Ali Akang vs. Municipality of Isulan, Sultan Kudarat Province

A contract of sale is perfected by consent on a determinate object and a certain price; nonpayment of the price does not invalidate the sale, and an action to recover registered land may be barred by laches even if the mode of transfer by a cultural minority lacked the executive approval required by the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu and the Public Land Act. The Deed of Sale was upheld as a valid contract of sale, and the petitioner’s stale claim was defeated by laches.

Ali Akang, a member of the Maguindanaon tribe, was the registered owner of Lot 5-B-2-B-14-F (LRC) Psd 1100183 in Kalawag III, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, covered by TCT No. T-3653. The Municipality of Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, through then Mayor Datu Ampatuan, acquired a two-hectare portion of the lot under a Deed of Sale executed on July 18, 1962, for ₱3,000, with the portion to be used exclusively as a government center site. The transaction implicated statutory protections for cultural minorities under Sections 145 and 146 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu, Section 120 of the Public Land Act, and Republic Act No. 3872, which require executive or Commission on National Integration approval for certain conveyances by illiterate non-Christians or where the instrument is in a language not understood.

Ali Akang, a member of the Maguindanaon tribe of Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, was the registered owner of Lot 5-B-2-B-14-F (LRC) Psd 1100183, located at Kalawag III, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3653, with an area of 20,030 square meters. Sometime in 1962, a two-hectare portion of the property was sold by Akang to the Municipality of Isulan, Province of Sultan Kudarat, through then Isulan Mayor Datu Ampatuan under a Deed of Sale executed on July 18, 1962. The Deed stated that for and in consideration of ₱3,000, Akang sold, transferred, ceded, conveyed, and assigned an area of two hectares, more or less, in favor of the Municipal Government of Isulan, to be utilized purposely and exclusively as a government center site. The Municipality immediately took possession of the property and began construction of the municipal building.

Thirty-nine years later, on October 26, 2001, Akang, together with his wife Patao Talipasan, filed a civil action for Recovery of Possession of Subject Property and/or Quieting of Title thereon and Damages against the Municipality, represented by its Municipal Mayor, Municipal Vice Mayor, and Municipal Councilors/Kagawads. In his complaint, Akang alleged that the agreement was one to sell, which was not consummated because the purchase price was not paid. The Municipality denied the allegations and claimed that the cause of action was barred by laches, that the Deed of Sale was valid, and that it had been in open, continuous, and exclusive possession of the property for forty years.

After trial, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Akang. The RTC construed the Deed of Sale as a contract to sell because its wording showed that the consideration was still to be paid and delivered on some future date. The RTC also found that the Deed was not determinate as to its object since it merely indicated two hectares of the 97,163-square-meter lot, an undivided portion of Akang’s entire property, so segregation was first necessary. On payment, the RTC found that the purchase price had not been paid; the Municipal Voucher was not competent documentary proof of payment but merely evidence of the Municipality’s admission that the consideration had not yet been paid, and it suffered infirmities because it was neither duly recorded, numbered, signed by the Municipal Treasurer, nor pre-audited. The RTC further ruled that the Deed was not approved under Section 145 of the Administrative Code for Mindanao and Sulu or Section 120 of the Public Land Act, as amended, and that Resolution No. 70 and Resolution No. 644 of the Provincial Board of Cotabato could not be considered proof of the sale because the Deed itself was not presented for examination and approval of the Provincial Board. Since the Municipality’s possession was not in the concept of an owner, laches could not be a valid defense to a property registered in Akang’s name under the Torrens System.

The RTC disposed of the case by declaring the contract a contract to sell without its stipulated consideration having been paid; declaring the contract and the Deed of Sale null and void ab initio for violation of Section 120 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 and Section 145 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu; ordering the defendants to pay the value of the lot at prevailing market value or, in the alternative, monthly back rentals retroactive to 1996 until they decided to buy and pay the value, with legal interest; ordering attorney’s fees equivalent to 30% of the value paid for the lot and ₱100,000 as moral and exemplary damages; ordering the Sangguniang Bayan of Isulan to pass a resolution or ordinance appropriating funds for payment; and ordering costs. By virtue of the RTC decision, proceedings for cancellation of Certificate of Title No. T-49349 registered in the Municipality’s name were instituted under Miscellaneous Case No. 866, and the Municipality’s title was cancelled and a new one issued in Akang’s name.

The Municipality appealed the RTC decision. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC and upheld the validity of the sale. It ruled that Akang was not entitled to recover ownership and possession because the Deed of Sale had already transferred ownership to the Municipality. The Court of Appeals applied estoppel and laches against Akang because he adopted inconsistent positions by invoking the Deed as a contract to sell while still demanding payment and calling for the application of Sections 145 and 146 of the Administrative Code for Mindanao and Sulu, and because he did not raise the nullity of the sale at the earliest opportunity, remaining passive for thirty-nine years and raising it only in 2001. The Court of Appeals also ruled that the Deed was a perfected contract of sale, not a mere contract to sell, since there was no express reservation of ownership and the absence of payment at the time of sale did not affect validity. It found actual payment as evidenced by the Municipal Voucher, which Akang himself prepared and signed despite the lack of approval of the Municipal Treasurer, and added that even if he was not paid, nonpayment did not affect the validity of the contract of sale. The Court of Appeals further noted that the erroneous cancellation of the Municipality’s certificate of title and registration of the property in Akang’s name in Miscellaneous Case No. 866 did not affect the Municipality’s ownership because registration or issuance of a certificate of title is not a mode of acquiring ownership. Akang sought reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied on October 29, 2008.

• Contract to Sell: Petitioner alleged that the Deed of Sale was merely an agreement to sell, which was not perfected due to non-payment of the stipulated consideration.
• Illiteracy and Non-Christian Status: Petitioner claimed that the acquisition was null and void because he is an illiterate non-Christian who only knows how to sign his name in Arabic and knows how to read the Quran but can neither read nor write in both Arabic and English.
• Nonpayment of Price: Petitioner maintained that the respondent had not paid the price for the property.
• Municipal Voucher: Petitioner argued that the Municipal Voucher is not admissible in evidence as proof of payment.
• Lack of Executive Approval: Petitioner argued that the Deed of Sale was not duly approved in accordance with Sections 145 and 146 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu, and Section 120 of the Public Land Act, as amended.
• Registered Land and Prescription: Petitioner claimed that the property is registered land covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title and cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
• Notarial Authority: Petitioner asserted that the Deed of Sale was notarized by Atty. Gualberto B. Baclig, who was not authorized to administer the same, hence null and void.
• Delay Excuse: Petitioner explained that the delayed filing of the civil action with the RTC was due to Martial Law and the Ilaga-Blackshirt Troubles in the then Province of Cotabato.

• Illiteracy: Respondent countered that petitioner is not an illiterate non-Christian and that he was able to execute, sign in Arabic, and understand the terms and conditions of the Special Power of Attorney dated July 23, 1996 issued in favor of Baikong Akang.
• Validity and Approval: Respondent argued that the Deed of Sale is valid because its terms and conditions were reviewed by the Municipal Council of Isulan and the Provincial Board of Cotabato.
• Nature of the Contract: Respondent argued that the Deed of Sale is a contract of sale and not a contract to sell.
• Laches and Possession: Respondent claimed that petitioner’s cause of action was already barred by laches and that it had been in open, continuous, and exclusive possession of the property for forty years.

• First-Time Appellate Issue and Notarial Validity: Whether petitioner’s attack on the validity of the Deed of Sale based on the lack of authority of the notary, raised for the first time on appeal, may be considered.
• Validity and Perfection of the Deed of Sale: Whether the Deed of Sale dated July 18, 1962 is a valid and perfected contract of sale.
• Payment of Consideration: Whether there was payment of consideration by the respondent.
• Applicability of Minority Protection Laws: Whether Sections 145 and 146 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu and Section 120 of the Public Land Act, as amended, invalidate the Deed of Sale.
• Laches: Whether the petitioner’s claim is barred by laches.
• Recovery of Ownership and Possession: Whether the petitioner is entitled to recover ownership and possession of the property in dispute.

• First-Time Appellate Issue and Notarial Validity: No. The issue was raised for the first time only in the petition and is barred by estoppel; the attack on the Deed’s validity vis-à-vis compliance with the 2004 New Notarial Law must be disregarded.
• Validity and Perfection of the Deed of Sale: Yes. The Deed is a valid and perfected contract of sale under Article 1458 of the Civil Code because all elements were present, and no express reservation of ownership appears, so it is not a contract to sell under Article 1479.
• Payment of Consideration: Yes. The Municipal Voucher proves payment of ₱3,000, and petitioner admitted his signature and is estopped from disclaiming payment. Even if unpaid, nonpayment does not affect the validity of the sale but merely gives the seller the right to demand specific performance or rescission.
• Applicability of Minority Protection Laws: No. Sections 145 and 146 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu and Section 120 of the Public Land Act do not invalidate the Deed under the circumstances; the appropriation was approved by the Municipal Council and the Provincial Board, no fraud or exploitation was shown, and petitioner understood the transaction.
• Laches: Yes. Petitioner’s claim is barred by laches. Although an action to recover registered land under the Torrens System is generally not barred by laches, exceptional circumstances allow laches to bar recovery, even if the mode of transfer by a cultural minority lacks executive approval.
• Recovery of Ownership and Possession: No. Petitioner is not entitled to recover ownership and possession of the property; the Court of Appeals’ ruling was affirmed.

• First-Time Appellate Issue and Notarial Validity: The petitioner’s assertion that the Deed of Sale was notarized by Atty. Gualberto B. Baclig, who was not authorized to administer the same, was raised for the first time only in this petition. Before the RTC and the Court of Appeals, petitioner focused mainly on the validity and nature of the Deed and whether there was payment. The settled rule is that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised in the lower court are barred by estoppel; considering belated facts and arguments would violate fair play, justice, and due process. The attack on the Deed’s validity vis-à-vis compliance with the 2004 New Notarial Law was therefore disregarded.
• Validity and Perfection of the Deed of Sale: Article 1458 of the Civil Code defines a contract of sale as one where a party obligates himself to transfer ownership of and deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay a price certain in money or its equivalent. Its elements are consent or meeting of the minds to transfer ownership in exchange for the price, a determinate subject matter, and a price certain in money or its equivalent. A contract to sell, under Article 1479, is a bilateral contract where the prospective seller expressly reserves ownership despite delivery and binds himself to sell exclusively to the prospective buyer upon full payment. In a contract of sale, title passes to the buyer upon delivery; in a contract to sell, ownership is retained by the seller until full payment. The Deed of Sale executed by petitioner and respondent was a perfected contract of sale because all elements were present. There was mutual agreement shown by their free and voluntary signing of the contract; there was an absolute transfer of ownership through the stipulation that petitioner “sell, transfer, cede, convey and assign” the property; the subject matter was the two-hectare parcel described in the Deed; and the price was ₱3,000, to be paid after execution. The absence of any express reservation of ownership or title bolstered the conclusion that the contract was not one to sell. Had petitioner intended otherwise, he could have immediately sought judicial recourse to prevent further construction of the municipal building or taken legal action to contest the agreement, but he did not.
• Payment of Consideration: Petitioner’s allegation of nonpayment was of no consequence because the Municipal Voucher presented before the RTC proved payment by respondent of ₱3,000. Notwithstanding the lack of the Municipal Treasurer’s approval, petitioner admitted that the signature appearing on the Municipal Voucher was his, and he was estopped from disclaiming payment. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was not paid, nonpayment was immaterial and had no effect on the validity of the contract of sale. A contract of sale is consensual, and what is required for its perfection and validity is the meeting of the minds on the object and the price. The contract was perfected when petitioner and respondent agreed on the object—the two-hectare parcel of land—and the price—₱3,000. Nonpayment merely gave rise to a right in favor of petitioner to either demand specific performance or rescission of the contract of sale.
• Applicability of Minority Protection Laws: Section 145 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu provides the requisites for contracts entered into by a person with any Moro or other non-Christian inhabitant, while Section 146 provides that contracts in violation of Section 145 are void. These provisions aim to safeguard the patrimony of less developed ethnic groups by shielding them against imposition and fraud in agreements dealing with realty. Section 120 of the Public Land Act affords the same protection, and Republic Act No. 3872 provides that conveyances and encumbrances made by illiterate non-Christians, or by literate non-Christians where the instrument is in a language not understood by them, shall not be valid unless duly approved by the Chairman of the Commission on National Integration. In Jandoc-Gatdula vs. Dimalanta, however, the Court stated that while the purpose of Sections 145 and 146 is to protect cultural minorities, the law cannot be blindly applied without considering how the parties exercised their rights and obligations. Here, Municipality Resolution No. 70, which approved the appropriation of ₱3,000, was accepted by the Provincial Board of Cotabato. In approving the appropriation, the Municipal Council of Isulan and the Provincial Board necessarily scrutinized the Deed of Sale containing the terms and conditions of the sale. Nothing on record proved that petitioner was duped into signing the contract, was taken advantage of by respondent, or had his rights unprotected. The Court’s duty to protect the native vendor should not be carried out to deny justice to the vendee when truth and justice are on the latter’s side; the law cannot be used to shield the enrichment of one at the expense of another, and it will not be applied so stringently as to render ineffective an otherwise valid contract except for want of approval by the Commission on National Integration, especially when the evils sought to be avoided are not obtaining. Petitioner’s claim that he did not understand the import of the agreement was also rejected. Although he alleged that he signed in Arabic the Deed of Sale, the Joint Affidavit, and the Municipal Voucher, all in English, and could not comprehend their contents, the records showed the contrary. He was able to execute in favor of Baikong a Special Power of Attorney dated July 23, 1996, written in English but signed by him in Arabic, authorizing Baikong, his sister, to follow up the payment of the purchase price. This raised doubt on his allegation that he did not understand the language, as he would not have been able to execute the SPA or would have prevented its enforcement.
• Laches: Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is not concerned only with the mere lapse of time. As a general rule, an action to recover registered land covered by the Torrens System may not be barred by laches, and laches cannot be set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right. In exceptional cases, however, the Court has allowed laches as a bar to recover titled property. In Romero vs. Natividad, laches barred recovery even if the mode of transfer was invalid. In Vda. de Cabrera vs. CA, the Court ruled that even registered owners may be barred from recovering possession by virtue of laches; while no title to registered land in derogation of the registered owner may be acquired by prescription or adverse possession under the Land Registration Act or Property Registration Decree, the same is not true with regard to laches. More particularly, laches will bar recovery of property even if the mode of transfer used by an alleged member of a cultural minority lacks executive approval. In Heirs of Dicman vs. Cariño, the Court upheld a Deed of Conveyance executed by Ting-el Dicman in favor of Sioco Cariño despite lack of executive approval, stating that despite the judicial pronouncement that the sale of real property by illiterate ethnic minorities is null and void for lack of approval of competent authorities, the right to recover possession was nonetheless barred by laches. Similarly, while respondent may not be considered as having acquired ownership by virtue of its long and continued possession, petitioner’s right to recover had been converted into a stale demand due to respondent’s long period of possession and petitioner’s own inaction and neglect. Petitioner’s explanation that the delayed filing was due to Martial Law and the Cotabato Ilaga-Black Shirt Troubles was not accepted. Martial Law was from 1972 to 1986, while the Ilaga-Black Shirt Troubles were from the 1970s to the 1980s. Petitioner could have sought judicial relief, or at least made demands on respondent, as early as the third quarter of 1962 after the execution of the Deed and before those events. Even if access to courts was restricted during those times, he could have immediately filed his claim after Martial Law and after the Cotabato conflict ended. His reliance on Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Pundogar, where Martial Law was treated as force majeure that suspended the running of prescription, was inapplicable because that ruling pertained to prescription and not laches. Petitioner’s lengthy inaction sufficiently warranted the conclusion that he acquiesced or conformed to the sale. Vigilantibus sed non dormientibus jura subverniunt—the law aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights.
• Recovery of Ownership and Possession: Because the Deed of Sale was a valid and perfected contract of sale, payment was shown or in any event did not affect validity, the minority protection laws did not invalidate the transaction under the circumstances, and petitioner’s claim was barred by laches, petitioner was not entitled to recover ownership and possession of the property. The Court of Appeals’ reversal of the RTC was affirmed.

• Contract of Sale vs. Contract to Sell — A contract of sale is a consensual contract by which one party obligates himself to transfer ownership of and deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay a price certain in money or its equivalent; its elements are consent, determinate subject matter, and certain price. In a contract of sale, title passes to the buyer upon delivery, whereas in a contract to sell, ownership is retained by the seller until full payment. The Court applied this distinction to hold that the Deed of Sale was a perfected contract of sale because all elements were present and no express reservation of ownership appeared.
• Nonpayment Does Not Invalidate a Contract of Sale — A contract of sale is perfected by the meeting of the minds on the object and the price; nonpayment of the purchase price does not affect its validity. The remedy of the seller is to demand specific performance or rescission. The Court applied this rule to hold that even assuming petitioner was not paid, the sale remained valid.
• Laches as a Bar to Recovery of Registered Land — Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is not concerned only with mere lapse of time. While an action to recover registered land under the Torrens System is generally not barred by laches, exceptional cases allow laches to bar recovery even by a registered owner, and even where the mode of transfer by a cultural minority lacks executive approval. The Court applied this doctrine to bar petitioner’s claim after thirty-nine years of inaction while respondent possessed and built on the property.
• Protective Laws for Cultural Minorities Are Not Applied Blindly — Sections 145 and 146 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu, Section 120 of the Public Land Act, and Republic Act No. 3872 protect cultural minorities from imposition and fraud in conveyances of realty by requiring executive or Commission on National Integration approval. These laws, however, are not applied so stringently as to render ineffective an otherwise valid contract solely for want of approval, especially where no fraud or exploitation is shown and the parties’ acts demonstrate understanding and approval. The Court applied this principle to uphold the Deed despite the lack of approval.
• Estoppel Bars Issues Raised for the First Time on Appeal — Issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised in the lower court are barred by estoppel; considering them would violate fair play, justice, and due process. The Court applied this to disregard petitioner’s belated attack on the notary’s authority under the 2004 New Notarial Law.
• Vigilantibus sed non dormientibus jura subverniunt — The law aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights. The Court invoked this maxim to reinforce the finding that petitioner’s long inaction and neglect barred recovery through laches.

• "A contract of sale is a consensual contract and what is required is the meeting of the minds on the object and the price for its perfection and validity." — This passage states the ratio for holding that nonpayment of the purchase price did not invalidate the Deed of Sale.
• "In a contract of sale, the title to the property passes to the buyer upon the delivery of the thing sold, whereas in a contract to sell, the ownership is, by agreement, retained by the seller and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price." — This passage provides the canonical distinction between a contract of sale and a contract to sell, which the Court used to classify the 1962 Deed.
• "More particularly, laches will bar recovery of a property, even if the mode of transfer used by an alleged member of a cultural minority lacks executive approval." — This passage states the laches doctrine applied to defeat petitioner’s claim despite the lack of executive approval.
• "The law cannot be used to shield the enrichment of one at the expense of another. More important, the law will not be applied so stringently as to render ineffective a contract that is otherwise valid, except for want of approval by the CNI." — This passage explains why the protective laws for cultural minorities did not invalidate the Deed under the circumstances.

• Jandoc-Gatdula vs. Dimalanta, 528 Phil. 839 (2006) — Cited for the rule that while Sections 145 and 146 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu aim to protect cultural minorities, the law cannot be blindly applied without considering how the parties exercised their rights and obligations; the Court relied on it to uphold the Deed despite lack of approval.
• Romero vs. Natividad, 500 Phil. 322 (2005) — Cited for the rule that laches will bar recovery of property even if the mode of transfer was invalid.
• Vda. de Cabrera vs. CA, 335 Phil. 19 (1997) — Cited for the rule that even registered owners may be barred from recovering possession by laches, and that while prescription or adverse possession cannot defeat a registered title, laches can.
• Heirs of Dicman vs. Cariño, 523 Phil. 630 (2006) — Cited for the rule that laches may bar recovery of property even if the sale by an illiterate ethnic minority was null and void for lack of approval of competent authorities.
• Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Pundogar, G.R. No. 96921, January 29, 1993, 218 SCRA 118 — Distinguished; its ruling that Martial Law as force majeure suspended prescription pertained to prescription, not laches.
• David vs. Misamis Occidental II Electric Cooperative, Inc., G.R. No. 194785, July 11, 2012, 676 SCRA 367 — Cited for the elements of a contract of sale.
• Heirs of Paulino Atienza vs. Espidol, G.R. No. 180665, August 11, 2010, 628 SCRA 256 — Cited for the distinction between a contract of sale and a contract to sell.
• Province of Cebu vs. Heirs of Rufina Morales, G.R. No. 170115, February 19, 2008, 546 SCRA 315 — Cited for the rule that nonpayment of the price does not affect the validity of a contract of sale and merely gives the seller the right to demand specific performance or rescission.
• Imani vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company, G.R. No. 187023, November 17, 2010, 635 SCRA 357 — Cited for the rule that issues raised for the first time on appeal are barred by estoppel.
• Lorzano vs. Tabayag, Jr., G.R. No. 189647, February 6, 2012, 665 SCRA 38 — Cited in connection with the disposition of the belated attack on the Deed’s validity under the 2004 New Notarial Law.
• Mateo vs. Diaz, 424 Phil. 772 (2002) — Cited for the general rule that an action to recover registered land covered by the Torrens System may not be barred by laches.
• Heirs of Ingjug-Tiro vs. Spouses Casals, 415 Phil. 665 (2001) — Cited for the rule that laches cannot be set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right.
• Isabela Colleges, Inc. vs. The Heirs of Tolentino-Rivera, 397 Phil. 955 (2000) — Cited for the definition of laches.
• Pineda vs. Heirs of Eliseo Guevara, 544 Phil. 554 (2007) — Cited for the rule that laches is not concerned only with mere lapse of time.

• Article 1458, Civil Code — Defines a contract of sale as one where a party obligates himself to transfer ownership of and deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay a price certain in money or its equivalent; the Court applied it to hold the Deed of Sale valid and perfected.
• Article 1479, Civil Code — Defines a contract to sell as a bilateral contract where the seller reserves ownership despite delivery and binds himself to sell upon full payment; the Court applied it to distinguish the Deed, which contained no reservation of ownership.
• Section 145, Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu — Provides the requisites for contracts entered into by a person with any Moro or other non-Christian inhabitant; petitioner invoked it, but the Court held it did not invalidate the Deed under the circumstances.
• Section 146, Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu — Provides that contracts made in violation of Section 145 are null and void; petitioner invoked it, but the Court did not apply it to invalidate the Deed.
• Section 120, Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141), as amended — Provides that conveyances or encumbrances by illiterate non-Christians, or by literate non-Christians where the instrument is in a language not understood by them, shall not be valid unless duly approved by the Chairman of the Commission on National Integration; the Court held it did not invalidate the Deed under the circumstances.
• Republic Act No. 3872 — Amended Sections 44, 48, and 120 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 and provides the same protection for illiterate or non-English-speaking non-Christians; cited in the Court’s discussion of the protective laws.
• Land Registration Act (now Property Registration Decree) — Cited in the laches discussion for the rule that no title to registered land in derogation of the registered owner may be acquired by prescription or adverse possession, but that laches may still bar recovery.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — The petition was originally filed as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 but was treated as a petition for review under Rule 45.
• Rule 65, Rules of Court — The original mode of the petition before the Supreme Court; the Court later treated it as a Rule 45 petition.

Bienvenido L. Reyes (ponente), with Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Chief Justice and Chairperson), Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Lucas P. Bersamin, and Martin S. Villarama, Jr., concurring.