Alonto vs. People

A conviction under B.P. 22 cannot stand where there is a material variance between the check described in the information and the check actually presented in evidence, particularly as to the date of issuance, because the identity and date of the check enter into the essential elements of the offense. The right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation is violated when the evidence does not correspond to the charge, rendering the conviction fatally defective.

Petitioner Angelina Zabala Alonto was engaged in the real estate business, while private complainant Violeta E. Tizon was a jewelry dealer. The two were introduced by Tizon's aunt, Flordeliz Bernardo, sometime in September 1990. The dispute arose from a series of jewelry purchases by petitioner from Tizon, for which postdated checks were issued as payment and subsequently dishonored. Prior to the filing of the present charges, an earlier criminal complaint for estafa and violation of B.P. 22 had been filed against petitioner in Caloocan City based on a different dishonored check, but was dismissed upon Tizon's execution of an affidavit of desistance after petitioner promised to settle her obligations.

Petitioner Angelina Zabala Alonto was introduced to private complainant Violeta E. Tizon, a jewelry dealer, by Tizon's aunt, Flordeliz Bernardo, sometime in September 1990. Between December 5 and 15, 1990, petitioner purchased several pieces of Singaporean jewelry from Tizon worth more than ₱100,000, signing four acknowledgment receipts for the items received on December 5, 11, and 15, 1990, and an undated fourth list. As partial payment, petitioner issued BPI Check No. 874716 (Timog Circle Branch) dated December 13, 1990, in the amount of ₱12,980, under Account No. 0271-0244-44. When presented for payment at Interbank, Caloocan Branch, on December 14, 1990, the check was dishonored for "account closed."

Tizon, through counsel, sent a demand letter to petitioner to make good the amount of the check and to pay the outstanding balance of ₱120,000. Petitioner returned a chain and a pair of earrings worth approximately ₱25,000, leaving an outstanding balance of ₱75,000. Tizon then filed a criminal complaint in the Caloocan City Prosecutor's Office, resulting in two charges — estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code and violation of B.P. 22 — before the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 126 (Criminal Cases Nos. 38680-81). Relying on petitioner's promise to settle her obligations, Tizon executed an Affidavit of Desistance dated January 8, 1992, leading to the dismissal of those cases.

Thereafter, in the presence of their respective lawyers, petitioner issued three BPI checks (Araneta Avenue Branch) under Account No. 3275-0292-02, each in the amount of ₱25,000, corresponding to the remaining balance of ₱75,000: Check No. 831256 dated February 5, 1992, Check No. 831257 dated March 5, 1992, and Check No. 831258, the date of which was variously stated as April 5, 1992 (per the documentary evidence, Exhibit "I") and May 14, 1992 (per the information in Criminal Case No. Q-93-41751). When the checks were presented for payment at Interbank, Caloocan Branch, on their respective due dates, all were dishonored for "account closed."

Fernando Sardes, a BPI employee handling collection, accounting, and bookkeeping, testified that petitioner opened Account No. 3275-0292-02 on December 27, 1991, with an initial deposit of ₱2,000, made no subsequent deposits, and closed the account as early as February 1992. He confirmed the issuance of the three subject checks and their dishonor for "account closed." For her part, petitioner testified that she was in the real estate business, not jewelry dealing, and that it was Tizon and her aunt Bernardo who entered into the jewelry transaction. She claimed she issued the three checks upon the advice of her lawyer and after being assured by Bernardo that she would fund them as they fell due, maintaining that the checks were issued merely to guarantee Bernardo's obligation.

The trial court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of violation of B.P. 22, crediting the prosecution's evidence that petitioner knowingly issued unfunded checks. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in toto.

• Sufficiency of the Charge and Conviction: Petitioner challenged the affirmance by the Court of Appeals of her conviction, arguing that the facts charged in the informations did not constitute an offense under B.P. 22.
• Double Jeopardy: Petitioner contended that the prosecution in the RTC of Quezon City violated her right against double jeopardy, as the earlier cases in the RTC of Caloocan City (Criminal Cases Nos. 38680-81) for estafa and B.P. 22 violation involving the same jewelry transactions had been dismissed.
• Jurisdiction: Petitioner argued that the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 85, lost or never had jurisdiction over the cases by operation of Republic Act No. 7691, which expanded the jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts to cover offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six years.
• Admissibility of Evidence: Petitioner asserted that the prosecution exhibits — the acknowledgment receipts (Exhibits A, B, C, and D) and the three BPI checks (Exhibits G, H, and I) — were improperly admitted without proof of their authenticity and due execution pursuant to Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
• Due Process and Equal Protection: Petitioner claimed that errors of law or irregularities committed during the trial prejudiced her substantial rights to due process and equal protection of the law.
• Lack of Consideration: Petitioner maintained that the three checks were issued without consideration, merely as a guarantee for the obligation of Flordeliz Bernardo, who had promised to fund them as they fell due.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding of guilt for three counts of violation of B.P. 22.
• Double Jeopardy: Whether the prosecution in the RTC of Quezon City violated petitioner's right against double jeopardy given the prior dismissal of cases in the RTC of Caloocan City.
• Jurisdiction: Whether the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 85, lost jurisdiction over the cases by operation of Republic Act No. 7691.
• Admissibility of Evidence: Whether the prosecution exhibits were improperly admitted for lack of proof of authenticity and due execution under Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
• Variance in the Third Count: Whether the variance between the check date alleged in the information (May 14, 1992) and the check date shown in the documentary evidence (April 5, 1992) for the third count renders the conviction fatally defective.
• Sufficiency of the Charge: Whether the facts charged in the informations constitute an offense under B.P. 22.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Yes, as to the first two counts. All elements of violation of B.P. 22 were established: petitioner issued checks to apply on account or for value, knew at the time of issue that she had insufficient funds, and the checks were dishonored for "account closed."
• Double Jeopardy: No. The earlier cases in Caloocan City involved a different check (BPI Check No. 874716, dated December 13, 1990) and were dismissed upon the private complainant's affidavit of desistance; the present cases involve three different checks issued afterward, and the offenses are not the same or necessarily included.
• Jurisdiction: No. The RTC of Quezon City, Branch 85, had already acquired and was exercising jurisdiction over the cases before R.A. No. 7691 took effect on April 15, 1994; new legislation does not divest a court of jurisdiction over pending cases absent an express statutory provision to that effect.
• Admissibility of Evidence: Yes, as to Exhibits A, B, C, D, G, and H. Private complainant identified the acknowledgment receipts and checks in her testimony, and petitioner never denied making the lists or issuing the checks. However, Exhibit "I" (the third check) was excluded for the third count due to the variance in date.
• Variance in the Third Count: Yes, the variance is fatal. The information alleged the check was dated May 14, 1992, but the documentary evidence showed April 5, 1992; since the identity and date of the check enter into the essential elements of the offense, the conviction for the third count cannot stand.
• Sufficiency of the Charge: Yes. The facts alleged in the informations sufficiently charge violation of Section 1 of B.P. 22, and checks issued merely as a guarantee fall within the law's coverage.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Section 1 of B.P. 22 punishes any person who makes, draws, or issues a check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that the check is not sufficiently funded, and the check is subsequently dishonored. The prosecution established all three elements for the first two counts: petitioner purchased jewelry worth over ₱100,000 and signed acknowledgment receipts; she issued postdated checks for ₱25,000 each to cover the remaining balance of ₱75,000; she knew at the time of issue that her account (opened with only ₱2,000 and closed by February 1992) had insufficient funds; and the checks were dishonored for "account closed." Petitioner's failure to pay despite written demands completed the offense. The defense that the checks were issued merely as a guarantee for Bernardo's obligation does not constitute a valid defense, because B.P. 22 applies regardless of whether the checks were issued in payment of an obligation or merely as a guarantee, the law making no distinction in this regard.

• Double Jeopardy: The requisites of double jeopardy require, among others, that the second prosecution be for the same offense or one necessarily included in the first. The earlier cases in the RTC of Caloocan City involved BPI Check No. 874716 dated December 13, 1990, in the amount of ₱12,980, while the present cases involve three different checks (Nos. 831256, 831257, and 831258) issued on January 5, 1992, after the dismissal of the earlier cases. Petitioner herself admitted she issued the three checks upon the advice of her lawyer in consideration for the dismissal of the Caloocan City cases. The offenses are distinct, involving different checks and different transactions, and the second prosecution is not barred.

• Jurisdiction: Under Administrative Circular No. 09-94, R.A. No. 7691 transferred jurisdiction over offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six years to the Metropolitan Trial Courts. However, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 85, had already conducted hearings on May 4, June 9, August 4, and August 24, 1993 — before R.A. No. 7691 took effect on April 15, 1994. The established rule is that where a court has already acquired and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to hear the case until final determination is not affected by new legislation vesting jurisdiction in another tribunal, unless the statute expressly so provides or is clearly intended to apply to pending actions — a situation that does not obtain here.

• Admissibility of Evidence: Under Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the authenticity and due execution of a private document may be proved by anyone who saw the document executed or written. Private complainant identified the acknowledgment receipts (Exhibits A, B, C, and D) which petitioner signed in her presence. Moreover, petitioner never denied making the lists or issuing the checks. The exhibits were properly authenticated and admitted. However, for the third count, the information alleged the check was dated May 14, 1992, while the documentary evidence (Exhibit "I") showed the check was dated April 5, 1992. Prosecution witness Sardes confirmed the date as May 14, 1992, contrary to private complainant's testimony of April 5, 1992. This variance is fatal because the identity and date of the check enter into the first and second essential elements of the offense under Section 1 of B.P. 22 — the making, drawing, or issuing of a check, and knowledge at the time of issue that the check was unfunded. The variance violates the petitioner's constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the offense charged.

• Sufficiency of the Charge: The facts alleged in the three informations track the language of Section 1 of B.P. 22 and sufficiently charge the offense. The law applies even where dishonored checks are issued merely as a deposit or guarantee, as the statute makes no distinction between checks issued in payment and those issued as a guarantee. Under the rule of statutory construction, where the law makes no distinction, none should be made by interpretation. The legislative intent is to make the prohibition all-embracing.

• Elements of Violation of B.P. 22 — The offense under the first mode of Section 1 of B.P. 22 has three elements: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply on account or for value; (2) knowledge at the time of issue that the drawer does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment in full upon presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without valid cause, ordered a stop payment. All three elements were found present as to the first two counts.

• B.P. 22 Applies to Checks Issued as Guarantee — The law makes no distinction between checks issued in payment of an obligation and those issued merely to guarantee an obligation. Where the law has not made any distinction, none can be made by interpretation or application. What matters is that the accused deliberately issued the checks to cover accounts and that the checks were dishonored upon presentment, regardless of whether they were issued as a guarantee.

• Requisites of Double Jeopardy — The defense of double jeopardy requires: (1) a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) filing before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) arraignment and plea; and (4) conviction, acquittal, or dismissal or termination without the accused's express consent. When all concur, a second prosecution for the same offense or one necessarily included therein is barred. The doctrine did not apply here because the earlier and subsequent cases involved different checks and different transactions.

• Jurisdiction Not Divested by Subsequent Legislation — Where a court has already acquired and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to hear the case until final determination is not affected by new legislation vesting jurisdiction in another tribunal, unless the statute expressly so provides or is clearly intended to apply to actions pending before its enactment.

• Variance Between Information and Evidence — Where the check described in the information differs materially from the check presented in evidence — particularly as to the date, which enters into the essential elements of the offense under B.P. 22 — the variance violates the accused's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, rendering the conviction fatally defective.

• "The law does not make any distinction as to whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or merely to guarantee the said obligation. In accordance with the pertinent rule of statutory construction, inasmuch as the law has not made any distinction in this regard, no such distinction can be made by means of interpretation or application." — This passage articulates the controlling rule that B.P. 22 applies to checks issued as guarantees, a frequently cited proposition in bouncing checks jurisprudence.

• "Since the identity of the check enters into the first essential element of the offense under Section 1 of B.P. 22, that is, that a person makes, draws or issues a check on account or for value, and the date thereof involves its second element, namely, that at the time of issue the maker, drawer or issuer knew that he or she did not have sufficient funds to cover the same, there is a violation of petitioner's constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the offense charged in view of the aforesaid variance, thereby rendering the conviction for the third count fatally defective." — This is the ratio decidendi for the reversal of the third count, establishing that a variance in the check's date is fatal to a B.P. 22 conviction.

• "It has been ruled that where a court or tribunal has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to hear the case until its final determination is not affected by new legislation vesting such jurisdiction in another tribunal, the exception being where the statute expressly so provides or is clearly intended to apply to actions pending before its enactment." — This passage restates the doctrine on retention of jurisdiction over pending cases despite subsequent legislative changes, applied here to reject the jurisdictional challenge under R.A. No. 7691.

• Wong vs. Court of Appeals, 351 SCRA 100 (2001) — Cited for the proposition that there are two ways of violating B.P. 22: (1) issuing a check knowing it is unfunded, and (2) having funds at the time of issue but failing to maintain sufficient funds within ninety days.
• Ngo vs. People, G.R. No. 155815, July 14, 2004 — Cited (together with Meriz vs. People, Caras vs. Court of Appeals, Bautista vs. Court of Appeals, and People vs. Laggui) for the enumeration of the three elements of the offense under the first mode of B.P. 22.
• Que vs. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) — Cited (through Lagman vs. People, Dico, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, Ibasco vs. Court of Appeals, Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, and People vs. Reyes) for the rule that B.P. 22 applies to checks issued merely as a guarantee, the law making no distinction in this regard.
• Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 667 (1994) — Cited for the four requisites of double jeopardy and the rule on barred second prosecutions.
• Philippine Overseas Drilling and Oil Development Corporation vs. Ministry of Labor, 146 SCRA 79 (1986) — Cited (through Ramos vs. Our Lady of Peace School and Bengzon vs. Inciong) for the doctrine that jurisdiction already acquired is not divested by subsequent legislation.

• Section 1, Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) — Defines and penalizes the making, drawing, and issuance of checks without sufficient funds. Applied as the substantive offense for which petitioner was charged and convicted on the first two counts; the elements of the offense under this provision were the framework for analyzing sufficiency of evidence and the variance issue.
• Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court — Governs proof of authenticity and due execution of private documents, providing that such may be proved by anyone who saw the document executed or written. Applied to uphold the admission of the acknowledgment receipts and checks identified by the private complainant in her testimony.
• Section 32(2), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691 — Expanded the criminal jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts to cover offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six years. Applied in rejecting petitioner's jurisdictional challenge, as the RTC had already acquired jurisdiction before the law's effectivity.
• Paragraph 2(d), Article 315, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 4885 and P.D. No. 818 — The estafa provision under which petitioner was previously charged in the Caloocan City cases, distinguished from the present B.P. 22 charges for purposes of the double jeopardy analysis.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ., concurred.