Alfonso vs. Yatco

Certiorari will not lie to correct errors of procedure or to review erroneous conclusions of fact or law where the judge has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; all rulings on questions pertinent to the case are within his jurisdiction and, however irregular or erroneous, cannot be corrected through certiorari. The proper remedy for a party aggrieved by a final decision, including one containing censuring remarks against counsel, is appeal.

The petitioner, Gerardo M. Alfonso, was an assistant in the law office of Attorney Estanislao A. Fernandez, Jr., who was the counsel of record for the defendants in Civil Case No. 7996 before the Court of First Instance of Laguna. The respondent judge, Nicasio Yatco, presided over that case. The dispute arose from the trial court's conduct of the hearing on August 20, 1946, and the subsequent censure of the petitioner in the decision rendered in the main case.

In Civil Case No. 7996 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, petitioner Gerardo M. Alfonso, acting in the name of Attorney Estanislao A. Fernandez, Jr., filed a motion on August 9, 1946, seeking postponement of the hearing set for that date. The judge granted the postponement and reset the case for August 20, 1946, with an intransferable character. When the case was called for hearing on that date, petitioner explained his delay in arriving, and the court found his explanations satisfactory. Petitioner then orally reproduced the petition contained in Atty. Fernandez's lost motion to withdraw his appearance as counsel for the defendants. The judge advised petitioner that since he was present, he could represent the defendants and proceed with the hearing to avoid obstructing the dispatch of cases and prejudicing the other party, who had come with witnesses.

Petitioner alleged that he had made no formal appearance in the record; that he was not prepared to enter trial because he was unfamiliar with the details of the case; that he had not even conferred with the defendants or their witnesses; and that he could not read the record because his eyeglasses had been lost. He asked for reasonable time to prepare. When the hearing resumed at about 11:20 in the morning, the judge reminded petitioner that he was a court officer and should not leave the courtroom, and petitioner entered the trial representing the defendants. In the afternoon, petitioner filed a motion (Annex B) seeking permission to withdraw his appearance as counsel for the defendants. As it bore the conformity of the defendants, the court granted the petition and continued the hearing without the defendants being represented. That same afternoon, the judge rendered a decision condemning the defendants.

On September 2, 1946, petitioner filed a motion seeking the expungement of paragraphs in the decision that censured his conduct as a lawyer, which was denied on September 9 of the same month. Petitioner then came to the Supreme Court in a petition for certiorari, alleging that the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and that he had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. He sought the revocation of the order of September 9, 1946, and the expungement of the two censuring paragraphs from the decision of August 20, 1946.

Petitioner alleged that he was a mere assistant in the office of Atty. Fernandez; that on August 18, 1946, Atty. Fernandez prepared a motion withdrawing his appearance for the defendants because he was occupied in Congress, and asked petitioner to appear for the defendants, to which petitioner agreed only if he had time to prepare before the hearing; that on the night of August 19, petitioner was a victim of a robbery in which he lost his eyeglasses and the signed withdrawal motion; that the "jeep" he was to take to Laguna broke down, so he had to take a truck, arriving on August 20; that he related all these facts to the respondent judge, especially the loss of the withdrawal motion; that the judge advised him to continue with the hearing; that petitioner told the judge he had not yet made his appearance in the case, but the judge told him to continue; that petitioner agreed to continue because he believed he could do so even in the absence of the defendants; and that in the afternoon the defendants arrived and gave their consent to his withdrawal, so the judge had no choice but to approve the withdrawal, but censured the lawyer.

• Propriety of Certiorari: Petitioner argued that the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and that he had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, justifying the special civil action of certiorari.
• Nature of the Order: Petitioner argued that the decision containing the censure was merely interlocutory, not final, and therefore certiorari was the proper remedy.
• Justification for Censure: Petitioner argued that the censure was unjustified because he was a mere assistant in Atty. Fernandez's office, had not formally appeared as counsel for the defendants, was not prepared for trial, and had lost his eyeglasses and the withdrawal motion in a robbery.

• Availability of Appeal: The respondent judge, in his own representation, maintained that the proper remedy for the petitioner was appeal, not certiorari, because the decision containing the censure was final and not interlocutory.
• Lack of Grave Abuse: The respondent judge's conduct was justified because petitioner had appeared before the court on August 9, 1946, in the name of Atty. Fernandez, and as a court officer, it was his duty to cooperate in carrying out the court's order that the case be heard on August 20 with an intransferable character.

• Propriety of Certiorari: Whether certiorari is the proper remedy to seek the expungement of censuring paragraphs in a final decision.
• Justification of the Censure: Whether the censure of the petitioner by the trial court was justified.

• Propriety of Certiorari: No. The proper remedy was appeal, not certiorari, because the decision containing the censure was final and not interlocutory, and the judge acted within his jurisdiction.
• Justification of the Censure: Yes. The Court declared that there was nothing in the record showing that the censure was not justified.

• Propriety of Certiorari: The Court held that the remedy available to the petitioner in the ordinary course of proceedings was appeal, not the special remedy of certiorari. The decision in which he was censured was final and not merely interlocutory, as he alleged. The Court cited a long line of decisions establishing the doctrine that a writ of certiorari will not be issued unless it clearly appears that the judge against whom it is directed proceeded without jurisdiction or exceeded it or gravely abused his discretion; it will not be issued to correct errors of procedure or to amend erroneous conclusions of fact or law. If the judge has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, everything he decides on questions pertinent to the case are resolutions within his jurisdiction, and however irregular or erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected through certiorari. The Court cited precedents where parties who were not originally parties to the case appealed, rather than filed certiorari, to seek the expungement of censuring remarks in decisions, including People vs. Abellera and People vs. Meneses, where the accused appealed to seek the expungement of censure despite being acquitted. The reason is simple: in the record itself of the latter two cases, it can be decided whether the censure was justified or not.
• Justification of the Censure: The Court declared that the petition had no merit, to avoid subsequent litigation. The Court noted that on August 9, 1946, Atty. Fernandez asked for the transfer of the hearing through petitioner Gerardo Alfonso, who appeared before the court in the name of Atty. Fernandez, undoubtedly with the consent of the clients. The judge granted the transfer but with the warning that the case would be heard on August 20 of the same year with an intransferable character. Petitioner knew all this, and as a court officer, it was his duty to cooperate in carrying out the court's order. His attitude, however, was the contrary, so he deserved the censure of the court. The Court expressly declined to decide whether the respondent judge's attitude in compelling the defendants to enter trial without a lawyer was correct, as that question belonged to the main case. The Court was only dealing with the attitude of the lawyer Gerardo Alfonso that was censured by the court, and declared that there was nothing in the record showing that the censure was not justified.

• Certiorari not a substitute for appeal — A writ of certiorari will not be issued unless it clearly appears that the judge against whom it is directed proceeded without jurisdiction or exceeded it or gravely abused his discretion in the exercise of his discretion; it will not be issued to correct errors of procedure or to amend erroneous conclusions of fact or law. If the judge has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, everything he decides on questions pertinent to the case are resolutions within his jurisdiction, and however irregular or erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected through certiorari. The Court applied this doctrine to deny the petition, holding that the proper remedy for the petitioner was appeal, not certiorari.

• "El remedio disponible para el recurrente en el curso ordinario de los procedimientos es la apelacion y no el recurso especial de certiorari. La decision en que se le censura es definitiva y no meramente interlocutoria, como el alega." — This passage establishes the core procedural holding: appeal, not certiorari, is the proper remedy because the decision containing the censure is final, not interlocutory.
• "Y es porque en una larga serie de decisiones, este Tribunal sento la doctrina de que no se expedira mandamiento . . . de certiorari a menos que resulte de una manera clara que el juez contra el cual se dirige procedio sin jurisdiccion o se excedio en ella o abuso gravemente en el ejercicio de su discrecion; no se expedira para subsanar errores de procedimiento o enmendar conclusiones de hecho o de derecho erroneas." — This passage states the canonical doctrine on the limited scope of certiorari, which the Court applied to deny the petition.
• "Y declaramos 'que no hay nada en los autos ante Nos que demuestre que la censura no esta justificada.'" — This passage states the Court's finding on the merits of the censure, declaring that the record does not show the censure was unjustified.

• Omaña vs. Gatulayao, 40 Off. Gaz., 2277 — Cited as a precedent where parties who were not originally parties to the case appealed, not filed certiorari, against an order denying their motion, and the Supreme Court reviewed the order on appeal.
• People vs. Abellera, 40 Off. Gaz., 7th Suppl., 70 — Cited as a precedent where the Supreme Court, on appeal, ordered the expungement of paragraphs that reprimanded the accused.
• People vs. Meneses, 2 Off. Gaz., 681 — Cited as a precedent where the accused appealed against the decision to seek the expungement of censure made against him despite being acquitted.
• Herrera vs. Barreto, 25 Jur. Fil., 253 — Cited in the long line of decisions establishing the doctrine that certiorari will not be issued to correct errors of procedure or erroneous conclusions of fact or law where the judge has jurisdiction.
• Gala vs. Cui and Rodriguez, 25 Jur. Fil., 540 — Cited in the same line of authorities on the limited scope of certiorari.
• Provincia de Tarlac vs. Gale, 26 Jur. Fil., 356 — Cited in the same line of authorities on the limited scope of certiorari.
• Napa vs. Weissenhagen, 29 Jur. Fil., 188 — Cited in the same line of authorities on the limited scope of certiorari.
• Gobierno de las Islas Filipinas vs. Juez de Primera Instancia de Iloilo and Bantillo, 34 Jur. Fil., 166 — Cited in the same line of authorities on the limited scope of certiorari.
• Ello vs. Juez de Primera Instancia de Antique, 49 Jur. Fil., 160 — Cited in the same line of authorities on the limited scope of certiorari.
• Santos vs. Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Cavite, 49 Jur. Fil., 416 — Cited in the same line of authorities on the limited scope of certiorari.
• Regala vs. Juez del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Bataan, Decision, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 88, February, 1947 — Cited in the same line of authorities on the limited scope of certiorari.
• Ong Sit vs. Piccio, L-1287, July 30, 1947, 44 Off. Gaz., 4915 — Cited in the same line of authorities on the limited scope of certiorari.

• Rule on Certiorari, Rules of Court — The Court applied the doctrine that certiorari will not be issued unless the judge proceeded without jurisdiction or exceeded it or gravely abused his discretion, and that it will not be issued to correct errors of procedure or erroneous conclusions of fact or law.

Moran (Pres.), Paras, Feria, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concurred.

• Justice Hilado — Dissented on the ground that the petitioner was never the counsel of the defendants' own choice in the main case, and the fact that he was an assistant in Atty. Fernandez's law office could not make him counsel for the defendants regardless of their will and consent. Justice Hilado argued that due process of law demands the right to a fair and adequate hearing in which one has the right to defend his interests before an impartial court, and that compelling the defendants to enter trial that morning represented by a lawyer they never employed, and to be left without counsel during the remainder of the proceedings until the case was decided against them, fell far short of affording them a reasonable opportunity to be represented by counsel of their own choice. He concluded that the judgment was null and void because it violated the Constitution, and that having no jurisdiction to render the judgment, the court lacked authority to make the pronouncements therein contained, including those complained of by the petitioner.
• Justice Perfecto — Concurred fully in the opinion of Justice Hilado.