Aliling vs. People

Where the prosecution's evidence suffers from inconsistencies on material points, the presumption of innocence is not overturned and acquittal is warranted; denial and alibi, if credible and corroborated, are complete and legitimate defenses that do not shift the burden of proof.

Hilario B. Aliling, also known as "Larry," was charged with Frustrated Murder under an Information alleging that on or about April 18, 2010, at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, at Barangay Matingain 1, Lemery, Batangas, he, armed with an unlicensed short firearm, with intent to kill and with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, and without justifiable cause, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attacked, assaulted, and shot Jerry Tumbaga y Marasigan, suddenly and without warning, inflicting upon the latter a 0.5 cm gunshot wound at the L1-L2 paravertebral area, left, and a 0.5 cm gunshot wound at the infrascapular area, right, which required medical attendance and incapacitated him from performing his customary work for more than three months. The Information further alleged that Aliling had performed all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of murder, but which did not by reason of a cause independent of his will, namely the timely and able medical attendance rendered to Tumbaga. Aliling filed a Motion for Bail, which the RTC approved in an Order dated August 24, 2010, and upon arraignment he pleaded "not guilty."

According to the prosecution, Tumbaga was watching a basketball game in Barangay Matingain at 10:00 o'clock in the evening of April 18, 2010, together with his uncle Jesus Marasigan. He left the place and proceeded to his motorcycle, parked about seven to eight meters away. As he was about to board it, he was shot at the back; when he looked back, he recognized Aliling as the one firing. Aliling fired again and Tumbaga was hit at the back a second time. Tumbaga ran away, felt dizzy, and fell near the basketball court. He was brought to Metro Lemery Hospital and, after about an hour, transferred to Batangas Regional Hospital, where he underwent surgery. Marasigan corroborated this account, testifying that he saw Tumbaga ride his motorcycle when Aliling suddenly arrived and fired twice at him; Tumbaga ran and fell while Aliling fled on a motorcycle. Dr. Mark Louie M. Lanting, who operated on Tumbaga, issued a medico-legal certificate dated April 29, 2010.

Aliling, for his part, testified that on April 18, 2010, between 7:00 and 8:00 o'clock in the morning, he was at Barangay Masalisi with Annie, Tessie, Janno, Piolo, Coring, and Melody, campaigning for a certain Apacible. They finished campaigning at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening and waited for the start of the miting de avance, which they attended and left at around 12:00 midnight. They proceeded to the house of Annie, their coordinator, in Barangay Matingain, arriving at around 1:00 o'clock in the morning. Aliling then took his motorcycle and went home, arriving at about 1:30 o'clock; the next day, he campaigned again. He first learned that he was a suspect on June 22, when he received a subpoena, and surmised that Tumbaga was probably angry at him because of a previous confrontation in Barangay Butong. Adrian Cabral Atienza testified that from 8:00 o'clock in the morning of April 18, 2010 until 1:00 o'clock of the following day, he was with Aliling and several others at Barangay Masalisi, campaigning for Apacible. Michael Perez Bathan, who was watching the basketball game at Barangay Matingain that night, testified that he heard two gunshots as Tumbaga was about to ride his motorcycle, that Tumbaga ran and fell to the ground, and that he did not see Aliling at the place when the shooting happened — instead, he saw an unidentified man shoot Tumbaga.

On November 25, 2015, the RTC found Aliling guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Frustrated Murder, giving more credence to the testimonies of Tumbaga and Marasigan, who both identified Aliling as the gunman, as against his defense of alibi. The trial court noted an inconsistency in Aliling's testimony — that he stated he used his motorcycle on the day of the incident but on cross-examination stated that he left his motorcycle at the house of their coordinator — and held that the positive allegations of the prosecution witnesses prevailed over the negative assertions of the defense witnesses.

• Insufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: Aliling maintained his innocence and argued that the prosecution was not able to discharge the burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Incredible and Inconsistent Testimonial Evidence: Aliling claimed that the testimonial evidence of the prosecution cannot be relied on as it was inconsistent and incredible.
• Misappreciation of Defense Evidence: Aliling alleged that the CA failed to properly consider the defense's evidence; according to him, the defense was able to present and submit unbiased testimonies of credible witnesses who supported his alibi that he was in Barangay Masalisi doing campaign activities until 1:00 o'clock in the morning on the day of the shooting.
• Eyewitness Account Favoring the Defense: Aliling pointed to the eyewitness Michael P. Bathan, a friend of both Aliling and Tumbaga, who testified that he witnessed the shooting incident and saw that the gunman was not Aliling but an unidentified person.

• Affirmation of Conviction: Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC's judgment of conviction.

• Affirmation of Conviction: Yes. The CA erred in affirming the RTC's judgment of conviction; the prosecution failed to overcome the burden of proving Aliling's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses being inconsistent on material points while the defense's alibi and eyewitness account were credible.

• Affirmation of Conviction: A person charged with a crime enjoys the presumption of innocence under the Bill of Rights and is designated as the accused precisely because the allegations against him must be proven beyond reasonable doubt; only when the prosecution has established guilt beyond reasonable doubt shall the presumption of innocence be overturned. Although a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 shall only raise questions of law, review of factual questions is allowed in the exceptional circumstance where the judgment is based on a misapprehension of the facts, which the Court found to be the situation in this case. While positive testimony is generally given more weight than denial and alibi, which are inherently weak defenses because they can be easily fabricated, the Court held in Lejano vs. People that not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated, and that a positive declaration from a witness that he saw the accused commit the crime should not automatically cancel out the accused's claim that he did not do it, since a lying witness can make as positive an identification as a truthful witness can. If found credible, denial and alibi may be considered complete and legitimate defenses, and the burden of proof does not shift by their mere invocation. In alibi, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time the crime was committed, but that it was likewise physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time thereof, referring to the distance between the two places and the facility of access between them. The Court found that Aliling's alibi was straightforward, credible, and corroborated by an impartial witness, and that there was eyewitness testimony that Aliling was not the gunman. Contrary to the RTC's finding, there was no inconsistency in Aliling's testimony as regards his use of his motorcycle: he testified that he drove his motorcycle to the house of their campaign coordinator "Ate Annie" in Barangay Matingain II, left it there, proceeded with the group to Barangay Masalisi on board their service vehicle, a pick-up truck, stayed until the miting de avance, returned to "Ate Annie's" house at around 1:00 a.m., and then used his motorcycle to go home with his sister-in-law, arriving at his house at 1:30 a.m. Atienza corroborated Aliling's whereabouts and the use of their service vehicle, and contrary to the CA's finding, Atienza did not state that he did not know the whereabouts of his companions at the time of the incident; he stated that he was beside Aliling and their coordinator during the miting de avance, and his statement that he did not know where his companions were referred to Melody Razon, Fe Reyes, Marie Razon, and Felix Collado. Atienza was the only witness without any familial relationship with either Aliling or Tumbaga, having met Aliling only during the campaign period while having known Tumbaga for a long time because they lived in the same barangay, making his status as an impartial witness beyond dispute and his testimony straightforward, credible, and unbiased. Bathan's eyewitness account bolstered Aliling's alibi, as Bathan positively testified that he witnessed the shooting and saw that the culprit was not Aliling, and Bathan was familiar with Aliling's features, having known him for a long time as they are relatives. The Court further held that self-contradictions and inconsistencies on a very material and substantial matter seriously erode the credibility of a witness, and that evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself, conforming to common experience and observation. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were contradictory on a material point: Marasigan claimed the gunshots were successively fired, while Tumbaga testified that there was a pause between the shots, which supposedly gave him the opportunity to turn his head and see the culprit after being shot for the first time in the back; Marasigan's testimony on the continuous succession of shots was corroborated by defense witness Bathan. The manner of execution of the crime was of prime significance, and the inconsistency in the statements of the prosecution witnesses on material points significantly eroded the credibility of their testimonies, juxtaposed against the forthright and consistent testimonies of the defense witnesses. In his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated April 22, 2010, which he identified and authenticated before the RTC, Tumbaga attested that Aliling had a companion that night at the basketball court, but during cross-examination he denied his statement; this detail as to whether the victim had seen the accused with or without a companion was a material detail as it went into the very execution of the crime. With the probative value of the prosecution witnesses' testimony greatly diminished, the alibi of the accused was given credence, and the prosecution failed to overcome the burden of proving the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. No less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required to support a judgment of conviction; while the law does not require absolute certainty, the evidence must produce in the mind of the Court a moral certainty of the accused's guilt, and when there is even a scintilla of doubt, the Court must acquit.

• Presumption of Innocence and Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt — An accused enjoys the presumption of innocence under the Bill of Rights and is designated as the accused precisely because the allegations against him must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Accusation does not amount to conviction; only when the prosecution has established guilt beyond reasonable doubt shall the presumption of innocence be overturned. In this case, the prosecution did not overcome the burden of proof, and acquittal was in order.
• Denial and Alibi as Legitimate Defenses — While denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses because they can be easily fabricated, not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated; if the accused is truly innocent, he can have no other defense but denial and alibi. If found credible, these defenses may be considered complete and legitimate, and the burden of proof does not shift by their mere invocation, the presumption of innocence remaining in favor of the accused. The Court applied this doctrine in giving credence to Aliling's alibi after finding it straightforward, credible, and corroborated.
• Requisites of Alibi — In alibi, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time the crime was committed, but that it was likewise physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time thereof. Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the appellant was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places.
• Positive Identification versus Denial and Alibi — Positive testimony is generally given more weight than the defenses of denial and alibi because the latter can be easily fabricated; however, a positive declaration from a witness that he saw the accused commit the crime should not automatically cancel out the accused's claim that he did not do it, since a lying witness can make as positive an identification as a truthful witness can. The Court must keep an open mind and guard against slipping into hasty conclusion.
• Credibility of Witnesses — Material Inconsistencies — Self-contradictions and inconsistencies on a very material and substantial matter seriously erode the credibility of a witness. For evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself, such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. Minor inconsistent statements in a witness' affidavit and in his testimony in court do not necessarily affect his credibility, but where the detail goes into the very execution of the crime, the inconsistency is material.
• Rule 45 — Questions of Law and the Misapprehension of Facts Exception — A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 shall only raise questions of law as the Court is not a trier of facts, since a factual question would necessitate the reevaluation of the evidence submitted before the trial court. This is allowed in the exceptional circumstance where the judgment is based on a misapprehension of the facts.

• "But not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated. Indeed, if the accused is truly innocent, he can have no other defense but denial and alibi. So how can such accused penetrate a mind that has been made cynical by the rule drilled into his head that a defense of alibi is a hangman's noose in the face of a witness positively swearing, 'I saw him do it.'? Most judges believe that such assertion automatically dooms an alibi which is so easy to fabricate. This quick stereotype thinking, however, is distressing. For how else can the truth that the accused is really innocent have any chance of prevailing over such a stone-cast tenet?" — This passage, quoted from Lejano vs. People, articulates the Court's caution against the reflexive rejection of denial and alibi and is the ratio for treating those defenses as legitimate when credible.
• "There is only one way. A judge must keep an open mind. He must guard against slipping into hasty conclusion, often arising from a desire to quickly finish the job of deciding a case. A positive declaration from a witness that he saw the accused commit the crime should not automatically cancel out the accused's claim that he did not do it. A lying witness can make as positive an identification as a truthful witness can. The lying witness can also say as forthrightly and unequivocally, 'He did it!' without blinking an eye." — This passage supplies the canonical formulation of the rule that positive identification does not automatically prevail over a credible defense, and it is frequently cited in later jurisprudence on credibility.
• "For evidence to be believed 'must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself — such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. There is no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside of judicial cognizance.'" — Quoted from People vs. Amon, this passage states the test of the credibility of evidence in itself, which the Court used to reject the prosecution's internally inconsistent testimonies.
• "It is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity and persuasion, so that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion. What is required of it is to justify the conviction of the accused with moral certainty. Upon the prosecution's failure to meet this test, acquittal becomes the constitutional duty of the Court, lest its mind be tortured with the thought that it has imprisoned an innocent man for the rest of his life." — Quoted from People vs. Erguiza, this passage defines the prosecution's burden and the constitutional imperative of acquittal upon failure to meet the test of moral certainty.

• Lejano vs. People, 652 Phil. 512 (2010) — Quoted at length by the Court for the rule that not all denials and alibis are fabricated and that a positive identification does not automatically cancel out the accused's claim of innocence; the Court relied on this as the doctrinal basis for treating Aliling's alibi as a legitimate defense.
• People vs. Amon, 218 Phil. 355 (1984) — Cited for the test that evidence must not only proceed from a credible witness but must be credible in itself, conforming to common experience and observation; applied to reject the prosecution's internally inconsistent testimonies.
• People vs. Erguiza, 592 Phil. 363 (2008) — Quoted for the rule that the prosecution must justify conviction with moral certainty and that acquittal becomes the constitutional duty of the Court upon its failure to meet this test.
• People vs. Agcanas, 674 Phil. 626 (2011) — Cited for the requisites of alibi, particularly that the accused must prove it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
• People vs. Anticamara, 666 Phil. 484 (2011) — Cited for the definition of physical impossibility as referring to the distance between the two places and the facility of access between them.
• Crisostomo vs. People, 644 Phil. 53 (2010) — Cited for the rule that positive testimony is generally given more weight than denial and alibi, which are inherently weak defenses.
• Sarabia vs. People, 414 Phil. 189 (2001) — Cited for the rule that minor inconsistent statements in a witness' affidavit and in his testimony in court do not necessarily affect his credibility; the Court distinguished it by holding that the inconsistencies in this case were material.
• Caunan vs. People and Sandiganbayan, 614 Phil. 179 (2009) — Cited for the rule that when there is even a scintilla of doubt, the Court must acquit.
• Pascual vs. Burgos, 776 Phil. 167 (2016) — Cited for the exception to the rule that Rule 45 petitions raise only questions of law, namely, where the judgment is based on a misapprehension of the facts.

• Article III, Section 14, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law, and that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. The Court invoked this provision as the source of the presumption of innocence and the requirement that guilt be proven beyond reasonable doubt, which the prosecution failed to satisfy.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Governs petitions for review on certiorari, which shall only raise questions of law. The Court acknowledged this limitation but applied the recognized exception allowing factual review where the judgment is based on a misapprehension of the facts, as it found in this case.

Carpio (Chairperson), Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe, and A. Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.