Almirol vs. Register of Deeds of Agusan

A Register of Deeds has no authority to refuse registration of an instrument on the ground that it is invalid or defective; however, where the Register of Deeds is in doubt as to the proper step to take, or a party in interest disagrees with the Register, the question must first be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 1151 before mandamus may be sought in the courts.

Teodoro Almirol purchased a parcel of land in Esperanza, Agusan, from Arcenio Abalo. The land was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 issued in the name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo." By the time Almirol sought registration of the deed of sale, Nicolasa M. Abalo had already died. The Register of Deeds of Agusan refused registration, invoking the presumption of conjugality and the rule that a surviving spouse cannot dispose of conjugal property without liquidation and heir consent. The governing statute at the time, Republic Act No. 1151, provided a mechanism for resolving doubts arising in the registration process through certification to the Commissioner of Land Registration.

On June 28, 1961, Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land situated in the municipality of Esperanza, province of Agusan. The property was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237, issued in the name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo." Sometime in May 1962, Almirol went to the office of the Register of Deeds of Agusan in Butuan City to register the deed of sale and to secure a transfer certificate of title in his name.

The Register of Deeds refused registration. In his letter dated May 21, 1962, the Register of Deeds stated three grounds for refusal: first, that Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 was registered in the name of Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo, and by legal presumption was considered conjugal property; second, that in the sale of conjugal property acquired after the effectivity of the New Civil Code, both spouses must sign the document; and third, since the wife had already died when the sale was made, the surviving husband could not dispose of the whole property without violating existing law, citing LRC Consulta No. 46 dated June 10, 1958. The Register of Deeds further advised that to effect registration, the property must first be liquidated and transferred to the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased wife through extrajudicial settlement or partition, and that the consent of the other heirs must be procured through another document ratifying the sale executed by their father.

In view of this refusal, Almirol filed a petition for mandamus before the Court of First Instance of Agusan, docketed as sp. civ. case 151, seeking to compel the Register of Deeds to register the deed of sale and to issue the corresponding transfer certificate of title, and to recover ₱5,000 in moral damages and ₱1,000 in attorney's fees and litigation expenses. Almirol asserted that it was a ministerial duty of the respondent to perform the acts required, and that he had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Register of Deeds, in his answer with counterclaim for ₱10,000 damages, reiterated the grounds stated in his letter, averred that the petitioner had an adequate remedy by appealing the decision of the respondent to the Commissioner of Land Registration, and prayed for dismissal of the petition.

The lower court, in its resolution of October 16, 1963, declared that mandamus did not lie because the adequate remedy was that provided by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 1151, and dismissed the petition with costs against the petitioner. Almirol appealed.

• Ministerial Duty: Petitioner argued that it was a ministerial duty of the Register of Deeds to register the deed of sale and issue the corresponding transfer certificate of title, and that mandamus was the proper remedy to compel performance of that duty.
• Absence of Alternative Remedy: Petitioner asserted that he had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, thereby satisfying the requisites for the issuance of mandamus.

• Invalidity of the Deed: Respondent reiterated the grounds stated in his letter of May 21, 1962, contending that the property was presumptively conjugal, that both spouses needed to sign the deed of sale of conjugal property, and that the surviving husband could not dispose of the whole property without prior liquidation and heir consent.
• Availability of Administrative Remedy: Respondent averred that the petitioner had another legal, plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law by appealing the decision of the Register of Deeds to the Commissioner of Land Registration, and prayed for dismissal of the petition.

• Propriety of Mandamus: Whether mandamus will lie to compel the Register of Deeds to register the deed of sale.

• Propriety of Mandamus: No. Although the Register of Deeds' grounds for refusal were not legal, mandamus was correctly dismissed because Section 4 of Republic Act No. 1151 provides a specific administrative remedy — certification of the doubtful question to the Commissioner of Land Registration — that must be exhausted before recourse to the courts.

• Propriety of Mandamus: The Register of Deeds' refusal to register was predicated on his assessment of the instrument's validity — specifically, that the property was conjugal, that the wife's signature was required, and that the surviving husband could not dispose of the property without liquidation. These considerations were improper because the determination of an instrument's validity is a judicial function, not one committed to the Register of Deeds. The law on registration does not require that only valid instruments be registered; the purpose of registration is to give notice, and questions of validity or effect are to be litigated after, not before, registration. A Register of Deeds is precluded by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 1151 from exercising personal judgment on the validity of an instrument; when in doubt, he is required to submit and certify the question to the Commissioner of Land Registration, who shall enter an order prescribing the step to be taken, which order is conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds. Because this administrative remedy is expressly provided by statute and is mandatory in character, it must be resorted to before a party may seek judicial intervention through mandamus. The lower court therefore correctly dismissed the petition, albeit for reasons different from those relied upon by the Register of Deeds.

• Register of Deeds Cannot Pass Upon Validity of Instruments — A Register of Deeds has no authority to determine whether a document presented for registration is valid, invalid, frivolous, or intended to harass; that function belongs to a court of competent jurisdiction. The law on registration does not require that only valid instruments be registered. Registration serves to give notice, and questions regarding the effect or invalidity of instruments are decided after, not before, registration. In this case, the Register of Deeds' refusal based on the supposed conjugal nature of the property and the absence of the wife's signature was an improper exercise of judgment on the instrument's validity.

• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies in Land Registration — Under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 1151, when a Register of Deeds is in doubt as to the proper step to take regarding any instrument presented for registration, or when a party in interest disagrees with the Register of Deeds, the question must be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration, who shall enter an order prescribing the step to be taken. This order is conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds. A party who disagrees with the Commissioner's ruling on a question of law may appeal to the Supreme Court within thirty days from receipt of notice. This administrative remedy must be exhausted before mandamus or other judicial recourse may be sought. The Court applied this doctrine to affirm the dismissal of Almirol's petition, holding that the statutory remedy was adequate and mandatory.

• "Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the register of deeds to determine; this function belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction." — This passage articulates the fundamental principle that a Register of Deeds' function is ministerial in character and does not encompass adjudication of an instrument's validity.

• "The law on registration does not require that only valid instruments shall be registered. How can parties affected thereby be supposed to know their invalidity before they become aware, actually or constructively, of their existence or of their provisions? If the purpose of registration is merely to give notice, then questions regarding the effect or invalidity of instruments are expected to be decided after, not before, registration." — This quotation, drawn from Gurbax Singh Pablo & Co. vs. Reyes and Tantoco, sets out the rationale for the rule that registration must precede litigation on validity, and was adopted by the Court as controlling doctrine.

• "This administrative remedy must be resorted to by the petitioner before he can have recourse to the courts." — This sentence states the ratio decidendi: the administrative remedy under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 1151 is a condition precedent to judicial action, rendering mandamus premature.

• Gabriel vs. Register of Deeds of Rizal, L-17956, Sept. 30, 1953 — Cited for the proposition that whether a document is invalid, frivolous, or intended to harass is not for the Register of Deeds to decide, but for a court of competent jurisdiction. Followed as controlling doctrine.

• Gurbax Singh Pablo & Co. vs. Reyes and Tantoco, 92 Phil. 182-183 — Cited for the principle that the law on registration does not require that only valid instruments be registered, and that questions of validity are decided after registration. Adopted by the Court as the rationale for the rule.

• In re Consulta filed by Francisco on behalf of Cabantog, 67 Phil. 222, 228 — Cited among authorities supporting the principle that a Register of Deeds cannot determine the validity of instruments presented for registration. Followed.

• Smith Bell & Co., Ltd. vs. Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 61 — Cited in the footnote as supporting authority for the same principle. Followed.

• Register of Deeds, Pasig, Rizal vs. heirs of Hi Caiji, 99 Phil. 25, 29-31 — Cited in the footnote as supporting authority. Followed.

• Section 4, Republic Act No. 1151 — This provision governs the reference of doubtful matters to the Commissioner of Land Registration. When a Register of Deeds is in doubt as to the proper step to take regarding any instrument presented for registration, or when a party in interest disagrees with the Register, the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner, who shall enter an order prescribing the step to be taken. The order is conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds. A party who disagrees with the Commissioner's ruling on a question of law may appeal to the Supreme Court within thirty days from receipt of notice. The Court held that this provision provides an adequate administrative remedy that must be exhausted before mandamus may be sought.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concurred. Sanchez, J., concurred in the result. Concepcion, C.J., was on leave.