Almario vs. Court of Appeals

A dismissal of a criminal case made upon the express motion or consent of the accused does not bar subsequent prosecution unless the dismissal was grounded on (1) insufficiency of evidence or (2) an actual, demonstrable violation of the accused’s right to speedy trial. The mere invocation of the right to speedy trial, unsupported by proof of unreasonable, vexatious, or oppressive delay, is insufficient to clothe the dismissal with the character of an acquittal.

Roberto Almario was one of the accused in two criminal cases before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 139—estafa through falsification of a public document and estafa—in which Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation was the offended party. Following his arraignment and the termination of pre-trial, the cases were scheduled for continuous trial, but multiple hearings were cancelled for reasons that included the elevation of the presiding judge to the Supreme Court, lack of notice to the accused or their counsel, and a prosecution-requested postponement to which the defense did not object. On the September 8, 1995 hearing date, the private complainant suffered a severe attack of gout and arthritis and failed to appear, though an associate lawyer was present. Almario’s counsel immediately moved for dismissal on the ground that the delay violated Almario’s constitutional right to a speedy trial, and the trial court granted the motion.

• Nature of the Charges: Petitioner was one of several accused in Criminal Case No. 91-6761 (estafa thru falsification of public document) and Criminal Case No. 91-6762 (estafa). Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation was the offended party. The Informations were filed on October 22, 1992.

• Pre-Trial and Initial Trial Dates: Petitioner was arraigned on March 18, 1992. After pre-trial was terminated on October 21, 1994, the trial court scheduled continuous trial for December 1994, January 1995, and February 1995. All three settings were cancelled because the presiding judge had been promoted to the Supreme Court and no successor judge was immediately appointed or detailed to the branch.

• Successive Postponements in 1995: The June 21, 1995 hearing was cancelled for lack of proof of notice to the accused and their counsel. On July 17, 1995, the private prosecutor moved for postponement due to the absence of witnesses, and petitioner’s counsel did not object. The July 24, 1995 hearing was reset because, although petitioner and his counsel were present, no proof of service of notice upon the three co-accused (Spouses Cruz and Dante Duldulao) was on record.

• September 8, 1995 Dismissal: On that date, the private complainant failed to appear, having suffered a severe attack of gout and arthritis. His associate lawyer, acceptable to the court, was present. Petitioner’s counsel immediately moved for dismissal on the ground of failure to prosecute and violation of petitioner’s right to speedy trial. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case as to petitioner, while issuing warrants of arrest for the co-accused.

• Reconsideration and Reinstatement: The private prosecutor sought reconsideration, which petitioner opposed. In its Order of October 25, 1995, the trial court set aside the dismissal. The court reasoned that only three hearing settings had been postponed after pre-trial, all for valid reasons; there had been no vexatious, capricious, or oppressive delays, nor any unjustified postponements sought or secured. It concluded that petitioner’s right to speedy trial had not been violated and, consequently, the dismissal upon his own motion did not bar further prosecution. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied on April 11, 1996.

• Double Jeopardy via Speedy Trial Dismissal: Petitioner maintained that the trial court’s order of September 8, 1995 dismissed the criminal cases on the explicit ground of violation of his constitutional right to speedy trial, which operated as an acquittal. The subsequent reconsideration and reinstatement of the cases, despite his objection, placed him twice in jeopardy for the same offenses in violation of Article III, Section 21 of the Constitution.

• No Actual Violation of Speedy Trial: Respondent People of the Philippines and private complainant RCBC argued that the postponements were few, justified, and not attended by vexatious, oppressive, or capricious delay. The private complainant’s absence on September 8, 1995 was excusable due to illness, and counsel was present.

• Dismissal with Consent Does Not Bar Reinstatement: Respondents contended that the dismissal was ordered precisely upon petitioner’s own motion and express consent. Because the requisite showing of an actual, unreasonable delay was absent, the exception to the express-consent rule did not apply, and double jeopardy never attached.

• Double Jeopardy: Whether the reconsideration of the order dismissing the criminal cases, which had been granted on petitioner’s own motion for alleged violation of his right to speedy trial, placed petitioner in double jeopardy.

• Double Jeopardy: Double jeopardy did not attach. The fifth requisite for a valid claim of double jeopardy requires that the prior dismissal or termination of the case be “without the express consent of the accused.” When a criminal case is dismissed upon the accused’s own motion, the dismissal is deemed to carry his express consent and generally does not bar a subsequent prosecution. Two exceptions are recognized: (1) dismissal based on insufficiency of evidence, and (2) dismissal based on a denial of the right to speedy trial. For the speedy-trial exception to operate, the violation of the right must be actual and demonstrable; a bare allegation does not suffice. The right to a speedy trial is violated only when proceedings are marked by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, unjustified postponements, or an unexcused lapse of a long period without trial. Here, the record showed only three hearing dates vacated after pre-trial—each for a valid reason: the presiding judge’s elevation, lack of notice to co-accused, and a prosecution postponement to which petitioner did not object. The September 8, 1995 hearing was the first setting at which the prosecution’s absence prompted a motion to dismiss, and the complainant’s illness was a legitimate excuse. No pattern of delay attributable to the State was established. Because petitioner’s right to speedy trial had not been infringed in fact, the September 8 dismissal, though labelled a response to that right, did not constitute an acquittal. Reconsideration of the order therefore did not offend the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

• Requisites of Double Jeopardy: For double jeopardy to attach, the following must concur: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned; (4) a valid plea has been entered; and (5) the accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the accused’s express consent. The fifth element was dispositive in this case.

• Express Consent Rule and Its Exceptions: A dismissal ordered at the instance of or with the express consent of the accused ordinarily will not place the accused in double jeopardy. The two recognized exceptions are: (a) dismissal on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, and (b) dismissal predicated on a violation of the accused’s right to speedy trial. For the second exception to apply, the violation of the right must be clear, actual, and substantiated; a mere request for dismissal asserting a violation does not by itself convert the dismissal into an acquittal.

• Test for Violation of the Right to Speedy Trial: The constitutional right to a speedy trial is deemed infringed only where the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, where unjustified postponements are sought and secured, or where, without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without trial. The determination is relative and must take into account the particular facts and circumstances of each case.

• “Generally, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion will not place the accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to speedy trial. Double jeopardy may attach when the proceedings have been prolonged unreasonably, in violation of the accused's right to speedy trial.”

• “There being no oppressive delay in the proceedings, and no postponements unjustifiably sought, we concur with the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that petitioner's right to speedy trial had not been infringed. Where the right of the accused to speedy trial had not been violated, there was no reason to support the initial order of dismissal. It follows that petitioner cannot invoke the constitutional right against double jeopardy when that order was reconsidered seasonably.”

• People v. Nitafan, 302 SCRA 424 (1999) — Enumerated the five elements of double jeopardy, specifically the requirement that the prior dismissal must be without the accused’s express consent.
• People v. Bans, 239 SCRA 48 (1994) and Commission on Elections v. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 501 (1994) — Established the two exceptions to the rule that dismissal with the accused’s consent bars jeopardy: insufficiency of evidence and denial of speedy trial.
• People v. Tampal, 244 SCRA 202 and People v. Leviste, 255 SCRA 238 (1996) — Applied the principle that a dismissal grounded on the right to speedy trial constitutes an acquittal only where the right was clearly violated; where no actual violation is shown, the reinstatement of the case does not offend the double jeopardy clause.

• Article III, Section 21, 1987 Constitution — Provides that “[n]o person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.” The Court interpreted this prohibition in relation to dismissals obtained at the accused’s instance for alleged speedy trial violations.
• Section 7, Rule 117, Revised Rules of Court — Codifies the requisites for former conviction or acquittal as a bar to subsequent prosecution, specifically requiring that the dismissal or termination of the prior case be “without the express consent of the accused.” The Court ruled that the phrase “without his express consent” is not satisfied where the accused himself moved for dismissal and the ground relied upon had no factual basis.

Bellosillo, C.J. (Chairman); Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concurred.