Almogera, Jr. vs. A & L Fishpond and Hatchery, Inc.

An employee who absents himself from work for a prolonged period without filing the required written leave application, in violation of a reasonable company rule duly made known to him at the time of employment, commits willful disobedience constituting just cause for termination under Article 297(a) of the Labor Code, provided the employer observed the twin-notice requirement of procedural due process.

Respondent A & L Fishpond and Hatchery, Inc. is a corporation engaged in breeding, production, and distribution of aquatic products, operating in Barangay Sampaloc, Apalit, Pampanga, with respondent Augusto Tycangco as its owner and proprietor. Petitioner Jerry E. Almogera, Jr. was hired by A & L in October 2013 as an all-around harvester with a daily wage of ₱318.00. A & L maintained a Code of Discipline and company rules governing work schedules and leave applications, requiring employees to accomplish a Vacation Leave Form at least five days before the intended leave, with supervisor approval prior to the leave.

Respondent A & L Fishpond and Hatchery, Inc. is a corporation engaged in the business of breeding, production, and distribution of aquatic products, operating in Barangay Sampaloc, Apalit, Pampanga, with respondent Augusto Tycangco as its owner and proprietor. In October 2013, petitioner Jerry E. Almogera, Jr. was hired by A & L as an all-around harvester with a daily wage of ₱318.00. A & L maintained company rules and a Code of Discipline governing employee attendance and leave applications, requiring all personnel going on vacation leave to fill up a Vacation Leave Form in two copies at least five days before the leave, with the form to be approved by the supervisor prior to the intended leave. Under Section I, Item 7 of the Code of Discipline, absences without official leave for five or more days carried the penalty of dismissal.

According to petitioner, sometime on January 5, 2017, he verbally sought permission from his immediate supervisor, Manuel Cruzada, to take a leave of absence for 11 days beginning January 6, 2017 until January 16, 2017, citing a family emergency in Naga. Petitioner claimed that Cruzada signified approval and committed to relay the request to higher management. Thereafter, petitioner left the workplace and went to Naga. Petitioner did not accomplish or file the required Vacation Leave Form.

On January 25, 2017, upon reporting for work, petitioner received a letter from A & L, dated January 24, 2017, requiring him to explain within five days why he should not be terminated for his absences without official leave covering the period January 6 to 16, 2017, pursuant to the Code of Discipline. On that same day, petitioner was placed under preventive suspension from January 25 to 29, 2017. Petitioner opted not to submit any explanation. A hearing was scheduled on January 28, 2017 to give him another opportunity to explain, but he again chose not to appear. On January 30, 2017, Tycangco issued a Memorandum formally advising petitioner of his termination effective that same day for violation of Section I, Item 7 of the Code of Discipline.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and various monetary claims before the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter ruled in his favor, finding illegal dismissal because respondents failed to prove that petitioner was furnished a copy of the Code of Discipline or that its contents were made known to him at the time of employment. The NLRC reversed, declaring the dismissal valid for just cause and finding that procedural due process was observed. The Court of Appeals sustained the NLRC. The NLRC and the CA both found that petitioner did not controvert the fact that he was furnished a copy and made aware of the A & L rules and Code of Discipline, and that his claim of lack of knowledge was raised for the first time only in his motion for reconsideration before the NLRC. Records also showed that petitioner had previously committed the same infraction, having been absent without official leave on December 26 and 29, 2016 and January 4, 2017.

• Claim of Authorized Absence: Petitioner insisted that his absences were not without official leave because he had verbally sought and obtained authority from his immediate supervisor, Cruzada, who approved his request and committed to relay the same to management, and thus he could not be faulted for relying on Cruzada's express approval.
• Lack of Knowledge of Company Rules: Petitioner argued that the authenticated copy of A & L's rules and regulations on leave application was not presented as evidence, and that there was no proof the company policy was communicated to him, so he could not be said to have violated it.
• Disproportionate Penalty: Petitioner contended that even assuming the acts imputed to him constituted just causes for termination, the penalty of dismissal was too harsh, particularly as it was allegedly his first infraction.
• Entitlement to Monetary Claims: Petitioner maintained that he was entitled to his entire monetary claims, including backwages, separation pay, and other labor standard benefits.

• Questions of Fact, Not Law: Respondents asserted that the petition must be denied for failing to raise questions of law, raising only questions of fact already threshed out before the LA and the NLRC.
• Rehashed Arguments: Respondents submitted that petitioner merely rehashed previous arguments already passed upon and found unmeritorious by the NLRC and the CA.
• Validity of Dismissal: Respondents maintained that the NLRC and the CA acted in accordance with law and jurisprudence in declaring that petitioner was validly dismissed, having observed both substantive and procedural due process before termination.

• Validity of Dismissal: Whether the CA erred in affirming the NLRC's ruling that petitioner was not illegally dismissed from work.
• Monetary Awards: Whether the CA erred in affirming the NLRC's ruling setting aside the monetary awards granted by the Labor Arbiter.

• Validity of Dismissal: No. Petitioner was validly dismissed for willful disobedience under Article 297(a) of the Labor Code, the company rules being reasonable, lawful, and made known to him, and respondents having complied with the twin-notice requirement of procedural due process.
• Monetary Awards: No. Petitioner was not entitled to backwages and separation pay, those remedies being reserved for illegally dismissed employees; however, the award of service incentive leave pay was sustained, respondents having failed to prove payment thereof.

• Validity of Dismissal: For a dismissal to be valid, the employer must comply with both substantive and procedural due process. Substantive due process requires a just or authorized cause under Articles 297, 298, or 299 of the Labor Code. Here, respondents discharged the burden of proving just cause — willful disobedience of the employer's lawful orders, which requires the concurrence of two requisites: (1) the employee's conduct was willful, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated was reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and pertinent to the duties he was engaged to discharge. Both requisites obtained. Petitioner's collective acts — failing to file the required Vacation Leave Form, disregarding the notice to explain, and refusing to appear at the scheduled hearing — manifested a wrongful and perverse attitude. The A & L rules were reasonable and lawful, designed to maintain work efficiency in a business heavily dependent on the presence of harvesters, and were relevant to petitioner's duties. Contrary to the LA's finding, the rules were made known to petitioner: respondents declared the rules were discussed and explained to all workers at the time of employment, and the Code of Discipline even contained a Filipino translation. Petitioner did not controvert this before the LA; his claim of lack of knowledge was raised for the first time only in his motion for reconsideration before the NLRC, rendering it barred by estoppel. Petitioner's insistence that his absences were verbally authorized by his supervisor was unsubstantiated and self-serving, and the manner of securing leave directly contravened the express written-form requirement. The penalty of dismissal was not too harsh, as the Code of Discipline expressly prescribed dismissal for five or more days of AWOL, and records showed petitioner had previously committed the same infraction on December 26 and 29, 2016 and January 4, 2017. Procedural due process was satisfied through the twin-notice requirement: the January 24, 2017 letter served as the first notice detailing the charge and giving five days to explain, and the January 30, 2017 Memorandum served as the second notice of termination. Petitioner was afforded two opportunities to defend himself but chose not to respond, tantamount to admission of guilt.

• Monetary Awards: Backwages and separation pay are reserved by law and jurisprudence for employees who were illegally dismissed. Since petitioner's dismissal was for just cause, these awards could not be sustained. The award of service incentive leave pay was upheld because the LA, NLRC, and CA unanimously found that respondents failed to present evidence of payment. Petitioner's claim for attorney's fees necessarily failed as a consequence of the finding of just cause and respondents' good faith. Legal interest of 6% per annum was imposed on the monetary award from finality of judgment until fully paid.

• Willful Disobedience as Just Cause for Termination — Willful disobedience of the employer's lawful orders requires the concurrence of two requisites: (1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. The Court applied this doctrine by finding that petitioner's failure to file the required leave form, refusal to submit an explanation, and non-appearance at the hearing collectively manifested a wrongful and perverse attitude, and that the company rules on leave application were reasonable, lawful, and made known to him.

• Twin-Notice Requirement in Termination — In termination proceedings, procedural due process requires the employer to furnish the employee with two written notices: (1) the first apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which dismissal is sought and gives reasonable opportunity to explain; and (2) the second informs the employee of the decision to dismiss. The hearing requirement is satisfied by an opportunity to be heard, not necessarily an actual hearing. The Court found both notices were properly served — the January 24, 2017 letter as the first notice and the January 30, 2017 Memorandum as the second.

• Issues Barred by Estoppel When Raised for the First Time on Appeal — Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower tribunal ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. To consider belatedly raised facts and arguments would trample on the basic principles of fair play, justice, and due process. The Court applied this doctrine to reject petitioner's claim of lack of knowledge of company rules, which was raised only in his motion for reconsideration before the NLRC.

• Management Prerogative — Employers may prescribe reasonable rules and regulations necessary or proper for the conduct of business and provide disciplinary measures to implement them. While the State affords constitutional protection to labor, it must also protect the right of employers to exercise management prerogatives, so long as the exercise is without abuse of discretion. The Court found no abuse of discretion in respondents' application of the prescribed penalty for AWOL.

• "Willful disobedience of the employer's lawful orders, as a just cause for dismissal of an employee, envisages the concurrence of at least two requisites: (1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge." — This passage states the canonical formulation of the two-requisite test for willful disobedience, the doctrinal basis for sustaining the dismissal.

• "It is well established that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel. Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." — This passage articulates the estoppel doctrine applied to defeat petitioner's belated claim of ignorance of company rules.

• "Although the State affords the constitutional blanket of affording protection to labor, the rule is settled that it must also protect the right of employers to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives, so long as the exercise is without abuse of discretion." — This passage defines the balance between labor protection and management prerogative, invoked to uphold the penalty of dismissal.

• Raza vs. Daikoku Electronics Phils., Inc., 765 Phil. 61 (2015) — Cited for the exception to the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, specifically when findings of the LA conflict with those of the NLRC and the CA, and for the principle that employers may promulgate policies, rules, and regulations on work-related activities.

• Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. vs. IBM Local I, 800 Phil. 645 (2016) — Cited as the source of the two-requisite test for willful disobedience, itself citing Bascon vs. Court of Appeals, 466 Phil. 719 (2004).

• Unilever Philippines, Inc. vs. Rivera, 710 Phil. 124 (2013) — Cited for the three-step procedural due process standard in termination cases: first notice with detailed charges, hearing or conference, and second notice of termination.

• Villeno vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 321 Phil. 880 (1995) — Cited to reject petitioner's plea of first offense, the Court having brushed aside the same plea in that case, holding that offenses cannot be excused on that ground when the employee's disregard of rules has been plainly demonstrated.

• Leus vs. St. Scholastica's College Westgrove, 752 Phil. 186 (2015) — Cited for the estoppel doctrine on issues raised for the first time on appeal, and for the imposition of 6% per annum legal interest on monetary awards.

• Distribution & Control Products, Inc. vs. Santos, 813 Phil. 423 (2017) — Cited for the burden of proof on the employer to show valid cause for dismissal, and for the twin-notice requirement of procedural due process.

• Article 297(a) [formerly Article 282(a)], Labor Code — Authorizes an employer to terminate employment for serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work. Applied as the substantive basis for petitioner's dismissal.

• Article 292 [Article 277(b)], Labor Code — Places the burden of proof on the employer to show that the dismissal was for a valid or authorized cause. Applied to require respondents to prove just cause, which the Court found they did.

• Article 279, Presidential Decree No. 442 (Labor Code), as amended — Cited for the principle that backwages and separation pay are reserved for employees who were illegally dismissed, via Veterans Federations of the Philippines vs. Montenejo, 821 Phil. 788 (2017).

Justices Leonen (Chairperson), Hernando, Inting, and Gaerlan concurred. Justice Gaerlan was designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez per Raffle dated February 10, 2021.