regulatory or police-power measure based on separate provisions. A city mayor is not precluded from ordering demolition or eviction despite the filing, pendency, or finality of an ejectment case, provided the demolition is within the period prescribed by the law or ordinance. The Court used this to reject the separation-of-powers argument.
• Summary eviction under Section 27 of Republic Act No. 7279 — Summary eviction is limited to (1) new squatter families whose structures were built after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7279 and (2) squatter families identified by the local government unit in cooperation with the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor, Philippine National Police, and accredited Urban Poor Organization as professional squatters or members of squatting syndicates. The Court found petitioners were long-standing occupants whose structures predated Republic Act No. 7279 and were never identified as professional squatters or syndicate members.
• Grounds for eviction or demolition under Section 28 of Republic Act No. 7279 — Eviction or demolition may be allowed without court intervention when persons or entities occupy danger areas, when government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented, or when there is a court order. The Court found the structures were not shown to be in danger areas and the fire-hazard finding concerned the condition of the structures, not their location.
• Building Official’s authority under the National Building Code and Quezon City Ordinance No. SP-1800 — The Building Official, not the City Mayor, has authority to declare a building or structure dangerous, ruinous, or illegal and to order demolition of dangerous or ruinous buildings. For illegally constructed structures, the City Mayor may order the owner to secure the appropriate building permit within 30 days; only upon failure or refusal may the City Mayor order eviction and demolition. The Court found no such declaration or order by the Building Official and no prior order to secure a permit.
• Lack of building permit does not warrant summary demolition — Under the National Building Code, constructing without a building permit, without more, does not call for summary demolition; it subjects the violator to an administrative fine or criminal case. The Court applied this in holding that the building official’s declaration that the structures were illegal did not justify immediate demolition.
• Prohibition against quasi-judicial acts of city mayors — Although mayors are executive officials, they perform quasi-judicial functions when issuing demolition notices or orders because these require factual investigation and hearings. A petition for prohibition is a proper remedy to command them to desist from implementing demolition or eviction orders issued with grave abuse of discretion. The Court applied this in finding the Petition for Prohibition proper.
• Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute — Exhaustion admits exceptions, including purely legal questions, patently illegal acts, urgent need for judicial intervention, irreparable damage, no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, strong public interest, private land, quo warranto, and violation of due process. The Court applied the exceptions because further administrative relief would have been futile and demolition would have caused irreparable damage.
• Grave abuse of discretion — Grave abuse of discretion is capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or exercise of power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. The Court found the city mayor’s issuance of the demolition memorandum amounted to grave abuse of discretion because it was outside statutory authority.
• Police power delegated to local legislative bodies — Police power is delegated to local government units through Section 16 of the Local Government Code and is exercised by the local legislative body through ordinances. Executive officials, such as the city mayor, implement the ordinance but cannot rely on the general welfare clause to validate an act beyond the ordinance’s procedure. The Court applied this to reject respondents’ police-power defense.

• "Republic Act No. 7279 empowers local chief executives to issue demolition and eviction orders without court intervention, as well as summary eviction, but only on limited grounds. They do not possess unbridled discretion to exercise these powers when the facts of the case fall outside the scope of the law." — This passage states the core limitation on city mayors’ demolition and eviction powers and frames the Court’s ratio decidendi.
• "City mayors have the legal authority to order demolitions and evictions without court intervention under Section 28(a) and (b) of Republic Act No. 7279, and summarily under Section 27 of the same law. Thus, the claim of petitioners that respondents usurped the power of the courts in issuing the Memorandum ordering the demolition does not hold water." — This passage confirms the limited statutory authority and rejects the separation-of-powers challenge, while later analysis shows the facts fell outside that authority.
• "Based on this, it is the building official, not the city mayor, who has the authority to: (1) declare that a building or structure is dangerous, ruinous, or illegal; and (2) order the demolition of dangerous or ruinous buildings." — This passage defines the respective roles under Quezon City Ordinance No. SP-1800 and the National Building Code, which the Court used to invalidate the mayor’s demolition order.
• "Here, the city mayor transgressed the bounds prescribed by the law and the ordinance. The structures do not fall within the scope of the law that allows for summary demolition and demolition without court intervention under Republic Act No. 7279 and Quezon City Ordinance No. SP-1800." — This passage is the Court’s ultimate application of the law to the facts and the basis for declaring the demolition memorandum void.

• City Engineer of Baguio vs. Baniqued, 592 Phil. 348 (2008) — Clarified that mayors, though mainly executive, perform quasi-judicial functions when issuing demolition notices or orders; used to hold prohibition proper.
• Aquino vs. Municipality of Malay, Aklan, 744 Phil. 497 (2014) — Held that the nature of the act determines whether it is judicial or quasi-judicial; quasi-judicial functions involve investigating facts, holding hearings, and drawing conclusions; applied to city mayors’ demolition orders.
• Eversley Childs Sanitarium vs. Spouses Barbarona, 829 Phil. 111 (2018) — Held that ejectment resolves only the better right of actual possession; used to distinguish ejectment from demolition.
• Alangdeo vs. City Mayor of Baguio, 762 Phil. 539 (2015) — Held that lack of building permit, without more, does not call for summary demolition but subjects the violator to an administrative fine or criminal case; also discussed summary eviction coverage and the building official’s role.
• Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc. vs. Robredo, 739 Phil. 283 (2014) — Cited for the constitutional requirement that urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner, and for mandatory due process requirements in eviction and demolition.
• Fernando vs. St. Scholastica’s College, 706 Phil. 138 (2013) — Explained that police power is delegated to local government units through Section 16 of the Local Government Code; used to reject respondents’ police-power defense because they were not the local legislative body.
• Alafriz vs. Nable, 72 Phil. 278 (1941) — Defined grave abuse of discretion as capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; applied to void the demolition memorandum.
• Denila vs. Republic, 877 Phil. 380 (2020) — Held that a judgment or order issued without jurisdiction is void; applied to the demolition order issued in excess of authority.
• Montes vs. Court of Appeals, 523 Phil. 98 (2006) — Cited for the requisites of prohibition.
• Triste vs. Leyte State College Board of Trustees, 270 Phil. 425 (1990) — Cited in connection with the rule that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an ironclad rule.

• Rule 65, Section 2, Rules of Court — Defines the writ of prohibition and its requisites; applied to allow prohibition against city mayors’ quasi-judicial demolition orders.
• Article 536, Civil Code — Provides that possession cannot be acquired through force or intimidation while a possessor objects, and that one who believes he has a right to deprive another of possession must invoke the aid of the competent court; used to distinguish ejectment from demolition.
• Section 455(b)(3)(vi), Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — Authorizes city mayors to require owners of illegally constructed houses, buildings, or structures to obtain necessary permits or make changes, or to order demolition or removal within the period prescribed by law or ordinance; the Court held this did not justify demolition absent compliance with the ordinance’s permit-first procedure.
• Section 27, Republic Act No. 7279 — Allows summary eviction and demolition of professional squatters and squatting syndicates; the Court found petitioners were neither new squatters nor identified professional squatters or syndicate members.
• Section 28, Republic Act No. 7279 — Allows eviction or demolition in danger areas, for government infrastructure projects with available funding, or by court order; the Court found no danger-area or other ground.
• Section 16, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — General welfare clause delegating police power to local government units; the Court held respondents, as executive officials, could not rely on it to validate the demolition order.
• Section 215, Presidential Decree No. 1096 (National Building Code of the Philippines) and its Implementing Rules and Regulations — Requires a finding or declaration by the Building Official that a building or structure is a nuisance, ruinous, or dangerous before abatement or demolition; applied because no such declaration existed.
• Sections 8 and 9, Quezon City Ordinance No. SP-1800, series of 2007 — Section 8 vests in the Building Official the declaration of a building as illegally constructed, dangerous, or ruinous; Section 9 requires the City Mayor to first order the owner to secure a building permit within 30 days before ordering eviction and demolition for illegally constructed structures; applied to invalidate the demolition order.
• Section 2, Summary Eviction Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 7279 — Limits summary eviction to new squatter families whose structures were built after Republic Act No. 7279’s effectivity and to identified professional squatters or squatting syndicates; applied to find no basis for summary eviction.
• Article XIII, Section 10, 1987 Constitution — Provides that urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner; cited in the discussion of due process requirements for eviction and demolition.
• Executive Order No. 708, series of 2008 — Cited as devolving demolition power to local government units; the Court recognized that Republic Act No. 7279 in relation to Executive Order No. 708 empowers local government units but only within limited grounds.

Justices Lazaro-Javier, M. Lopez, J. Lopez, and Kho, Jr. concurred.